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ABSTRACT

This book is a review of the 1986 United Nations International Year of Peace conducted at an international conference in Fiji. The theme of the conference was "People Create Alternatives," and the issues of conflict resolution and avoiding global destruction were addressed. Specific topics discussed were: (1) "Theories and Techniques of Conflict Resolution"; (2) "Nationalism vs. the World as Expanded Community"; (3) "Economic Factors in Relationship to Conflict"; (4) "Confronting the Nuclear Crisis"; (5) "Human Rights in the Developing World and Everywhere Else"; (6) "Peace Studies and Research"; and (7) "Super Power Rivalry in the Pacific Basin." Also included are proceedings from the following symposia: (1) "The Rotary Center for World Understanding and Peace"; (2) "Globalizing Teacher Education: A Vehicle for Peace"; (3) "Developing Curricula for Peace Education in Secondary Schools"; (4) "Awakening the Sleeping Dragons"; and (5) "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War." One of the richest elements of the conference was the interdisciplinary character of the participants. The book describes how the contributions of these many fields of study can aid in the search for a clearer definition of the problems that face the world and potential solutions to those problems. (SM)

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TOWARD A WORLD OF PEACE
PEOPLE CREATE ALTERNATIVES

TOWARD A WORLD OF PEACE PEOPLE CREATE ALTERNATIVES

*Proceedings of the First International
Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace
Studies in The United Nations Year of Peace,
1986*

EDITED BY

JEANNETTE P. MAAS

ROBERT A.C. STEWART

The University of the South Pacific

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC, SUVA, FIJI

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PREFACE

This book is an account of the first official event for the entire global community in the 1986 United Nations International Year of Peace. The location in the Fiji Islands of this first International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies was singularly appropriate. Not only does Fiji's location on the 180 meridian mean that "the day begins here", but Fiji has demonstrated a unique ability to develop inter-relations between many ethnic groups without destructive antagonisms.

The Conference asked: Can we as human beings take charge of our survival? How may the widespread fatalism and helplessness of many people be overcome? The theme of the Conference was *People Create Alternatives*, addressing through dialogue and exchange of perspectives, the seemingly intractable issues of our time, related to how we can get along with each other to avoid the Damocles sword of global destruction.

Several hundred concerned people from all over the world converged on the Suva, Fiji, campus of the University of the South Pacific. Representing 28 nations they came from International Bodies, Government and Private organizations, Universities and Research Institutions, or as private citizens. They were hosted by one of the world's most unique Universities — the regional university for 11 different tropical island nations, whose combined boundaries cover an area three times the size of Europe. In this region there are an estimated 300 different language groups, and its peoples range across Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia.

In hosting the event, the Senate of the University of the South Pacific (USP) was responding to a direct request by the United Nations for participation and observance of the International Year of Peace. USP established an organizing Committee in April 1984, proportionally representative of the diversity of its own staff. The University looked forward to a Conference where the widest variety of points of view would be expressed; the range of perspectives in this volume amply illustrates the success of this objective. Also because the eleven governments of the region who support the University have limited resources, the University had to

ask that the Conference be financially self-supporting. This meant that the possibilities for travel and fee assistance were very limited indeed.

One of the richest elements of the Conference was its interdisciplinary character. Participants from the following areas contributed: Anthropology, Botany, Business Management, Commerce, Defence Studies, Earth Sciences, Ecology, Economics, Education, General Science, Geography, History, International Relations, Law, Medicine, Philosophy, Physics, Politics, Psychiatry, Psychology, Religion and Sociology. In addition, members of staff from several institutes or centres for conflict resolution and mediation were in attendance. There were also students and members of the general lay community. The remarkable thing was that they were all talking to each other, not in academic jargon, but in terms each could understand. One gauge of how well a Conference is going is the moderately pitched "hum" that develops during breaks that indicates a concentration in both speakers and listeners. The hope that the Conference would provide an opportunity for a community of conversation was certainly fulfilled.

This book aims to show how the contributions of these many fields of study can aid in the search for a clearer definition of the problems that face us and their possible solutions. *The People Create Alternatives*' theme is addressed in a great variety of ways.

Not all Conference papers and abstracts could be included in this volume. This is because not all participants gave us permission to publish; some participants were publishing the paper elsewhere, and a few did not provide us with a full paper. Where selection was necessary, we attempted to be as equitable and impartial as possible. First we had to address the redundancy issue. For example, we had five papers on Gandhi and non-violent protest methods. In cases of duplication, we tried to select what was, in our view, the best paper. As we studied the papers, we found some long on historicity, and little else. Some were devoted to diagnosis, ("Ain't it awful?") without recommendations for solving problems. There was criticism of "western ideology" but solutions such as returning to long past (imagined) ways of life don't seem appropriate for today's urban millions. Neither do recommendations that everyone "should" subscribe to one "right way". In other words, we tried to select as broad and balanced a base as possible. And of course, the ever present need for economy had to be taken into account. Abstracts of all papers are included with authors' addresses.

It might be asked why are there more papers from some countries than from others? Because the Conference had to be self-funding, those participants who could get funding, were already on their way through, or had already planned for Conferences elsewhere, were those who could afford to participate. The United States and Australia were neck and neck insofar as total numbers were concerned, with Canada a close third. We were happy in the end that at least 28 countries could be represented. We must assure our readers that strenuous efforts were made over a two year period to obtain funding for sponsoring people who could not pay their

own way.

Another question relates to why there were not more non-academic groups represented. Of the 7000 posters mailed out, at least 1500 went to groups and organizations not of an academic nature, and notices were placed in several hundred journals and magazines, publications that are circulated widely among Concerned Groups. As it turned out, most proposals for individual papers and symposia were from the academic side. However, the door was open to all groups and individuals to propose papers, and we turned no one away on the basis of the focus of the proposals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to express our gratitude to the many people and organizations whose assistance and financial support made this book and the Conference on which it is based, a reality. Many friends, faculty members, Committee members and co-opted helpers helped make the Conference a success. The efforts of those who stayed on over the holiday period, giving up vacation time were crucial. We would like in particular to mention the following; Aren Baoa; Donald O'Hara; Mary Low; Salusalu Manoa; Barbara Moore; France Mugler; Radha Ram; Paddy O'Sullivan; Hillary Pickering; **Rajeshwar Prakash, and Philippa Waisu.**

For general financial support to the Conference and this book we would like to thank the United Nations General Fund; the Embassy of the Peoples' Republic of China, Fiji; Ambassade de France, Fidgi; the British Council of Churches Division of Conference for World Mission; and our Keynote Speaker Professor Hannes Alfvén.

Appreciation is due to the following organizations for sponsoring individuals to attend the Conference: the Australian High Commission Development Fund; Baha'i International Community; Centre for the Study of Human Evolution; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; Kellogg Foundation; The Rotary Foundation of Rotary International; Saybrook Institute; International Red Cross; Society of Friends, England; World Council of Churches; the Embassy of the United States, Suva; and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, as well as the many Universities that gave Conference leave and funds to enable their staff members to participate.

We are grateful for the various services given by the USP Fiji Centre, Fiji Times, Air New Zealand and Tour Contractors, Fiji.

We thank all the Conference and book authors for their contributions, Muni Deo Raj for his art work on the cover; Ulaiaisi Taoi and

staff of City Typesetters; Jo Cagilaba and Atma Ram of the Fiji Times; and Rina Basdeo, Anita Naidu and Vasiti Komaitai of USP for typing.

As a final note we, the Editors, hope that this volume will empower and enlarge the vision of those who are working toward human survival.

Our belief is that the insane possibilities for extinction of this species and this planet can, and must, be countered.

Jeannette P. Maas

Robert A.C. Stewart

Suva, Fiji
August, 1986.



Acting Vice Chancellor Dr Robert Stewart opening the United Nations Year of Peace at the University of the South Pacific.

Seated (left to right) Professor Herbert York, Professor Hannes Alfven, Dr Jeannette Maas and Professor Jan Prawitz.

TOPIC I: THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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Mrs. Kerstin Alfvén with Professor Jan Prawitz.



Nobel Laureate Professor Hannes Alfvén delivering the keynote speech.

WAR-PEACE DICTIONARY*

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ABSTRACT

A dictionary for translating the distorted language on which pro-nuclear propaganda is based into correct, understandable language on which peace efforts can be based.

When Confucius was asked what was the first thing he would do if he became Emperor of China, he answered: 'The most important thing would be "the rectification of words".' In modern language this means that semantics is very important: we must use the correct words for everything we speak about.

This principle is applicable to the nuclear debate. Those who strive to stop the nuclear arms race risk losing every debate as long as they accept the euphemisms used by the leaders of the arms race in place of more adequate terms. We shall try here to find translations for the terminology which the powerful scientific, industrial, military and political leaders of the nuclear arms race have succeeded in getting so generally accepted that what they really do is camouflaged. This is a difficult task, but it is of such great importance that it would be a worthy activity for many of us to devote considerable time to during 1986, the United Nation's Peace Year.

This preliminary dictionary is not put in alphabetical order, and does not have the format of a conventional dictionary, because it is believed that the present format makes it easier to read.

*The Keynote Speech at the First International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies in the United Nations International Year of Peace, 1986, held at the University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, December 31, 1985-January 5, 1986.

ANNIHILATORS AND OMNICIDE

NUCLEAR ARMS OR ANNIHILATORS?

An important euphemism is 'nuclear arms'. It gives the impression that these arms are similar to old-fashioned arms. In the back of their minds, people may associate them with brave knights fighting in shining armour. But the criminal pressing the button which will annihilate millions if not billions of civilians, including women and children — or rather, torture them all to death — is doing nothing heroic. 'Annihilators' would be a more precise term for such arms.

NUCLEAR WAR OR OMNICIDE?

The American philosopher John Somerville has coined the word 'omnicide' (suicide-genocide-omnicide) as an adequate description of what the full use of annihilators would result in. This term 'omnicide' is even more appropriate now, when it appears likely that a full-scale nuclear attack would result in a nuclear winter.

SCIENCE AND NUCLEAR WAR

PROGRESS OF SCIENCE

The nuclear threat of annihilation is a product of the so-called 'progress of science'.

We should note that 'science' has several meanings. It meant initially 'natural philosophy' (reine Wissenschaft), the unbiased investigation of nature. But nowadays it is more frequently used for the application of science for technical purposes. For a century or more this activity has been of immense benefit to humankind in raising the standard of living, but during the last decades the technology has increasingly been used for commercial, military and political purposes, with the result that large branches of science have turned into a threat to us all. It is inappropriate to use the term 'progress' for an activity which is as opposed to progress as anything could be.

DISCOVERY OF FISSION

Years ago some scientists discovered nuclear fission and later others enthusiastically worked at making nuclear fission increasingly more terrifying. At present more than half of the scientists in the world are paid directly or indirectly by the military and political establishments. On the other hand, there are a great number of scientists who, since the Manhattan project, have protested as strongly as possible against the development of annihilators.

FINDING THE TRUTH

Are scientists qualified to take part in the nuclear debate? By profession, scientists explore the world around us, the microcosm of the atoms, the macrocosm of galaxies, and the biosphere with all its infinite complications. A particularly interesting part of the biosphere is human society, which is treated by such disciplines as sociology, psychology, criminology and political science. In each of these fields, scientists of different specializations try to find the truth in an unbiased way. One of the most important puzzles is why man, who normally lives in peace with others, sometimes kills another individual — homicide — and why he sometimes kills thousands or millions of other individuals — war or genocide. At present, a general madness appears to be sweeping the world, and humanity is girding its loins for omnicide, the killing of all life.

TELLING THE TRUTH

What role can scientists play? It is our profession to clarify the truth to ourselves and to our colleagues. It is also our duty to tell everyone the truth and nothing but the truth: to educate people about the real state of the world.

It has been thought that this should be done by whispering advice into the ears of the world's political leaders. Decades of sad experience in the nuclear debate have taught us this does not work. Politicians are under pressure from many groups more powerful than scientists and, according to the rules of the political game, they listen — they must — to those who can exert the most pressure. Of course they would be concerned if their actions led to world destruction, but clearly they are more concerned about winning the next election or, in dictatorial states, about retaining their power.

GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS

Hence the only effective remedy for the nuclear threat would be that of a popular movement becoming strong enough to exert decisive pressure on the politicians. As I see it, this is the only way to save our culture, our society, and the scientific and technical knowledge on which our civilization is based. I find it very satisfying to see such a grass roots movement now developing.

SCIENTISTS AND THE ARMS RACE

Is the situation really so dangerous? Yes! It is not necessary for me to repeat all the arguments — they are well known — but I believe that the more you study the present situation, the more terrifying it looks. There are an increasing number of scientists warning against the present buildup of nuclear arms. Still it is surprising that more scientists do not speak out. Why do they not? One reason is that most scientists are specialists. To them the most important thing is their latest discovery or latest technical

innovation. Whether this is to the benefit or the detriment of humankind is often of secondary interest. They are happy to pass the responsibility to the businessmen, the military men and the politicians, who pay their research grants and salaries. Since destructive results are usually rewarded more generously than others, scientists are often under pressure to accelerate the 'race to oblivion'.

NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE AND HUMANE INTELLIGENCE

But there is a second, deeper reason why scientists do not protest more strongly. Scientists are often — but not always — very 'intelligent' people. However, in this context there seems to be two different types of intelligence. One kind is what we may call 'nuclear intelligence'. The people who possess this count their achievements by how many people their devices can kill: how large a figure they can enter in the 'megadeath' column.¹ Their aim is to make this figure as large as possible for the 'enemy' and as small as possible for their own masters. What 'megadeath' means in human terms is something they either do not understand or refuse to think about. In particular, they never mention that killing people by nuclear means is not comparable to killing the same number of people by conventional weapons, because radioactive death is not a 'heroic' death in the old sense; very often it is a slow torturing to death, as we know very well from Hiroshima.

The other kind of intelligence we may call a 'humane intelligence'. Those who possess it cannot avoid seeing the meaning of megadeath in human terms. Their intelligence is combined with empathy in such a way that they are compelled to identify themselves with those who would be killed. In their imagination they themselves constitute one millionth of what the people with nuclear intelligence call a megadeath.

What I am referring to is best explained by a reference to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) (or the Physicians for Social Responsibility) who, inspired by Helen Caldicott and many others, have started a movement for saving mankind from "The Final Epidemic." This movement is now the spearhead of a rapidly increasing popular movement. The Union of Concerned Scientists is another example of a group of scientists with humane intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE TEST

How do you separate those who possess nuclear intelligence from those with humane intelligence? You need only listen to what they say for a few minutes. You can judge them from what they advocate: more nuclear arms — or less.

¹ One megadeath means the death of one million people.

POLITICAL SLOGANS AND REALITY

THE REAL FRONTIERS

Both superpowers contain fanatics who claim that for moral reasons the other superpower must be destroyed, because it represents all the evil in the world. This is, of course, a naive and highly distorted view. With the threat of annihilation as humanity's most pressing problem, the real boundary lies between those who advocate and produce more annihilators and those who wish to limit, reduce and eventually eliminate them.

So the real frontier in the world is not the frontier between 'capitalists' and 'communists'. It is between the people with nuclear intelligence and those with humane intelligence, or in other words, between the hawks and the doves.

HARDWARE AND SLOGANS

The threat of omnicide derives from two factors, the annihilators themselves, including missiles and airplanes for their delivery, and the political slogans which justify them.

The construction of annihilators and delivery systems is extremely complicated and it is claimed, with reasonable justification, that only experts are competent to discuss these problems. However, this does not hold true for the second factor, i.e., the political slogans which are necessary in order to persuade the people of the world to accept the annihilators. These slogans are not at all sophisticated, they are primitive; indeed, stone age man also thought he could negotiate only from a position of physical strength. Rather, anyone who can read and think is competent to discuss and analyze the problems. In fact, the 'experts' are perhaps rather less competent than ordinary people to discuss them because of their professional bias. And many experts possess more nuclear than humane intelligence.

DOES REAGAN WANT TO KILL GORBACHEV OR SAKHAROV?

Let us analyze some of the words in the nuclear debate: Reagan says that the "Russians" and the "Communists" are the permanent enemies of the United States and of the whole "free world", and they represent all the evil of our times. Hence it is necessary to spend billions and trillions of dollars for the "defense" against them, which means more sophisticated nuclear annihilators which are aimed at destroying the Soviet Union. But less than half of the population of the USSR belong to the Communist party! When Reagan presses the button he will kill more non-Russians than Russians, and by far more non-communists than communists. Most of these people hate the Russians and the communists. So does it make sense to kill these others?

Furthermore, there are a large number of dissidents — the most famous one is Sakharov — whom Reagan rightly considers to be heroes.

Does he really want to kill them too?

Reagan says that he must have the 'first strike option', i.e., the option of suddenly launching a nuclear attack in order to 'punish the Russians' if they take any political or military action which he considers to be a threat to the United States or any of its allies. It is perhaps reasonable that he wants to threaten Gorbachev and the Politbureau, who probably would be responsible for the action. But they would most likely be sitting in the safest silo in the USSR, just as Reagan and his friends would be sitting in the safest silo in the United States when he is heroic enough to press the button. So he would punish the Soviet leaders only indirectly, by killing a huge number of innocent people in the USSR, which would probably include Sakharov and other dissidents.

Furthermore, what is meant by the 'free world'? Does not this part of the globe include quite a few of the world's most reprehensible dictators?

DOES GORBACHEV WANT TO DESTROY THE COUNTRY OF MARX?

There are many other simple questions about the slogans which every thinking man or woman can, and must, ask. Many of these questions should be addressed to Gorbachev, but because of the asymmetry between the United States and the USSR, they are not the same questions we need to address to Reagan. We have good reason to ask Gorbachev why he deploys so many SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe directed against Central and Western Europe. Does he do that with the consent of the East Europeans? Has he told his people that this will kill more workers than capitalists? Does he really want to annihilate Central and Western Europe? Is it possible that he does not appreciate the culture he and his country have inherited from Europe? Does he really want to destroy the country of Karl Marx — annihilate it forever?

WESTERN EUROPE AND CULTURE

We should also ask M. Mitterand and Mrs Thatcher whether they know that, when they fire their nuclear annihilators, they will torture millions of innocent people to death and devastate large regions, perhaps for ever. Do they realize that nothing similar has been done since the times of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane? Has Mrs Thatcher compared Tamerlane's roads — marked by pyramids of human skulls — with the misery her Tridents will produce, and realized that such a comparison will make Tamerlane look mild and moderate? Has M. Mitterand compared 'la culture Francaise' with the culture of Genghis Khan? Does he understand that the 'superiorite de l'esprit' may refer to nuclear intelligence but certainly not to humane intelligence?

FUNDS FOR MASS KILLING OF CIVILIAN POPULATION

The annihilators are utterly aggressive. Their use will result in mass

killing of innocent civilians (either by direct strike or by a following 'nuclear winter'. Is it reasonable to call such an activity 'defensive'? Only by a misuse of words can it be motivated to finance them from the Department of Defense. The development and construction of them should be financed — if at all! — from Funds for the Mass Killing of the Civilian Population. In order to demonstrate that this has very little to do with defense, a new department should be organized: *Department for the Mass Murder of Civilian Population*. We should look forward to the debates in Congress or in various Parliaments on how many billions of taxpayers' money should be allocated for this. We should try to find out when the Politbureaus of the Soviet Union and China, and the Knesset introduce this honest terminology in their secret discussions about annihilators.

STAR WARS

We can not completely exclude the possibility that a partial defense against missiles (by laser beams, etc.) can be constructed in the future, and this is the basis for what is called SDI, which stands for 'Strategic Defence Initiative', usually nicknamed 'Star Wars'. This project has been severely criticized by practically all who have studied it without being corrupted by the billions of dollars which are spent on buying scientists to work on the project. The debate has clarified the real character of the project. It aims at developing a new, utterly destructive technology. How can this be referred to as defense? By the same misuse of words which we have discussed. It is claimed that in principle an utterly destructive technology can be used even to destroy the destructive missiles before they reach their targets. This is possible if only one or a few missiles are launched, but it is unrealistic if thousands of them are launched simultaneously. The concept of a 'strategic defense' is used only to camouflage the real character of the project which is to develop a superdestructive technology. What should we call the project if we want to use a correct and honest terminology? We could very well call it SDI, but this abbreviation should rather stand for *Super Destructive Initiative*.

REALISTIC POLICY

WHAT POLICIES ARE 'REALISTIC'?

The enormous escalation of the arms race is now producing a healthy reaction all around the world. With the physicians in the front, rapidly growing groups of scientists are joining the opposition against the 'race to oblivion'. However, the main burden of opposition is not carried by scientists but by several other professional groups and by people who are so far from science that they are completely free from 'nuclear intelligence'. The peace movement has already grown strong enough to produce some political results. It is high time to discuss what the strategic aims should be.

Many people believe that it is necessary to be what they call 'realistic'. This means that they want to accept the power structure of the world as it is today. In spite of all the rosy talk about democracy, the real power is possessed by leading politicians, the military establishments, the economic oligarchies, and the large bureaucratic organizations. It is said that we have to respect them and understand that nothing can be achieved which is contrary to their interests. What we can do is to try to persuade them to modify their actions, slow down the rate of increase in armaments or modify a formulation in an international treaty. It is further said that if those who have power are naive or mad enough to believe that escalating the nuclear arms race is a realistic policy, we all have to try to accept this in order to please them.

This method has been tried now for decades and for decades the result has been small steps forward at the same time that big steps have been taken towards catastrophe. The arms race is escalating, the nuclear situations gets increasingly unstable, and the threat of omnicide more horrifying.

HAZARDS OF PACIFISM

It is essential that the anti-nuclear movement fight the production and deployment of annihilators but, under present conditions, not all arms. It appears at present unrealistic to be a pacifist in the sense of believing that it is possible to get rid of all arms now. Before it is possible to achieve a completely disarmed world, it is necessary to find a way of making such a world stable against aggressors. The victims of aggression cannot be saved by disarmament. Furthermore, in many cases the only hope of getting rid of ruthless dictators is by armed rebellion.

So we must state clearly that our fight against nuclear annihilators and the threat they pose to us all must take precedence over opposition to conventional arms, although we must oppose the production and use of biological chemical, and similar weapons as well.

THE END OF THE DETERRENCE EPOCH

That there has been no nuclear war since Hiroshima-Nagasaki is credited to the balance of terror between the superterrorists, the United States and the USSR. However, it is evident that the deterrence epoch is approaching its end. Modern annihilators are increasingly constructed for first strike attacks.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Against this background, it becomes increasingly evident that a strategy that says it is necessary to negotiate from a position of strength is 'either bluff or suicide' (indeed omnicide), as has been stated by competent

strategists. This also holds true for all kinds of threats, from any side, to use annihilators for political purposes. All these actions must be considered as crimes against humanity, indeed, crimes committed against ourselves.

The manufacturing of nuclear annihilators is a similar crime, because once manufactured they will sooner or later be deployed. So is any research into increasing the efficiency of annihilators, because it is hard, if not impossible, to prevent any new inventions of this kind from sooner or later being manufactured and deployed.

But logic takes us further. Mining uranium, constructing the reactors in which plutonium is produced, and developing easier methods of separating the uranium isotopes are obviously similar activities. If they are not stopped, commercial pressure, which exploits power-greedy politicians, will spread nuclear material and nuclear technology to an increasing number of states. We have already witnessed the beginning of this process, the acceleration of which will follow automatically. There was a hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might be able to halt this spread, but the way this organization has been run has, rather than hinder it, has probably helped to destabilize the nuclear situation by spreading nuclear technology and building up nuclear lobbies everywhere.

An analysis of this kind shows that there is no possibility of accepting any nuclear activity at all.² The belief that we can accept some kind of nuclear activity and avoid any inherent risk of a nuclear holocaust is mistaken. No one has yet shown that it is possible to create such a state which would remain stable. The mere existence of fissionable material and the fact that the techniques which enable the manufacturing of nuclear annihilators are in the hands of ruthless political and commercial interests, constitutes a threat to us all.

Until someone demonstrates that it is possible to accept some nuclear technology and remain safe, there is only one conclusion: the sole means of avoiding the increasing threat of nuclear omnicide is to consider all nuclear activity as a crime against humanity.

Planet Earth cannot accommodate both life and nuclear technology. One of us — life or nuclear technology — has to be buried for ever. We have to choose.

THE ONLY REALISTIC POLICY

It is not 'realistic' policy to limit our actions for saving ourselves from omnicide to those which are acceptable to the political, military, commercial and scientific establishments of today. We have all seen clearly enough that their actions lead to an escalating risk of omnicide. A policy which has such consequences cannot be called 'realistic'. If we believe that man has a brain to be used for saving the human race from extinction, we

² Exceptions are very small-scale used for medical purposes and as tracers, the purely scientific investigation of the structure of nuclei, etc.

cannot allow the present establishments eliminate the use of the human brain in promoting their short-sighted interests.

The only possible definition of a realistic policy is one which aims at rescuing us from the nuclear threat. Hence, the only realistic policy is to stop all nuclear activity as soon as possible.

Why do we not do so? The Physicians for Nuclear Responsibility have shown that there is no cure for the consequences of a nuclear war. Those physicians who are psychiatrists have diagnosed the present state as a severe psychic disease of mankind. Humanity is threatened by a general madness of destruction, a most serious illness. It is contagious. If one leading politician has been infected, his colleagues in other countries run a risk of also being infected. It is a fatal disease but unfortunately not fatal only to those who have been infected. It also threatens those who are not. The disease should be called the Super Destructive Illness, or shortened to SDI. For everyone who wants to survive, who wants to save our children and grandchildren, who wants to preserve our culture and everything that man has achieved, the highest priority must be to cure mankind of SDI — the Super Destructive Illness.³

³ Some essential parts of this paper were published in *Development Dialogue* (1984: 1-2), a publication of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Övre Slottgatan 2, S-75220, Uppsala, Sweden.



Conference attendees listening to Professor Hannes Alfvén's keynote address.

THIRD PARTY CONSULTATION: A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH FOR DE-ESCALATING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

Social scientist practitioners have developed a number of problem-solving approaches for the potential de-escalation of international conflict. Most are captured by a general model of third party consultation — a small group discussion method in which an impartial team of facilitators improves communication and institutes dialogue between the antagonists. This paper will review and evaluate a variety of pilot workshops that have demonstrated this strategy for developing creative peaceful alternatives.

All of us are acutely aware that the world is in a sorry if not perilous state with regard to the ability to productively manage international conflict (see for example, Roche, 1984). Since World War II, over one hundred major conflicts have erupted in the violence of war as the primary means of attempted settlement. Even worse, the frequency of war appears to be on the increase from an average of nine per year in the 1950's, to eleven per year in the 1960's, to fourteen per year in the 1980's. But beyond the pale of widespread conventional war, lies the even more horrendous potential of worldwide nuclear omnicide fueled by the arms race between the USA and USSR. The nuclear stockpile of 50,000 weapons now represents over five thousand times all the explosive force used in World War II. The use of even a fraction of these weapons would produce a catastrophe of unheralded proportions (Sagan, 1983).

The economic and social costs of humankind's primary means of handling conflict are well known. The nations of the world now spend over

\$1 million per minute on armaments, more than twenty times the sum spent on assistance for international development, and more than the entire income of two billion people living in the world's fifty poorest countries. Over fifty million people work directly or indirectly for the continued militarization of the planet, including over half a million of the world's best scientists (Stockholm Peace Research Institute, 1978). We obviously have invested a lot and are willing to risk a great deal in our current approaches to conflict management. Do they merit the investment? Are they worth the risk? Do we have other options?

The traditional approach to handling social conflict has involved both violent and non-violent means, both of which are proving inadequate to attain the goal of a peaceful world. This is not necessarily surprising, since the occurrence of conflict in international relations, the most complex level of human interaction, is ubiquitous and enigmatic. Conflict is commonly defined as a social situation in which incompatible goals and activities occur between two parties who hold antagonistic feelings toward each other and who attempt to control each other (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, 1982). The traditional approach to managing conflict is based primarily in the use of power — the ability to control the other party in order to meet one's own goals. This approach is represented in the principle and practice of deterrence (the threatened use of violence to deter aggression), which when it breaks down results in war. The continued application of the power approach typically fuels escalation of the conflict and leads either to a continuing stalemate or to a win-lose outcome. The essence of deterrence (that is, manipulation via threat) is a primitive approach to social relationships which is most often invoked when the parties see each other (but not themselves!) as unreasonable, simple-minded, or barbaric — children, animals, criminals (Morgan, 1983). There is now considerable evidence to indicate that deterrence and the arms races that it feeds are eventually ineffective and self-defeating. Anthropological analysis of two thousand years of deterrence indicates that over the long run, arms races are associated with a higher probability of war (Naroll et al., 1974). Quantitative analyses of recent international disputes indicates that those preceded by an arms race are more likely to lead to war than those without (Wallace, 1979). Despite the evidence, military strategists continue to place confidence in the Roman dictum, "If you want peace, prepare for war." The more accurate admonition would seem to be, "If you prepare for war, you get war."

The power approach is also represented in non-violent methods of traditional dispute settlement, whether involving direct negotiation between the parties or the intervention of a powerful third party as in judicial settlements or arbitration. These strategies fail partly because they make a scarcity or fixed-pie assumption and adopt a win-lose stance in which the use of coercive power is inevitable (Burton, 1979). This erroneous conventional wisdom holds sway over the growing realization that conflicts are not based solely or primarily in scarcity, but in the method of allocation,

and more importantly, in the inequitable distribution of readily available non-material goods that satisfy universal human needs for security, identity and independence. According to Burton (1979), breakthroughs in negotiation occur only when the opposing party is seen as having universal, inexorable needs and when a view of negative outcomes for one party is changed to a view of positive outcomes for all. In the meantime, the traditional attempt to see international conflict as based in objectively perceived conflicts of scarcity and to use power tactics to manage it, is doomed to failure.

My own analysis and approach as an applied social psychologist parallels that of Burton and other nontraditional thinkers (Fisher, 1982). The humanistic value base of applied social psychology indicates that individuals and social groups have undeniable needs and rights for security, dignity, respect, and a "place in the sun" on both physical and psychological dimensions — identity, participation and adequate control of their own destiny. As long as these needs and rights are denied through suppression, a dynamic for social change is created. This is not to deny the traditionally recognized major sources of international conflict — economic, value and power differences, as identified for example by Katz (1965) — but it does underscore the importance of an alternate analysis from the fixed-pie, power assumptions of the past. This analysis is also not to deny the continuing efficacy of traditional diplomatic methods of dispute resolution embodied in negotiation, mediation and conciliation. Although it is becoming popular to criticize the procedures and accomplishments of international institutions, particularly the United Nations and its agencies, it can be effectively argued that the world would be in an even sorrier state without a long record of accomplishments accruing from international diplomacy and cooperation (Roche, 1984).

Alternate approaches to international conflict resolution require fundamental changes in the way human beings think and behave in relation to conflict. This has become acutely apparent in the nuclear age. Albert Einstein, one of the scientific geniuses who advanced our physical understanding and technology beyond our social abilities, was also one of the first to realize the qualitative change that had occurred with the unleashing of the atom:

Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. We scientists who unleashed this immense power have an overwhelming responsibility in this world life-and death struggle to harness the atom for the benefit of mankind and not for humanity's destruction (Nathan & Norden, 1968, p.376).

What are some of the aspects of thinking that need to be changed, and what are the alternate processes? Psychologist Robert Holt (1985) has recently provided an initial response to Einstein's challenge. His analysis, based on knowledge of cognitive processes, indicates what a variety of questionable

assumptions underlie current policy development, particularly the United States' foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. For example, it is assumed that, "The military value of weapons rises with every increase in their number, their destructive power, their accuracy, their speed, and their concealability." (p.206). But in the nuclear age we must question whether the quickness of the Pershing II or the concealability of the Cruise missile truly increase their value in deterring aggression and thereby increasing security. For example, it is assumed that, "Whatever benefits an adversary must damage us," (p.206) and that "Hostile acts short of war, tending to weaken, threaten, or destabilize the enemy, increase one's security and are advantageous." (p.207). These two statements belie the general belief that all international conflicts are zero-sum games (that is, what one side loses, the other gains), whereas the reality is that both sides will lose in a nuclear war and that both sides will benefit from peace. These types of assumptions generally indicate thinking processes which reject contradictory but accurate information, which are rigid rather than flexible, which are unable to think abstractly and openly, and which cannot cope with paradox (e.g., to accept that adding more nuclear weapons actually makes the United States less secure).

The alternate cognitive processes which are required to meet Einstein's challenge are captured by Holt (1984) in the concept of "systems thinking." This broad strategy of conceptualizing and reasoning is articulated by twelve prescriptive rules, some of which are similar to those that underlie creative problem-solving. For example, systems thinkers are advised to think analytically, but also holistically and integratively, to move flexibly between abstract concepts and concrete facts and examples, to not necessarily accept the initial formulation of a problem, to consider the widest possible range of factors in making a decision, and to adopt a long term perspective in establishing policies.


What are the changes in human social behaviour that need to be effected in order to ensure our survival? Basically, we need to shift from approaching conflict as a war to be won or as a piece of pie to be negotiated to approaching it as a shared problem to be solved by the active, face-to-face participation of the parties. Over the past four decades, this problem-solving shift has been occurring in a range of disciplines and professions that deal with human conflict in various contexts, including social work, marital counselling and divorce mediation, judicial pre-trial conferencing and diversion mediation, industrial relations, communal relations, and organization development. The primary thrust of this shift is to improve communication, initiate dialogue, and facilitate problem-solving between the parties with a view to changing the basic relationship at the same time as resolving the conflict. It is now time for the field of international relations to seriously consider the problem-solving alternative. In other words, it is time for transition from power bargaining and traditional forms of dispute resolution to problem analysis and to the discovery of mutually agreeable options (Burton, 1984, 1985a). The method of third party consultation

promises to be an important element within this overall transition.

A MODEL OF THIRD PARTY CONSULTATION

In the past twenty years, a number of social scientist/practitioners have experimented with a variety of strategies for direct intervention in situations of intergroup conflict in organizational, community and international settings (Fisher, 1983). These interventions have typically consisted of small group, problem-solving discussions organized and facilitated by the social scientist/practitioners in the role of an impartial third party. The assumption is that constructive problem-solving can be most satisfactorily implemented with the facilitation of a skilled and trusted intermediary. The objectives of these discussions range from individual attitude change, through the generation of creative solutions to conflict, to subsequent improvements in the wider relationship between the parties. The approach of the third party is to facilitate problem-solving through improving communication and analysing the basic relationship between the parties, rather than by encouraging or imposing specific settlements on substantive issues. Thus, these problem-solving workshops are distinguished from the more traditional forms of third party intervention including mediation and arbitration (see Burton, 1979 and Fisher, 1983). The unique identity of the approach has been captured by the term, *third party consultation* (Walton, 1969; Fisher, 1972).

Figure 1. A model of third party consultation.



An initial descriptive model of third party consultation has been developed by Fisher (1972), through drawing on pioneering applications at the interpersonal level (Walton, 1969), the intergroup level (Blake et al., 1964), and the international level (Burton, 1969; Doob, 1970). This general model emphasizes the identity, strategies, and behaviour of an impartial and skilled consultant who enters directly into the arena of conflict in a facilitative and diagnostic manner, thus aiding the antagonists to analyze and deal with the underlying attitudes and basic issues in their relationship. A revision of the model is presented in Figure 1, in which each circle represents a major conceptual component (Fisher, 1976). These major components are common to most applications and identify the requisites of effective practice.

The third party *identity* requires that the consultant be a skilled scholar/practitioner whose background, attitudes, and behaviour engender impartiality and whose professional knowledge and expertise enable the facilitation of productive confrontation and conflict resolution. Furthermore, the consultant should have moderate knowledge of the parties, low power over them, and high control over the consultation situation. Thus, the consultant will not have predefined perceptions based on a high degree of knowledge of the parties, the parties will feel free to explore their relationship, and the consultant can manage the discussions toward productive confrontation. In most applications, the third party has been composed of a team of social scientist/practitioners whose group or national identity is perceived as impartial or at least as balanced. In addition to a high degree of skill in human relations and problem-solving, the third party needs to be knowledgeable of conflict processes from a social-scientific point of view. An adequate identity lays the basis for a *helping relationship* based on humanistic values and involving trust, respect, and understanding, which serves as a prerequisite to open and constructive problem-solving. The *situation* refers to the essential social and physical arrangements in which the consultant organizes a series of informal and flexible small group discussions in a neutral and informal setting. The rationale is to provide a context that will facilitate productive confrontation between the parties focusing directly on the nature of the conflict. The third party *role* refers to the appropriate pattern of behaviour, which is basically facilitative and diagnostic: The third party uses social skills to facilitate problem-solving and draws on social-scientific knowledge to further the parties' understanding of their relationship. In addition, the consultant must remain nonevaluative, noncoercive, and nondirective over outcomes, although the direction of social process is a definite role requirement. In the initial model proposed by Fisher (1972), the identity and role of the participants are also considered. At a minimum, they are interested and representative members of their groups who are willing to enter problem-solving discussions. At a maximum they should be appointed but informal representatives who can influence decision-making in their respective groups or nations. The core strategies of the model are expressed

in the third party *functions*:

1. inducing mutual positive motivation for problem-solving;
2. improving the openness and accuracy of communication;
3. diagnosing the issues and processes of the conflict; and
4. regulating the interaction among the participants.

The functions serve as guides for systematically moving the problem-solving process forward. The functions are operationalized through specific behavioural *tactics* (for example, restating a participant's opinion) and more general *procedures* that involve structured exercises for participants (for example, the development and exchange of intergroup images). When combined with a variety of *supportive activities* (for example, preliminary interviews and follow-up activities) all of the components of the model are conducive to reaching the *objectives* within an overall programme of consultation:

1. improved attitudes involving more complex, veridical, and favourable attitudes towards the other party;
2. an improved relationship, which shows a change from a destructive, win-lose approach to the collaborative, problem-solving orientation;
3. conflict resolution involving innovative solutions freely agreed upon and a commitment to work on future disputes prior to escalation; and
4. the study of conflict, which increases both consultant and participant understanding.

One significant element of the various approaches captured by the third party consultation model is that an attempt is made to truly resolve the conflict as opposed to suppressing it, managing it through an ongoing power balance, or attempting to terminate it by violent means.

APPLICATIONS OF THE METHOD

Following leads from other areas of intergroup problem-solving, particularly in organizational settings (for example, Blake et al., 1964), social scientist/practitioners have begun applying methods of small group problem-solving to international relations. Initial efforts are acknowledged by Bailey (1970) in his review of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes compiled for the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. Similarly, Doob (1975) reviews several international workshops with a view to discerning similarities and differences, while Hill (1982) provides an analysis of conflict resolution techniques which emphasises the need for further theoretical development. The brief review provided here will parallel that provided by Fisher (1983) with the addition of some significant updates (see Table 1).

The pioneering work of Burton (1969) on his approach of "controlled communication" bears many similarities with third party consultation. In his approach, a panel of social scientists work to create a problem-

TABLE 1: PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOPS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

<i>Setting and Study</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Third Party</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Method of Assessment</i>	<i>Reported Outcomes</i>
<i>Burton, 1969</i>	<i>Indonesia/Malaysia/Singapore</i>	<i>mixed team of social scientists</i>	<i>ten days</i>	<i>case study analysis</i>	<i>increased understanding</i>
<i>Burton, 1985</i>	<i>United Kingdom/Argentina</i>	<i>mixed team of social scientists</i>	<i>ten days and ongoing</i>	<i>case study analysis</i>	<i>new realizations</i>
<i>Doob, 1970</i>	<i>Ethiopia/Somalia/Kenya</i>	<i>American social scientists/human relations trainers</i>	<i>2 weeks</i>	<i>case study analysis post questionnaires</i>	<i>improved attitudes</i>
<i>Cohen et al, 1977</i>	<i>Palestinian/Israelis</i>	<i>American & Canadian social psychologists</i>	<i>2 days</i>	<i>case study analysis</i>	<i>increased understanding</i>
<i>Cohen & Azar, 1981</i>	<i>Israelis/Egyptians</i>	<i>American & Canadian social scientists</i>	<i>2 days</i>	<i>case study analysis</i>	<i>increased understanding</i>
<i>Fisher, 1980</i>	<i>India/Pakistan</i>	<i>Canadian social psychologist</i>	<i>15 hours</i>	<i>pre & post interviews</i>	<i>improved attitudes</i>
<i>Kelman & Cohen, 1979</i>	<i>India/Pakistan/Bangladesh</i>	<i>American & Canadian social psychologists</i>	<i>2 days</i>	<i>case study analysis</i>	<i>increased understanding</i>
<i>Wedge, 1970</i>	<i>Dominican Republic (University)/United States (Embassy)</i>	<i>American psychiatrist</i>	<i>ongoing for about 1 year</i>	<i>case study analysis improved relationships.</i>	<i>improved images</i>

solving atmosphere in which the appointed representatives of conflicting states can examine their perceptions and explore means of resolution. Effective communication is established by third party control and the conflict is analysed with the aid of consultant knowledge about conflict processes. Burton's seminal work at the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at University College London focused on the conflict in Southeast Asia involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The three governments nominated representatives who attended a ten-day session in which analysis lead to some unexpected realizations about the conflict. While the transfer of effects to the wider interaction between the nations was difficult to assess, the fighting stopped shortly after the meetings. Burton is now located at the Centre for International Development at the University of Maryland and has continued his problem-solving efforts through the establishment of the Conflict Resolution Project. Current work of the Centre involves the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict and also the Lebanese situation (Burton, 1985a, 1985b). Invited members of the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and political representatives from the Argentine met for a four day session in September of 1983 and subsequently established mechanisms for continuing contact and for widening the initiative. A longer session followed in April 1984 and a third meeting in February 1985 was also attended by a representative of the Islands. In the discussions, important realizations have come about, particularly regarding the aspect of sovereignty and the motives that fueled the conflict. A report on these activities is now in press.

Doob and his associates have successfully brought the techniques of human relations training to bear on situations of international conflict. The foremost application was a workshop which applied sensitivity training and other exercises in an attempt to produce innovative solutions to border disputes in the Horn of Africa (Doob, 1970; 1971; Doob et al., 1969; Walton, 1970). Informal representatives from Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya met under the guidance of the American organizers and trainers in two mixed training groups, both of which produced mutually acceptable solutions to the dispute. However, the total workshop could not reach consensus and the experience ended on a note of frustration. The consultants' analysis suggests that enhanced communication and favourable attitude change did occur, although these perceptions were not shared by all participants.

The work of Burton (1969) and Doob (1970) has been compared and evaluated by Kelman (1972). In addition, Kelman and Cohen (1976, 1979) have drawn on these earlier efforts in developing their interactional approach of problem-solving workshops directed toward international conflict resolution. Cohen, Kelman, Miller and Smith (1977) brought together Palestinians and Israelis in a weekend pilot workshop designed to induce objective analysis and effective communication regarding the Middle East conflict. Preworkshop sessions were held with each national group to enhance commitment to the workshop and to provide the third party with

information to plan the sessions. A statement on the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism became the focus of the entire workshop and an amended version was eventually agreed upon. The consultants perceived the workshop as offering useful insights into the conflict, and follow-up with participants indicated increased understanding and support for further workshops. Kelman and Cohen (1979) are also taking a long term, action research approach to the Middle East conflict in which problem-solving workshops may continue to play an important role. In this context, Cohen and Azar (1981) were invited to serve as third party facilitators in a problem-solving discussion involving Israeli and Egyptian intellectuals that focussed on several crucial topics. The ideas generated from the meeting were then combined with information from indepth interviews, conducted with selected elite since 1976, to provide a description and evaluation of the peace process between Israel and Egypt. In a related effort, Kelman (1982) conceptualizes a prenegotiation process designed to create the conditions for starting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations toward a mutually satisfactory settlement and a stable peace. These initiatives demonstrate the importance of transferring the outcomes of discussions to the ongoing relationship.

Kelman and Cohen (1979) also report on a pilot workshop on the India/Pakistan/Bangladesh conflict. Preworkshop sessions were again useful for paving the way for intense interaction and new learning in the workshop proper. Discussion of issues was followed by each side generating a list of possible reconciliation steps and one important symbolic gesture was the Pakistani's agreement to a war-crimes trial in response to Bengali concerns about atrocities. The consultants suggest that such workshops can help develop a vocabulary of de-escalation and create new learnings which are potentially transferable to the political arena.

A similar pilot workshop on the India/Pakistan conflict is described by Fisher (1980). Using a highly structured approach, the third party consultants facilitated a series of separate and joint meetings involving the two national groups. Perceptions were developed and exchanged on the present relationship, the national images, a possible ideal relationship, and the problems and potential solutions to the conflict. The joint discussions were subjected to content analysis using Bales Interaction Process Analysis and a set of categories describing typical third party interventions. These analyses demonstrated that the workshop evidenced the general problem-solving process and that the third party interventions made sense in terms of the model. Pre and post interviews in conjunction with a semantic differential scale indicated that individual attitudes were affected in favourable directions.

Based on a psychiatric model for intercession in intergroup conflict, Wedge (1970) served as an intermediary during the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis between the American Embassy and the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo which was strongly affiliated with the Revolutionary Youth Movement. Wedge's analysis stresses the irrational stereotypes that exist in intergroup conflict and the importance of establish-

ing effective communication in order to move toward limited cooperation on superordinate goals while maintaining each group's identity and integrity. Following five stages of consultation, Wedge was able to establish meaningful contact with both parties, identify mutual interests, bring members of the two sides together, establish programmes of cooperation, and terminate the intervention. Specifically, a programme of technical consultation by international specialists sponsored by the American Embassy assisted the development of the University and led to direct meetings between the conflicting parties. This contrast altered the inter-group images in favourable directions and improved the relationship in the longer term. In an update Wedge (1979) makes the point that the continuing development of a profession of informal mediation is necessary to prepare intermediaries who can help conflicting parties articulate their positions as a prelude to direct negotiations.

EVALUATION OF WORK TO DATE

It is clear that applications of third party consultation in the international sphere are quite limited, especially relative to the magnitude of the consequences of violent strategies of conflict management. One major restriction in this area stems from the problematic question of transferring any outcomes to the wider relationship between nations. Nonetheless, some very useful pilot work and in some cases more impactful initiatives have been carried out on several disputes. Although little quantitative assessment has been done, all studies report some degree of beneficial outcomes, and in no case was consultation terminated by the withdrawal of the parties.

The development of theories of intervention, including that of third party consultation, is assessed to be rudimentary, involving mainly generalized descriptions and inductive models that serve a minimal prescriptive function by providing guidance for further practice (Fisher, 1983). Clearly there is a need to move from prescriptive to predictive theory (Hill, 1982). Many unresolved questions limit the deductive power of existing theory and few models include the dynamic linkages among the various components. Illustrative limitations and possibilities for further theoretical development are provided by Fisher (1983).

With regard to practice, these problem-solving strategies are pointing toward the development of a promising social technology for peacefully resolving international conflict. There are many guidelines and in some cases detailed examples to guide further applications. However, one area that has received too little consideration is the selection and training of the third party consultants. Current practitioners have provided few comments on their manner of selecting members of their third party teams. With regard to training, some initial suggestions for appropriate skills and experience are provided by Fisher (1976).

The quality of research in this area is probably the weakest link in the chain of theory, research, and practice (Fisher, 1983). There is an over-reliance on case study analysis to describe and evaluate the process and the outcomes of consultation, and when quantitative measures are used there is usually a lack of psychometric information on their basic quality. While descriptive research has utility for communicating and improving the method, it does not serve as a base for developing valid theoretical linkages or for making inferences about effectiveness. These considerations lead to the general conclusion that although problem-solving approaches may have good potential, a great deal more developmental work needs to be done before their application can be vigorously promoted. The most useful avenue for such development is through action research, in which continuing pilot applications of the method are comprehensively evaluated.

CURRENT INITIATIVES AND THE CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE

What is required at this point is the continuing development and application of problem-solving methods for the resolution of international conflict and for the institutionalization of such methods alongside established diplomatic activities. Opportunities for the institutionalization of action research programmes and for consultant training programmes are now emerging.

In September, 1984, a bill establishing the United States Institute of Peace was passed by Congress for the purpose of engendering research, training and education in peaceful methods of conflict resolution. The broad ranging powers and duties of the Institute specifically include the development and provision of training and continuing education programmes in international conflict resolution for practitioners, policy-makers and policy implementers. Although the current US administration continues its endeavours to downgrade, divert or eliminate the new Institute, it would appear to be a concept and a force whose time has come.

In June, 1984, the Canadian House of Commons passed a bill establishing the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security for the purpose of increasing knowledge and understanding of the issues relating to peace and security from a Canadian perspective, with particular emphasis on arms control, disarmament, defense and conflict resolution. The Institute has the powers to establish an information resource centre, support research, publish and disseminate reports, sponsor conferences, and award scholarships and fellowships. The Institute has recently initiated a research grant programme which emphasizes policy analyses and which includes a call for studies of institution building at the international level.

Nongovernmental initiatives, although limited, appear to be at the forefront in terms of developing action research and training opportunities in international conflict resolution from a problem-solving perspective. Two initiatives in particular will be mentioned although other laudable

examples may exist. In the United States, George Mason University has established the Conflict Resolution Center, primarily associated with the name of Bryant Wedge, who has long advocated and practiced a problem-solving approach to peacemaking. One immediate accomplishment of the Center is the training and credentialing of professional practitioners in conflict management (Wedge, 1983; Wedge and Sandole, 1982).

A second ambitious and relevant innovation is the establishment of the Center for International Development and the Conflict Resolution Project at the University of Maryland, largely through the efforts of Edward Azar and John Burton. As discussed above, the Center is currently active in the development and application of the problem-solving process (Center for International Development, 1985). In addition, the Center has established the Council for the Facilitation of International Conflict Resolution, an innovative organization of approximately 100 scholars, diplomats and other practitioners who share a common interest and commitment to the problem-solving approach. The Council will assist in making the facilitation process available to parties engaged in protracted conflict and will ultimately invite international institutions to make greater use of the process in their own procedures. With these institutions to make greater use of the process in their own procedures. With these initiatives, the Center for International Development is at the leading edge in developing peaceful alternatives for conflict resolution in a troubled world.

How do these initiatives fit into a broader picture of the future in which international conflict will be handled peacefully? One strategy is to follow the analyses of Burton, Azar and others which sees protracted and apparently insolvable conflicts as based in universal human needs that cannot be suppressed or negotiated. When conflicts of this type are identified, potential resolution lies in the problem-solving process that allows for the identification of needs and their satisfaction through integrative solutions. A second strategy, which Burton and Azar's approach appears to allow for, is to recognize that many conflicts may be a mixture of need and of interest — the economic, value and power differences noted earlier. In such cases, the conflict also appears intractable and has often escalated to a point of violent intensity. The appeal of the problem-solving approach here is to de-escalate the conflict through improved communication and dialogue to the point where need identification and satisfaction occur, but also to the point where negotiation of differing interests can be effectively implemented. Finally, in a third situation of primarily objective conflict of interest which has escalated through the subjective processes of mismanagement to violent confrontation (see Deutsch, 1983), the problem-solving approach can also induce de-escalation to the point where formal negotiations may succeed. Negotiation would be carried on and supported by the full range of formal and informal diplomatic efforts that have been developed and have proven useful in managing conflict since the emergence of the international system. Thus, the general conclusion is that regardless of the sources of conflict, problem-

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solving models such as third party consultation, can offer a valuable complement to existing practices in de-escalating and eventually solving international conflict.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A BUSINESS PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

A conflict resolution strategy developed in the field of business is explained and proposed as an alternative to the use of a win-lose or compromise orientation. The approach assumes that most problems of conflict involve both technical and emotional elements. Therefore, the effective resolution of such situations necessitates the use of a problem-solving strategy that systematically addresses both these components of the conflict. Such a model along with its limitations and potential applications is discussed.

When asked what it would take to solve the current problem in Northern Ireland, one government official was reported to have said, "more killing". On the surface such a response would appear to be both callous and repulsive. Yet, the speaker expanded on his remark to indicate that, in his opinion, neither side had yet experienced sufficient pain to encourage them to explore alternatives to their current conflict resolution strategy. Regrettably, such an assertion has validity. For the implementation of effective conflict resolution strategies necessitates some willingness on the part of parties to investigate alternatives. Unless other options are seen to be potentially more beneficial (less pain or more gain) it is unlikely that meaningful change will occur.

On the world scene we do not have the "luxuries" of the Irish. For the superpowers possess far more efficient and effective means of destruction. In fact, we are fast reaching the point where one does not even have to be a major world power to have the capability of killing millions in a matter of seconds. Of additional concern and contrary to the Irish situation, is the fact that once killing starts, through use of nuclear

weapons, it could escalate quickly. Thus, it is unlikely that a threshold effect would be experienced which might encourage the exploration of non-military methods of conflict resolution. Furthermore, the losses in such a conflict cannot be simply tabulated according to the numbers killed in this explosion or that one. It is becoming increasingly evident that the long term effects of a nuclear war will be at least as destructive as the bombings themselves (nuclear winter).

Could such action ever be justified on the nature and/or depth of the disagreements between the conflicting nations/groups? It would be hard, if not impossible, to rationally do so. How then can such confrontations be avoided? Are there not more productive means of resolving our differences?

This paper will concentrate on a conflict resolution/problem solving approach that has been developed for business/organizational applications. It may seem strange at first to think an approach originating from such a source would be applicable to the realm of international conflict resolution. Businesses, at least in capitalistic countries, operate in an environment of organized conflict. In fact, most western economies implicitly assume that economic development is based on conflict (competition) and that this condition is not only desirable but essential for growth. However, while interorganizational conflict is acceptable, uncontrolled intraorganization conflict is viewed as destructive. Thus, significant resources have been dedicated to resolving conflict within organizations, and it is this body of knowledge that is used and appears relevant.

Before proceeding, a few author biases and assumptions are in order. First, it cannot be universally accepted that conflict is solely negative and has no positive attributions. To the contrary, conflict is often the major reason why we change and, at times, find new and better methods of doing things. To assume conflict is only destructive leads one to concentrate on the elimination of the conflicting behaviours rather than trying to understand the situation and develop meaningful methods to resolve the conflict. The former approach (eliminate behaviours) achieves, at best, only short term "resolution" and while lessening the immediate threat but seldom really resolves the problem.

Second, while the origins of conflict are many, the parties involved must see the resolution of the problem as more desirable than the rewards of the conflict itself. In some circumstances, it must be recognized that the conflict itself is the goal and not the problem resolution. This is an important distinction because one cannot always assume that all parties want the problem resolved. Finally, one must recognize that there are no universally applicable methods of conflict resolution. Rather the nature of the problem (conflict) should dictate a more appropriate resolution strategy.

Many researchers in the area of international conflict have concentrated on the identification of the causes of the conflict, as a necessary requisite for the development of viable solutions. While one could present an endless list of the specific causes, there appear to be three macro

categories in which most problem origins would fall. These, according to Smith (1979), are: economic considerations, political and decision processes, and social psychological processes. Economic factors would include such conditions as unequal resource distribution, differing stages of economic development, the existence of multinational firms, differential population growths relative to economic growth, and conflicting economic interests to name but a few. Political and decision processes would involve primarily the sources and uses of power but factors such as differing political processes, negotiation approaches/styles, policies and policy making mechanisms would be included. Finally, social psychological processes consider differences that are more individual oriented as opposed to the structural factors previously presented. Here, factors such as nationalism, culture, leader attitudes, ideology, compassion, and motivation would be representative of this category.

Not that surprisingly, proposed methods for resolving conflict tend to follow the author's perception of the conflict's cause. Those that see economic factors as the major cause suggest means of minimizing or managing economic differences. The control and appropriate use of power is seen by those in the political and decision processes as a necessary requisite for peace. A change in attitude (individual change) is viewed as critical by those with a more social psychological processes perspective.

It must be recognized, however, that the previous paragraph oversimplifies an extremely complex situation. For the proposed solutions to lessening international conflict do not always neatly fall into only one category, although the emphasis may be in that area. As only one illustration, a detailed study by Bloomfield, Leiss, and Legere (1967) where 52 local conflicts were studied, recommended numerous mechanisms for controlling such outbreaks of hostility. These covered all three categories previously identified and included organizational interventions, economic measures, political reforms and improved communication and information processes.

Likewise, disarmament, which has been proposed as solution by many (a recent analysis of the alternative views is found in Berkowitz, 1985), would not simply be classified as apolitical and decision process change. For such action would have ramifications in the other causal areas. Reduced arms expenditures, would directly impact on a nation's economic development. As well, a decision to disarm would necessitate some degree of social psychological change. Thus, efforts to classify causes may be useful in understanding the origins of conflict, but the impact of the changes proposed cannot be restricted to only one causal category due to the complexity and interrelationship of the variables.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

At this point a transition into an alternative method of analysing conflict seems appropriate. While many researchers investigate the causes

of conflict as a means of identifying possible solutions, perhaps it is equally useful to first understand the nature of the problem (conflict) before deciding on the process to be used to resolve it. As will be apparent later, the nature (type) of the problem is not the same as the causes of the problem. The former is used primarily to identify appropriate conflict resolution strategies while the later is used to recommend solutions.

Within the business and related literature numerous problem categorization schemes exist (Guilford, 1956; Duncan, 1959; Davis, 1969; Steiner, 1972; Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980; and Hill, 1982). All have merit and all could conceivably be the central focus of this paper. One, however, seems to provide a more useful point of departure, because it is a) relatively easy to explain in nontechnical terms; b) leads to more prescriptive advice, and c) seems to be more relevant to the issues at hand.

The basis of this problem classification scheme was first developed over 30 years ago by N.R.F. Maier (1952), and has been investigated, tested, and utilized by many over the years. Vroom and Yetton (1973), for example, used Maier's ideas to develop their own classification model. The approach to be described differs to some extent from that proposed by Maier but relies heavily on the original model and assumptions. Its basic tenet is that one must first understand the nature of the problem that exists. Once understood, an appropriate course of action becomes more apparent.

Regardless of the specific problem, it appears that two conditions must be satisfied in order to arrive at an effective decision. First, the decision reached must be technically sound. Second, the individuals who are to carry out the decision must be supportive of the action proposed.

The first of these two variables is labelled Quality (Q) and relates to the technical (non-human) aspects of the problem. For example, if one was faced with the decision of buying a word processor a number of variables would be considered. These might include the software available, the cost of the various options, maintenance costs, the useful life of the equipment, the compatibility of the equipment, and the costs of training. If a purchase decision were made solely on these factors, the decision maker would have only considered the technical components of the problem.

The second variable, Acceptance (A), is also important. Here, one must consider the extent to which the individuals affected by the decision will be supportive of the action. Such a condition typically includes an emotional response to the problem and/or possible solutions. For example, using our previous illustration, if the person who will be using the word processor has a strong preference (status, individual compatibility, a different perception of technical merit, or other reasons) for one model over another, then the actual productivity of the individual could differ greatly from that which would be expected based on a technical analysis of the problem alone. Thus, two variables become critical in gauging the overall effectiveness of the decision reached (Quality and Acceptance).

However, to more fully understand the nature of the problem one

must also recognize the variability of the two criteria. Going back to our word processor illustration, suppose we had identified three possible makes of word processors. If so, we might find or know that there are significant differences in costs, speed, software, maintenance histories, and delivery dates. Such a conclusion would indicate that there were major quality (technical) differences between the options available. Conversely, one may find that the differences are perceived to be negligible, and hence, on a quality (technical) basis it would make little difference which processor was selected. Similarly, addressing the acceptance issue, the people involved in making the decision or using the equipment may either not really care which unit is bought or very strong preferences may exist. Thus, depending on the specific situation, variability may or may not exist.

Using these two major problem dimensions (Q & A) four different problem situations can be defined (Figure 1) based on the degree of variance involved. One problem type is where there is a high technical variability but the individuals involved have little at stake or no emotional attachment to the decision reached. This would be labelled a Q/A problem. Alternatively, there may be a high emotional involvement but on a technical basis there is not any real difference between the quality components of the problem (A/Q). A third possibility is when neither the acceptance nor the quality dimensions vary to any great extent (O/Q.A). Lastly, and the problem type that appears to be most representative of international conflict resolution situations, is the condition where both quality and acceptance are highly variable (Q, A/O).

ACCEPTANCE (Variability/Importance)		High	$\frac{A}{Q}$	$\frac{Q,A}{O}$
		Low	$\frac{O}{Q,A}$	A
			Low	High
			Quality (Variability/Importance)	

Figure 1. Problem classifications based on quality, acceptance and variability.

With these problem types in mind, one may now consider their relationship to the overall decision effectiveness (DE). Two common contentions are that this relationship can be explained by one of the following formulae: $DE = Q$ or $DE = Q + A$. Both assumed relationships involve major flaws.

The first relationship, ($DE = Q$), would only be applicable for Q/A and $O/Q,A$ situations since acceptance is less variable. In other situations it is not an appropriate relationship since the acceptance factor has not been included. Acceptance is and always will be a major component in such cases and to ignore it makes the erroneous assumption that only the technical aspects of a decision will define success.

The second alternative ($DE = Q + A$) assumes that the minimum level of decision effectiveness is defined by either the Q or A component, whichever is higher. On the surface this additive relationship may seem reasonable, and it would be technically applicable in all situations except for a $Q, A/O$ problem. However, consider the following examples. Assume a decision is made that has the utmost technical quality but no one is willing to carry it out, or alternatively, everyone was willing to carry out a decision that had not technical merit. Such decisions would be totally ineffective. Yet, an additive relationship would define decision effectiveness as equal to either the high technical merit, in the first case, or the high acceptance level in the second. In neither case would the formula approximate the real effectiveness.

A multiplicative relationship ($DE = Q \times A$), more accurately identifies the decision effectiveness in all situations. Since acceptance, using the earlier illustration, is non-existent (no one will carry out the decision), DE , in mathematical terms, would be zero (0). Therefore, the actual decision effectiveness is more accurately reflected by a multiplicative rather than an additive relationship. Not only is such a formula more mathematically correct, but it more accurately sets out the interrelationships between the two key variables.

The point in discussing the differences between an additive and multiplicative model is not a trivial one. For the strategies of decision makers are to a large extent dictated by such implicit or explicit assumptions. An additive concept generally infers that decisions should first be made on technical grounds (Q) and then efforts should be made to increase the acceptance of the decision often through the use of power and/or persuasion. When negative reaction is encountered, which is often the case, then the decision maker is "forced" to either exercise more power or else compromise in order to gain some acceptable level of support. Such strategies often lead to either more conflict or half-hearted implementation. Neither of which are characteristics of an effective decision. The multiplicative model portrays the true relationship more accurately and results in strategies that accommodate the Quality and Acceptance needs.

While not being privy to discussions at the top levels of government, one suspects that many politicians have a $DE = Q + A$ orientation. It is often

assumed that the "other guy" is bad and that one must achieve, as first priority, a technically correct decision at all costs. Acceptance, rather than being true support, is defined in terms of the extent to which one can monitor the actions of the other. Thus, there is an over emphasis on the Q with little attention to the A. Negotiations tend to centre on numbers (bombs, tanks, personnel), ratios (this force to that one) and verification rather than endeavoring to develop feelings of trust. Ironically, it is assumed that technology is king and can be used as a substitute for meaningful acceptance. One questions the wisdom of such an assumption.

Having developed and explained a model, attention should now be turned to the strategies such a model would propose, with particular reference to the issue of international conflict resolution. In approaching this task the author must clearly identify his lay person status in terms of the political complexities of such a domain and apologise in advance for any over simplifications that may merge.

In order to focus the discussion it is assumed that most problems in the international realm are of the Q,A/O variety. While it is conceivable that conflict situations could be Q/A or A/Q types, the majority, particularly those that have been more difficult to resolve, include both complex technical issues and emotional considerations. Research with this problem type (Miner, 1979a; Miner 1979b) has investigated three problem solving alternatives. One strategy option was to first address the technical dimensions of the problem and then move on to the acceptance issues ($Q \rightarrow A$). Alternatively, both were considered simultaneously ($Q \leftrightarrow A$). Finally, acceptance was first priority followed by the technical considerations ($A \rightarrow Q$). Research (Miner, 1979a) seems to indicate that the latter of these three strategies is most effective. While further research still needs to be conducted, the first two options appear to be less effective for the following reasons. First, when there is a high emotional component, decision makers need an opportunity to "vent" their feelings prior to trying to solve complex technical problems. Such an emotional release tends to minimize hidden agendas, clarify perceptions and lead to more creative thought. The $Q \rightarrow A$ approach negates such an opportunity by dealing with acceptance issues last. Thus, the participants remain skeptical of the motives of others, harbour unspoken concerns and do not participate objectively in the problem solving process. Second, the $Q \rightarrow A$ approach tends to parallel the $DE = Q + A$ assumption previously identified. Specifically, the participants using such a method assume that the effectiveness of a technically correct solution can be enhanced by adding more acceptance at a later date. This does not seem to be the case. For when such a strategy is employed, an approach where one would expect to find a higher level of quality, it in fact achieves the lowest level of technical merit (Miner, 1979a). Thus, the failure to consider the more emotional components of a problem prior to the technical issues minimized decision effectiveness. Finally, the ($Q \leftrightarrow A$) method seems to "fail" because it tries to deal with potentially conflicting objectives in a simultaneous fashion. Other research (Miner, 1979b) in-

icates that such efforts, particularly when attempted by outsiders, results in both lower levels of quality and higher levels of dissatisfaction.

The A → Q strategy avoids these two concerns. First, the two issues are separated; second, efforts to address emotional concerns are undertaken prior to trying to grapple with the technical issues of the problem. A further stage of the proposed process involves a re-examination of acceptance after a specific decision or course of action has been reached (A → Q → A).

In more tactical terms the following "skills" should be employed by a facilitator in Q, A/O situations using a A → strategy:

(1) The problem should be stated in such a way that it does not create defensiveness but rather approaches the difficulty in an objective and constructive manner. In doing so the problem statement should (a) be put in situational terms ("How can we make the world more peaceful?" would be preferred over "How can we make nations less hostile?" because the former concentrates on a situational objective while the latter passes judgement, creates defensiveness and limits the universe of possible solutions.); (b) not suggest alternatives ("Can peace best be achieved by disarmament or political reform?" would potentially limit the discussion of other viable alternatives); (c) not indicate a preference for any solution or approach ("Economic restructuring seems to be a major concern. How can peace be achieved within this reality?" would be a situation where a bias is shown.); (d) not criticise any possible solution ("How can we achieve world peace having recognized that disarmament is not a feasible alternative?" is a case where a solution is criticised).

(2) The supplying of essential facts and information in an unbiased and open manner. Specifically all relevant information should be supplied without judgement. One should avoid the use of adjectives (better, worse, stronger, weaker) that intentionally or unintentionally evaluate the information provided. For example, a statement such as "The USA has significantly increased its arms budget over the last three years while the USSR has only had moderate increases," would not be an objective presentation of facts. It would be far better to provide the raw data along with appropriate comparison information (total budget, gnp) and any other information that might be relevant for drawing a conclusion about arms expenditures.

(3) Ensure that all participants in the decision have equal involvement. This can be attained by (a) protecting the individual's right to express his or her feelings/ideas; (b) preventing the domination of the discussion by one or more individuals; (c) requesting input from less vocal members, and (d) making individuals feel their ideas are wanted and useful. When problems involve a high acceptance component, it is essential that real participation occur. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that an environment be created that encourages the exchange of ideas and feelings. The previous suggestions are provided as a means of creating such a condition.

(4) Restate expressed ideas and feelings in a brief, accurate and clear manner. This is accomplished by capsulating the idea/feeling and

restating it without an indication of agreement or disagreement. For example, "The delegate from Nicaragua feels that the recent mining of Managua harbour was an infringement on his country's territorial rights." would be better than "The delegate from Nicaragua has a good point. The recent mining of Managua harbour was an infringement on his country's territorial rights." The latter statement passes judgement rather than simply reflecting the views of the speaker.

(5) Questions rather than statements should be used to stimulate problem solving behaviour and explore areas that seem to be relevant. For example, the use of a question such as "To what extent should the current unrest in Chile influence our decision?" is preferred over "The current unrest in Chile seems to be relevant to our decision." While both try to get at the same issue, the latter judges the situation and leads the decision makers while the former simply questions the relevancy of the issue. This may seem to be a trivial distinction, but it is not. Questions imply doubt and maintain objectivity but still can be used to focus discussion. Statements, on the other hand, can be used to focus attention, but the perceived objectivity of the stater may be in doubt.

(6) As discussion proceeds, summarization should be used to (a) move the discussion along, (b) indicate progress and (c) indicate differences of opinion as well as points of agreement. As an illustration, a summary statement might go something like this: "Our discussion, thus far today, seems to have concentrated on the economic differences between the two countries. One, Canada, feels that the recent trade restrictions in lumber and pork are contrary to the notion of freer trade which they feel has been promoted by the US government and is embodied in the GATT agreement. The US, on the other hand, feels that government subsidies to the lumber and pork industry in Canada create an unfair trade relationship which puts its own producers at a major disadvantage. Both sides agree that the current US-Canadian exchange rate has exacerbated this situation." In this summary statement the following should be noted: (a) areas of agreement and disagreement have been identified, (b) the speaker has not taken sides, and (c) a brief summary of the major points has been made conveying a sense of progress. Since both sides seem to agree on at least one common problem (exchange rate) the speaker might wish to now focus the discussion in this area. To do so, he/she might ask: "Are there any cooperative actions that might be taken by both nations to minimize the problems created by the current US-Canadian exchange rate?"

With this prescriptive advice in mind, a broader five phase sequence of activities for a Q/A/O problem can be presented. The first step involves the presentation of the problem. Here, the items referenced earlier under points 1 and 2 are critical. The second phase, involves the expression of feelings about the situation (anger, distrust, skepticism, concern). Generally, this phase tends to concentrate on the negative attributes of the other party or the situation. Rather than stifling such discussion, this exchange should be encouraged as long as it contributes to a better understanding of the

situation in hand. The skills identified in points 3 through 6 are most useful to achieve such understanding. In the next step, an attempt to "balance" the negative perceptions provided earlier is attempted. Here an effort is made to obtain positive, or at least neutral, comments about the individuals or situations. To effect such a transition, the speaker would summarize the previous information and, through questioning, try to direct the discussion toward any positive impressions. Obviously, one could never expect to receive as many positive comments as negative ones. Yet, a number typically emerge and with the use of the skills identified, more usually come forth.

To this point, it should be noted that no effort has been made to address the specific conflict. What has occurred is a presentation of the problem and the expression of feelings about the problem or the individuals involved. It is only after such an information exchange that one can productively enter the fourth phase (solution generation and decision making). Here one initially concentrates on the generation of possible solutions. This becomes a type of brainstorming activity where ideas are presented and recorded without evaluation. It is only after a number of possible solutions have been developed, that the participants are encouraged to evaluate the suggestions. The need to separate the solution generation from the evaluation phase is a generally accepted principle of group decision making. The use of the last four skills seems to even further enhance the quality of the decision. Finally, after a decision is made, one must ascertain whether the decision reached is acceptable (a willingness to support it exists). If so, the process is complete. If not, the problem becomes why there is no support and discussion centres on an expression of feelings prior to trying to answer this question. This process, along with the required skills and philosophy, is labelled Problem Centered Conflict Resolution (PCCR).

Before proceeding two potential limitations of PCCR must be recognized. First, this approach has originated and been tested largely in a small group business environment. While one assumes that small group research in the area of international conflict resolution may have principles similar to those of business, there are sufficient difference for one to be cautious about generalizing the apparent success of this approach to one where political considerations and representative roles may be quite different. The second and perhaps the most critical limitation, is that this approach assumes the presence of an unbiased and well trained facilitator who can concentrate on the process considerations rather than becoming directly involved in the decision itself. To what extent individuals involved in conflict situations would be willing to "employ" such an individual is purely a matter of speculation. However, without such an individual, it is extremely unlikely that the proposed process could be followed by the parties themselves given that they already have substantial disagreements.

APPLICATION CONSIDERATION

The use of negotiators in situations involving international conflict resolution are not that uncommon. However, what is being proposed is not a negotiator in its more pedestrian sense, one who acts as a catalyst to achieve compromises and trade-offs, but rather one who acts as a facilitator by using a defined conflict resolution approach which emphasizes a problem solving orientation rather than a compromise mode. Perhaps, this is a too idealistic aim. However, one field of applied organization research, Organizational Development (OD), has strongly advocated the need for such an individual, typically labelled a change agent, when trying to resolve conflict (French and Bell, 1978; French, Bell and Zawacki, 1983; Huse, 1980; Margulies and Raia, 1978). Other research seems to clearly indicate that parties involved in conflict do need an acceptable third party to help them deal with the issues that divide them (Fisher, 1983).

For PCCR to be successful the following would be required:

(a) The facilitator would need a thorough understanding of conflict resolution, in general, and be trained in the specific skills and process described. This would not appear to be a major problem since the training of other individuals (largely business persons) has been conducted with some success.

(b) The change agent should have the following minimum personal qualities: impartiality, integrity, credibility, energy and sensitivity. A bilingual ability (the languages of the conflicting parties) would be seen as a definite asset. Knowledge about the specific conflict or the parties involved is seen as helpful, but too much information may well jeopardize the other qualities desired. Such a position (knowledge is useful but not essential) has been supported by others (Burton, 1969; Walton, 1969 and Fisher, 1972).

(c) The conflicting parties must be willing to accept the individual as a facilitator. This would perhaps be more problematic. As stated earlier, the author does not contend to be more than a lay person with regard to issues of international conflict. What mechanisms and approaches would be useful in obtaining this end is unknown. However, to be successful, the parties must be willing to accept the person in the defined role.

(d) The parties must also be willing to dedicate time, energy and resources to the process. Furthermore, they should have a high level of authority, be representative of their group, command personal respect, and, if possible, have a more problem solving then confrontational bias.

(e) Situational variables are seen as relevant but less so than the previous considerations. What is important is that the process be given an opportunity to work with a minimum amount of unnecessary interference. If this necessitates the use of a more remote location or less public meetings, then such a decision should be taken.

(f) A track record of success would need to be established. This would, presumably, provide future participants with higher confidence levels. It is for this reason that it is recommended that such an approach be

employed first in situations where the stakes are not so high that neither party is unwilling to take a bit of a gamble. One does not have the audacity, nor has there been sufficient research, to recommend or even assume that this approach would be both acceptable and successful in dealing with a major issue in its initial application. For in many ways the willingness to implement such strategies involves the acceptance dimension. The parties have to be willing to try it and prior success may be the only reason short of utter frustration that would induce them to do so.

(g) Finally, as stated much earlier, no approach to conflict resolution is universally successful. Some may be better than others, but all have their successes and failures. Therefore, it must be recognized that there will be disappointments. Yet, what the conflicting parties are being asked to do is play the odds and accept a strategy that appears to have a higher likelihood of success.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The method proposed (PCCR) endeavours to avoid the contraction of the zones of possible solutions and ideally expand these areas to include new options. This concept of zones and their relationships was first presented by Bernard (1938), as the "zone of indifference" and later by Simon (1947) as the "zone of acceptance". In both instances the authors were conceptualizing the acceptance of authority by subordinates. Each felt that an employee's decision to follow or not follow a supervisor's directive was a function of specific variables which could be modified. Thus, authority could be increased by expanding the zones of indifference/acceptance. This concept has also been adopted in the negotiation realm (Raiffa, 1982) to portray the areas of acceptable solutions.

Figures 2 and 3 attempt to visually convey this concept of zones and their relationships. In the first instance (Figure two) the area inside the border represents the universe of possible solutions. The amoeba-like figures, for parties A and B, depict those solutions from the universe that are acceptable to each. As can be seen, there is no overlap in this first case. Hence, the parties, with their present positions, cannot reach an agreement. Figure three shows an alternative situation where overlap exists. Here, there are solutions that are acceptable to both parties, but it is unlikely that either party would be initially aware that such a commonality exists.

When one considers conflict resolution as a process, one realizes that the parties to the conflict come into negotiations with preconceived concepts and positions. Their pre-negotiation positions could be represented by either Figure 2 or 3. As a result of interaction, during negotiations, their zones of acceptable solutions can change. When conflict is not managed well, it is likely that the number of possibilities will shrink and could even eliminate a condition where prior overlapping existed.

Figure 2. Zones of possible solutions with no overlap.





Figure 3. Zones of possible solutions with overlap.



PCCR assumes that the border of each party's acceptable solutions is not defined solely by technical considerations. Rather it is also influenced by each party's perception of the other and their own willingness to develop and explore acceptable alternatives. Therefore, the proposed role and activities of the change agent is tied to multiple objectives.

First, it is felt that the effective flow of communications is an essential ingredient for the clarification of perceptions and improvement of the information exchange process. Such an assumption is supported by Burton (1969) when he stresses the critical nature of this variable and contends that it is *the* most important variable in conflict resolution. PCCR advocates that the facilitator must maintain an unbiased process oriented approach. From the problem statement (skill one) through the summarization techniques (skill six) actions are proposed that stress the need for objectivity and encourage the accurate and effective exchange of information. Since most parties enter negotiations with a more negative view of the other than is warranted, effective communications should result in a more accurate impression which in turn should lead to an expansion of the respective zones of possible solutions. Hence, the likelihood of an ultimate agreement is increased.

It is also felt that the venting of feelings prior to problem solving and the separation of the solution generation and evaluation phases should lead to more creative problem solving. Research (Van de Ven, 1974; Hill, 1982; Miner, 1984) seems to confirm this latter assumption and the research previously cited (Miner, 1979a) seems to support the prior one. When considering Figures two and three, one must realize that the unmapped areas (places where neither party see acceptable solutions) may result from one of two conditions. The first is where the possibility has been considered but rejected based on certain assumptions. It is in this situation where perceptions become important and can possibly be altered by improved communications. Alternatively, the case may well be that the option has not even been thought of by either party. It is not that it has been rejected but rather that it has not even been considered. Creative problem solving, thus, becomes the process by which such options are identified and subsequently analysed, expanding the zone of possible solutions. Again, it is assumed that such creativity can best occur by dealing first with the emotional issues. Negative feelings hinder creativity and unless these are resolved (an $A \rightarrow Q$ strategy) the likelihood that the parties will objectively consider alternatives is greatly diminished.

PCCR is proposed as an alternative to the more typical win-lose and compromise strategies that are often employed by conflicting parties. It is recognized that the research supporting this approach has come largely from the business and organizational literature and may not be generalizable to the area of international conflict resolution. Yet, support does exist (Neale and Bazerman, 1985) for negotiation strategies, like PCCR, which have a more problem solving/decision making orientation.

Whether PCCR can make a direct or indirect contribution to the

understanding and resolution of international conflict is purely a matter of speculation at this point. However, as stated earlier, we may not have the "luxuries" of the Irish. Our "old" methods do not seem to be meeting with much success. Perhaps viewing conflict from a somewhat different vantage point may help.

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Professor Jan Prawitz introducing Professor Hannes Alfven.

NAVAL ARMS AND NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

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ABSTRACT

The freedom of navigation principle makes any coastal state the neighbour across the sea of every other coastal state, small and powerful alike. The implication for arms control in the maritime domain of this special legal regime is discussed. A survey is made of possible measures of global or regional application and of the role of confidence building measures. Special difficulties, such as the East-West military imbalance at sea, the flag state coastal state conflict of interest and the need for harmonization of different legal instruments are discussed. The 1985 UN expert study on the naval arms race is referred to.

While disarmament negotiations have not managed to halt the arms race, almost all branches of military activity have one way or another been addressed at such negotiations. There is, however, one important exception. The naval activities and forces have attracted little attention after 1945 compared to its role in the world military situation.

Before World War II a number of arms control agreements related to naval forces were concluded. Among them were the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, the 1930 and 1936 London Naval Treaties, all agreed between the major naval powers at that time, i.e. the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.

Numerous regional restrictions in the maritime domain were also agreed during the last 150 years. Just a few could be mentioned here.¹ The famous example is the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement between Britain and the US limiting the naval forces on the North American Great Lakes. There

¹ The United Nations report "Study on the Naval arms race" (A/40/535) Annex I includes a list of 27 pre-1945 treaties on demilitarization, other arms control and confidence-building measures applying to the maritime domain.

are also the agreement on neutralization of the Black Sea, the two agreements between Argentina and Chile on the demilitarization of the Magellan's Straits (1981) and on the limitation of their naval armaments (1902). The Washington Naval Treaty prescribed i.e. a freeze on fortifications and naval basis on many islands in the Pacific. Very important today is the 1936 Montreux Convention regulating the transit of naval vessels to and from the Black Sea.

Laws of war provisions related to naval warfare are included in the VI-XIII Hague Conventions of 1907.

THE POST 1945 TREATY HISTORY

Some measures regarding naval forces were agreed after 1945, however. Most important are the bilateral US-USSR limitation on the number of SLBM-submarines and the number of missiles onboard such submarines in SALT I of 1972 and SALT II of 1979. SALT I expired in 1977 and SALT II should have expired at the end of 1985, but did never enter into force. Both agreements are still respected, however, in relevant parts.² Related to the SALT agreements is a confidence building measure, the agreement of 1972 on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High seas and its Protocol of 1973.

There are two multilateral treaties relevant to the maritime domain agreed after 1945. One is the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban).³ The other is the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea Bed Treaty).⁴

An interesting regional measure is the inclusion of vast sea areas of the Atlantic Ocean and the South East Pacific between latitudes N 35° and S 60 ° into the area of application of the treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco) once the treaty fully enters into force (Art 4:2 and 28:1). However, some nuclear weapon powers when pledging to respect the status of the treaty by acceding to its Protocol II filed reservations to the extension of arms control measures into high sea areas referring to "recognized international law".⁵

Such reservations were instituted already in the text of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 providing for the demilitarization of "the area south of 60 (degrees) South Latitude, including all ice shelves". There would be no

² In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18.

³ The Partial Test Ban entered into force 1963 and had 112 parties as of 1 Jan 1985.

⁴ The Sea Bed entered into force in 1972 and had 75 parties as of 1 Jan 1985.

⁵ The Tlatelolco Treaty was agreed in 1967 and had entered into force for 23 Latin American States as of 1 Jan 1985. Protocol II (the guarantee protocol) is in force for all nuclear weapon states.

restriction, however, of rights under international law on the high seas within the area (Art. VI).

Recently the South Pacific Forum countries agreed to establish a Nuclear Free Zone in the South Pacific (1985 Treaty of Rarotonga). The zone is the second in a densely inhabited area and extends from the border of the Latin American zone in the east to the west coast of Australia and from the Antarctic area in the south to the equator — for some Kiribati areas even beyond — in the north (Art I and Annex I). The zonal perimeter encompasses vast sea and ocean areas but the treaty does not limit any existing "freedom of the seas" (Art. 2). The entry into force of the treaty process has just begun. In due time, therefore, it will be clear how the nuclear weapon powers will react to the protocols they will be invited to sign.⁶

Some measures have been proposed after 1945 but are not yet agreed. Among those are the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean, the abstention from navigating naval forces in areas that are both remote from their home ports and close to coasts of other states, the establishment of sanctuary areas for SLBM-submarines, and the prenotification of military exercises in sea areas adjacent to Europe.

The Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga cover the major part of the southern hemisphere by nuclear arms control regimes. This situation could be further advanced if agreement is reached to establish the proposed zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia.

The relative lack of interest in naval forces with regard to arms control is hardly due to lack of appreciation for their importance but rather the fact that the legal regime at sea was not until recently defined in a clear way. There was an attempt during the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference to raise the question of limiting the military use of the vast high sea areas of the world considered to be the common heritage of mankind. The issue was, however, considered to fall within the general mandate of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. But there it was considered difficult to deal with naval issues before the Law of the Sea Conference had defined the legal regime of the sea. Before that it would be unclear who would be entitled to agree on what.

On 10 December 1982 the new Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica. From that date on, there is a firm legal base for discussing arms control and disarmament at sea.

⁶ The Rarotonga Treaty was agreed on 6 August 1985 and is open for signature to all States members of the South Pacific Forum, its three protocols to relevant nuclear weapon powers.

⁷ The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature in December 1982. Three important states have not yet signed, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom. The Convention has not entered into force as of 1 Jan 1986.

From that date on, there should be no excuse for not addressing arms control and disarmament issues in the maritime domain. A few western major powers did not sign in Montego Bay. But their reason not to do so was not disagreement over security related provisions in the Convention but linked to the regime for exploitation of economic resources on the ocean floor. There should thus be general agreement over security related provisions, the more so as the majority of those provisions are customary law as much as treaty law thus applying to all states of the world.

The adoption of UNCLOS has apparently lifted the long time taboo on discussion of naval arms control. In 1983 United Nations General Assembly initiated an expert study on the naval arms race in order to "facilitate the identification of possible areas for disarmament and confidence-building".⁸ After considering the experts' report⁹ in 1985 the General Assembly went on and initiated a fresh process of negotiations that will begin in United Nations Disarmament Commission in May 1986 and continue half a year later in the General Assembly.¹⁰ The subject thus seems to be open for discussion.

THE LEGAL SETTING AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

The legal background for negotiating new arms control measures applying to sea areas and naval forces is based on three pillars of international law: First there are the general restrictions on the use of force, the right of self defence embodied in the United Nations charter (Art 2:44, 51) and the related principles of non-intervention and non-aggression. Secondly there is the law of the sea. Thirdly there is arms control and disarmament and laws of sea warfare agreed between states.

The Convention of the Law of the Sea is a treaty based on the tradition of the freedom on the high seas dating back to Hugo Grotius' work *Mare Liberum* in 1609. The regime was the opposite of arms control. Its aim was arms non-control at sea. Therefore, introducing measures of arms control and disarmament at sea now would, depending on the circumstances in each case, involve agreement among states to abstain from specific UNCLOS freedoms they may enjoy.

According to UNCLOS coastal states exercise full and exclusive jurisdiction in its internal waters only, i.e. inside a coastline perimeter, the so called base line. A coastal state has jurisdiction over the exploitation of natural resources in its exclusive economic zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the base line. A coastal state has no jurisdiction in the high seas. An archipelagic state may establish archipelagic waters within

⁸ Res 38/188 G.

⁹ UN Document A/40/535.

¹⁰ Res A/C.1/40/535.

baselines surrounding all islands of the state, in which a jurisdiction similar to that in territorial seas applies.

All states have the right of innocent passage for their ships in the territorial sea of other coastal states, and in archipelagic waters, and of transit passage in international straits and are subject to almost no military restraints in economic zones on high seas. The legal concepts referred to in this and the preceding paragraph are more precisely defined in the Law of the Sea Convention.

There is a significant difference between applying arms control to sea areas as compared to land areas, because of different legal regimes. Almost all land is subject to the jurisdiction of one state, a well known exception being Antarctica. As a consequence, adversary military forces on land are geographically separated from each other in peacetime. Naval forces of different states, on the other hand, may mix all over the sea, on the surface, in the water and on the sea bed. Indeed, they are frequently doing so.

SOME MILITARY AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The technological development of the means for maritime warfare has made as remarkable advances as the means for warfare on land. The nuclear, electronic, aviation, computer, automatic battlefield and weapon-effects revolutions apply to naval forces as well. This trend is of course dominated by the two major military blocs, but with some delay, the new technology is gradually influencing the navies of smaller countries as well. Developments include radically new vessel design, such as hydrofoils and hovercrafts. New missile technology also permits small ships, fast patrol boats and aircraft to carry weapons with a fire power earlier associated with large warships only.

There are a surprising number of nuclear weapons earmarked for use in the maritime context. About 7200 warheads are attached to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) assigned to strategic second strike. There are some 5900 tactical nuclear weapons deployed by naval forces for use against surface ships, submarines, aircraft or targets on shore. Thus, between every third and every fourth nuclear weapon of the world total inventory is earmarked for naval use. A fair share of those, the number varying over time, but say more than half of them are always on the move at sea as a matter of routine. If a new generation of sea-bed cruise missiles with nuclear warheads will be deployed in large numbers, as has been suggested, this trend will be further enhanced.

But the nuclear revolution does not only mean nuclear weapons at sea. There are about 550 nuclear reactors for propulsion of submarines and some surface ships, exceeding more than twice the number of electricity generating nuclear power reactors in operation on land.

The main conventional weapon development relates to the capabilities of ship-to-ship and air-to-ship missiles, considerably diminishing

the role of conventional naval artillery. The new technology includes missiles able to fly at both high and low altitudes, to be launched from above or under the surface and which could finish a flight by a dive to a submerged target. Advanced guidance systems including also external satellite-assistance permit both over the horizon targeting and almost hundred percent hit probability. Of course, defence systems to meet the threat of the new missiles have also been developed.

New methods and aids for precise navigation permit all weather all time operation with ever increasing precision, including submerged navigation in areas covered by ice.

Beside the technology of weapons systems and ships, the major naval powers have acquired a considerable capability for sea transportation of troops. The mobility and range of their amphibious forces have also increased.

Also maritime aircraft has been considerably developed to permit longer ranges, more advanced surveillance, more effective strike capabilities, and more precise navigation regardless of weather. Inflight refueling has become routine.

In summary, present maritime, i.e. naval, amphibious and sea-transportation capabilities combined, provide the major power blocks with increasing possibilities not only to outbalance each other but to project considerable military force in most parts of the world. Gun boat diplomacy, over seas invasion and closing of sea lanes by mines are now possible at shorter notice, with more precision, over longer distances and in larger scale than ever before.

Growing naval activities have increased both the general risks for confrontation at sea, and the special risks for unintended incidents and unnecessary conflicts as a consequence of the difficulty to correctly identify objects in various weather and illumination conditions in sea areas to which all have access.

Such risks are particularly large in relation to submarines and antisubmarine warfare activities. In particular, submarine incidents in coastal waters include several uncertainties. Firstly, the submarine may not necessarily know where it is. Secondly, the coastal state may not know for certain who is the flag state. Thirdly, it may be difficult to communicate between the coastal state and the submarine. And fourthly, the coastal state may not know if the submarine has nuclear weapons on board. Important in this regard is the UNCLOS provision that innocent passage through the territorial sea by submarines and other underwater vehicles must be on the surface with flags shown (Art 20).

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUE

As there are a variety of naval forces deployed for a variety of purposes, there should also be a variety of objectives to be pursued by arms

- ★ stabilising the strategic nuclear balance;
- ★ limiting and reducing the maritime arms primarily of the military forces of the major power blocs;
- ★ providing for a reasonable *seaboard security* for well over hundred small and medium-sized coastal states;
- ★ confidence-building;
- ★ modernizing the humanitarian laws of war relevant to the maritime domain;
- ★ guaranteeing the UNCLOS rights of non-belligerent states in case of war.

According to the UN expert study, negotiating arms control and disarmament in the maritime domain should be governed by four "axioms":

First, disarmament measures should be balanced and should not diminish the security of any State. But as naval forces are not independent of other military forces, they should be considered in their general military context. There is no such thing as an independent naval balance or parity. Disarmament measures in the maritime field should thus be balanced in that general sense. Second, this fact combined with the very differing geographical situations of States could require multilateral measures of restriction for naval forces and weapons to be numerically asymmetrical in order to maintain an overall military situation in balance. Third, because of the universal nature of the Convention of the Law of the Sea, such measures should not take the legal form of amendments to the Convention. They should be embodied in separate legal instruments in harmony with the Convention. Fourth, as in all arms control and disarmament, appropriate verification and complaints procedures are essential for the proper implementation of agreed measures.¹¹

A number of difficulties different from those facing current negotiations on other issues will have to be overcome. One is the East-West imbalance in the naval domain. Another is the conflicting security interests between a few major military flag states and a large number of small and medium-sized coastal states. A third is the need mentioned above to harmonize the legal instruments of the arms control agreements and the Law of the Sea. A fourth is special technical problems related to submarines.

A fifth is the several centuries long tradition of the freedom of the high seas making the mere idea of elaborating or abstaining from such freedom in favour of arms control burdened by red tape and prestige.

The discussion of possible areas for arms control measures in the maritime domain after Montego Bay has just begun. The UN expert study contains a long list of possible arms control measures in the maritime domain within the frame of quantitative, qualitative, geographic and mission restraints, confidence-building measures and the modernization of

¹¹ A/40/535 para 285.

the laws of sea warfare. The report makes no priorities among listed measures except that it stresses the importance of nuclear weapon related measures. The report recommends for measures¹²:

- ★ Multilateralization of the US-USSR Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and above the High Seas.

- ★ Continuation of negotiations to widen the scope of the Sea Bed Treaty in accordance with its article V.

- ★ Extending the nuclear weapon free regime of the Antarctic Treaty to sea areas within its area of application (south of 60 degrees south).

- ★ Modernization of the laws of sea warfare.

More specifically, it would be possible to identify the following general categories of measures:

- ★ Limitation of sea-born strategic nuclear weapons and the establishment of sanctuaries for SLBM-submarines. The purpose of such measures would be to promote the stability of the nuclear balance.

- ★ General prohibition of carrying nuclear weapons onboard naval vessels except onboard specifically recognized units. The purpose would be to avoid actual or suspected nuclearization of routine patrols and the nuclearization of possible incidents at sea. One possibility is that nuclear weapon carrying vessels show a special flag.

- ★ Limitations of blue water forces of the major power blocs, their amphibious forces and special military transportation vessels. The purpose would be to provide a maritime contribution to an attempt to achieve a general balance between the blocs at a lower level and to limit the capabilities for gun boat diplomacy and overseas power projection. While important for the international situation at large, even dramatic measures of this would not significantly help the small and medium-sized coastal states, because the naval forces of major powers, even if substantially reduced, could during a limited period of time easily be concentrated for "gun boat diplomacy", power projection and aggression against an overseas neighbour. General limitation measures must thus be complemented with CSBMs.

- ★ Confidence and security building measures (CSBM), e.g. limitation of the cruising of activities, special codes of conduct for submarines and other submerged activities, and limited or full demilitarization on a regional or sub-regional basis. The purpose would be to relax tension, build confidence, decrease the presence of military force regionally and to provide "seabord security" to coastal states.

- ★ Provisions for guaranteeing safe access to the high seas for ships and aircraft of neutral and non-combatant states. The purpose would be to separate vessels of states involved in military conflict from those of states not involved and to give a general priority to peaceful activities at sea.

- ★ Modernization of the Laws of War to be applied at sea, an issue

¹² *Ibid.* para 322.

which was overlooked when the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were negotiated because the Law of the Sea negotiations were not finished at that time.

The concept "seaboard security" was introduced in the UN expert study to summarize the interest of coastal states. The relevant paragraph reads:

The principle of freedom of navigation on the world's oceans makes a coastal State the neighbour across the sea of every other coastal State, including all significant naval Powers. While naval forces have the recognized legal right to cruise and operate off the coasts of foreign States, coastal States, particularly those which are small or medium in size, have on the other hand a legitimate claim for a reasonable "seaboard security" and should not be subjected to power projection possibly originating from such activities. It should be noted in this regard that the Convention on the Law of the Sea includes balanced provisions which would meet security needs of both flag States and coastal States provided they are strictly implemented. It should also be noted that the security of both categories of States could be further enhanced by means of agreed confidence and security-building measures in harmony with the Convention and customary international law.¹³

SOME PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY SWEDEN

Recognizing the significance of the adoption of UNCLOS, several countries have expressed views on issues of arms control in the maritime domain. One of them, Sweden, took the initiative to the UN expert study in 1982 and has later proposed some measures for further consideration. In an intervention¹⁴ at the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1985 five issues worthy of such consideration "without delay" were proposed:

"First, long-range sea-based cruise missiles should be banned before they are produced in large numbers;

Secondly, all tactical nuclear weapons on board warships should be taken ashore and not be on board on routine patrol;

Thirdly, the legitimate claim of coastal states to reasonable "seaboard security" should be confirmed;

Fourthly, the inalienable right of all States to the freedom of the seas should not be infringed upon the military activities.

Fifthly, a modernization of the current laws of sea warfare should be undertaken."

On the same occasion it was noted that the large number of tactical nuclear weapons onboard warships had been largely overlooked. It was further noted that one reason for that was the policy pursued by nuclear

¹³ *Ibid.* para 264.

¹⁴ Statement by the representative of Sweden, ambassador M.B. Theorin in the first Committee of the UN General Assembly on 15 October 1985 (A/C.1/40/PV.4).

weapon powers neither to confirm nor to delay the presence of any nuclear weapons onboard any particular ships at any particular time¹⁵ and that policy creates legitimate concern in many countries, especially when warships of nuclear Powers in accordance with international law make use of their right to innocent passage through these countries' territorial waters or call at their harbours. This policy was characterized as the opposite to building confidence between States. "It is in fact a confidence-blocking practice that should be abandoned."

At the *Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe*, Sweden has together with other neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe advocated that naval activities, especially amphibious activities, should also be subject to special notification and restriction measures.¹⁶ The conference deals primarily with conventional forces and arms.

In relation to the proposed nuclear weapon free zone in Northern Europe, Sweden insisted that the zonal arrangement should cover the Baltic Sea including its high sea areas. Other Nordic countries have referred to other sea areas in the North Atlantic. It has been recognized that extending a full or limited nuclear weapon free regime to sea areas would introduce some limitation to existing freedoms of navigation, and would thus require agreement among all states concerned to waive relevant rights of this kind.

Implementation of a regime of restriction for nuclear weapons at sea would require the abandoning of the "neither confirming nor denying" policies by the nuclear weapon powers. Instead ships that under such a regime could carry legally nuclear weapons should be identified, for instance by showing a special flag,¹⁷ making them eligible for agreed restrictions and possibly providing them, for safety purpose, with privileges in addition to those granted to warships in general. If such ships could not be identified any information or restriction measure regarding nuclear weapons at sea would be meaningless.

It should be noted in this regard that Article 23 of UNCLOS foresees future international agreements on special precautionary measures for ships carrying "nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances", when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.

¹⁵ The policy neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular place at any particular time has been described as originally a public relations policy in a report by Arkin, W.M., *Contingency Overseas Deployments of Nuclear Weapons*, Institute for Policy Studies, (February 1985).

¹⁶ Documents CSCE/SC/3 and CSCE/SC/7.

¹⁷ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1940 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Annex I, Art 16, prescribes design for a flag for identification of works and installations containing dangerous forces.

NON-MILITARY APPROACHES TO STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE: AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY

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ABSTRACT

Deterrence is a most unsatisfactory concept upon which to build the security of the United States or the existence of humanity, but it is more stable and, consequently, better than the alternatives. The single function of deterrence is to prevent any country from making a rational calculation which would lead to a nuclear attack on the United States. The doctrine of deterrence says to any would-be attacker: "Take your best shot; we will have enough destructive potential left to bomb you back to the Stone Age and we are willing to do precisely just that." This obviously is not a fancy concept but it does have a perverse elegance in its simplicity.

LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE

Deterrence breeds distrust and fear. If the United States is to deter the Soviet Union, it must do two things: First, assure that the Soviet Union knows our ability to sustain their attack and have enough destruction power left to obliterate their society, and second, communicate our willingness to retaliate. Unfortunately, that communication fulfills the worst fears and assumptions the Soviet leadership makes about American intentions. Being properly frightened by our terrible capability and readiness to use it, they are compelled to deter the United States. They, of course, emphasize their terrible destructive capability and their willingness to use it. This communication is then used in the United States to justify still further increases in arms. While deterrence is inescapable, it creates a vicious circle of reciprocal insecurity. Whatever concrete steps are taken to increase the

subjective sense of security has the opposite impact on the Soviet Union, making them feel more insecure. They, in turn, take concrete steps to reduce their sense of insecurity, which has the opposite effect in the United States.

Deterrence applies only to calculations of costs and benefits. A very real danger in our era is that concepts like deterrence are over-intellectualized and then build huge destructive arsenals which are justified by intellectual formulations. We need to periodically remind ourselves that neither deterrence nor magnificent nuclear arsenals can protect us from a miscalculation of risks, costs, and benefits; from an intransigent leadership which backs itself into a corner during an international crisis; from irrationality by a key individual in either the Soviet or American chain of command; or from mechanical error.

APPLICATION OF DETERRENCE

Deterrence is used not simply to preclude a Soviet attack on the United States but to discourage a wide variety of possible Soviet actions including a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The fact that the Soviet Union has not invaded Western Europe is seen as one of the triumphs of deterrence. Never mind, as George Kennan has observed, that the Soviet Union never intended to invade Europe. In this context, deterrence is like the old joke about the man snapping his fingers. "What are you doing," he asked. "Scaring away sabertooth tigers," he responds. "But there haven't been any sabertooth tigers around here for thousands of years," to which the man responds, "See how effective this is!"

The problem with applying deterrence to Soviet actions other than an attack on the United States is one of credibility and commensurability. Let's imagine for a moment a "shoe fanatic" who wants to deter real and imagined enemies from stepping on his neatly polished shoes. If he sees a particularly "aggressive" looking acquaintance, he might announce his personal policy of deterrence: "If you step on my shoes, I'll step on your shoes." The acquaintance might think this policy a little strange since he never intended to step on the fanatic's shoes. Nevertheless, if the acquaintance thinks about it, the threat of retaliation is plausible and effective should he ever become inclined to intently step on the guy's shoes.

Imagine now that the fanatic tells his acquaintance: "If you step on my shoes, I'll kick you in the shins." The acquaintance might respond by saying "If you kick me, I'll kick you back." While both might now start wearing metal tips in their shoes for greater kicking damage, the acquaintance is likely to be deterred because he has an old football injury and the whole thing really is not worth the bother.

But our fanatic still doesn't feel that he has properly deterred the acquaintance and feels compelled to threaten: "If you step on my shoes, I'll knock you out." Now depending on their respective sizes, reputations, and aggressive inclinations, the shoe fanatic's deterrent policy may or may not work. The very threat required by deterrence has the potential to create

conflict where none existed or to heighten whatever tensions existed between the two. But assuming that the shoe fanatic has a credible capability to carry out his threat, deterrence would work because the threat was commensurate to the action being deterred.

However, if the shoe fanatic says, "You step on my shoes and I'll pull out this .38 and blow you away," the acquaintance is going to wonder about the sanity of our shoe admirer. He might even dismiss the threat thinking that no one would take such an extreme measure over a pair of shoes. But the acquaintance reads his daily newspaper and concludes that maybe the shoe fanatic is one of those crazies out there. In this case, deterrence rests not on commensurability between action and response but on the acquaintance's recognition of the insanity of the shoe fanatic.

Finally, what if the fanatic tells the acquaintance: "If you step on my shoes, I'll take this hand grenade and blow us both up." The acquaintance would probably dismiss the threat as empty rhetoric until the fanatic produced the grenade, pulled the pin and threw the pin out the window. The shoe fanatic has now approximated our strategic posture. It is a very effective deterrent. No one steps on the fanatic's shoes although he finds it tiresome to always walk around with an armed hand grenade and sleeping is particularly difficult. In fact the more inconvenience the fanatic's deterrent posture causes him, the more he needs to believe that his shoes really are in jeopardy, for how else can these extraordinary "defensive" measures be justified?

The essential problem here is the incommensurability between the potential action of the acquaintance and the response. The threatened response loses credibility unless the other side understands the essential irrationality of the deterring nation. Charles DeGaulle understood this when he recognized that no rational society would risk annihilation in order to protect France. DeGaulle's concerns became the source of his doubt and the credibility of the American deterrent. A few years later, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, DeGaulle was less concerned about the credibility of the American deterrent and more concerned that the United States would stumble into a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union which would engulf France but exclude French interests or policy inputs.

The peace in Europe may have depended less on containment and the American nuclear umbrella than on the absence of a Soviet inclination to invade and a Soviet appreciation of our irrationality. There is another possibility. The system worked because the United States has maintained an immense nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. "Deterrence" in this context is the ability of the United States to hold a first strike capability over the Soviet leadership. Deterrence has been used, not to prevent a Soviet strike on the United States, but to regulate Soviet behaviour in areas of variable concern to the United States.

This interpretation fits a lot of the available evidence.

★ The United States dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima/Nagasaki not to save American lives during an invasion, but to demonstrate

this terrible new technology to the Soviet Union.

★ The initial monopoly that the United States enjoyed with atomic weapons was a substitute for manpower and conventional war capabilities in Europe in the late 1940's.

★ Every major weapons innovation of the Cold War has been an American initiative so that the United States might perpetually stay one or two steps ahead of the Soviet Union.

★ The various missile and other "gaps" and cultivated fears that the Soviet Union is "ahead of us" has been a hyperbole for the fact is that the Soviet Union keeps trying to catch up. As they approach parity it is interpreted that they are "ahead of us".

★ The United States prefers to substitute advanced military technology and airpower for ground troops and conventional war capabilities. A policy of nuclear superiority is less likely to arouse the hostility of Americans who, understandably, do not want their lives disrupted by the burdens of war, superpower competition, or empire.

★ Many in the US military and among military intellectuals at the institutions clustered around the military see nuclear weapons like the crossbow, simply a new tool to be used in fighting and winning a war. Nuclear superiority should be pursued just as military superiority has always been pursued by the powerful and ambitious.

★ The consensus at the upper strata of the US foreign policy establishment is that nuclear weapons are just another instrument in geopolitics. As long as we maintain nuclear superiority, we have a freedom of action not enjoyed by our primary adversary in the international arena.

★ US reluctance to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons underscores our strategic posture. To renounce the first use of nuclear weapons would require a revamping of the entire United States posture towards the Soviet Union. Proclamations do not prevent wars but the absence of this proclamation says a great deal about the US commitment to nuclear superiority and building a policy towards the Soviet Union around that superiority.

★ Nuclear superiority has given American presidents a range of discretionary action at the expense of the Soviet Union. The US naval blockade during the Cuban missile crisis, the mining of Haiphong during the Vietnam War, and the strafing and bombing of Soviet ships in Haiphong all attest to our ability to hold it over the Kremlin when we perceive that the chips are down.

The policy of nuclear superiority is increasingly expensive, dangerous and, ultimately, fruitless. We now spend in excess of \$300 billion per year on military capabilities while our society aches for investment in industry, education, human resource development, and a wide variety of other needs. We could probably deter a Soviet attack on the United States and play a role as a major power in the international community for less than half of that figure and did so five years ago. On what we might save, we could either balance the budget or create 150 major Federal programmes,

each funded at \$100 million, or capitalise 50,000 new businesses at \$3 million each. Which of these various options will, in the long-run, make our society more secure, stable, and free? What have we gained by a policy of nuclear superiority if our collective national life is impoverished?

The continued pursuit of nuclear superiority is dangerous because, in a crisis, the Soviet Union might feel compelled to launch a pre-emptive attack or launch on warning. If we really want to avoid a nuclear war, we need to be concerned not only about our own strategic capabilities but the other side's strategic situation and sense of security. The mind-set which values dominance needs to become sensitized to the interdependence and mutuality of a nuclear relationship.

Nuclear superiority is fruitless because it is inevitable that the Soviet Union will reciprocate and copy each of our weapons initiatives. Throughout the arms race, we have operated on the assumption that if we just introduce one more weapons system then we will be safe and secure. Our willingness to accept parity with the Soviet Union in the mid-1960's when both sides had developed second strike invulnerability has returned the world to what Albert Wohlstetter described in 1959 as the "delicate balance of terror." The balance of terror was delicate in 1959 because both sides relied on highly vulnerable manned bombers and liquid fuel missiles. Today sophisticated first strike weapons have brought us around the full circle. Worse yet, we stand poised to pursue "defensive" weapons which will heighten our respective first strike capabilities and at an economic cost which is so staggering as to be nearly incomprehensible. For what? Why are we driven to grasp onto some vision of "security" and military superiority? To explain US behaviour strictly in terms of Soviet behaviour is like asking what must the Jews have done to make Hitler so angry. We must begin to explore the pathology of American goals and behaviour.

ALTERNATIVES

Some might argue that the world would be safer if we threw all of our nuclear weapons away. Even if we could negotiate an ironclad disarmament treaty with the Soviet Union and other nuclear powers, such a treaty would be unacceptably unstable. Both we and the Soviet Union and a variety of other countries would still have the know-how and capabilities of producing nuclear weapons systems. We can never throw away knowledge, a knowledge will haunt us for as long as we survive on this planet.

The problem with disarmament is that the incentive to cheat is so great. Imagine some future crisis in the Middle East under conditions of disarmament. The US President receives a telephone call from the Kremlin. "Mr. President, you know that disarmament agreement we both signed back in 1986? Well, we have been cheating and we've got 12 missiles pointed at the United States and you have 48 hours to get the Marines out of the Middle East. And while you're at it, we'd like to cancel payment on our latest wheat purchases and we want you to send 50,000 IBM PCs and 100

tickets to the Superbowl." Given the instability of disarmament, we might expect this response from the US President: "That is very interesting Comrade and quite a coincidence too, for we've been cheating. We've got 50 missiles pointed at the Soviet Union and we want you out of...." Disarmament cannot do away with the underlying conflict and tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, nor the distrust that fuels the arms race.

Between a policy of reciprocal disarmament and nuclear superiority there are a wide range of options. The obsessive pursuit of superiority may hide our fear and cowardice behind bravado and tough talk, discounting the dangers of nuclear war. Alternatives to nuclear superiority inherently have risks and those risks may require courage, national resolve, and national consensus. Consider the worst case scenario where we could not threaten the Soviet Union with massive retaliation. That would not prevent us from saying to the Soviet Union: "We cannot fight you with nuclear weapons but we will not abandon our political sovereignty, territorial integrity, national pride, or critical national interests." As a country, we might also say: "If you invade us, we shall fight; if you try to blackmail us, we shall tell you to 'Go to hell,' and if you invade or bully a key ally, such as a NATO country, we shall resist your effort by every means possible." To resist, to struggle, to fight and even die in order to pressure our political sovereignty and territorial integrity requires a genuine common will, something the United States may presently lack. To impose one's national will on another country as a result of nuclear superiority does not, which is precisely why nuclear superiority is so attractive to a foreign policy elite afraid of popular sentiment, especially in light of the Vietnam era protests and Congressional criticism. Nuclear superiority encourages the pursuit of policies which lack a common will.

The primary difference between a policy of nuclear superiority and an alternative policy which runs the risk of nuclear punishment growing out of blackmail, making a worst case assumption, is the quality of the experience. Bravado in running the risk of nuclear war is the ultimate "cop out" and the ultimate act of cowardice, for it says "I want my way or it's all over, for everyone for all time." Living without superiority runs the risk of being forced to resist and overcome tyranny and being ready to make terrible sacrifices in order to preserve individual and collective dignity and liberty. Nuclear superiority believes in a sterile and mechanistic dependence on technology; alternatives trust in the human spirit.

Our challenge as a common people living on a single planet is to find some stable means of surviving with the terrible knowledge and capability we have for producing and using weapons of mass destruction. Our survival depends much less on technical innovations than on conceptual and attitudinal innovations. In policy terms, we need to recognize that:

★ Deterrence, a narrowly defined concept, is here to stay. But deterrence must not be allowed to function as a mask for a policy of nuclear superiority.

★ Stability among the nuclear powers is the central goal. We need to work for a strategic configuration which will allow us to survive another 50, 100 or 500 years and that time perspective ought to be used in evaluating proposed weapons innovations.

★ Arms control, arms reductions, and deterrence are inter-dependent policies.

★ Europe and our other key allies must develop their own collective response to whatever threat the Soviet Union poses for them. Certainly Europe has the manpower, technology, industrial base, and wealth to assure its own security via conventional, militia, and sea based nuclear forces.

★ Deterrence can be strengthened by means other than new missiles and bombers.

If we take the concept of deterrence seriously, let us creatively explore alternative ways of making deterrence more stable.

Since the essence of deterrence is holding civilian populations and industry hostage to a retaliatory strike, we should build upon that premise and make it more concrete and real for both the Soviet and American elites. For example, the wives, children and parents of the top 1,000 political, industrial, and military leaders from both the Soviet Union and the United States might be required to reside in the other country as a condition to their tenure in office. Even if the relatives of American elites demanded \$1 million per year for the hardship, the total cost would be cheap, \$1 billion per year, compared to the cost of one new strategic weapons system.

Each country should also exchange one million school children each year. It would be no problem for the Soviet leadership to recruit a million children and relocate them in the United States. In the United States, scholarships to cover the cost would probably be sufficient inducement and additional stipends could be offered as necessary. Our children would learn the virtues of discipline and authority, not to mention a renewed appreciation for our cultural freedom, and Soviet youth could be corrupted by our materialism and easy lifestyle. The advantages of such an exchange are weighted in our favour.

Along with students, probably 9 and 10 year olds, we could exchange several hundred thousand school teachers who could educate the other side in their respective language, culture, history and literature. The goal would be to replace the stereotyped myths we hold about each other with more accurate information communicated by real-life Americans and Russians.

Five percent of the respective military officer corps could also be exchanged. These exchange officers might serve as "Nuclear War Awareness Officers" presenting to the officers of the other side what they have learned about the devastation of nuclear war. Officers might also serve in administrative posts sharing insights about efficiency and cost consciousness. This proposal would have the beneficial effect of humanizing the "enemy". It

would be much harder to talk about bombing the "damn Commies" back to the Stone Age with a Soviet Colonel sitting at the lunch table, especially when that Colonel was becoming a friend.

Each side could also exchange ten hours per week of public affairs television programming about the dangers of the contemporary world. There are a variety of joint projects which the Soviet Union and the United States could pursue in order to learn peaceful collaboration. For example, we could collaborate on the delivery of emergency famine assistance, in space exploration, in designing a mutual strategic defense against third party nuclear weapons or nuclear terrorism, or in agricultural research, perhaps plant and animal genetics.

An important area of collaboration and demystifying would be strategic theory and specialized study of each other's society. These specialized institutions feed their respective military establishments with information, rationalizations, and justifications for hostility and new weapons systems. If these institutions could receive large grants to study effective forms of collaboration, reversing the arms race and related topics in collaboration with their counterparts on the other side, we might neutralize one of the major stimuli of current behaviour.

Let us do away with special shelters for the political, military, and corporate elites in each country. If these elites think that they can survive a nuclear war while eliminating the other side as a viable force in the world, they might well do so. For the vast majority of us who will be assured casualties of a nuclear war, deterrence needs to become less a Soviet-American phenomena than a process of how citizens in the United States and the Soviet Union deter their respective national elites from taking that fateful decision to strike first. As citizens, we might even establish an early warning system in which any general movement by our own elite to their shelters is communicated to the world, assuring that *no one* has a sanctuary. Soviet dissidents might be induced to reciprocate in-kind. Our survival is too important to be left to national elites with access to shelters which give them at least the illusion of survivability.

We must take the profit out of the strategic arms race. If deterrence is a lasting price we must pay for our over-zealous fascination with technical innovation in weapons of mass destruction, then let us do it as a grim necessity. Deterrence should not be just another business where big profits can be made. There is something particularly obscene and insane about making profits from the preparations for annihilation. We prepare for a war we assume will never happen and after a while we play the game because giant corporations grow rich and large military bureaucracies develop an insatiable appetite for more and better weapons. We must eliminate the very possibility that the arms race is sustained by the desire for profits.

In negotiations with the Soviet Union, our target should be reducing the available weapons of destruction to at least a point where humanity can survive even if Murphy's Law takes control of the strategic equation. In

such negotiations, we must acknowledge that there may be too much distrust and hostility for reductions to be formally negotiated especially when national negotiators play a game of "one-upsmanship". We may find it easier and more productive to pursue reciprocal unilateral initiatives. Arms races involve a series of reciprocal unilateral initiatives. Neither we nor the Soviet Union feel compelled to negotiate a treaty before introducing a new weapons system. The same dynamic process can be used to reverse the arms race.

No version of arms control and no policy for "winning" a nuclear war against the Soviet Union can assure world peace. There are no final solutions except extinction. Conflict is an inherent product of the international political system; eliminating the Soviet Union or eradicating communism, if possible, would not eliminate international conflict any more than defeating Hitler's armies or the Japanese military machine brought permanent peace. We need to assure our survival in spite of international conflict, for conflict and tension are permanent features of our world.

COMPARATIVE CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT METHODS' IMPACT ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

Among the many critical problems of our century, none is more vital than how the conflicts inherent within them are managed by those who participate in conflict. Use of violent methods to resolve conflicts has reached such a magnitude of physical destruction as to threaten winners and losers alike, whether by nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, and whether the contests are within or between nations. This paper presents a conflict analysis methodology, together with various benefits and costs of non-violent versus violent methods of resolution.

NECESSITY FOR NON-VIOLENT METHODS

Escalation of the destructive power of weapons, the promise of scientific and technological developments for further increases, and the widespread proliferation of these means throughout the world, make restraint and the use of non-violent methods imperative for any rational relationship between costs paid for benefits won or objectives achieved. All resolutions of conflict, including the costs paid, benefits won, losses sustained, are crucially influenced by the methods employed by the adversaries. These, in turn, are affected by the contestants' perception of the conflict because this involves knowledge of options.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTION

Perception of conflict is therefore central to the analysis, methods,

and resolution of any given conflict for the underlying reason that all human behaviour is governed by the principle that people act on their perceptions of reality regardless of whether or not, objectively speaking, those are true, erroneous, or a mixture of both. This principle was best stated by Kenneth Boulding in his observation that "it is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour." (Boulding, 1962, p.423). In their own self interest, therefore, adversaries in conflict are under a common necessity to develop perceptions of themselves and their opponents as close to reality as possible, including the correction of erroneous perceptions when facts and experience substantially negate them. In other words, to alter perceptions during a conflict when they are demonstrated to be false. This means overcoming the powerful factor of denial.

In her monumental comparative, historical study, *The March of Folly; From Troy to Vietnam*, the eminent historian Barbara Tuchman (1984) documents the persistence of this problem in political decisions from ancient times until the present. "A phenomenon," she observes, "throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests. Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity... Why" she continues, "do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests?... (Tuchman, 1984, p.4). Making a distinction between folly and other types of misgovernment such as tyranny, excessive ambition, and incompetence, she defines folly as the persistent pursuit of a counter-productive policy despite the fact that it is obviously failing, contrary to self interest and for which there were available recognised and feasible alternatives.

In her earlier work, *Guns of August*, (1962) she documented follies committed by both the Central Powers and the Allies before and during World War I, a conflict which most historians and political scientists today regard as a mistake but which was also foreseen and warned against at the time without benefit of hindsight. Moreover, there were alternatives that were proposed that could have prevented the beginning and spread of armed conflict in 1914, could have ended it in 1916, and could have resolved it in a more lasting way than was done by the victors in 1918-1919. It was Lloyd George, the British wartime Prime Minister, who remarked at the Versailles conference with remorseful foresight that it was a shame that in twenty years the Allies would have to do it all over again. His perception was documented in E.H. Carr's (1981) study *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939* and by subsequent events but it did not alter that of other Allied leaders nor the manner in which that conflict was resolved temporarily at Versailles.

Among military leaders too, those with the correct perceptions of a long war were unable to alter the perceptions of their colleagues that it would be a short war in both Great Britain and Germany. This military misperception also dominated the thinking of Russia and France. What is

significant is that faced with the more realistic but unpleasant perceptions of eminent realistic but unpleasant perceptions of eminent military men like Moltke and Joffre in Germany and Lord Kitchener in Britain, most political and military leaders in those countries chose the more optimistic perception without any solid basis in existing reality. (Tuchman, 1962, pp. 119-120).

A classic example, however, of how a correct perception of economic reality could lead to a false prediction of human response in political behaviour, was the cost/benefit analysis done by Norman Angell (1962) in his widely read and influential pre-war book *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*. In this work he correctly perceived that the economic benefits to be achieved by winning a war were less than the costs of waging it and that the world had reached such a stage of financial and economic interdependence that the victors would suffer along with the defeated. War had become unprofitable so that trade and commerce were better avenues for economic gain. His misperception was to conclude that given this reality no nation would be foolish enough to start one, therefore war had now become impossible. (Angell, 1962). Unfortunately, the book fostered its own illusions among those who chose to believe either that war would not happen with its major economic incentive removed or that if it did happen it would be of short duration since it would be too costly to wage a long war. Angell's major failure was to assume that when confronted with reality, people are so rational they are incapable of acting against their own self interests. This is the value of Barbara Tuchman's most recent study with its relevance for today's conflicts and for the importance of realistic perceptions that are then acted upon.

Other comparative studies support the importance of accurate perceptions in conflict situations. Two studies by political scientist John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations go to War* and *Nations in Darkness; China, Russia and America*, examine several of the major and some of the minor conflicts of our century from World War I to the Iran-Iraq war in terms of how and why Government leaders made the decision to go to war. His conclusions are instructive for those who contemplate armed conflicts as an instrument of political policy. "The first general theme that compels attention," he states, "is that no nation that began a major war in this century emerged a winner". (Stoessinger, 1982, pp. 205-206).

A second conclusion was that: "In the atomic age, war between nuclear powers is suicidal; war between small countries with big friends are likely to be inconclusive and interminable; hence, decisive war in our time has become the privilege of the impotent." (pp. 205-206).

According to Stoessinger, a third conclusion emerges concerning victory: "In our time, unless the vanquished is destroyed completely, a victor's peace is seldom lasting. Those peace settlements that are negotiated on the basis of equality are more permanent and durable." (p.207).

His central conclusions are that "the most important single

precipitating factor in the outbreak of war is misperception", involving a leader's self image and of his perceptions of his adversary's character, intentions of his adversary's character, intentions and capabilities. One of the most persistent misperceptions common to both sides on the eve of conflict is belief in a short, decisive victory. (p.209). He also supplies evidence for the symbiotic relationship between adversaries and concludes that: "When a leader on the brink of war believes that his adversary will attack him, the chances of war are fairly high. When both leaders share this perception about each other's intent, war becomes a virtual certainty." (p.11). The mutual misperceptions then become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Among the types of misperception, Stoessinger believes the most important is "A leader's misperception of his adversary's power" because "it is not the actual distribution of power that precipitates a war; it is the way in which the leader thinks that power is distributed." Therefore, he concludes, "on the eve of each war, at least one nation misperceives another's power. In that sense, the beginning of each war is a misperception or an accident. The war itself then slowly, and in agony, teaches the lesson of reality. And peace is made when reality has won. The outbreak of war and the coming of peace are separated by a road that leads from misperception to reality." (Stoessinger, 1982, pp.212-213).

NEGOTIATION AND PERCEPTION

Conclusions drawn by Tuchman and Stoessinger on the basis of their studies of war have validity for unarmed or non-violent conflict too. In negotiation, for example, whether at the level of a labour-management conflict or in diplomacy, perception is a crucial ingredient. According to one expert on negotiation, "All power is based on perception". If you believe you have it, then you do, which will be conveyed to your adversary, but, "If you think you don't have it, even if you have it, then you don't have it", because you will act powerless and this will encourage your opponent. (Cohen, 1980, p.20).

POWER, NON-VIOLENCE AND VIOLENCE

Power, which I define as the ability either to influence or control others in order to achieve your objectives, rests basically on a symbiotic relationship between your self-perception and others' "perception that you can and just might, bring about intended effects that they believe might help or hurt them." (p.54). It is not a unilateral exercise of the powerful over the powerless as it is frequently represented, but an interactive relationship between two or more opponents in a conflict that is actually more psychological than physical, since the purpose is to influence or control the opponent's perceptions and behaviour. Except if the objective is physical destruction of the opponent or his property, even the threat or use of violent

sanctions are designed to alter perceptions and behaviour in most conflict situations. In reality, however, non-violent inducements as well as non-violent sanctions are also employed in conflicts as methods to exercise power. Violence and non-violence are two sides of the same coin of power, usually linked by the same objectives but differing in methods, cost/benefits, and impact on the resolution of the conflict.

If violence is basically defined as intentional physical damage to persons and property in order to influence, control, or eliminate an opponent or his property, then non-violence must be defined in reference to violence as the attempt to influence or control an opponent to achieve one's objectives in a conflict by all means, except intentional physical damage to persons and property. That includes a wide range of methods that are utilized in all types of conflicts, including violent ones, sometimes preceding the use of violent methods, sometimes parallel with them, but almost always used in the resolution process. Non-violence, therefore, cannot be understood through conflict analysis as being isolated from violence, power, and conflict, or simply as a negative rejection of these basic ingredients of human relationships. Attempts to do so by both some advocates and detractors of non-violence has led to misperceptions. The relevant focus for the study of non-violence is not non-violence *per se* but the uses of non-violent methods as tools of power, (inducements and sanctions), in conflicts. It is conflict which must be the centerpiece for analysis so that non-violent and violent methods are studied for their impact on the perception of conflict, its management, costs/benefits, and resolution. On a comparative basis, which methods, violent or non-violent, achieve one's objectives most successfully, in the shortest time, with the least cost, and with the most permanent resolution of the conflict?

CONFLICT ANALYSIS

This comparison can be accompanied by the use of a conflict analysis methodology for analyzing past conflicts, monitoring current conflicts in action, and predicting the possible course of future conflicts on the basis of accumulated data from a growing body of case studies. Data is gathered and organized in response to the following crucial questions as indicated below:

CONFLICT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

1. What is the Context of the Conflict?
 - A. Where is it located?
 - B. What is the time span?
 - C. Is there any change in the form of expansion or contraction of location or time span?

2. Who is Involved in the Conflict?
 - A. Who are the primary participants?
 - B. Who are the secondary participants?
 - C. Who are interested or affected parties?
 - D. Change. Is there any increase or decrease among any of the above during the course of the conflict?
3. What are the Methods of Conflict?
 - A. Identify violent methods.
 - B. Identify non-violent methods.
 - C. Identify mixture of violent and non-violent methods.
 - D. During the course of the conflict, have there been any changes in methods from non-violent to violent or vice versa or an escalation or de-escalation of intensity?
4. What is the resolution of the conflict?
 - A. Win-Lose. Identify who won and who lost.
 - B. Win-Win. Identify winners.
 - C. Lose-Lose. Identify losers.
 - D. Non-resolution: protracted conflict or withdrawal.
5. What are the Costs/Benefits or Gains/Losses to participants and interested parties in terms of:
 - A. Percentage of objective achieved?
 - B. Financial costs?
 - C. Casualties in dead, wounded, missing, incarcerated?
 - D. Property destroyed or attained?
 - E. Productivity and employment lost or gained?
6. Evaluation of cost/benefit for winners, losers, and interested parties on a comparative basis, including total cost of the conflict for all concerned. This methodology can be used to analyse domestic conflicts from labour-management contests to ethnic contests, as between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, religion-based, as with the Sikhs in India, racial, as in South Africa, and political as in Poland, El Salvador, Nicaragua.

It can also be used to analyse international conflicts, such as the Falklands war, the US in Grenada, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, or the Iran-Iraqi war, or India's struggle for independence.

A comparative analysis of past and current conflicts in this century leads to certain tentative conclusions concerning the effectiveness of violent and non-violent methods in conflict resolution which require further comparative study which cannot be covered in this paper.

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Those conflicts which are classified as violent, because violent methods used by one or all of the participants were prevalent and decisive for the outcome. Most international wars fall into this category.

2. Those classified as non-violent, either because both adversaries used non-violent methods to manage and resolve their conflict or because one side successfully used non-violent methods against a losing opponent who used violence. India, the American Civil Rights struggle, and Solidarity in Poland are examples.

3. Those conflicts where non-violent methods, such as negotiation, succeed because violence is explicitly or implicitly threatened but not used. The Cuban missile crisis is a good example.

4. A mixture where both violence and non-violence are used by opponents and both contribute to the final outcome. Civil and revolutionary wars tend to be of this type where propaganda and other non-violent methods are used to undermine or win over opponents or segments of the population in order to gain control of the government and the country. The Cuban revolution is a good example of this, as well as the current conflict in South Africa where both non-violent and violent methods are being utilized against Apartheid.

Since most conflicts, if not all eventually are resolved, what effect does the use of violent and non-violent methods have on the resolution? Non-violent conflicts are more likely to result in win-win outcomes than those which are violent or a mixture. Violent and mixture conflicts are more likely to have win-lose, lose-lose, or non-resolution outcomes. Conflicts where the threat of violence support non-violent resolutions are the most tenuous because they can easily escalate into a test of armed strength as on the eve of World War I, a situation more comparable to our present diplomacy operating against the backdrop of a nuclear standoff than the conflicts before World War II. Moreover, negotiated non-violent resolution may prove temporary as the conflict continues and each side builds more armed forces to prepare the way for a violent confrontation later when one side feels stronger or because misperception or folly take over as indicated earlier.

VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT SANCTIONS COMPARED

It is frequently overlooked or forgotten that the exercise of power against an opponent involves both the plus of inducements, which can represent a gain for both sides, and is non-violent, and the negative of sanctions, which can be either a violent or non-violent loss for one or both sides. In the exercise of power in conflicts, when the inducements are offered, they are non-violent methods regardless of whether those using them are committed to using violent or non-violent sanctions. The difference between those who wage conflict by violent means and non-violent lies then in the type of sanctions employed. The former use or threaten to use weapons to inflict damage on people or property in order to alter the adversary's perceptions, intentions, and capabilities and thus influence the resolution of the conflict. The latter attempt to influence the adversary through the use of non-violent sanctions, ranging from non-cooperation,

civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts, fasting, demonstrations, propaganda, and withholding of those things which the adversary may need and want. The Arab oil boycott of the early 1970's is a good example of this. In the resolution of violent and non-violent conflicts, both use some form and negotiation, however.

COSTS OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT CONFLICTS

Finally, non-violent conflicts cost less for both sides in terms of human casualties, property damage, financial costs, and other economic losses. Both victory and defeat are cheaper when compared with violent conflicts. Anyone who compares the essentially non-violent Indian struggle for independence in terms of cost with that of Vietnam against the French, Indonesia against the Dutch, or Algeria against the French, and note the disparity in costs to both sides as well as the nature of the resolution of these conflicts.

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"WARS AND RUMOURS OF WARS" — HUMAN NATURE, OR SIMPLY BAD HABITS?

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ABSTRACT

Many human beings appear to accept human conflict, including military strife, as unavoidable. We generalize from the data of several thousand years of recorded events, plus our darkly romantic assumptions about how "cave men" must have behaved. But if one begins with a much more temporally extended perspective, and then makes some attempt at analysis and synthesis, a quite different possibility emerges.

Many persons appear to accept human conflict, including military strife, as unavoidable. We generalize from several thousand years of recorded events, plus our darkly romantic notions about how "cave men" must have behaved.

But if one begins with a considerably extended temporal perspective, and attempts to examine the most fundamental variables involved in human experience and behaviour, quite a different possibility emerges. As I will show, war is neither part of fundamental human nature, nor an eternally inevitable derivative of that nature.

Let's begin with a very basic, bedrock sort of question. In what manner — by what principle of principles — are living creatures to survive? As yet, only two solutions to the problem of survival have been suggested.

One may be called the biomechanical solution. A creature exemplifying this mode of maintaining existence in pure form is a biological machine, endowed genetically with the bodily structures and behaviour patterns necessary to its continuing existence. Its capacities for making life-furthering responses, from simple reflex actions to more complexly organized

behaviours, are given, innate. Actual use of these capacities is cued by stimuli or events in the creature's environment, without any need for choice or decision on the part of the organism. Indeed, such a being would have no requirement for experience or consciousness or mind. It could be biological without being in any sense psychological, i.e., it would have no need for such experiential capacities as emotion, perception, and thinking. But evolutionary processes have not produced exclusively biomechanical organisms with a behaviour complexity remotely approaching that of humans, or a number of other species.

The other fundamental solution to the survival question is the experiential one. Instead of responding to environmental contingencies as a biological automation, the creature first has conscious experiences of objects and events in its surroundings, and then responds, selecting in some manner from whatever variety of alternatives its consciousness can entertain. Such an organism requires capacities for both perceptual (informative) experience and emotional (evaluative) experience, as well as various processing potentials such as learning and thinking. Capacities for bodily response are of course also essential.

Both the biomechanical and the experiential modes of being are obvious in the behaviour of many species, that is, use is often made of both of the basic ways of maintaining existence. This is evident in our own species. Where biomechanics are concerned, humans possess skeletal-muscle reflexes and a myriad of more or less fully automatic vegetative or life-support processes. Just as obviously, at least to each of us within our own private world of consciousness, we experience emotionally (for example, love, fear, hope, and anger), perceptually (for example, sounds, colours, odors, and tastes), and in terms of more complex meanings ultimately patterned from simple emotions and percepts. Parenthetically, a third solution to the survival problem is occasionally proposed, namely, that behaviour is caused by deity. However, this idea is logically, if not theologically, equivalent to the biomechanical solution as far as responsibility for response initiation is concerned.

Let us now examine the manner in which capacities for conscious experiencing (that is, mind) enable survival. Such an examination is essential if we are to understand ourselves, because so many of our activities, survival-oriented and otherwise, relate chiefly to our experiential dimensions, rather than to our biomechanical ones.

Few persons, even in my discipline (psychology), would argue today that experiential events such as emotions and images do not exist, or even that they exist but have no selective relation to behaviour. Indeed, lines of research as methodologically and substantively varied as the experimental analysis of meaning, neuropsychology, and phenomenology are converging in agreement on the fundamental, irreducible, homogeneous constituents or, borrowing an analogy from chemistry, elements of conscious experience. And these basic, innate experiential qualities appear to be readily classifiable into two distinct groups, namely, emotions and percepts. That is, we

are intrinsically endowed with capacities for knowing our external and internal environments, and with capacities for caring about, or evaluating, whatever we know.

It requires no more than a few moments of reflection to see that this makes extraordinarily good sense. If a creature's survival is not to be biomechanically guaranteed — if it is not outfitted by its heredity to respond automatically in a life-maintaining manner in every threatening situation — then it must be sentient. It must have some sort of experiential copy of its surroundings, some basic cognitive awareness, and it must be able to respond emotionally to what it perceives or cognizes.

Psychologists have devoted a great deal of time to the study of our basic perceptual capacities, and we now know much about them, although there is still more to learn. For example, we have not yet completed the foundation task of classification; we know that there are far more than five "senses", but not precisely how many. But we have been very slow, almost loath, to engage in research on our affective or emotional nature. (There are several reasons for this avoidance, which need not detain us here.) We owe most of what we do know about emotion to a handful of persons who have stubbornly insisted on studying it, e.g., P.T. Young (1961), Magda Arnold (1960), O.H. Mowrer (1960), Charles Osgood (Osgood, May & Hiron, 1975), Robert Zajonc (1980), and Carroll Izard (1977). It was Zajonc, incidentally, who wrote in 1980: "Contemporary cognitive psychology simply ignores affect." (Zajonc, 1980). Although Osgood and his colleagues (Osgood et al., 1975) have demonstrated with a wealth of cross-cultural studies that the fundamental experiential dimensions which contribute the most to our conscious life are emotional or affective, not perceptual or cognitive, and though Izard (1977) had competently argued that emotion is in fact the foundation of motivation, there is as yet no journal devoted primarily to emotion, there are few if any books which can serve well as basic textbooks, and the International Society for Research on Emotion is not yet two years old. We have no list of primary emotions that more than a few persons will accept; the two best known contemporary lists agree on five basic emotions, but one (Izard's 1977) then adds five more, which are simply different than the three additional ones on the other list (that of Robert Plutchik 1980). There is no generally acceptable definition of emotion, in fact, there is no nearly adequate basic vocabulary for talking about emotional experience, whether in psychology or in everyday life. And a great many persons, both within and outside psychology, still profess to believe that emotion is unimportant, largely or only negative, irrational, atavistic, and so on.

Notwithstanding all of these lacks, failures, and blind spots, we do know some assuredly basic, and wholly important, things about emotion, enough to begin making some far-reaching positive differences in the behaviour of both individuals and groups, including nations.

I return now to my assertion that any creature who deals with the exigencies of survival at least partly via the experiential solution must be

able to care (that is, be emotional) as well as to know (that is, perceive). Many people, including lay persons, philosophers, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, etc., have appeared to believe that perception and the higher-order cognitive experiences derived from it are enough to enable survival. They rarely deny the reality of mind, or that it bears a critical relation to behaviour. But they may not acknowledge the reality of emotion, and if they do they tend to make it peripheral, something to be largely or fully ignored. But this simply makes no sense. Consider: It is of no use to us to know or perceive that food tastes sweet unless we also want it, unless we like the sweet taste and eat the food to obtain it. It is of no value to know that one's hand is hot, in fact, about to burn, unless one cares to remove it from the fire. Pain is frequently a signal of danger, but if we were not equipped to make strong negative evaluations of our pain percepts, we would do nothing to avoid the danger. A sunset replete with the greatest variety of colours and patterns imaginable would be paid no attention if our perceptual experience of the hues and shapes was not emotionally evocative. Nor would it have availed *Australopithecus* to perceive the charge of a saber-toothed tiger unless negative emotion was part of the experience. Merely knowing that the tiger had sharp claws, great fangs, powerful muscles, and fine coordination would have been quite insufficient to stimulate the survival behaviour, or indeed any behaviour. Our ancient cousin would merely observe the sights, sounds, etc. of the tiger and the surrounding forest, until the creature killed her or him. If not innately endowed with the appropriate, automatic survival behaviours, the only alternative is to fear, to feel a need to get out of harm's way. An emotionless being who was not forced to move by biomechanical factors would at best merely take the scene in, perhaps well aware of imminent destruction but unmoving because unmoved. Not even the pain induced by claw and tooth would matter, because pain percepts unaccompanied by negative emotion remain merely percepts, cognitive rather than motivational events, as research in both psychological and neurological dissociation has shown. We can imagine that if our hapless primate said anything at all as the tiger approached — and why she or he would bother to speak with no emotion to motivate speech is of course incomprehensible — it would be in a totally flat voice, unbroken by inflections, pauses, or other modulations: "The-ti-ger-is-charge-ing-at-me-now-it-is-knock-ing-me-down-now-it-is-bit-ing-my-arm-off-now..." How such a creature could exist at all is of course imponderable, but it is clear that if somehow it did, it wouldn't live long enough to reproduce, and thus was not our ancestor. No, our ancestors possessed capacities for both emotional and perceptual experience ages ago. How they acquired them is unknown — did mind arise in some epiphenomenal fashion from body, or was mind present in some form from the beginning, or...?

When one thinks about such survival situations as the one involving the tiger, it is obvious that both emotion and perception are essential to any experiencing or conscious creature. As Tomkins (1965) has elegantly put it:

"Reason without emotion would be impotent, emotion without reason would be blind." If you know but don't care, you'll do nothing, be impotent. If you care but don't know, you'll be unable to act; you are blind. Either way, you cannot possibly survive.

The clear, vital principle which emerges from this analysis is that emotion plays a central and crucial role in all operant or voluntary behaviour, whether such behaviour is of mind or of body. If your behaviour is not under direct stimulus control (reflexive, biomechanical) then it must be a function of your needs and wants, your fears and hopes. You literally would not voluntarily lift a finger unless there were at least a mild emotion motivating you, some felt need or want that would be better served by moving the finger than by holding it at rest. I say this partly because no third source of motivation (in addition to biomechanical and emotional) has yet been uncovered, and, even more convincingly, it can be said because when we do take the trouble actually to look for the antecedents of the simplest, most mundane voluntary behaviours, we in fact do find that emotion is always involved, along with perception and perhaps thought.

Thus the primeval inhabitants of cave and savanna share with their modern counterparts who dwell in apartment blocks or on farms a very basic human nature. Our ancient progenitors did not gaze at charging tigers, as we do not gaze at onrushing automobiles, in full possession of a splendid array of cognitive powers — seeing, hearing, reasoning that one's body is about to be annihilated if escape is not immediately attempted — but not moving. We do in fact move, and that behaviour is the direct subsequent of how we feel about what we know, not of what we know in and of itself.

Where can these ideas usefully lead us? What follows from the fact that we evolved as beings who are not only able to perceive objects, events, and processes which are life-threatening, but who also intrinsically dislike such experiences and therefore attempt to escape, minimize, or avoid them? First, consider the general conditions of life for most people at most places throughout our development. If we look at how the majority of persons have lived during the recent centuries for which we have some written record, we find every reason to believe that their capacity for negative emotional experience was frequently activated. Fears of group or individual violence, fears of starvation, fears of disease — such emotions have filled the lives of many people, and have been essentially absent in the lives of very few. Though there is enough food on our planet to feed all of its inhabitants at least adequately, we permit upwards of thirty million people (some estimate forty million or even more) to die every year of starvation and various non-lethal diseases rendered deadly by malnutrition. It remains appropriate to remember, and mourn, the fact that we killed at least fifty million people in World War II; but every two years, or less, we permit that many more to die. The present point, however, is not the patent monstrousness of these deaths, nor of the inequitable food distribution underlying them, but rather that with so many people constantly hungry (far more than the several dozen million who actually die) there is an incalculable burden

of negative emotion in the world. How long this has been the case we do not know, but our speculative reconstructions of what life was like prior to the advent of the first record keepers offer the strong probability of a planet on which negative emotion would often have been stimulated by the rigours of day-to-day existence. Given the manner of geophysical evolution of our planet (consider its violence, for example) and of the biological evolution which began later (life feeds on life, remember), and of the psychosocial evolution which commenced only recently, it clearly appears that when people say "It's a jungle out there." or "It's a dog-eat-dog-world." they are, all too sadly, correct. Correct for their time, and probably for all times past.

There are two all-important consequences which follow directly from the frequent or continuous presence of negative emotion in our experience. First, negative emotion becomes attached (conditioned, associated) to a great many persons, objects, and events which do not innately evoke it, entities which are either emotionally neutral, or even able to excite our capacity for positive emotional experience. Research has not revealed many intrinsic sources of negative emotion, that is, there appear to be only a few perceptual experiences or physiological states which call forth primary unpleasant feelings such as fear, terror, and dread. These few sources, interestingly, are what psychology and biology have called the "primary drives" — pain, hunger, thirst, fatigue, and anoxia. To perceive pain is also to feel badly. To be hungry, that is, to experience what we call hunger pangs is not only to be in a particular perceptual state, but, at least as significantly, a negative emotional one. And similarly for other biological drives. Thus it appears that we evolved in a very sensible manner, as creatures who innately don't like the very states that are inimical to our survival. I don't like the experience of thirst, but there is no internal circuitry that forces me to seek out liquid; that would be biomechanical behaviour. Rather, I choose behaviours which will relieve the negative emotion which is part of the total state and experience of thirst.

Negative emotion may well have few fundamental or given stimuli, but if the conditions of life of a person, group, or indeed race are such that those stimuli are often present, then the experience of feeling bad will be frequent. As we have just seen, a great many, probably most, people, past and present, have lived or do live in environments in which strong negative emotion is often unavoidable. And this is all that is required for the formation of associations between unpleasant feeling and any of the many perceptual experiences which do not intrinsically arouse it. Such emotional conditioning, as it is often called, has been demonstrated in the animal and human research laboratory hundreds of times, and is equally easy to observe in everyday life. Suppose that you are looking at, listening to, or otherwise perceiving someone or something who or which is emotionally neutral (or even positive) to you while you are experiencing more or less strong negative emotion from, say, a painful stimulus. There is a high probability that an association will form between your perceptual experience and the negative feeling, such that you will subsequently dislike,

or at least like less, the person or thing. For example, if a parent slaps a child smartly while saying "No!" for each misdemeanor, the child will very soon attach negative emotional meaning to the word. Such emotional learning is very rapid, and its occurrence is often not directly or consciously noted. We simply say that the meaning of the person or thing seems to be "coloured" by fear, distaste, and the like. We should not regret our facility for acquiring new emotional associations, however, for without it we would not have survived, at least not as the potentially rather free beings we actually are. If only a few of the wealth of experiences we are capable of having were to be innately upsetting or frightening (the biological drives), but if in fact the world contained many other dangers, then we of necessity had to be able to learn to fear a number of things. If we weren't endowed with so-called instinctive fears of the sights and sounds of charging saber-toothed tigers and onrushing automobiles, for example, then we needed to be able to associate negative emotion with them, perhaps on the occasion of a narrow, and painful, escape, or the death of another.

The terrible difficulty for our race has been that so many of us had to learn to associate negative emotion with vastly too many persons, objects, and events, things which were not themselves threatening, nor even bona fide harbingers of any peril. This has to happen because our conditions of life were too often inherently negative, directly stimulating our capacity for primary negative feeling. We learned to fear the tiger, and that was good. But we also learned to fear old people, near or distant people, and on and on. And that has been unimaginably hurtful. The very negative emotion which provided us with a marvelously effective alternative to the bio-mechanical way of surviving has at least partly enslaved most people at most places thus far in the history of our race, through a much-too-widespread working of the nonetheless essential capacity for negative emotional learning. And no one is to blame. Few of us, in fact, even know what has happened, how, or why. But we can now know, and that understanding can begin to make a vast, positive difference. We can begin to become free beings. We can begin to stop wandering through the world, troubled by and reacting, often hurtfully, to a legion of unnecessary fears.

We are now ready to consider the second of the two consequences of the recurrent experiencing of negative behaviour, or defensiveness. When we are frequently beset by troublesome affect, we attempt to ward it off somehow — to avoid it, escape it, or at least diminish it as much as possible. Many specific ways of defending against negative emotion have been described, and supported by evidence from research, clinical experience, and routine living. These so-called "defense mechanisms" typically appear to operate almost automatically (thus the term "mechanism") rather than being selected consciously and implemented voluntarily. They are analogous to the reflexes of the body which protect us from physical injury, such as the involuntary blink of your eye at the sudden, rapid approach of an insect or pebble; one could well label them "psychomechanical." And their high degree of development in us may be attributable to the same

model, namely, variation and selection, which is invoked to illuminate the evolution of physical defense patterns. Clearly, if a creature is to have a capacity for powerful negative feeling as a cornerstone of its survival potential, it also requires some sort of experiential damping device on those occasions when the emotion is too hurtful.

But our defensiveness is not solely related to innate factors. Reinforcement and modelling and further impetus. If I defend and experience some relief, that relief strengthens my tendency to defend. Also, the defensive behaviour of others serves as a model, particularly when it appears to result in some sort of reward or gain for them; I imitate their actions, and anticipate similar reinforcement.

Examples of our defensiveness abound, though we may not always recognize them, especially in ourselves. Perhaps the simplest mechanism is that of direct denial, as when a person, upon being informed of the death of mate and children, shouts "No!" and is apparently unable even to consider the possibility that all loved ones have perished. Other defensive strategies are more indirect, as when one berates others for a thought or action which one would like to engage in but also fears or scruples against. Or one may offer an ostensibly good, but false, reason for a personal failure or shortcoming. Anna Freud has described many of these mechanisms.

The value of these psychological defense devices is obvious, then: When one is faced with a great deal of fear, frustration, and the like, immediate relief is vastly desirable, and this is precisely what the defenses provide. But there is great danger in permitting one's self to be very defensive, no matter how natural it may feel, no matter how automatically it may seem to occur, and regardless of the relief one may achieve. That danger lies in the fact that use of these mechanisms is self-deluding and self-perpetuating. To defend successfully is indeed to achieve at least a partial diminution of my fear, and thus I can pretend, at least for a time, that the problem has vanished. But this is indeed a delusion, for defensive behaviour does nothing about the source of negative emotion in the first place. The following example will show the self-perpetuating and self-deluding aspects clearly. Suppose that I have learned to be afraid of groups of persons larger than four or five. My defensive behaviour, perhaps remarked by others but unnoticed by me, is to arrange my affairs so that I rarely find myself in the midst of a crowd. I am relieved each time I avoid a large group of people, and that emotional experience further strengthens or reinforces my avoidant behaviour. But so long as I continue in this manner, I will have no opportunity to deal with the primary problem, my learned fear of large gatherings. The crowd-fear connection remains intact, ready to motivate my evasion again and again. Thus my defense is self-perpetuating. And it is very likely to be equally as self-deluding. I may simply become blind to the fact that crowds frighten me. I will not permit myself to recognize this fact, for that would arouse some negative feeling. My blindness is itself defensive, of course, a kind of denial. If others happen to point out to me that I am never willing to be in the company of more than a

couple of persons at a time, I may very well defend via a process such as rationalization, saying that I have found that small groups are more effective at problem solving, much more able to generate true warmth and friendship, and so on. Valid principles, perhaps, but I'm using them deceptively.

One of the most hurtful principles of defensive behaviour, a principle which is indispensable to the present analysis, is that we frequently appear to be aggressive, even hostile, when we are defensive. For example, a person's learned fear of individuals in positions of reasonable and proper authority may be defended against by arguing with them without apparent good reason, maligning them, noisily refusing to heed them, and so on. We often say: "The best defense is a good offense." In situations where what we really mean is: "My chosen defense mechanism is offensiveness, aggression." Some observers of human behaviour, preeminently Freud (1946; 1959), have seen so much aggression that they imagined it to be a, if not the, major intrinsic motive for human behaviour generally. But subsequent careful research has revealed hostile aggressiveness as simply one of a number of given human behavioural capacities, basically defensive in nature, and with a probability of arousal depending markedly on modelling and reinforcement. It is in fact the frequent modelling and reinforcement of hostile behaviour which relate to its being so readily selected by so many of us. In my country ice hockey is the national sport, and it is often played in a most aggressive, not to say combative, even reptilian manner. Yet there are other ways to play hockey, and play it very well, techniques involving grace, skill, and even a degree of mannerliness and urbanity. But were you to watch our little boys being instructed in the game by their parents and coaches, many of whom model little else but pugnacity and strongly reward it in the boys, you would quickly understand why so many of them play in such bellicose, churlish fashion. And hockey is only a game! Were the battles of England won on the playing fields of Eton, or were they begun there?

The next essential point is that defensiveness, certainly including aggressive forms of defense, is very often a highly social phenomenon. Suppose that something which I fear appears or occurs, and I elect, however unconsciously, to react defensively, in particular choosing some form of aggressive, hostile behaviour. I may well have no actual intent of hurting you; my hostility may not be directed intentionally toward people. In Laura Huxley's words: "You are not the target." (Huxley, 1963). But my behaviour has that unfortunate effect nevertheless; it has aroused negative emotion in you. You may now deal with your uncomfortable feelings in a defensive manner, and, given the omnipresence of the modelling and rewarding of aggression, you may well choose such a behaviour. There may still be no personal hostile intent, but I may be stung anyway, and again defend, and at least eventually we will be angry with each other, and our mutual defensive responding may continue indefinitely. The basic behaviour model for this sort of interpersonal interaction can be called *the social psychology of mutual defensiveness*. An everyday example: A woman

arrives ten minutes late at an important business meeting, upset because she is late and because she has read all of the reports necessary to the planning she must now coordinate. She defends against her negative feelings by being brusque in greeting her colleagues. She doesn't mean to hurt them, she simply achieves some degree of relief by donning a mantle of curtness, which serves to distance her from the others, and she can feel less guilty concerning her shortcomings. Her abruptness of course in no way deals with her imperfections per se, and she will probably be dilatory in the future. But it may well chafe her associates, who are no more forced to be defensive than she was, but who very likely may be. For example, one may several times ask her to repeat a sentence. He may not be attempting to frustrate her or take revenge, but merely trying to shield himself from further negative verbal behaviour from her. Thus it seems to him that he can't quite hear her now, though she may be speaking in a very clear and even friendly manner. But his self-protective behaviour may begin to annoy her, and unless at least one of the two is a very unusual person, a self-perpetuating cycle of mutual defensive-aggressive behaviour may be established. They were not each other's targets, but it required only a few moments for them to become such. Consider two families, clans, or nations, instead of two individuals. The same model applies. People often say that each behaviour which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America direct toward each other seems to follow each preceding such behaviour in an inexorable, seemingly ineluctable manner. It may well seem that way, but there is nothing inevitable or immutable about the process. It is simply, albeit on a terrifyingly massive scale, another instance of the operation of the model of the social psychology of mutual defensiveness. Indeed, the belief that the process is fixed, ineludible, may itself be defensive; frightening as such a preordained progression toward final dissolution would be, many of us may be actually more afraid of the notion that the mad, (defense-) mechanical dance can be interrupted, for that would imply overwhelming personal responsibility to act now. Still more fundamentally, our tendency to defend ourselves from negative emotion can lead us to generate and accept thoroughly pessimistic views of our most basic nature. One hears with some frequency, for example, that humans are "born bad," "innately evil," and the like. Quite clearly, our defense-born negative behaviours are sometimes horrific, but to say that such behaviours demonstrate an irrevocable malignancy at our core is not only to offer what at best is opinion or speculation rather than evidenced truth, but it also serves as an excuse. That is, the fact that many of us are capable, when sufficiently frightened, or doubtlessly heinous behaviour can be divested of some of its power to paralyze our minds by asserting that in fact we are not responsible, that it is fundamental human nature to do some surpassingly ghastly things. But it isn't. It is simply the worst fruit of mutual aggressive defensiveness. Mutual aggressive defensiveness — m...a...d... — mutual assured destruction. MADness, assuredly. But not inevitable.

To review that I have said thus far:

(1) There are two basic modes of surviving, the biomechanical and the experiential, and humans have evolved as creatures who employ both, but who emphasize the experiential.

(2) One cannot successfully use mental or experiential capacities in the service of maintaining existence unless such capacities include a strong potential for negative caring or emotion. Facilities for knowing and reasoning are also necessary, but by themselves quite insufficient.

(3) Emotion is the wellspring of our intentional behaviour, whether of mind (thought) or body (action).

(4) The normal environments of most people have been, and are, such as to evoke negative emotion rather often.

(5) We have thus associated our fears, griefs, hatreds, etc., with many persons, events, and things which are not inherently negative. Emotional conditioning or learning is a very low-threshold phenomenon.

(6) We are very likely to behave defensively when experiencing much bad feeling. Defense behaviour will therefore be frequent, because there is so much in our environments to which negative emotion has become attached.

(7) Our defense behaviours may offer temporary relief, but they don't deal with the sources of our fears. However, they do often hurt or frighten others, who may themselves behave defensively. Thus we quickly establish endless circles or spirals of mutual defense and aggression, though we rarely if ever had any desire to do so in the beginning.

We had to evolve as we have. There have had to be "wars and rumours of wars" because we had to experience negative emotion all too frequently, and in our unthinking attempts to protect ourselves from such emotion we unwittingly stimulated it in others, who reacted similarly. None of this means that we are innately based or damned, and there is nothing in my analysis to support an argument that war and other forms of human conflict must continue. Rather, they are indeed bad habits, which can, however slowly and with whatever difficulty, be unlearned and discarded.

We had to evolve as we have, yes. But we no longer need to continue in the old pathways. As stated above, we can now begin to stop wandering through the world, troubled by and reacting hurtfully to a legion of unnecessary fears. What can first save us, and then help us embark on a much more tranquil and perhaps joyous evolutionary course, is our now rapidly increasing understanding of who we fundamentally are. First, we are indeed emotional beings, despite centuries of defensive protestations to the contrary. And when we find ourselves in sufficiently frightening circumstances, we can be very destructive, so desperately so that we have actually appeared to some persons as irrational, demonic, or both. But irrational and demonic are labels for our behaviours, not for our essence. In fact, quite a different possibility is beginning to emerge. We may in fact be "born good". That is, at bottom we may be such that, if we could experience all possible ways of being and then be offered an absolutely free choice among them all, we would choose a social order in which all persons are

free to develop their positive potentials, an order in which there would be no war, murder, rape, etc., because the sources of negative emotion which motivate defensive behaviour would be obliterated where possible, and greatly diminished where full extinction is impossible or unwise. Hunger, for example, can be totally abolished, but minor and momentary pain, as from a stubbed toe, probably cannot (and obviously should not) be completely eliminated.

Few if any humans have ever had the free choice just described. Generation after generation, millenium after millenium, we inherit a world much too full of things that hurt. Our innate capacity for defensiveness is quickly aroused, and buttressed by learning. And we are prisoners before we reach the age of two or three, prisoners of our conditioning, as Marilyn Ferguson says, though we may sincerely believe ourselves to be more or less free. Russians are by and large not free. How do I know? They are making bombs — defensive behaviour. By that token Americans are equally unfree — they, too, are making bombs. (Ferguson, 1980).


Happily, the defense model is not the only model for human interaction. It merely appears to represent the only *modus vivendi* when we are so immersed in our fears and the social customs that derive from them that we can't entertain the possibility of another way of being. The alternative model which a few have already seen and understood is the growth or actualization model. The basic strategy is logically simple, though it is at first emotionally difficult to implement the model in ordinary living because it requires that one begin to suspend one's defensive reactions.

You begin by finding a relatively minor source of negative emotion, something to which you typically react defensively, and you admit both your fear and your resultant self-protective behaviour. Next, you resolve to deal directly with the source of your unpleasant feeling, in one of two basic ways. If your fear is learned, you deliberately design and put yourself through experiences which will detach or dissociate or counter-condition the negative emotion. For example, a person possessing a learned fear of fish could buy a beautifully illustrated book on fishes of the coral reef, and page through it in a setting otherwise very much to her or his liking, for example, a loved one is present, some treasured music is playing, a favourite beverage is at hand, and so on. If one is careful in creating such experiences, the positive emotion will outweigh the negative, and rather quickly take its place in association with the once-feared experience. Our person may soon begin to like pictures of fish so well that a trip to an aquarium can be planned and undertaken, again accompanied by a maximum of positive stimuli. Eventually, she or he may go snorkeling on a reef. As you succeed in undoing your less intense negative emotional conditionings, you can begin to deal with more powerful fears, continually augmenting a sense of inner strength and respect as you progress.


A smaller number of your fears will have to be dealt with in a different way, of course. I refer to those negative feelings which are related to such intrinsic sources as hunger. The counter-conditioning process I have

TABLE 1: THE TWO BASIC BEHAVIOUR MODELS

The social psychology of mutual defensiveness:



Growth or actualization



presented will not avail, and you will instead have to accept the task of destroying the source. In the case of hunger, one obviously has to develop methods for ensuring an adequate food supply. Both models are summarized in Table 1.

Note the critical difference between these techniques and the defense model. When engaging in defensive behaviour, one does one's best to achieve immediate relief from negative emotion, employing a method which may hurt either the self or others or both, but which does nothing about the source of the unwelcome feeling. Thus the next time the threatening event occurs, one again feels badly, and again defends, imprisoned in an endless cycle of fear and relief. In the growth or actualization approach, one allows the negative emotion to continue for a time, and that of course hurts, but the source is dealt with and one is no longer afraid. The cycle is broken. As you vanquish more and more sources of negative feeling, you find that the capacities which you have freed from defensive guard duty are now available for growth pursuits, for actualization in a perhaps ever-expanding variety of enjoyable enterprises. As one guerilla fighter can occupy ten regular soldiers, so one important defense system can hold much of a person, or nation, in thrall, demanding much or all what could otherwise be actualized in constructive, happy ways. If the guerilla disappears, the regulars can become artists, teachers, scientists, physicians, explorers, musicians, philosophers, craftsmen, mystics... and gentler, fonder mates and parents.

The growth or actualization model can be employed by an individual, or collectively, by an aggregation of persons, for example, a nation. It does require facing rather than defensively running from some fears, but the process can and should be very careful, gradual. If we can understand now that a vastly different, much more optimistic, light-hearted and positively flowering race and civilization would begin to emerge, we can easily endure the relatively brief pangs we will experience in overcoming the sources of our fears.

The model of the social psychology of mutual defensiveness requires two persons, groups, or nations. The growth or actualization model requires one person, group, or nation. One person can initiate the prevention of an argument; one nation can initiate the prevention of a war. Suppose that you and I have been locked in an endless cycle of mutual aggressive defensiveness-madness. And suppose that I suddenly realize that you have stopped responding in ways that feel negative to me when I behave defensively toward you. You have stopped reacting to me (and doing little else), and are now acting, diminishing your negatives and beginning to do things which you appear to want to do, things which may well look inviting to me. Might I not at least wonder what you have discovered? And if I were to ask you about it and you were to be friendly, as you very likely would be, might I not want to begin attempting some changes too, however cautious and suspicious I might initially be?

Will and can humans take charge of their own evolution? They can. I

don't know whether they will. I hope that this discussion will help to increase the probability that they will do so, in positive ways, and very soon.

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SECURITY & SAFETY: THE SEARCH FOR A DYNAMIC RESOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

Although fundamental to the existence of individuals and nations, security has proven highly transitory at best, completely elusive at worst. In part this is because we conceive of security in static terms, dependent on external agents for attainment, whereas the lives of both nations and individuals are dynamic and ever-changing. Current theories and concepts are examined. Alternatives are suggested for those forms of security over which we have little control.

Although fundamental to the existence of individuals and nations, security has proven highly transitory at best, completely elusive at worst. I submit this is because we conceive of security in static terms, as dependent upon external agents, whereas both individuals and nations are dynamic and ever-changing. I intend to briefly examine current theories and concepts. The alternatives suggested draw support from the field of psychology.

Probably, the most overpowering motivations we humans have is that of security (Maslow, 1970). Throughout life, much of our activity is directed toward attaining the goal of being secure. And, what is true, at least in this instance, of humans, is also true of nations. Once we have attained this end state of security, we expect that we will be fulfilled, that we will be complete, that we will live happily ever after.

At infancy, we learn that others provide us with the security that we have (Blatz, 1958). We learn to look outside of ourselves for safety — to depend on individuals and objects. This dependence on external agents to make us secure carries on through adolescence and adulthood. As we get older, and to draw examples from the Western industrialized world, we

begin to look for our security in bank accounts, pension funds, job tenure or seniority and in a myriad of other features that not only help us to maintain the status quo but also provide for our future well-being. Examples of security sought in external agents can also be cited from non-industrial cultures, although the symbols may differ. Unfortunately, the more we invest in these external agents the more vulnerable and threatened we are by external forces. That is, the more dependent we become on external agents to provide our security for us, the less secure we are. Paradoxically, though, we also become more and more committed to the notion that greater security will be obtained if only we can get more of this agent.

This is the myth of security; this is not what happens. And it doesn't happen because, as organisms, we are dynamic and not static. As such, it is reasonable to expect that dynamic goals, not static ones, will more accurately describe the strivings of humans and nations. This is because the essence of life lies in fulfilling, rather than fulfillment. Consequently, in any system of security, we have to plan for, to anticipate, change.

Similar reliance on external agents may be observed with respect to the behaviour of nations. Translate bank balance into nuclear warheads and you have the state of thinking that currently characterizes our superpowers, the philosophy that argues that one more weapon or weapons system will bring us the security we need but do not possess. But, as with individuals, greater security does not come from more and better external agents, i.e., weapons. The most elaborate defensive systems may become ineffective, as did the supposedly impregnable Maginot Line, or obsolescent, as a result of scientific advances. External objectives, especially in an era characterized by rapid technological change, cannot be relied upon to make us secure or even to feel secure. I submit that increased acquisition of newer and deadlier nuclear weaponry will decrease rather than increase our security because it will increase real tensions while concomitantly presenting us with the illusion of security and make us evermore dependent on our nuclear weaponry and less able to employ alternative solutions.

When we are secure, we feel safe, protected, content and at peace with ourselves and others. Our tensions have been reduced because we are no longer threatened. However, as I have noted, those external agents upon which we rely for our security are themselves vulnerable to crises which could hamper, even destroy, their efficacy. This situation is tension-inducing rather than tension-reducing. We are never certain that our security agent, on which we are becoming more and more dependent (or addicted) will protect us from external malevolent forces. This is the reality.

To live close to reality is never comfortable and, as a consequence, we often make use of mechanisms which distort reality for the purpose of making us feel more comfortable and less anxious. The psychoanalysts refer to these as ego defense mechanisms. We know them by such names as denial, projection and rationalization. We all make use of these mechanisms, both individually and nationally. Because they distort reality,

they have the potential for danger since they cloud our vision and interfere with rational decision-making. But, as with drugs, they may have pleasant effects. Consequently, there is a tendency to an increasing reliance upon such defense mechanisms, especially in times of great tension. The result is that reality becomes more and more distorted in order to keep anxiety in check.

Some 25 years ago, the American social psychologist, Urie Bronfenbrenner (1961) presented us with a detailed report on the extent to which such distortion can be employed to mask reality. Bronfenbrenner, who spoke Russian fluently, was in Russia in the summer of 1960, primarily for scientific purposes. During what spare time he had, he attempted to socialize with the citizenry as freely and in as many different situations as possible to determine how they perceived the United States of America and Americans. What he discovered was truly amazing.

He writes;

At first, I was troubled only by the strange irrationality of the Soviet view of the world — especially their gross distortion of American society and American foreign policy as I knew them to be. But then, gradually, there came an even more disquieting awareness — an awareness that I resisted and still resist. Slowly and painfully, it forced itself upon me that the Russians distorted picture of us was curiously similar to our view of them — a mirror image (p.46).

Thus, both Americans and Russians viewed the other as the aggressor and had selective data to support their claims. Both considered the other's government to be exploitative and one that deludes its people. Both felt that the majority of inhabitants in the other country were not supportive of their government. Both felt that the other could not be trusted. Finally, while both viewed their own nation's foreign policies as sane and reasonable, they saw the other country's policies as utter madness.

Such distortions, of course, accomplished many things, including enhancing group solidarity and the individual's own self-image by viewing the "enemy" as thoroughly evil and completely responsible for the current state of affairs. The distortions, however, do this at a price: they also increase tensions and create feelings of insecurity — just the opposite of the intended goals.

As tensions increase, so, too, do the defences until a point is reached where one fails even to recognize the image. As this upward spiral gains momentum, as the image becomes increasingly blurred, it becomes easier and easier for the other side to attribute to the image whatever characteristics it desires and, thus, to interpret the image as it wishes. Since what we are presented with is becoming less well-defined and more amorphous, we come to rely more heavily at each stage upon information supplied to us by others to aid in our interpretation of what is before us.

Psychologists have long known that, no matter how ambiguous the stimulus, the subject attempts to attribute meaning to that stimulus in order to incorporate the stimulus into her/his scheme of reality. Indeed, clinical

psychologists make use of a number of projective techniques that ensure that the stimuli being presented are capable of being seen and interpreted in a variety of ways. Such techniques are said to uncover hidden or unconscious motivation in the individual, since the subject interprets the stimuli according to his/her own particular needs and desires, according to her/his own unique perception of reality. It is critical, of course, that these stimuli are presented in a completely neutral manner.

Our need to find meaning in the meaningless is not confined to the clinician's office. As children and even adults, we see all sorts of shapes and figures in the clouds in the sky. Similarly, the insurmountable problem of the non-objective artist is that the audience is continually finding all sorts of recognizable material in the canvasses and, so, attributing meaning and interpretation that the artist never intended.

We know, as well, that once we suggest, even hint, that an ambiguous stimulus could be seen in a particular light, the viewer will grasp this information and perceive the stimulus in this way. This is why clinical psychologists take great pains to standardize their procedures for administering projective techniques and, to continue the analogy, why many artists title their works as non-objectively or as abstractly as the subject matter therein.

Let us return to the "national" level. When we view another nation and its people in a distorted manner, the more vague and ill-defined the image becomes, the more open and vulnerable we are to suggestions from others as to how to perceive that image. As tension and anxiety are added to the situation, not only does our need to make sense of the material at hand increase, so too, our vulnerability to the proffered interpretations of others is increased. We begin as well, to reduce that image to mere black and white and to eliminate the varying shades of grey. We and our side soon become the embodiment of all that is good, they and their side of all that is good, they and their side of all that is evil. Moreover, we allow less and less room for individual differences. "Our" society's criminals may yet be regarded as better persons than the most respected individuals of "their" society, simply and solely because they are ours. Indeed, through language and labels, we can convert our "enemy" into a sub-human species and, once that reduced status is achieved, we can more readily justify our use of inhuman conduct in our dealings with them. Through all of this, of course, we risk becoming the horrible monsters we perceive our enemy to be.

I submit that, in a search for security, the superpowers have allowed themselves to reach the stage I have just described. They have deliberately blurred and distorted the image of the other to justify their own behaviour and to permit their interpretation of the other's motivations and characteristics to go unchallenged. Each has claimed sole possession of honourable intentions, while allowing the other no room for good deeds. What we have at present, then, is two "righteousnesses" on a collision course, with neither side willing or able to back down. The superpowers continue to seek greater security from external objects, which, in this case, means larger and larger

stockpiles of more and more deadly nuclear weapons.

From the perspective of the individual, this escalation generates increased anxiety, feelings of alienation and hopelessness. Yet, on a national level, the build-up of nuclear arsenals does not make the superpowers feel more secure. As has been pointed out by others, "... the more a nation spends in the name of 'defense', the less real security its citizens have" (Osgood, 1966, p.14).

Having arrived at that point in time where we are continually spiralling upward, where each superpower's image of the other has become increasingly blurred and distorted, and where security is defined by superiority in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, the question is squarely raised: "How do we reverse this process?"

Many years ago, the American psychologist Charles Osgood (1962, 1966) proposed a method, based on principles of learning and interpersonal communication, to reduce and control international tensions. He termed this mechanism graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction, known by its acronym GRIT. Essentially, GRIT initially involves one nation implementing a series of small steps designed to reduce tension and to induce reciprocation from an adversarial nation. The initial steps chosen do not threaten national security. If the adversary reciprocates with its own tension-reducing measures, the door is opened for further de-escalating acts of increasing magnitude by the first nation. There is thus initiated a reciprocal downward spiral to the point where our reliance and dependence on nuclear weapons for our security becomes manageable and, perhaps, even non-existent. While Osgood's proposed mechanism may imply mutual disarmament in graduated steps, at no point does the method threaten the nuclear or non-nuclear capacity of either nation for retaliation. That is, GRIT does not demand an act by the initiating nation which is so self-threatening as to guarantee its rejection.

Obviously, to be viable, GRIT must be able to induce early reciprocation by the opponent. Otherwise, the initiating nation would return to the prior status quo but with much less enthusiasm for attempting, or responding to, de-escalating probes in the future. Consequently, much consideration must be given to methods of inducing reciprocation from the other side. Among those offered by Osgood are: the persistent communication of sincere attempts to reduce international tensions; public announcement of initiatives prior to their implementation coupled with an invitation to the other side to reciprocate in any form; the actual implementation of the initiatives at the declared time; and, importantly, the continuation of the initiatives over a period of time regardless of the response or of tension-increasing events elsewhere.

It is not my intention to extensively discuss GRIT or, in fact, deterrent or spiral conflict theories. These topics are covered elsewhere in the programme. However, it is important to relate these to my analysis of static versus dynamic resolutions of security. The deterrent theory epitomizes reliance on external agents. And, for this reason, it is subject to the

criticisms I have already noted. Spiral conflict theory, in contrast, is dynamic and interactive and, thus, is a more accurate description of the security dilemma. GRIT is a dynamic and interactive model designed to reduce tensions and, thereby, increase security. This interactive approach, I submit, is the most fruitful for dealing with the problems of security. I intend to draw from several areas of psychology to support this assertion.

If we return to the distorted mirror analogy, we can readily see many of the dangers inherent in any sincere attempt at de-escalation by either superpower. When one's image of the other is blurred and out of focus, it is almost inevitable that motivations and intentions will be misinterpreted. For example, the calculated de-escalating move may be dismissed publically as propaganda, and privately regarded in terms of hidden agendas. We cannot assume that either country is perfectly rational. Each side's perception of reality is coloured by its belief systems and dogmas and it is these which are at least partly responsible for the distorted and blurred image of the other.

Given the preceding analysis, it would appear then that the bargaining table is not the place to begin. Negotiation in general, and arms talks negotiations in particular, have as an overriding goal, the obtaining of the greatest possible concessions from the other side for the least possible cost to one's own. In the current atmosphere of international relations, a treaty that suggests that "we" got the better of "them" is all too often considered a good treaty. Indeed, some arms talks negotiators have professed this to be their only aim. Others have gone even further and suggested an approach of "take all you can without giving anything away and then take a little more". In such a forum, the process of graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction is doomed.

Before we can properly apply GRIT, we must reduce the amount of distortion and vagueness in our image of the other side and in their image of us. The most fertile way, the model for, reducing this distortion is through increased interactions between citizens of both regimes (a relatively short-term strategy) and by the ongoing formal and informal education of our citizens (a rather long-term strategy). In neither area is success — and hence the growth of real security — assured, but a number of psychological studies are supportive.

Consider first the ordinary interactions of citizens. Is it reasonable to assume that by increasing the amount of contact one nation has with another, we will decrease the mutual distortions in perception? Encouraging increased cultural, athletic and scientific exchanges between superpowers, does permit each culture to learn more of the customs, values and traditions of the other. Similarly, allowing unfettered tourism permits ordinary persons from both nations to interact with each other.

We have data from three areas of psychology to suggest that this could be a sound approach to the problem.

Social psychological research has shown that one way to eliminate prejudice is by means of personal contact and interaction (Aronson, 1984).

This somewhat oversimplifies the data and, as we shall see shortly, is not an automatic effect. Prejudice has many features in common with what we are concerned with here on an international level. Both involve a distorted image, the use of stereotypes, the elimination of shades of meaning and the polarization of attitudes.

The area of perceptual illusions provides us with research data on the Ames Room (Ames, 1951). This room is so designed that, when viewed from one perspective, it looks like any other room we have encountered. But, it is constructed with sides of different length and height so that the cues we normally employ to interpret our data no longer work. Thus, balls may appear to run uphill against the force of gravity and people, when placed at different locations in the room, appear to change markedly in size. The illusions occur because, while we perceive the room to be rectangular, it is in fact a set of trapezoids joined so as to form acute and obtuse angles.

Two aspects of the Ames room studies are important here. The first is that the illusion persists despite intellectual knowledge of how the room is shaped. It is only when the subject actively explores the room with a stick inserted through a hole in the wall that the illusion is prevented. Thus, insight into the nature of a situation is not nearly as effective as interaction with that situation.

The second important feature of the Ames Room studies is that we enter with a set of preconceived ideas about what rooms are like. This is our frame of reference and, while it worked quite well for other rooms, it proved faulty when applied to this distorted room. Because of this faulty frame of reference, we saw the illusion, not the reality.

For every situation we encounter, we generally possess some frame of reference that allows us to interpret what we observe in a manner that is consonant with our belief and value systems. While such frames of reference are useful by providing a ready-made means of ordering our perceptions, they can also severely handicap our perception of reality because they allow us to see what we expect we will see. An illustration will perhaps clarify this point. Several years ago, in conjunction with their annual mental health week, the Canadian Mental Health Association decided to encourage the large psychiatric hospitals to open their doors to the public for that week in an effort to alter the common negative perception of mental hospitals and their inmates. It was hoped that, at least for those who took advantage of the invitation, the stigma attached to patients, the hospitals and even the staff would be lessened. The result of this experiment was that the visits and tours changed very little. Generally, the "visitors" entered the "situation" with their own preconceived notions as to what they would "find". And that is what they "found". Those whose frame of reference depicted the hospital as a terrible and inhumane place, described the setting after the visit as terrible and inhumane. Those who held the opposite view prior to the visit, subsequently described the setting as just the opposite.

People see what they want to and what they expect to see. They do so in order to make the new experience consonant with their belief systems.

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But the Ames study does suggest that we might be able to get people to perceive situations differently by means of greater exposure and actual interaction amongst the participants. It was only by interacting as freely and in as many situations as he did, that Bronfenbrenner began to alter his initial image of what the Russians were like. Similarly, in the prejudice studies, when the different groups had common problems, shared goals which required cooperation for their attainment and the opportunity to interact freely one with the other, prejudice decreased (Sherif, 1966). Mere geographical proximity is not likely to lessen preconceived notions and stereotypes. Indeed, because of the selective nature of our perceptions, mere proximity could quite conceivably reinforce those stereotypes. It is actual interaction which is critical.

Research in psychotherapy also lends support to the thesis that increased interaction is effective in reducing distorted images. Virtually all of the evocative psychotherapies emphasize the development of insight as crucial to attitudinal and behavioural change. However, psychotherapists repeatedly have found that cognitive understanding of one's problems, of itself, fails to bring about the desired changes. Intellectual awareness of the condition is insufficient. In contrast, some patients or clients may never develop the appropriate insight, yet, may show remarkable improvement during the course of their treatment. Several studies suggest that the crucial variable in successful psychotherapy is not insight but interaction.

In one such study (Coons, 1957), hospitalized patients were assigned randomly to one of three psychotherapy groups: an "interaction" group, where members were encouraged to interact verbally with the other group members but with no attempt to develop insight into their problems; an "insight" group, where insight into one's problems was encouraged but interaction between members was discouraged; and a control group which received no group psychotherapy. "Improvement" was determined by a comparison of pre- and post-therapy records on a standardized intelligence test and a projective technique. The comparisons were done by someone unfamiliar with the group to which each patient belonged, thus eliminating any experimenter bias.

The results revealed that, on both indices, there was significantly greater improvement in adjustment for persons in the interaction group than in the insight or control groups. No significant differences in improvement were observed between the insight and control groups.

What seems most interesting for our purposes is that, for the interaction group, no bounds were placed on the content for the material discussed. The discussions which ensued were far-ranging. What mattered was the process whereby patients verbally interacted with one another. Interaction, and not insight, would seem to be the important ingredient in psychotherapeutic improvement, whether it be interaction between patients or between patient and therapist.

Behaviour modification, which in many areas has superseded the evocative psychotherapies, may be characterized, in this context and at least

in theory, as relying exclusively on interactions — on interactions designed and programmed according to learning theory principles. Indeed, researchers (e.g., Lindzley, 1956) have shown that chronic psychiatric patients experience marked clinical improvement when they are allowed to interact with machines that are programmed to reward a variety of behaviours including social and altruistic ones. A case history of one such patient revealed he had progressed from a chronically deteriorated state to one where he was given free grounds privileges. There was no doubt that this change was associated with his interaction with the machine. For, when this interaction was terminated, the patient gradually regressed, grew untidy and uncommunicative until his grounds privileges had to be revoked.

The examples I have related have in common that individuals and groups were placed in situations which produced changes in behaviour and attitudes — changes which better allowed the problems the various individuals and groups faced to be resolved. The consequence of those interactions was that these people developed new skills which permitted them to be more effective in dealing with reality.

If attitude change, thus, is possible and desirable, how will attitudinal change impact an individual and national security? As stated earlier, individual security comes, not from heavy reliance on external objects, but from awareness of reality, from "knowledge" of one's "world" as it really is. One cannot obtain accurate knowledge of others through distorted images. Distorted images provide "knowledge" of myths, not realities.

It is perhaps trite to remind ourselves that we, as individuals and as nations, do not exist in a vacuum, that we co-exist with our neighbours and with other nations. I submit that peaceful co-existence requires undistorted mutual images. Both sides, to speak on the national level, must feel secure whereas, at present, each superpower seeks to feel secure at the expense of the other. In the words of one commentator "... neither the United States nor the USSR can make itself more secure by trying to make the other less secure" (Smith, 1984, p.465).

Thus far I have discussed relatively short-term strategies for attitudinal change aimed at reducing mutual "image distortion". A more comprehensive, albeit longer term, approach utilizes "peace education" at all levels of human development in formal and less-formal settings. A detailed curriculum for "peace education" is beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example, Barnett, 1982). However, I would suggest the following areas for exploration.

We must ensure that we disseminate factual material on the consequences of nuclear warfare for the survival of humankind. Current information on such effects leads to the inevitable conclusion that nuclear warfare would produce no winners, only losers. The implication of this conclusion is either that nations should rely more heavily on so-called conventional weapons or that aggressive and violent solutions for solving problems must be abandoned. At present, violent solutions are appealing for a number of reasons, including, a long history (or tradition) of

successful usage of such solutions and a still strongly entrenched philosophy of "might makes right". Additionally, using force to "correct" injustices has long been regarded as the evocation of some atavistic instinct over which we have little control. Such a belief, of course, is attractive since it permits illegal and anti-social behaviour, yet excuses the consequences of such conduct.

My use of the phrase "so-called conventional weapons" undoubtedly reveals my position with respect to such reliance. Firstly, there is no assurance that in a major conflict nations will refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the current variety of chemical and biological weapons may be non-nuclear but may well prove as deadly and non-specific as their nuclear counterparts.

I submit, therefore, that it is the abandonment of aggressive and violent solutions to disputes which is the only option. This is not a pious hope. Social psychological research has fashioned teaching methods that effectively train children to employ non-violent methods in resolving disputes. (See, for example, Baron, 1976; Feshback & Feshback, 1981). Mechanisms for applying such principles on a much larger scale can and must be developed. Current vehicles for international non-violent dispute resolution, of course, include the various international forums and courts.

More generally, we must impart to our students the knowledge that patriotism must not be synonymous with xenophobia. While that may be politically expedient (Volkan, 1985), we must resist such characterization. As a corollary, we must refrain from seeking to proselytize others or to employ propaganda which demeans and degrades our "adversaries".

There is a caveat to this. We must remain aware that there are important cultural, philosophical and political differences between the two superpowers and that these differences are not easily resolvable, certainly not unilaterally. Consequently, reciprocation must be a high priority. It should be recalled that the distortions discussed by Bronfenbrenner (1961) existed equally for both sides.

Attitude change through education, while a long-term strategy, does represent dynamic security by means of increased knowledge. There is evidence indicating that such education is effective in a number of areas and settings. For example, in Sweden, over the past decade, a deliberate attempt has been made to place peace education on the curriculum at all levels of educational institutions (Falk, 1983). Students emerging from this process are more concerned with, and become more directly involved in, war and peace issues.

If educative and other methods can substantially alter attitudes, there remains the question as to the potential impact of such changed attitudes. Two relatively recent, but very different, examples in the United States suggest a considerable impact can result. One example concerns the Vietnam war. Through a variety of non-violent protests by growing numbers of ordinary citizens, general public opinion regarding the war markedly affected that nation's foreign policy. With respect to public

attitudes toward the People's Republic of China, change was effected from the "top-down". That is, prior to President Nixon's visit in the 1970's, the widespread image of China was an intensely negative one that in some ways caused them to be perceived as an even greater enemy than the Russians. In less than fifteen years, this image has been remarkably transformed to that of a "friendly" nation. Both examples give us reason to be guardedly optimistic that we can alter important attitudes, nationally and individually, and so increase real security.

Finally, let me mention two encouraging signs that suggest increased education and interaction may well be helping to reduce distorted images at the national level. Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in what one author (Campbell, 1985) terms "citizen diplomacy". For a number of reasons, including heightened concern about the prospect of nuclear war, the failure of arms talks and the current climate of Soviet-American relations, increasing numbers of Americans are touring Russia, on "unofficial" goodwill visits. These encounters have been criticized as "naive, counter-productive and even dangerous to diplomacy", but, I submit, they will prove to be of merit if they assist these "citizen diplomats" to more clearly perceive their Russian counterparts who, like themselves are not without imperfections, but also have a genuine desire for security and a better life.

The second example is a six-part series entitled "Peter Ustinov's Russia" to be televised in North America in the 1985-86 season. While it is to be entertaining and informative, its stated purpose is also to dismantle many of the western world's misconceptions about Russians and to promote peace by overcoming prejudice and propaganda. Significantly, too, this will be the first western-produced show of its kind that will also be presented on Soviet television.

The analysis presented suggests that a static model for security, one based on dependence on external agents, one which seeks to preserve the status quo, will be ineffective. Rather, the only meaningful approach to security must recognize the goal of mutual security through elimination of mutually distorted images utilizing a variety of short- and longer-term strategies. Security is always based on the future, not in the present or in the past.

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ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS IN TOPIC I

COMMUNITY CONFLICT: THE EL DORADO INVASION OF WARMAN

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ABSTRACT

In this study we have selected a conflict situation (building of a proposed uranium refinery), in a solid (ethno-religious Mennonite) rural community, to see whether a consummatory issue such as refining uranium in a pacifist community does not create extensive opposition. We wanted to discover how some communities organize effectively to attain common goals. We conclude that the Warman Mennonite community was successful in keeping Eldorado Nuclear out, because in Wellman's terms, they were a "saved" community with a "traditional" core, which had built numerous outside networks in a "liberated" way. They benefited from both traditional strong ties and extensive new social networks. Thus they were able to shift the controversy from instrumental to consummatory issues, and from a bargaining to an oppositional strategy.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN A CANADIAN PRISON — A PARADIGM FOR RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with conflict resolution in a prison society. A technique for intervening will be described and a case will

be made for regarding this situation and procedure as a paradigm of international conflict.

Some illustrations of the points made are provided by drawing upon a simple case history and contemporaneous world events. From this some conclusions regarding future international conflict resolution are drawn.

RECIPROCAL HOSTAGE EXCHANGE: A UNIFIED APPROACH TO BOTH DETERRENCE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

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ABSTRACT

This paper articulates a new and very different approach to "deterrence", one focussed on the underlying causes rather than the more easily visible effects of superpower intransigence, one with the capacity to forestall all forms of potential aggression (not just those that are nuclear), one that attempts to resolve rather than "manage" the nuclear dilemma, one based on positive rather than negative incentives, and one with the unusual potential to remove barriers rather than continuously to create them. I argue that a massive and governmentally-sponsored "reciprocal hostage exchange" program represents a deterrent "force", or perhaps more accurately a "restraining presence", that uniquely combines inhibition or war-like or destabilizing acts in the short term while *simultaneously* enhancing confidence-building and transnational understanding over the longer term, at all levels of the body politic.

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL: THE AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

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
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ABSTRACT

1. A brief analysis of forty years of Australian foreign policy, which — but for the Whitlam years — was

second-hand, while the present is of ambivalent attitudes and missed opportunities.

2. A longer proposal for the conversion of that policy into one which is based on a newly found position of Australia in the Asian and world communities.
3. A more extensive set of suggestions on how Australia may contribute to the reduction of tension and the resolution of conflict between the two world powers.



Dr Jeannette Maas and Dr Robert Stewart at opening ceremony.

TOPIC II: NATIONALISM VS THE WORLD AS EXPANDED COMMUNITY

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THE POTENTIAL FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS IN IMPROVING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS

PAUL VON WARD



Dr Douglas Corey, Professor Hannes Alfven, Professor Ruth Ellsworth and Dr Jeannette Maas at Welcome Party.

PRECONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION — THE CASE OF WARS OF INSURGENCY

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ABSTRACT

Internal wars have become breeding grounds for proxy-interstate wars, e.g. Lebanon, Vietnam, Central America. Finding means to manage and resolve internal wars is imperative for the parties and for international security. The literature is disparate and contradictory. A series of hypotheses are extracted concerning successful mediation: the nature and characteristics of the parties; the conflict; and the third party intermediary. The viability of mediation as an approach is examined. Conditions are divided into necessary and sufficient. Only sufficient conditions might make mediation applicable and viable in more internal war situations than a cursory look at a long list of preconditions might suggest.

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the conditions that contribute to the success of mediation as a peace-making device in internal wars. It starts with an explanation of why the focus of the analysis is on "mediation" and "internal wars", then presents a series of hypotheses pertaining to the conditions that facilitate the effectiveness of mediation of internal wars. Finally, it concludes by evaluating and ranking these conditions and examining the implications for the feasibility of mediation in these kinds of conflicts. Before proceeding further, I would first like to define the two concepts central to this paper: "mediation", and "internal wars."

In this study, the term mediation shall be defined as an intervention

in a conflict, by an actor not a party to the dispute, aimed at helping the parties resolve their conflict peacefully through negotiation and compromise. It shall include good offices and inquiry which some authors have considered as separate from mediation.¹ The second concept that calls for a definition is the notion of internal war. Andrew Janos defines it as a "violent conflict between parties subject to a common authority and of such dimensions that its incidence will affect the exercise or structure of authority in the society." (Janos, 1964, p.130). Even though I shall use this definition as a fairly basic identification of internal wars, we have to be aware of its limitations. It could hardly be said that in civil wars of secession the insurgents are subject to a common authority with their opponents. The authority exercised by the incumbents over the secessionist seems to be only *de jure* and not *de facto* in most instances. Moreover, many authors warn about the futility of trying to strictly draw the boundaries between internal wars and external or international wars. For example, Kelly and Miller point out that "only conceptually can there be a purely internal war, although, as affected by the variables of goals, scope, and duration, there are obviously greater and lesser degrees of inner-outer permeability in such wars." (Kelly & Miller, 1969 and Duner 1983).

There are several reasons why this study focuses on "mediation" and "internal wars". First, it appears that the incidence as well as the gravity of internal wars is on the ascendancy.² Many internal wars that start as isolated and minor develop a tendency to lure-in more major powers, thereby escalating the destructiveness of the conflict and even at times endangering international peace and security.³ There have been many examples of such conflicts since the end of World War II: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, East Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Lebanon, Jordan, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Zaire, Rhodesia, Ethiopia, and Chad, etc. In some of these conflicts, nuclear weapons were even considered as options by some decision makers to "win" these intractable wars. Ideological divisions in the world today tend to foster the perception that the outcome of every political struggle in every part of the world is of vital concern to each of the ideological blocs. Moreover, modern technology is increasingly decreasing the significance of national boundaries for military strategy and ideological commitments. As a result, internal wars become forums for larger conflicts such as racial, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist or cold war rivalries. Conflicts in remote areas tend to suddenly acquire strategic importance, and wars that might seem insignificant at first become breeding grounds for larger conflicts and violence.

¹ See Plano & Olton (1979) for the distinction some have attempted to make between mediation, inquiry and good offices.

² See Suter (1984, p.1). Also see Small & Suter (1979, p.68) who point out that for the 68 years period between 1871 and 1939, 40 civil wars took place while during the 31 years between 1946 and 77 alone 37 civil wars occurred.

³ Small and Singer (1979, p.69) substantiate this view with data for the period between 1946-1977. During this time, 63% of the 37 civil wars that took place were internationalized.

Some argue that the nuclear era has made all-out international wars extremely dangerous and that internal wars reduce the risk of such confrontations by allowing states to wage their conflicts indirectly through local political movements and rebellions elsewhere. (Luard, 1972). There might be some validity to this argument. However, as illustrated in the examples cited above, the danger that internationalized civil wars pose to global peace and security is still so grave that they cannot be accepted as substitutes for direct interstate wars. Methods for their avoidance or peaceful resolution must be found. Moreover, to date, most of these conflicts have been waged in poor third-world countries. Conflicts that might have spent themselves out were it not for international intervention continue on for years. Consequently, they exacerbate the already abysmal poverty of these countries by destroying their fragile economic base and inflict endless misery upon generations of people. Thus, from the perspective of the people of these countries, a way out of these conflicts becomes even more imperative.

Mediation was made the focus of this study because it seems to be the most appropriate mechanism to resolve internal wars when compared to all the other third party and even non-third party conflict resolution devices. The other major third-party conflict resolution mechanisms, adjudication and arbitration, are not relevant for the resolution of large-scale social and violent conflicts such as civil wars.

Other conflict resolution mechanisms that do not involve third parties range from outright victory or loss by one party to the conflict, on one end of the spectrum, to voluntary negotiation and bargaining, on the other. An outright military solution could hardly be said to resolve the conflict even though it may terminate it. Since the underlying problems behind the conflict are not dealt with, a coerced solution will always contain seeds of future conflict and tension. The other end of the spectrum of non-third party mechanisms consist of negotiation and bargaining. These could be the most ideal means of settling large-scale social conflict if they involve compromise and accommodation. However, the process of negotiation, when it does not involve third party intermediation, is fraught with many problems that prevent its success or even limit its frequent use.

The problems in negotiation partly arise from the patterns of communication that are inherent in the process itself. The mode of communication between the parties in a negotiation interaction tends to encourage a "contest of wills". Messages sent by the parties to each other embody a large amount of distortion because they frequently tend to be implicit and discrete, utilizing threats, warnings, bluffs, and sometimes outright misinformation.⁴ Concessions and compromises are difficult to

⁴ The series of studies by Deutsch and Krauss have indicated how the use of threats and counter-threats in the bargaining process leads to the escalation of the conflict, to fiercely competitive behaviour and even to the failure of the bargaining process itself. See Deutsch & Krauss (1962).

come by because they might create a perception that the party who makes concession is weak. Moreover, the fact that there is no external source of information that is not coloured by the hostilities, stereotypes, suspicions, fears, and prejudices of the conflicting parties limits the range of options and alternatives that might be apparent to the negotiators. Because of these shortcomings, the success of negotiations directly between conflicting parties can be severely limited.

Mediation, on the other hand, incorporates some of the beneficial aspects of negotiation while rectifying its shortcomings. It maintains aspects such as the parties' autonomy in decision making, their full participation and involvement in the resolution process, and the potential for dealing with the root causes of the conflict. But, at the same time, it remedies the defective communication that afflicts the negotiation process by filtering the distorted messages, encouraging open and frank interactions, expanding the range of options and alternative solutions, providing face saving devices for concession and, in general, making compromise and accommodation an attractive instead of a disgraceful option. It encourages commitment to the results of the negotiations by creating an atmosphere in which the parties could present their cases fairly and justly.

Although mediation seems to be the most appropriate and the most beneficial method of dealing with internal wars, unfortunately its full potential and advantages have not been fully tapped. In order for mediation to be utilized more frequently as an effective method of resolving internal wars, it must be thoroughly understood and its theory more fully developed. At this point, let alone the theory, even the literature on the subject is scant, contradictory and in disarray. This study attempts to contribute to the systematic theorization of mediation by synthesizing the fragmented literature and identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of mediation of internal wars.

PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION OF INTERNAL WARS

A. IDENTITY OF THE CONTESTANTS

It has been argued that negotiated settlement can occur only between parties whose "identity" or "personality" has been well defined. (Modelske, 1964). In a civil war or insurgency against a government, it is usually difficult to clearly define the "identity" of the insurgents or rebels. For the purposes of third party intermediary intervention, it does not suffice merely to identify the corporate personality of the contestants — the clear identification of the representatives and the spokespeople of the conflicting parties must be established.

This prerequisite also implies that there has to be inner stability and cohesiveness within the power structure of each party. Such stability could give the representatives of the parties more flexibility to compromise and

bind their constituencies. Unless enough stability exists, it is difficult for both the mediator and the protagonists to know whether any commitment made now would ever be implemented in the future.

It is a generally held view that leaders of internally noncohesive groups tend to be more aggressive and provoke conflict with outsiders in order to be able to forge inner cohesion.⁵ Under such situations, therefore, it is not surprising that mediation would fail since the leaders of such groups would likely be resistant to any attempts to resolve the conflict. Even though the inner unity of the conflicting parties may not necessarily bring about success, we could argue that their lack of unity hinders mediation.

The absence of an intense personality conflict among the leaders of the conflict group has also been viewed as a factor that contributes to the success of a mediation effort. If disputes between groups become personalized, emotional irrationality takes over and saving face and intransigence become serious preoccupations for the parties. "Even if any settlement is reached, it is viewed as untrustworthy." (Ott, 1972, p.616). Although it cannot be doubted that such personal animosity could be a problem in mediation, its effect could be mitigated if the mediator is well qualified in intervention skills, which, as we will see below, is an essential prerequisite for successful mediation. The mediator could temper the prevailing personality conflicts by controlling the communication process, by facilitating indirect communication, filtering-out the rhetoric and anger between the parties that hinder compromise, and by capitalizing and encouraging the parties to focus on their transcending convergent interests. This is not to argue that such tactics of the mediator could erase the problem entirely. The intensity of the hostility would determine whether the mediator could effectively mitigate the negative effects of the animosity on the mediation process.

In an insurgency situation, sometimes the very clear identification of the parties might also create a counterproductive effect. The more clearly the insurgents are identified, and the more closely they approximate the position of the incumbents, (i.e., the existing government), the more reluctant the incumbents will be to deal with them for fear of conferring a status of equality on them. (Ott, 1972). Many negotiation and mediation efforts have been bogged down because of this problem. The unwillingness of the Nigerian Government to negotiate with the leaders of the secessionist Biafrans during the Nigerian Civil War, or that of the Rhodesian Government with the representatives of the Patriotic Front are only few illustrations of this dilemma. (Yarrow, 1978; Davidow, 1983). Therefore, one of the problems mediators have to contend with is how to bridge the gap between the "rebels" and the government without threatening the sense of sovereignty of the latter. Some approaches will be discussed later. (See subsection E below.)

⁵ See for example Coser (1956). The same view is expressed by Bloomfield & Leiss (1969, p.27).

Another factor that might have a bearing on whether or not mediation intervention is likely to succeed is the dependency of the conflict parties on outside sources for support to wage their conflict. Frei argues that the possibilities for success in mediation become higher the more one or both conflicting parties are dependent on or are supported by outside parties. (Frei, 1975). Even though the specific reasons he gives for this view may not be totally acceptable,⁶ yet the hypothesis is a plausible one. Especially, if the dependency is high, it could create a sense of vulnerability and insecurity on the side of the conflicting parties arising from the fear that the support might be terminated due to internal political factors of the support givers. Such sense of vulnerability could sometimes make a negotiated settlement of the conflict an attractive option and could serve as an entry point for intermediary effort.

B. DURATION OF THE CONFLICT

It has been argued that settlement is feasible only when internal wars have lasted more than a certain minimum duration. "Settlements most often seem to follow upon an initial test of strength in which the several parties' capacity for mischief and violence has been demonstrated in action." (Modelske 1964, p.142). A certain minimum duration is also an essential precondition for the involvement of third party actors, of conciliatory mechanisms and of international plans and resources. (Modelske, 1964). Even though there has not been an attempt to define precisely what the minimum duration is, the implication seems to be that if the conflict does not last for some period, it may not be important enough to require the attention of third party intermediaries.

However, merely the age of the conflict may not be enough. The level of intensity the conflict might have undergone during its life might also be important. Frei (1975, p.463) observed that in cases where the level of intensity increased over time, mediation had very little chance of success. On the contrary, where there was tension for a certain duration (three years or more in his study), but the conflict did not escalate to a higher level of intensity, the chances for success were greater.

Another measure of duration and the amenability of a conflict for mediation has been the stage at which the positions of the conflicting parties begin to harden. According to this view therefore, it is important for the mediator to offer his/her services at the earliest stage of the conflict before contending positions have become firm. (Jackson, 1972, p.27). Once positions have been stated in public, it will be difficult for the intermediary to facilitate compromise because it would involve one party having to lose face by backing down from its publicly stated positions.

⁶ His reason is that the supporters, especially when they are super powers, have a common interest in not letting local conflict escalate to the nuclear level and perhaps also a common tacit agreement not to risk the influence they have gained through the conflict by its intensification.

This prerequisite of minimum duration, seems to be a rather demanding one. It requires a great amount of precision timing from the point of view of the mediator. It demands that the conflict lasts long enough for the conflicting parties to test each other's strength, and that there be enough "blood-letting" to create the realization that the objectives of both parties could not be very easily attained. But it requires that the conflict should not last long enough to raise its intensity level too much or harden the stated positions. The question of "fine tuning" will be discussed again later in the section on "Timing of Intervention".

C. STALEMATE

The existence of stalemate could probably be one of the most important preconditions for effective third party intermediary intervention. It has been defined as a state of affairs in which neither side, given its aims, has the resources to overwhelm the other (absolutely, or without incurring unacceptable losses). Stalemate creates between the parties that *situation of balance* without which negotiations cannot properly begin. (emphasis mine) (Modelski, 1964, p.143).

This concept is very confusing to deal with because it has been given a multitude of connotations and implications, some contradictory, by various authors.

One concept that has been interchangeably used with stalemate is the concept of power parity. Many have argued that the probability of success of an intermediary's effort is related to the existence of at least a rough parity of power between the parties to the conflict. (Himes, 1980, p.240; Touval, 1983, p.9; Young, 1977, pp. 43-44; Liska, 1962, p.204 and Ott, 1972, p.616).

The justification for this argument is that if there is a marked difference in power between the contending parties, the stronger party would expect total victory and would have no incentive to accept mediation. The stronger party may even view the mediator as a stumbling block towards the achievement of victory and not cooperate with him/her or, if it does, will tend to use the latter as an instrument for facilitating surrender. (Legg & Morrison, 1971 and Meyer, 1960). "It goes strongly against the grain of human nature to seek a negotiated solution when one can be imposed merely by demanding it." (Modelski, 1964, p.149).

On the other hand, power parity could arguably be competitive and escalatory and might endanger the success of mediation. The balance of power theory has been criticized on the grounds that it leads to escalation and show down of force in an attempt by each party to upset the balance since the probability of each party winning or losing is equal. (Organski, 1961 and Wright, 1965).

Part of the apparent inconsistency between these two lines of argument seems to arise from the confusion that is created by the interchangeable use of the terms "parity" and "stalemate". These two terms may

not necessarily have the same implications. Power parity could exist merely in the level of untested perceptions; while stalemate implies that the parity has been actually tested by confrontation and that the conflict is deadlocked. Thus, if the balance exists merely on the level of perceptions, it is likely to be competitive and escalatory. Therefore, especially when viewed in conjunction with the other precondition identified so far, that "the capability of the parties for violence and mischief must be demonstrated", it makes more sense to talk of "stalemate" rather than mere "parity of power" as a precondition for successful mediation.

However, it does not seem that mere stalemate is enough. Its existence may not necessarily lead to a search for mediation unless the state of deadlock created exacts a "high and rising cost" from the protagonists. (Ott, 1972, p.616). The rising cost could provide an incentive to the parties towards settlement with the hope of cutting their costs down. A problem arises however if the intervention took place too late after the parties have decided to incur the "high and rising cost". The parties could resist political settlement because the more they spend in the pursuit of their goal, the more they will be hesitant to withdraw. Withdrawal from the conflict might be considered as a "betrayal of those who have already lost their lives", and might imply an admission that they have spent all their resources on something unattainable. (Edmead, 1971). This might reflect on the political judgement of the leaders of the conflict parties which might have serious political repercussions on their incumbency. [What happened to the leaders of Argentina in the aftermath of the Falkland Crisis could serve as an illustration of the apprehension that political leaders might have in such situations.] Thus intervening when the parties are expecting a high and rising cost but before they incur it calls again for another precision timing and fine-tuning.

Based on the concept of equality of power, a mediation strategy which has come to be known as "empowerment", and which has special relevance for internal wars has been developed. Where power is grossly asymmetrical in its distribution, it is argued that the interventionists must help the weaker parties empower themselves before meaningful negotiation and settlement can occur. Wehr (1979) explains the concept of "empowerment" as follows:

The empowerment model of conflict regulation rests upon the principle that balance is desirable in a conflict situation... It operates primarily in conflict situations that are grossly asymmetrical, where there is domination of the weak by the strong... As the desperate and the oppressed gain some sort of power base in the conflict, some legitimate leverage of countervailing force, the conflict becomes more amenable to negotiated, nonviolent settlement... [The empowerment of the weaker party increases its acceptability as an actor in the conflict and enhances options for dealing with the opponent]. (Wehr, 1979, pp. 37-38; Fisher, 1969 and Curle, 1971)

Modelski (1964) uses the same idea with regard to internal wars. He contends that the requirement of stalemate could appear very restrictive if it

is left to happen on its own accord, since it rarely occurs by itself. However, he says it is possible to contrive a stalemate by international action. "The international system can induce such a situation, because its resources are superior and because a sufficient amount can be diverted in aid of the weaker party..."⁷ Without going into the merits of the claim that the international system can play this role, in the context of internal wars, such empowerment strategy could be problematic unless used in a very marginal sense. Otherwise, it could escalate the conflict and cast doubts about the impartiality of the mediator. This strategy is likely to be more effective if the equalizer and the empowerer role is played in the negotiation process than in the battle field. Goals and objectives that could not have been attained by force may be attained by skillful negotiation and bargaining on the table. In most instances, even after a stalemate has been established in the war front, there may not be parity in the negotiation because one of the parties, usually the insurgents, are not able to present themselves as equal bargaining partners to the government representatives. They usually lack resources (information, finances, organization) or skills (qualification and experience in diplomatic negotiations). Results attained through such negotiations are likely to be lopsided or manipulated to the detriment of the weaker party. This not only perpetuates the underlying problems that were the causes of the conflict, but also creates doubts about the credibility of the process and the agreement itself, ultimately sowing the seeds of future discontent and conflict. In this situation, the third party could rectify the imbalance by empowering the weaker party so that the latter could conduct the negotiations equally and fairly. Strategies such as helping the unorganized or weaker party formulate consensus negotiating positions, providing expert counsel and assistance, providing information so that the party is enabled to make realistic demands and decisions etc. could be used to create the desired equality for the fairness and integrity of the peace process.⁸

Concerning the danger "empowerment" might create to the neutrality of the third party, both Wehr and Modelski suggest that the "empowerment" be done by another actor other than the intermediary who is willing to work in conjunction with the latter for the benefit of the conflict resolution process.⁹ Moreover, the establishment of the mediator's trust and the acceptance of the sincerity of his/her purposes by the parties is crucial

⁷ See Modelski (1964, p. 143). Also Rubin (1981) argues that a third party could lend a hand to the weaker party in order to increase the motivation of the disputants by making the gravity of their situation more apparent, or protect the importance of the mediator's role i.e. justify the necessity of his/her continued active involvement.

⁸ For a more detailed discussion of such empowerment devices used in an actually mediated internal war, see a forthcoming book by this author entitled, *Mediation of Internal Wars: Strategies and Case Study — The Sudan Civil War, 1955-72*.

⁹ This model is analogous to national systems where the government assumes the role of the prosecutor and the judge at the same time, but different arms of the government assume these duties. A similar pattern exists in the division of labour between the General Assembly and the Secretariat of the UN in handling international conflicts.

for the success of empowerment strategies. As illustrated by the efforts of the World Council of Churches to mediate the Sudan Civil War in 1972, the government allowed the intermediaries leeway to play an empowering role in favour of the insurgents because it had full confidence on the sincerity of the intermediaries' intention to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (Touval, 1983).

D. INTERESTS AT STAKE

Some argue that the issues of the conflict have an important bearing on the success or failure of mediation. The claim is that there are some issues that lend themselves to mediation and others that do not. However, the definition of these issues is replete with contradictions. In abstract, one might argue that some issues are basically zero-sum, leave no room for accommodation and therefore no space for negotiation and compromise. Disputes arising from core values deeply held by the parties might serve as an example of this situation since they end up being basically judgements of right and wrong. Territorial issues have also to be considered to belong in the category of unmediatable issues. Some have argued that the reason for the intractability of the Middle East conflict is the territorial nature of the issues. (Touval, 1983, p.8). Comparatively, economic and power sharing conflicts lend themselves to negotiation and mediation. However, even such a broad classification is not satisfactory because issues that ostensibly looked "zero sum" at the beginning could be converted to "positive sum" issues by the involvement of a skillful mediator who could help the parties reduce their perceptual rigidities and their view of mutual incompatibility by redefining the issues in new and interesting ways. Also, the nature and characteristic of the issues could change or acquire different negotiable dimensions during the process of the conflict. In the context of internal wars, it is possible to argue that wars of secession and territorial independence might be one of those issues that has the appearance of a zero-sum game and therefore difficult to mediate. It is not difficult to imagine why a state may not be willing to negotiate its own disintegration. However, the conflict could start as a movement for secession and the point of settlement could be political autonomy within the framework of one state, which is comparatively more amenable to negotiation. Therefore, it is risky to dismiss any issue as being inappropriate for mediation since what the parties could publicly state as their objective could vary from what they are willing to accept.

Instead of looking at the issues in terms of content, a more helpful way of looking at them might be in terms of their complexity or multidimensionality. It is possible to contend that a complex or multidimensional issue lends itself to mediation because it creates more possibilities for tradeoffs. Since all the dimensions of the issue may not be of equal importance to the two parties, it may create a willingness to compromise on some of the issues if one gets concessions on the others. On the other hand, if it is a single issue conflict or is presented as such in the negotiations, it

would generate a perception of "lose-all" or "win-all" and the flexibility for the mediator would be severely restricted increasing the chances of the mediation's failure. One strategy which emanates from this is that the mediator could break up the issue into negotiable sub-units and start the negotiation from the less difficult sub-issues and work up to the more difficult. This could build a benevolent cycle of good will, flexibility, confidence in the process, and an attitude of cooperation. The 1979 mediation process of the Rhodesian civil war seemed to have benefitted from the use of this strategy. The mediator supposedly broke the issues into smaller component parts and took a step by step approach which allowed flexibility and trade-offs instead of negotiating the whole issue as one package. (Davidow, 1983, p.10). A similar approach was utilized in the mediation of the Sudan Civil War in 1972.

E. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIATOR

This is a broad category that subsumes many variables and about which there is a fair amount of consensus. In a nutshell, the following characteristics have been viewed as requisites for the mediator in order to make the mediation efforts successful:¹⁰

1. impartiality regarding the issues in the dispute;
2. independence from all parties to the conflict;
3. the respect of and acceptability to all protagonists;¹¹
4. the knowledge and skill to deal with the issues;¹²
5. possession of the required physical resources, e.g. meeting site, transportation and communication facilities, persons for verification and inspection services;
6. leverage, i.e. the possibility for the mediator to put pressure on one or both parties to accept a proposed settlement; (Cot, 1972, p.599) and
7. international support for the mediator.

While there seems to be a general agreement about the importance of the first six characteristics, the importance of leverage has been controversial. For some people, the issue of leverage rests at the center of the success or failure of mediation. (Frei, 1975, p.482; Cot, 1972, p.12). The possession of the "instruments of coercion" or the ability to reward or punish the conflict parties for the decision to accept or reject a settlement proposal has been considered to be a strong facilitator for mediation effectiveness. On the other hand, others have argued that "intellectual dexterity and persuasiveness in dealing with such problems as the trans-

¹⁰ The list is based on the abridged summary provided by Ott (1972, p.599).

¹¹ For Wehr (1979), respect includes credibility as someone with past success in settling disputes. Wehr (1979, p.50). Moreover, Frei (1975) adds a qualification here and warns that too much respect could be detrimental. He contends that success in mediation is hindered if the mediator is either too prominent or too insignificant.

¹² See the next section for a detailed discussion of this characteristic.

mission of information and the dissolution of tactical rigidities" are more important for the success of mediation. (Young, 1967, p.56). Yarrow even goes a step further and argues that in certain instances the mediator's lack of political power might even facilitate success rather than hinder it. He argues that the credibility and sincerity of the mediator could be enhanced because of his non-political nature and inability to "call down sanctions of any kind." Such a lack of power allows the mediator the potential "to permit an open and relaxed relationship between human beings." (Yarrow, 1978, p.256).

In the context of internal wars, some kind of leverage would no doubt enhance the persuasiveness of the mediator. This does not mean however that the availability of leverage replaces the necessity of having the "intellectual dexterity" to deal with mediation problems. Nor does it mean that it has to be used automatically. In fact there are strong arguments for tremendous restraint in its use. Excessive use of leverage might cast doubts about the neutrality of the mediator, and might create suspicion that the third party has a vested self interest in the outcome of the conflict. Some observers have criticised the use of excessive leverage in the Mid-East negotiations of the early 70's by US Secretary Henry Kissinger because it created a situation in which each party was negotiating with Kissinger rather than with each other for whatever concession the United States would give them. (Fisher, 1981). Walton (1969) argues that this kind of negotiation relationship inhibits a lasting agreement characterized by the internationalization of changed attitudes. (Walton, 1969).

The need for leverage also does not mean that the mediator has to command enormous resources. Part of the leverage arises from the respect the parties have for the mediator and their reluctance to jeopardize the mediator's continued involvement by continuously rejecting his/her proposals. Sometimes, just the mere ability of the mediator to mobilize international public opinion could be a source of tremendous leverage since it could possibly influence the views of allies and aid givers to the parties. Thus, leverage should not be viewed only in terms of material resources.

The other characteristic of a mediator that has been considered crucial for the success of the intervention effort is the international support behind the effort. In the context of interstate conflict, many authors have suggested that a "plurality of states", the "Secretary General of the UN or other designated people", or other international organizations be the parties to play the role of third parties. (Lall, 1966, p.100; Frei, 1975, p.484). The rationale is that the mediator who gets his or her mandate from an international organization is less likely to offend the feelings of sovereignty of the parties than if the mandate came from one state. It is argued that especially when pressure is exerted in the mediation process, it is better that the pressure take place through an international organization because the conflicting parties have less reason to be "personally insulted". Besides that, the pressure related mediation intervention can be presented as an action of a higher institution. (Lall, 1966 and Frei, 1975). Moreover, it is argued that

the parties recognize the impartiality of a mediator more quickly when he/she is sent by an international organization than by an individual state. (Lall, 1966 and Frei, 1975).

It is questionable, however if these observations would be totally applicable to conflicts between states and insurgents. In most internal wars, the sovereignty feelings of the governments involved in the conflict will be even more pronounced since the incumbents consider the war as an internal affair, and not a matter for the involvement of other states or international organizations. As we pointed out above, one stumbling block in mediation of internal wars is the fear by governments of conferring a status of equality on the "rebels", and a public recognition of the legitimacy of the latter's cause if they sat and negotiated with them. This fear would be even more accentuated if the mediation effort was undertaken in an international political environment and political actors where the insurgents could potentially gain *de facto* international recognition and status by merely interacting with these actors. In such a case it is doubtful if the sovereignty sensitivities of governments would be alleviated by the involvement of bodies such as the UN or other international political organizations. Even if they are not unofficial, in contrast, the assumption of the role of the third party by non-political, non-governmental international organizations could have a salutary role in reducing the anxiety of governments in dealing with "rebels". Interaction between the intermediary and the "rebels" would not lend international legal and political status to the latter, thus pacifying the sovereignty sensitivities of governments and making the negotiations less threatening. Moreover, the intermediary intervention of these organizations could have the benefit of access to resources and skills that may not be available to a single state mediator, thus combining the benefits of international involvement without the risk that such involvement entails.

There have been many situations in Africa where other states or international political organizations such as the OAU have been rebuffed as mediators in secessionist wars on the ground that their intervention would violate the sovereignty of the governments concerned or would give international legitimacy to the "rebels". In contrast, part of the success of the World Council of Churches' mediation of the Sudan Civil War was due to their humanitarian and ecumenical rather than their political nature.

F. SKILLS OF THE MEDIATOR

Wehr provides a detailed enumeration of what the knowledge and skills required of a mediator entail. These are:

- (a) conflict situation analysis, i.e., fact finding: parties, issues and goal clarification;
- (b) empathy: ability to understand positions of antagonists without subscribing to them;
- (c) listening: "active listening" helps parties to vent hostility and frustration, gains trust for intervenor;

(d) sense of timing: judging when conflict is receptive to intervention, when negotiations are appropriate;

(e) trust and credibility development: establishing "credentials," trust relationships with conflict parties and between them, intervenor objectivity;

(f) mediation: scheduling negotiations, helping negotiators formulate "yesable propositions," clarifying and getting parties to agree to trade-offs, insuring full implementation of an agreement;

(g) communication: facilitating and validating communication among conflict parties, accurate verbal and non-verbal messages;

(h) imagination: the capacity for eliminating impasses through imaging creative alternatives, recombining alternative solution or parts thereof, priority goals reranking;

(i) joint-costing: helping conflict parties to accurately assess the costs of conflict to each, and the potential benefits of resolving it;

(j) crisis management: minimization of hostility and violence in extremely tense conflict situations through such measures and rationalizing the command-and-control system of forces of order, controlling access to weapons of violence on all sides, rumor control. (Wehr, 1979, pp. 51-52).

Even though it might be impossible to find a mediator who satisfies all the requirements of characteristics and skills, a successful mediator should have a substantial package of these resources.

Although "sense of timing" is only one of the requisite skills for a mediator, for some authors the question of timing one's intervention is so critical that the success or failure of mediation hinges on it. But unfortunately, the claims made about appropriate timing are so contradictory that they defy the operationalization of the concept.

The argument behind timing is that each conflict situation has entry points where intervention can best begin, (Wehr, 1979, p.50), and that, in many situations, the time for initial intervention is critical to its success. (Jackson, 1958, p.26). Therefore, different authors have identified key points such as "before positions harden", "when valuation of the object is low", "when valuations start to rise", or "when parties start to expect rising costs", etc. as appropriate times for intervention. Others have argued that sufficient time should be allowed to lapse before intervention in order for the parties to show their capacity for force. Unfortunately, most of these timing concepts are very subjective. It might be very difficult for the mediator to establish the prevalence of these points since the parties' perceptions could be different from the mediator's and the public rhetoric of the contenders could differ from what they privately believe. The mediator might be able to ascertain the arrival of these points after the fact, but according to these theories of timing, intervention would be too late by them.

On the other hand, some have suggested more objective indicators of timing such as "the change of government", "the arrival of stalemate", or "deadlock", etc. which might be easier to ascertain. A change of government has been considered as a desirable entry point because it might bring into

office leaders who have not made such heavy personal commitments to the pursuit of previously stated objectives and therefore, can abandon them more easily. (Edmead, 1971, p.16). Thus the more prudent approach for the intermediary would be to become involved as soon as the more objective indicators are established rather than to wait until all of the requirements of timing are satisfied. The mediator could then monitor the conflict from close range and adjust his/her actions by trial and error. This keeps the prospects for mediation alive and always reminds the parties that negotiation could be an alternative to the way they are waging their conflict.

It is not always easy to detect changes in circumstances surrounding a conflict and identify the opportune moments for intermediary interventions. It requires close proximity to the conflict and astute and sensitive observers. In this regard, the role of international, non-political, non-governmental humanitarian agencies can be very important. In civil wars which entail wide scale suffering, as many of these civil wars do, agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, Oxfam, etc. would have an important mediatory potential. These organizations, either by their own initiative or by the invitation of the contenders, approach the parties with a humanitarian umbrella which gives them access to the conflicting parties that many outside organizations could not have. Such an inlet could provide them with an opportunity to observe and study the conflict from close range, to get a better view of the perception and concerns of the protagonists, to identify key actors and decision makers, to monitor the process of the conflict and even to assess the outlooks for peaceful regulation or even resolution of the conflict, and to identify possible entry points. Since these organizations are also seen as being free from advancing specific nationalistic interests in addition to their willingness to provide aid under difficult and dangerous circumstances, it would not be very difficult to establish their integrity, and this should provide them with a good basis from which to start intermediary activities. In view of these possibilities, it might therefore be a worthwhile idea for such humanitarian organizations to dispatch unofficial observers along with their relief and rehabilitation aid to war afflicted areas in order to study the conflict and explore the feasibility for peacemaking.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The discussions in the section above illustrate what one could call the dilemmas of mediating internal wars. The dilemmas arise because governments involved in internal wars are caught in the confounding position where they are afraid to negotiate directly with the insurgents whom they call "rebels" because their interaction with them might be tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of the cause of the "rebels". They fear that this could create a precedent which might encourage other dissident groups to take the violent route in order to get recognition for

their cause. On the other hand, these governments are also wary of the involvement of third parties as intermediaries because this might be tantamount to allowing an infringement of their sovereignty on matters they consider to be issues of internal affairs. They are also afraid that external involvement might provide international status to the "rebels" and a recognition of "a state of belligerency" which might encourage other states to assist the insurgents much more openly. Thus, these governments reluctantly feel that force is the only arbiter of their conflict with the insurgents even though the cost of the conflict might be intolerable in material and human terms.

A third party involved in mediating internal wars has to carefully tread between these schizophrenic attitudes about the desirability of his/her involvement in the conflict itself. This immediately throws a hurdle in front of the effort even before it gets off the ground. These constraints, which seem to be unique to internal wars, call for an overly subtle and sensitive approach lest the mediation effort be branded as meddling in the internal affairs of the government concerned.

Keeping these difficulties in mind, we can summarize the other conditions that were identified as essential ingredients for the success of the mediation effort by organizing them into three groups as follows: preconditions concerning A) the nature and characteristics of the conflict parties; B) the nature and characteristics of the conflict itself; and C) the nature and characteristics of the mediator.

Under the first group of characteristics, the following conditions for the success of mediating internal wars were identified: (a) that the parties of the conflict are clearly identifiable and inwardly united, (b) that the personality conflict among the leaders of the conflicting groups is not very intense, and (c) that the parties are dependent on external sources for aid to wage their conflict.

Under the second group called the nature and characteristics of the conflict, the following conditions were identified as prerequisites for success, (a) that stalemate must exist accompanied with a perception by the parties that the cost of non-settlement will be high and rising, (b) that the nature of the issue should not be essentially zero-sum, and (c) that the issues for the negotiation be multiple and many sided. Under the third category called the characteristics and skills of the mediator, the following preconditions were identified: (a) that the mediator should manifest the variety of skills and characteristics listed in subsections E and F of this section, (b) that the mediator should have leverage over the conflict parties, and (c) that the mediator be a representative of a non-political, non-governmental international body or at least have the backing of such an institution.

The underlying claim of our discussion so far is that if the above preconditions are satisfied, mediation of internal wars has a higher likelihood to succeed. A question arises, however, whether the list of preconditions that have to be satisfied is so formidable as to make mediation

appear impracticable in many situations which may not manifest all the required characteristics. One wonders therefore whether all the conditions enumerated are equally important or if they could be ranked according to their importance to the success of the mediation effort.

By examining the treatment given to these factors by various authors and the strength of the arguments that have been marshalled about their importance, we might be able to narrow down our list to a smaller set of conditions without which mediations would have no chance of success.

As we have observed above, the existence of stalemate was considered to be a very important condition by many authors, even though it was framed in many different ways. (See, for example, Young, Cot, Modelski, Wright, Ott, Wehr, Liska, and Touvall discussed above.) Of course, as we have argued previously, stalemate must be paired with other factors like high and rising cost for nonsettlement and a relatively low intensity level of conflict, in order for it to facilitate successful mediation.

However, it does not mean that even such an elaborately qualified stalemate condition alone is sufficient. It must be accompanied by a well qualified and endowed mediator. The sufficiency of the "characteristics and qualifications of the mediator" by itself has been disputed in the literature as illustrated by the controversy between Ott and Young (Ott, 1972, p.59 and Touval, 1983, p.17). None-the-less, whatever the resolution of this controversy might be, it cannot be denied that a mediation situation would be more amenable to success if the required condition of stalemate was supplemented by a well qualified and skilled mediator.

In addition, there seems to be a consensus among many authors that there are some issues that are mediatable and others that are not. Even though there has not been any final agreement on what exactly these issues are, it seems to be established that the issues must be essentially non-zero sum and that they must be multi-dimensional.

While each of these three conditions by itself may not be sufficient to make mediation of internal wars successful, if we view them cumulatively or jointly, we can formulate a group of conditions (consisting of stalemate, qualified and skilled mediator, and the nature of the issues), which could be considered necessary and sufficient. This way, we might be able to argue that a mediation effort would be worthwhile in all situations where at least these three conditions are satisfied, even though all the other characteristics might not be apparent.

Moreover, a further examination of the long list of conditions reveals that the mediator is not entirely dependent on the prevalence of all the conditions before intervention. Some of the conditions could, to a certain extent, be influenced by the mediator. For example, we have already pointed out situations where stalemate might have existed in fact but that the parties might continue their fighting either because of their lack of awareness of the stalemate or out of unrealistic hope that they will attain their objectives. The mediator can more quickly avail of the benefits of stalemate by using his/her skills and relationship of trust to articulate and

make visible to the parties that stalemate exists and that the continuation of their conflict might not lead to the attainment of their respective objectives.

Moreover, even though we have identified the "clear identity and inner cohesion of the intermediary as part of the empowerment strategy, the intermediary could help resolve disagreements between factions within the conflict parties, by aiding them in negotiating their differences and formulating common positions with the peace process in mind. This would encourage not only wide support for the negotiation, but also foster inner cohesion which we said was one of the important conditions.

In addition, deficiencies of the mediator with regard to some of the requisite characteristics such as knowledge and skill, possession of the required physical resources or even leverage could be alleviated through strategies such as team mediation, and borrowing or using by proxy the resources of another third party.¹³ The 1972 mediation of the Sudan Civil War illustrates how at crucial moments, the intermediaries were able to utilize the resources of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to break deadlocks or guarantee the compliance of certain promises made during the negotiations by the parties.

Thus, the pessimism about the feasibility of mediating internal wars which might arise from the apparently long list of conditions that have to be satisfied may not be justified. Hopefully, this would encourage international bodies to show more readiness to try mediation in more internal war situations. The price of not trying at all seems greater than trying and failing, and the victory of successful mediation can outshine the pains of the failures.

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¹³ See footnote 7 for more details about how such strategies could be used.

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THE DESERT, THE STOCKMARKET AND WORLD PEACE

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ABSTRACT

A special world city-community surrounding a World University for Peace is proposed, situated in an unused-desert part of the earth, and funded by stocks bought and sold. Money will be used as an incentive to involve the world's people in the promotion of peace. In addition to generating a world-unifying symbol, creative usage and cultivation of the desert would be emphasized. These efforts could be an evolutionary development helping us to survive on this planet.

I am proposing a peace project which I believe will appeal to the altruistic and to the greedy, to the materialists and to the spiritualists, to the selfish and to the selfless, to the rich and to the poor and which will involve nearly every person on this planet. I am proposing something which will be a visible symbol of our unity and commitment to life that will channel energies directly into the construction of peace and indirectly to the reduction of war, toward the realization of what is healthy while weakening what is pathological in us; a project that will help free the positive from the oppression of negativity, that will inspire the spirit while making it economically profitable to foster peace. The idea may be grandiose, but I believe something grand is vital to reduce the threat of extinction and simultaneously to build a powerful flowering peace.

I am proposing the creation of a *World City* that will grow out of the desert. At the heart of this oasis will be a *World University for Peace*. This World University will study and promote the causes of peace as well as study and promote the cultivation of the desert. The World City-University will be a place where people live and work cooperatively for the enhancement of life on this planet. The development of the World City-University will be inter-connected with the reduction of world armaments. A small fraction of the savings from those reductions will be invested both in the

City and into stocks given to the people. As money is saved, from arms reductions, the City will grow and people will receive dividends. Stocks will be bought and sold on the Market. A powerful incentive, money, will promote world-wide interest in making peace flourish.

A key element of this proposal is the generation of a world-unifying symbol,¹ the World City-University for Peace, its linkage to world-wide arms reduction, and the use of money as an incentive to involve the world's people in the promotion of peace.

At the heart and core of the World City is the University for Peace. One of the University's purposes is the study and promotion of world peace.² The orientation is a positive one, focusing on the building of trust, cooperation and harmony as the primary ways of reducing tensions and hostilities between people. To study and foster only the positive forces within humans could obscure that which is negative. However, the greater danger, I believe is a too clear perception of the negative and an overshadowing of the positive within. Furthermore a pathological view of man fosters a pessimism which can restrict our creative energies necessary for the solution of war and peace. By studying therefore the causes of peace, we will be framing the problem before us more in terms of how do we promote peace and less how do we prevent war, more in how do we cultivate the positive and less on how we eliminate the negative. Although the two processes are intermingled, the emphasis on peace will concentrate energies more on encouraging the unfolding of the healthy within and between us, in contrast to controlling, or protecting ourselves from that which we believe to be dangerous or malignant. Perhaps too, the ugliness which does reside in us is the result of our beauty trapped deep within our being, which distorted by pain, shrieks out in anguish to escape. The poet, Rilke said that "perhaps all the dragons of our lives are princesses who are only waiting to see us once beautiful and brave" (Rilke, 1975). We must therefore release ourselves from our inhuman bondage and set peace free.

The other purpose of the University for Peace is the study and promotion of the cultivation of the desert.

I have chosen the desert as the setting for the World City-University for Peace, for real and symbolic reasons. People are real and undernourished, starving and dying because of desertification of large parts of the world. Approximately twenty percent of the earth's surface is under threat of becoming desert, and eighty million people inhabit that land. Every year, world wide, some twenty-one million hectares of land become arid (Twose, 1984). Perhaps close to a million people are undernourished or close to

¹ According to Joseph Cambell, the mythologist (1972), there is a need for new myths to guide us through "an agony of reorientation..."

² In contrast was a proposal for an United States Academy of Peace which firstly would be American and not World Sponsored, and secondly focuses more on the study of conflict resolution as an alternative to military solutions (March 1, 1983, S564).

starvation (Boston Globe, 1985). The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, like OXFAM, Feed The Children, CARE and the Red Cross also have actively struggled to feed the hungry through gifts of food, planting crops, sharing knowledge and technology. What I am proposing is the integration of these many resources through a central, on the site organization; the University for Peace. The University would offer research into the problems of desertification which would include social and political factors. It would serve as a conduit for the world's efforts to prevent hunger.

Knowledge obtained through research could be directly applied through existing agencies. A more efficient and timely managing of crisis could take place, with the end-in-view of eventually preventing hunger. As the University for Peace became firmly rooted, branches could be established in other arid areas of the world. The unified, cooperative world effort to eradicate hunger would be manifested as the deserts bloomed. The hungry and spiritually hungry could be fed.

A symbol of hope (fertility) could replace the symbol of despair (barrenness). And as our "swords are beaten into ploughshares," life will have a better chance of surviving on this planet. The University for Peace, then, will be a place dedicated to the study and promotion of peace and of the cultivation of the desert. It will be a world centre for research into the ecology of nature and the psychology of peace. Faculty and students will come from all over the world to work together. World leaders will come to teach and to meet each other in an atmosphere of hospitality and trust. The barriers between people will be dissolved and people will come to know each other. The University will offer its resources and knowledge to world problems. It will be an exciting, productive place of individuals connected to a common cause. Mediation experts will help resolve those difficulties, gaining new knowledge in the process of those explorations. The University, itself, will become a laboratory for problem solving, a model for the rest of the world.

In time, students will graduate and re-enter the larger world changed by their living experiences and prepared to use their skills and knowledge for the world in the quest of peace and land cultivation. Their familiarity with each other and with world leaders will help them establish meaningful connections to each other in the future. Communication, therefore between future leaders will already have begun.

The University for Peace will grow over the years as the threats of wars diminish. It will also eventually grow into a World City, a place designed for wholesome living, a place of beauty, socially inviting and technologically innovative. It will come to represent creativity in the service of the people.

Other World Cities would sprout in the deserts, oases of and for life. And a symbol of humankind's cooperation and hopes will be a guiding beacon through troubled waters. The positive effects of people working together to study and promote peace and life, of involving the world's people in that enterprise, and the beneficial results of those mutual efforts

could promote an ever expanding, self renewing cycle of hope and peacefulness in the world.

I will now describe how this World City could be financed, its relation to arms reduction and to the stock market. In 1983 the World Military and Social Expenditures publication estimated that 600 billion dollars was spent on defense (1983, p.16). However, with the United States of America currently budgeting nearly 300 billion dollars and with the probability of the Soviet Union matching that amount, and with the increased competition,³ ongoing wars, and inflation, a figure of 800 billion dollars is a conservative estimate of world-wide defense expenditures. Assume then, that there is a world agreement to reduce arms expenditures by ten percent. Ten percent of 800 billion dollars is a savings of eighty billion dollars. If only ten percent of that amount (one percent of the total), i.e., eight billion dollars, were transferred toward constructing the World City, then we would have a substantial beginning. Shares could be distributed to four billion people. Each person could receive one share valued at two dollars invested in the World City.⁴ In the second year, six billion dollars would be invested into the World City and two billion dollars returned to the people as dividends (a twenty-five percent return in the second year). In subsequent years, a greater reduction in arms would create larger dividends. A Market could be established for transactions. The value of the shares would rise and fall with the fluctuations of the world climate for peace. A sensitive barometer would be created that would heighten excitement and awareness to world tensions and relaxations. That awareness would become translated into action that would protect and promote their self interests. A threat to peace therefore would constitute a threat to people's investments. Likewise the reduction of a threat and the build up of peace would protect or enhance their investment. The immediacy of results as seen or known on the stock market exchange would help shape the people's opposition or support of governments' policies, depending on whether or not their money was safe or jeopardized. For money is a powerful symbol. People will die for it. They will kill for it. They will sacrifice themselves or others for it. It can help to create or to destroy. To tap that commodity can tap a resource to strengthen peace.

Money, then is an incentive for involving people in the peace process. Involving the world's people also means involving the children of the world. They will become aware of their part in the world early in their lives, leading them to become prepared to cope with the caring of the world.

³ James Schlesinger estimated that "Star Wars" might require one trillion dollars on space defense and another one trillion dollars for defense against cruise missiles and bombers. (Union of Concerned Scientists Pledge Bulletin Jan. 1985, as reported by John Tirman).

⁴ The use of stocks to promote world peace has also been advocated by Stuart M. Speiser who believed that by creating ownership of the major industrial companies by the people (of the USA), through a "superstock" that the ideological difference between the United States and the Soviet Union, a major source of tension and hostilities would be ameliorated (Speiser, 1984).

They will have an investment in their future, and peace will not be a futuristic abstraction, but something concrete and related to them. The ability to have a definite relationship to something which they believe in, also can create a sense of pride, hope and power. As shareholders, in concert with other shareholders, they will be able to exert some influence on the course of peace. A people's movement could develop, a unifying force for peace.

It is possible, however, that the potential profit from the peace project would motivate people to purchase large blocks of stocks. Perhaps those with altruistic feelings would do likewise. Hundreds, thousands and perhaps millions of shares could be concentrated in the hands of groups of people or institutions. Thus instead of a dispersal of power throughout the general population, there would be a concentration of power. And that power would be a leverage on governments.

It could be argued that a two dollar share is insufficient to motivate or involve people into the peace process. However in many developing parts of the world, two dollars per person, especially in families of five to ten people becomes, say, ten to twenty dollars worth of shares. That value and its dividends could represent a significant amount of money. Perhaps some would feel compelled out of need to sell those shares. Others, more fortunate, may be able to retain them and have its value double every four or five years. Furthermore, the amount of money in those shares might not be crucial to *feeling* invested and therefore acting involved. The symbolism of that investment could produce the hope and feeling of power so necessary for the promotion of peace.

The stock market as a means to produce awareness and excitement in peace is a capitalistic invention and therefore might be viewed in a skeptical or negative way. However, no one is being exploited and no person's labour is making someone else rich at someone's personal expense. The fact is that everyone would own, initially, the ownership in the World City and its productions. Furthermore, trading on world markets is common to both capitalistic and communistic nations. And the exchange of money is fundamental in all societies of the world. If it is believed by many that the "ends justify the means," then I would say that whatever could help peace grow and diminish the threat of war, without injuring others, is justified.

Reinforcing people's interest is not only through the reward of money, but also through the reward of seeing something grow, i.e., the World City-University for Peace. There would be established a direct and clear relationship between arms reduction and the construction of the World City. Thus, as a particular nuclear weapon, for example, was destroyed, a portion of the savings would go into the World City. The money would not go somewhere into the vast world, assuming that that was an alternative, but into a specific project at a specific place. The build down of weapons would directly result in a build up of the City. The transformation from destruction to construction would be apparent. The

association between the events, reduction and construction, would form a strong causal and effect connection. Thus the rewards from making money through arms reduction and peace construction as well as knowing the association between the two could promote peace.

The combined effects then of a biological instinct (survival) with a psychological need (hope) with a sociological need (cooperation), with a spiritual need (symbolic unity), with an economic incentive (money) could create a way toward peace.

Of course, investments, involvements and goodwill operate in a world also filled with pride, greed, and fear. The fact, too, that people are shaped, molded and sometimes distorted during their developmental years by deprivations and hostilities leads some to seek control over or revenge toward others; while other humans, oppressed in early life, can become followers of the power hungry who promise them a fulfillment of their frustrated wishes and dreams. What I have been proposing, therefore, is not intended to erase anguished memories, nor to ignore the evil in the world. It does offer one idea for peace. Although the design, form, or content may be challenged or disputed and altered, however, I believe that what is essential, is the preservation of the principles, i.e., of creating a new World Unifying Symbol and of involving the world's people. Money or the stock market is one possible incentive.

In conclusion then, although the political, social, psychological and technological obstacles to establish a World City-University for Peace are multitudinous, my belief, however, is that a world which has created nations and civilizations as well as organizations like the United Nations, can also create a World City. The increasing awareness that we live in one world, that we are all interrelated and that we have a common ancestry and share a common fate leads me to believe that the establishment of a World City could be an evolutionary development, helping us to survive on this planet.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND LANGUAGE PLANNING IN CANADA

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ABSTRACT

The argument is explored that the Separatist Movement in Quebec, Canada was defused by socio-political planning which included Legislation in Bilingualism and by Biculturalism which created economic and social benefits to the political minority. Evidence is presented that such legislation in Language Planning outside of Quebec reduced the conflict between Separatist Movement and the Federalist Movement.

One of the sources of conflict between ethno-linguistic groups, both nationally and internationally, can be conceptualized as between the high and low status and power languages. Russian, English, and French, for example, are high status and power languages internationally whereas Swahili and Urdu are less viable internationally. Having a high status language that is associated with potential economic and therefore military and political, power is one of the fundamental components in the north-south split and the means whereby avenues of transition can be developed so that the low status and power language groups can become equal partners with the high status and power language groups is an appropriate topic for the north-south conflict reduction dialogue. In addition, the rapid or accelerate socio-economic or cultural transition of any country or any cultural-linguistic group within a country towards modernization or increasing power can also occasion conflict both nationally and internationally.

Examples of disparities between have and have-not sociolinguistic groups within a country (e.g. South Africa) or between countries are legion, yet successful models and examples other than war for conflict reduction are rare. Historically, in the colonial model long-term resolution of differences between haves and have-nots has depended on the low power

ethnolinguistic group or country, attaining access to high power language and educational opportunities, to permit the attainment of equal status by the have-not group or country, through the growth of its industries and its ability to compete on an international level. Such a capacity to compete, however, requires an enhanced education as well as an ability to market and communicate one's expertise in one of the international languages. Education in one of the international power languages therefore becomes critical.

As distinct from the long history of language planning which strove to promote the standard usage of a language, during the 60's and 70's there has been an increasing international trend towards supporting indigenous languages. This has served to promote nationhood and solidarity of ethnic and cultural pride but at the same time may not have been conducive to producing international communication essential to the educational and economic development of the country. Thus in an era of rapidly escalating worldwide economics, international language planning becomes an increasingly important component in the reduction of conflict between different ethnolinguistic groups in bilingual countries and in economic development both within a country and internationally. Bearing in mind the movement to support nationalist languages in developing countries during the 60's and 70's (e.g. Tanzania, Kenya) and the increasing movement towards international economics of the 70's and 80's, it is instructive to evaluate how language planning and constitutional reform have been effective in reducing a growing ethnolinguistic conflict in Canada during a period of increasingly international economics.

Language planning as a practice for promoting standard usage is almost as old as languages themselves and has had a long history of increasing or reducing conflict with various degrees of success both nationally and internationally. However, following World War II, language planning has increasingly been used to promote indigenous and minority languages (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania) and to cultivate a pride in nationalism and minority and ethnic pride throughout the world. In Canada, however, language planning has been recently used to reduce the long standing conflict between the use of the two internationally powerful languages of French and English. This conflict has continued since the defeat of the French by the British on the Plains of Abraham in 1763. The subsequent British North America Act of 1867 required the establishment of French and English rights at the federal level but not at the provincial levels of government which controlled education. Because of the demographics and economic status of English speakers in North America, the result was increasingly gross regional and economic status differences between the functional value and economic power of English and French across Canada. Even in Quebec where the majority language was French, the language of economic power was English. Following world War II "the quiet revolution" between "the two solitudes" of French and English increased. The growing demand by the French for recognition of their

linguistic rights was also fed by several factors which produced the appropriate socio-economic context for change. These factors would include:

1. the passing of power from the traditional Duplessis government in Quebec.
2. the decline in power of the Catholic church during the 60's.
3. the post war affluence which highlighted the economic control by the English in Quebec and emphasized that the Quebecois were not "*les maitres chez nous*".
4. the global growth of the ethnic movement and minority languages in the 60's and the popularization of minority rights in the US and UNESCO.
5. the growth of the women's movement in the western world.
6. the civil rights and black movements in the US and the more radical groups such as the Black Panthers.
7. the anti-war movement in the USA and Canada and related groups such as Students for a Democratic Society.
8. the war on poverty in the US and around the world.
9. the affluence of the 60's which provided increased social experimentation and change.

In Quebec this growing dissension between "the two solitudes" during the 50's and 60's led Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson (recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1963) to form the Royal Commission on the Study of Bilingualism and Biculturalism which produced a five volume report published in 1965-67. The *Official Languages Act* enacted in 1969 as a result of the initiatives of Lester Pearson and the consequent Bilingualism and Biculturalism Report had declared that the equal status of French and English at the federal level had not been effected, and this report further legitimized the francophone cause. A small minority of extremist "separatistes" had already stylized themselves in accord with other civil rights and minority and black freedom fighters in the US and elsewhere and were ready to use extreme means, including the assassination of Pierre Laporte and the kidnapping of Richard Cross as well as the threat of separation as promoted by the Parti Quebecois to gain recognition of their linguistic rights. This chain of escalating violence culminated in the War Measures Act being declared by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1970 and the immediate occupation of the capital, Ottawa, by troops. The Canadian populace, long conditioned to a history of tranquility, was shocked by the gravity of this national conflict.

During the 70's, the Separatist movement continued to gain momentum and with the election of Rene Leveque's Parti Quebecois and "Les Separatistes" in 1976, the country was soon faced with the spectre of national dissolution. Thus the Parti Quebecois used the threat of separation as a bargaining tool to gain language and culture reforms and concessions and in 1978 held a public referendum in Quebec to determine whether

Quebec, in order to control its own destiny, would separate from Canada.

The role of language planning policy, however, was instrumental in the outcome of this referendum. The Official Languages Act and the consequent federal language planning response to this act served to begin to redress the francophone grievances, and thus neutralized some of the force from the P.Q. thrust. Furthermore, the P.Q., having been elected, were able to vigorously pursue the movement and set about passing legislation and engaging in their own language planning to enrich and empower their linguistic rights so as to preserve their language and culture: e.g. Law 63, Law 22, Law 101. These laws made French the official language of Quebec and furthered the progress toward holding a referendum on separating from Canada. Consequently, the federal government on its part strongly encouraged two goals: 1. to demonstrate to the Quebecois and francophones throughout Canada that Canada was committed to guaranteeing and promoting French rights as required by the BNA Act, and 2. to entrench those rights by repatriating the constitution and guaranteeing the rights of francophones therein.

In order to achieve these goals, Federal funding of French government services and educational instruction throughout Canada became a priority through fiscal entente with provincial governments. The federal government was thus able to extend French services throughout the federal government and its agencies, which created substantial demand for francophone skills in all provinces; and, by promoting French education was able to promote the demand for francophone skills in provincial government ministries and at all levels of education throughout Canada. Moreover, the Federal Office of the secretary of State working in cooperation with the recently created Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages were able to directly support educational and social science research and exchange programs for teachers and students and other innovations that promoted the teaching of French and the study of bilingualism. All of this created a further demand for francophone skills throughout Canada and further increasing the status, prestige, self-concept, and socioeconomic power of francophones.

One development that was particularly innovative was the promotion of the immersion method of teaching French as a second language to English speaking Canadians. A team of psychologists at McGill University in Montreal promoted the development of the natural or communicative approach to language learning which was in opposition to the traditional more mechanical pedagogy of teaching languages which had rarely provided communicative competence (Carey, 1985). This innovation called "the immersion method" of producing bilingualism was the ideal vehicle to promote the status of French education because it could be promoted as being Canadian, educationally enriching, academically respectable and in the interest of national unity. Moreover, it appealed to the middle and upper middle socio-economic class desire to perform something to ostensibly redress grievances of the minority group while also putting

their children in a position to gain through enriched education, greater cultural awareness, and perhaps enhanced employability in education and government positions. Thus, the popularity of this movement was perceived as a grass-roots parentally-driven organization, and at the same time, the Secretary of State could support such affiliate organizations as Canadian Parents for French and the Canadian Association of Immersion Teachers which promoted the demand for immersion and other French programmes. In addition, the federal government supported research institutions across the nation which strove to further understand bilingualism and bi-culturalism and to promote tolerance and understanding between "the two solitudes" thereby reducing national conflict and promoting peace.

The result of this language planning and other government initiatives has been an increasing demand for francophones' skills at all levels in the federal and provincial governments in teaching, administrative and consultant positions, and in school boards and provincial ministries from program planners to text book writers, and publishers. In fact, the demand for francophone skills was such that large numbers of Quebecois were recruited in provinces all across Canada. The consequent migration of Quebecois to English dominant Canada further served to increase social interchange and to promote tolerance and understanding between the French and English groups.

However, the nature of much of the newly-created employment for francophones, although relatively broad based, was primarily in the professional, semi-professional, and white-collar sectors and this sometimes created a demand for a non-existent bilingual professional with comico-tragic results. In government circles this led to the bilingual lifeguard syndrome (referring to a bilingual lifeguard being hired who was unable to swim). This required the creation of further institutionalized programmes for the training of bilingual (e.g. teacher education programmes for immersion teachers) and the training of professionals to become bilingual (e.g. English training programs for francophones) thus furthering the demand for francophone and bilingual skills.

Thus language planning and instrumental in reducing the "separatiste" movement and the conflict that led to it by:

1. Demonstrating to Quebecois and francophones throughout Canada that the Federal government would seriously attempt to guarantee the rights of francophones by passing legislation that entrenched the language rights: e.g.

- the Official Languages Act (1969)

- the Repatriation of the Constitution (1982)

- the Charter of Rights added to Constitution, (1982).

2. Establishing fiscal entente with provincial governments which created provincial French programmes which in turn created provincial government jobs and private sector employment.

3. Promoting federal language planning based on the researched

knowledge that strong popular support existed for francophone rights among anglophones as indicated by the B&B report.

CONCLUSIONS

During the past 20 years language planning and constitutional reform have been an effective venture in Canada in helping to reduce the long-term conflict between the two socio-linguistic groups. This effectiveness can be documented by two major events: 1. The Parti Quebecois' referendum to separate was defeated by a 60 to 40 decision, and the Parti Quebecois was defeated in the December, 1985 provincial elections despite the fact that the PQ had realized that linguistic rights were no longer a burning issue and campaigned on improved economic and employment opportunities. 2. The separatist movement is no longer a strong plank in the PQ platform due in part to the fact that the Quebecois now do have linguistic guarantees and reassurances at the federal level, and their self-concept is more in tune with the economic and world climate of the 80's. Thus, conflict over language rights and equal status in the 60's which led to the kidnapping and assassination of government officials and the declaration of the War Measures Act, and the threat of Rene Levesque's Parti Quebecois separatists to split the country during the 70's is a declining issue in the 80's. This outcome was achieved as a result of language legislation and serious language planning which succeeded in guaranteeing linguistic rights and enhancing the status of the language and the socio-economic well-being of the non-dominant group.

This unusual resolution of a conflict as a result of language planning must be examined in the context of the important socioeconomic factors that made such conflict reduction possible. First, the developing social attitudes of the Quiet Revolution and its support of the traditional control of the Catholic church in the 50's that were held in place by the Duplessis government of the 50's provided sufficient cultural and socioeconomic discord and impetus for the social reform that was encouraged by the Lesage government in the Quebec of the 50's and thus set the stage for the social reform of the 60's. Second, the grass-roots movements towards the ethnicity, civil rights, the women's movement, heritage languages, the black movement, and the anti-war movements in the US and elsewhere during the 60's provided models for Canadian separatists. Third, the expansive economy of the 60's contributed to the social climate in which it was necessary to promote such issues as affirmative action in the US and bilingualism in Canada. Fourth, the majority population not only tolerated such minority-rights ventures, they actively supported them as witnessed by the B&B Commission surveys of 1965 which found that the majority of English speaking Canadians felt that francophone linguistic rights had not been effectively guaranteed.

In the deficit-ridden 80's there is not only the lack of concern over

such movements in terms of public support but a much greater reluctance on the part of the government to entertain such costly measures.

Language rights and separatism are dormant in Quebec due to several factors which would include a more sophisticated awareness of the international nature of the world of the 80's and a growing realization that the goals of the separatiste movement were economically and politically largely untenable. Quebecois have gained a new sense of self awareness and self confidence due to the separatiste movement of the 60's and 70's, but this increased vision has also encouraged them to look beyond the past and into a more international world of the future in which there is a growing realization that to compete internationally English fluency will be a reality.

A CYBERNETIC EXPLANATION AND SOLUTION FOR FREUD'S DEATH INSTINCT THEORY

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ABSTRACT

Self-destructive behaviour, while observable, has been difficult to understand because it is contradictive to life. Contradiction (or paradox) can be explained by the self-referential phenomenon e.g. "This sentence is false." Narcissism is a self-referential phenomenon, and we argue, gives rise to the illusion of a "death instinct". Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem gives mathematical expression for the phenomenon: $O \neq \text{not } O$. In psychological terms: pain = pleasure, death = life.

At the close of World War II we were confronted by what seemed to be a thesis and antithesis: The United Nations as a negotiatory and conciliatory body, and the potential for nuclear destruction. There is growing evidence from the proliferation of armed conflicts that have sprung up over the world that we have made little appreciable progress in resolving human differences.

It may be that in order to understand and resolve these difficulties we will have to re-examine the very thought processes we utilize. In approaching conflict resolution we start with presuppositions based on a set of belief systems regarding reality, knowledge, and codes of ethics. We will argue that there is an illogic inherent in our communications and our methods of confronting and negotiating with others. We will attempt to show that this is an aspect of the so-called death "instinct", and has critical implications for our current political situation.

In 1931, the philosopher/mathematician Kurt Gödel demolished the set of assumptions which mathematicians and logicians held to be true: that a mathematico-logical system can be *both* consistent (that is, free from contradictions) and complete (that is, all possible truths from the system have been derived). Gödel proved mathematically that any formal axiomatic reasoning system, if consistent will be incomplete; and if complete, will be inconsistent (i.e. contradictory).

Gödel himself referred to this as the *incompleteness theorem* (Gödel, 1962). This discovery undermined Bertrand Russell's and Alfred North Whitehead's monumental *Principia Mathematica*, (Whitehead & Russell, 1903) and the efforts of the Vienna Circle to build a contradiction free language. The effect on the mathematical world was electrifying, and it came to have practical implications for cyberneticists who were trying to make logical programmes for computing systems. It did not have a corresponding effect in the world of social scientists. They have failed to appreciate or explore the implications of this block buster. Our purpose is to consider some of these implications.

To begin with, we want to address the importance of self-referential loops or paradoxes. Such statements introduce illogic into a system presumed to be rational. The oldest example of this on record is the liar's paradox developed by the ancient philosopher Epimenides, a Cretan, who said: "All Cretans are liars." In essence, this can be transposed to "This sentence is false"; or an expanded version:

The following sentence is false. The preceding sentence is true.

Gödel proved that all axiomatic systems ultimately share this paradoxical structure when they are required to make logical statements about themselves. He did this by inventing a numerical coding system (called Gödel numbering), so that verbal statements could be numericalized. This permitted him to make mathematical statements that were mathematical statements about mathematical statements, i.e. metalevel statements. This resulted in his discovering the paradoxical structure of all rational, axiomatic reasoning systems. Expressed numerically, $\text{Not } 0 = 0!$

What has this to do with the psychology of self-destruction? First, let us note that the paradox grows out of a structural and hierarchical relationship (such as Bertrand Russell's Theory of Logical Types) between the information gained from within the system (or the categorized) and the information gained from the system's outside (or the category of that which is categorized). If we do not confuse the matter by failing to recognize that we are talking about *text* and *context*, i.e. referent language that talks about things, and meta-language that talks about how we talk about things, the whole matter is not so paradoxical. However, when this distinction is not made, the inside/outside boundary breaks down. A special type of psychological confusion develops when this system is established internally between the self and a reified image of the self.

The purpose of consciousness is to process information to determine

what adaptive work needs to be done in the real world. Infinitely regressive systems of recursion (in both humans and computers) cause oscillation and preclude resolution. Obsessional thinking ("squirrel caging") and the pursuit of mutually exclusive goals are examples. In the short run, of course, self-destructive behaviours can be blissful before becoming self-destructive.

In mythology, this is symbolised by the snake swallowing its own tail. Carl Jung called this the symbol for Uroboric incest (Neuman, 1954). The myth of Narcissus is a story about self-reference and the deadly consequences of the confusion of outside and inside information — i.e. falling in love with one's own image as though it were a real, outside other. The Adam and Eve story is about the dangers inherent in self-reference: "Who told you you were naked?" This is the major clue to the fact that they had somehow gained reflective knowledge. In other words, we infer that this story about "beginnings" indicates that human consciousness evolved to a certain point at which it became *reflective*. It could watch itself watching, a necessary pre-requisite for gaining knowledge of good and bad. But it could also watch itself watching itself watch, a metalevel phenomenon. A self-image could be formed and *reified*: myself the watcher of myself. The Narcissus myth and the Adam and Eve allegory are analogues for each other, and indicate the deadly Biblical potentiality: "You shall surely die" (Corey and Maas, 1976).

To put more meat on our Gödelian bones, we shall turn to some of the writings of the late French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1956). In jumping to Sartre at this point, we want to show that the *incompleteness theorem* has its counterpart in Existential thought. It is true that some might argue the relationship is only metaphoric, but the thrust of our argument is in the opposite direction.

In Sartre's phenomenology, there are three ontological modes of being. The first is the being-in-itself as the mass-energy, the stuff that is just what it is. The second mode is the being-For-itself, or consciousness. Sartre says, "A world comes into being when consciousness comes into the world." Consciousness actively organizes a world *for itself* by intruding space and time into the "stuff", pulling figures out of the ground of the being-in-itself. Consciousness, as a choice, seeks to preserve itself as an individual gestalt, frequently called, though inappropriately, a self-preservation instinct. Thirdly: Consciousness also experiences itself as being seen by others, feeling others and being felt *by* the other. In other words, the Other has a pre-ontological status (i.e. prior to description) which is the source of a personal experience for me in shame, fear, or bliss; and *afterward*, through my reflection, becomes a source of knowledge for me about my outsideness: "The Other outlines me in my being." I can know the outsideness of the other as an object in the world, but I cannot know the Other's insideness by analogy with myself. According to Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre, 1956) the Other exists for us in two forms:

In short, the Other can exist for us in two forms: if I experience him with evidence, I fail to know him; if I know him, if I act upon him, I only reach

his-being-as-object and his probable existence in the midst of the world.
No synthesis of these two forms is possible.

Sartre relates that he pondered the problem of solipsism for a long time and came to realize that Hegel was wrong when he said that we know the Other by analogy with ourselves. The being of the Other is in no way dependent upon our own subjective being, or our reasoning abilities. The Other is always surprising us, giving us more, or less, than we expect. The Other-as-different-from us is our saviour, saving us from our own infinitely regressive recursive self-referential information systems.

The mind of the layman has not been unaware of this phenomenon, but has almost always remained at the concrete level, and so avoids real enlightenment. Consider the following statements:

Pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps ...
Talking out of both sides of your mouth ...
Wanting to have your cake and eat it too ...
Not letting your right hand know what your left hand is doing ...
You are your own worst enemy ...

These statements embody the self-reference principle, and express the essence of Sartre's concept of 'bad faith' — wanting to have the benefits of being both outside and inside like the snake that swallows its tail!

How does contradiction, when lived out, become self-destructive? The evidence for this is largely clinical. The essence of most neurotic problems is the wish to have one's cake and eat it too, to strive for goals while sabotaging them. A description in *Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr* (Sartre, 1963) is illustrative:

... he has chosen to be this fundamental conflict, to exist simultaneously in two dimensions which are mutually exclusive, to himself at every moment by two frames of reference and to justify himself by two scales of value. And since he is playing the game of loser-wins, let us say that he had decided to destroy himself at the same time by works and by faith.

Sartre's concept of the Other should not be seen as synonymous with the popular psychological formulations of "interpersonal relations" or "significant other". Rather than simple environmental impact, the Other provides us outside information (through my later reflection) about my outsideness. We are saved from what Freud called Narcissism, self-referential loop.

It was when Freud was studying the problem of *Narcissism* that he felt forced to radically alter his whole theoretical structure. Thus psychoanalysts speak of the early and late Freud. Previously, Freud had said that humans could be in conflict with themselves because of the dualism between the so-called "self-preservation instinct" (e.g. hunger), and the so-called "race preservation instinct (e.g. procreation). In other words, a conflict between hunger and love, or love of the self and love of the other. In observing the phenomenon of *narcissism* he saw that love of the other could be reduced to love of the self — in his jargon, *object libido* became indistinguishable from *narcissistic libido*. This seemed to pull the rug out

from under his dualistic theory of conflict.

There were three other puzzling observations that seemed to deny logic. Freud discovered the repetition compulsion — some people repeat over and over again the same self-destruction behaviour that is in no way modified by pain or punishment as is demanded by simple behaviourism. This finding was enshrined in his monograph: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud, 1950). Secondly, some analyses proved to be “interminable” — i.e. the patient refused to get well. Thirdly, some neuroses seemed to spring up *spontaneously* without previous historical causes. How was Freud to make sense of all this?

He hypothesized that there must be a “death instinct” (Thanatos) operating along with the “life instinct” (Eros)! This did suggest a rather pessimistic picture, both for the outcome of psychoanalytic therapy, and for society as a whole. The pessimism of the “late Freud” was enshrined in his book *Civilization and its discontents* (Freud, 1930) and in his League of Nations conversations with Albert Einstein, published under the title *Why War?* (Freud, 1932). This pessimism disturbed his followers greatly. In order to buy hope cheaply, the so-called Neo-Freudians threw out the “death instinct”, and returned to a simplistic cultural relativism and *tabula rasa* theory, modified only by the fuzzy psychiatric concept of genetic predisposition (Brown, 1959).

How from a cybernetic point of view can we make sense of all of this? Bad faith takes the self-reflection as the truth of one's existence. This reification is what makes for the inside/outside confusion. Self-reflection takes a position upon itself as though it were in the position of the outside Other, thus attempting to have the benefits of mutually exclusive positions, (the impossible Ideal Synthesis). It is this paradoxical inversion that enables consciousness to “win-by-losing” — to convert pain into pleasure, and life into death. (The best psychodynamic exposition of all this is to be found in Sartre's biographies of Genet and Baudelaire. Sartre draws the analogy between the paradoxical inversion and the Epimenides paradox on page 362 of the Genet biography.)

Our contention is that Freud ran smack up against the Gödelian self-referential contradiction in the phenomenon of narcissism, Not $0 = 0$! Love of the Other equals self love; object libido becomes indistinguishable from narcissistic libido; pain equals pleasure; life equals death. He was right the first time. Love of the Other is not reducible to love of the self, but the two become equated at the level of reflexive self-reference. This reduction is not neurologically hard-wired in, to use cybernetic jargon, but is soft-ware self-programming: I create me, thus becoming father to myself, a creation in my own image, after my own likeness, a heaven of mirror images, with no need for the outside Other. “Who told you you were naked?”

As Philosophers like to say, what is the practical cash value of all this? Time does not permit an exhaustive listing, but we will enumerate a few.

1. There is no omnipresent god's-eye view humanly possible. There

can be, and ultimately will be, at least two or more contradictory points of view that are both equally correct. Those who think in terms of good-guys and bad-guys and evil empires, beware.

2. It can be taken as a truism that when contradiction is lived out, it must sooner or later become self-destructive.

3. Communication is constantly being aborted through failure to recognize that words can be, and are, defined from diametrically different points of view. For example, "freedom" has *two* metaphysical definitions, not *one* — one derived from the individual's point of view, and one from society's — an inside-outside dichotomy. Another example of communication abortion: you cannot define for yourself alone both the defensive and the offensive aspects of the weapon you hold in your hand. One man's defense is another man's offense. This is the confusion we now see in the American Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). The USSR sees this as an offensive strategy. We are not making a political or military point here, but an epistemological one.

The fourth implication we want to discuss is the problem of paranoia. The hallmark of the paranoid psychosis is the pre-emptive strike. The paranoid lives the worst-case scenario to the hilt: "They are going to bomb me tomorrow, so I'd better bomb them today." When you read in the papers about someone walking into a shopping centre and gunning down twenty or so people before being shot by police you can be sure that the gunman is suffering from paranoia. Another characteristic: he does not believe he is paranoid, but that other people are. He may be quite adept at proving his case through legalisms. Also, he is given to religiosity — he may see himself as a saviour with a divine mission, or a great military leader.

Paranoia is the epitome of the closed, self-referential loop that serves as a defense against relationship with others. The attempt to close the self-referential circuit is an attempt to eliminate the moderating effect of negative feedback. Without negative feedback, the system runs away to self-destruction.

Freud observed that paranoia came out of the subsoil of narcissism, although there are, he said, intermediate structures, so the relationship is neither simple or direct. He also observed that paranoia is a caricature of a philosophical system. This system is one of self-reference epitomized by the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am (I think) — a creation in my own image after my own likeness.

The authors of this paper have not had access to primary international relations data, but we have observed in the popular press reports of the US State Department Officials' frequent reference to the government of the USSR as being paranoid, and recently stated that at times they don't even seem to be acting in their own best interests. Whether the Russians see the Americans as equally paranoid, and not acting in their own best interests we do not know, because we do not know how to read Russian newspapers; however, our guess would be that they do.

In any event, press releases and international behaviour indicate a

high level of mutual suspicion and distrust of each other. All of this information is interesting and, we take, supportive of our general argument. But this is not the level we chose to focus upon. Our beginning thesis was that there is illogic in our very methods of communication and of conflict resolution caused by the paradoxical and potentially self-destructive phenomenon of self-reference. This became a problem to be understood and solved when consciousness evolved to the point that it could reflect upon itself, and reflect upon this reflection creating a reified image, a creation in my own image after my own likeness. It is at this point, we hold, that consciousness started to play the uniquely human game. It seems we are all subjects in an evolutionary experiment: is a negotiatory consciousness freed from instinct a viable evolutionary option — or must we surely die?

If our species is to survive, maybe some of the trillions to be spent on defense should be cooperatively spent on exploring the problems of communication and paranoia.

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COMPARING REGIONAL COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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ABSTRACT

The paper compares the experience of four adjacent regions in the Asia-Pacific area in regard to political cooperation. The organizations involved in the comparison are the South Pacific Forum, Asian and Pacific Council, Asian and Pacific Parliamentarians' Union, Association of Southeast Asia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The organizations are compared on a set of parameters for assessing prospects of organizational success, based on integration theory. Predictions of future success are attempted.

I. THE NEED FOR A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

Hitherto most discussion on regional cooperation has tended to focus on individual international organizations or sets of organizations in a particular subregion of the world. A general theory of success and failure in regional organizations has been slow in developing as a result. Perhaps the earliest effort to sketch a framework for comparative analysis of regional cooperation, Karl Deutsch and associates' *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Deutsch et al., 1957), consisted of an intensive comparison of 12 attempts at political unification, 13 cases of pluralistic security-communities, 7 unified states that broke apart, and 1 unsuccessful pluralistic security-community; the focus was exclusively on political integration and disintegration in Europe and North America. A framework specifically oriented toward international organizations was next presented by Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter (1964); 10 organizations, mostly economic in focus, were compared in Africa, Europe, and Latin America, though conclusions were tentative. With a systematic examination of four contemporary cases, Amitai Etzioni (1965) next sought to develop a more

general theory on political unification; as his approach was based on organization theory in sociology, the vocabulary of his analysis easily lent itself to organizational comparisons. And Ernst Haas (1975) repeated his quest for theory building with a later study in which 30 organizations were compared, though codings were perhaps less reliable due to the larger sample.

While the study of Deutsch and associates advanced several propositions about success and failure in political unification, and Etzioni refined his theory through a study of two cases of success and two of failure, Haas and Schmitter sought to study the potential of economic organizations to become supranational organizations with an eventual political character. Haas (1976) found eventually that economic organizations want to continue to be economic and generally resist politicization of the sort that would lead to integration along political lines.

Regional cooperation among the poorer countries of the world, notably those in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the South Pacific, have not pursued the course of economic integration with a view to possible political unification so frequently assumed by the scholars noted above. Instead, countries in the Third world have been seeking to strengthen nation-building and to advance prosperity by banding together with other poor countries to achieve collectively what their resources do not permit individually. Louis Sohn's (1971-1972) analysis of 42 African international organizations concluded that the principal aim of African regional cooperation has been to form a shield against outside influences. Other scholars, without presenting specific case analyses, have come to the same conclusion in more speculative essays (Fry, 1981; Hansen, 1969).

If we look at the Asian and South Pacific regions, we find a number of peculiarities. In Asia 50 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been formed; in the South Pacific the count is 25 (Table 1). Regional cooperation in both regions has tended to consist of about two types —

TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

	<i>Asian IGOs</i>	<i>Pacific IGOs</i>
<i>Political IGOs</i>		
average # members ($\bar{X}$)	7.1	6.0
total IGOs formed	7	2
total IGOs defunct	2	1
defunct/formed	22.2	50.0
<i>Technical IGOs</i>		
average # members ($\bar{X}$)	12.5	13.6
total IGOs formed	43	23
total IGOs defunct	7	2
defunct/formed	16.3	8.7

Source: Haas (1986, in press).

politicized organizations seeking to advance a variety of political and nonpolitical objectives, on the one hand, and technical organizations that seek to avoid stepping on political toes so that they can provide a high quality service to technocrats and other kinds of experts (Haas, 1985, Ch. 10). Political organizations have a smaller membership and a higher mortality; technical organizations have a larger membership and lower mortality (Table 1).

The practical question posed by the record of regional cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, thus, is not to explain why non-political organizations have failed to become politicized. After all, politicization seems to lower the life expectancy of a regional organization, and existing technical IGOs prefer to preserve their lives rather than running the risk of politicization followed by extinction. As we have already seen, organizations in Europe have already preferred similar caution, perhaps to the chagrin of social science theorists. The problem in Asia and the Pacific instead is to explain why some political organizations fail but others do not. We thus need a body of knowledge for advising politicized regional organizations on what they can do to optimize their survival.

II. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

For the purposes of this study I have identified seven international organizations in which cooperation on political matters is at the core of their origin and development (Table 2). A brief description of each organization is in order at this point.

TABLE 2: ABBREVIATIONS AND YEARS OF EXISTENCE OF REGIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Acronym	Name of Organization	Years of Existence
APPU	Asian-Pacific Parliamentarian's Union	1965-
AIPO	ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Union	1975-
ANZUS	Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States	1951-1985*
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations	1967-**
ASPAC	Asian and Pacific Council	1966-1972
IFMC	Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference	1980-
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	1983-
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization	1954-1977
SPF	South Pacific Forum	1971-

* ANZUS has become a bilateral Australian-US arrangement in 1985, and it is likely to be dissolved in due course.

** ASA, the predecessor of ASEAN, began in 1961.

Source: Haas (1985, in press).

The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, as the ANZUS Pact is known, was signed in

1951. As its status is unclear at the time of writing, I have decided not to include it in this study, though it is classified as defunct in Table 1.

The least well known, the *Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union* (APPU), was originally the *Asian Parliamentarians' Union* (APU). APPU holds General Assembly meetings each year and issues a variety of types of resolutions; the political resolutions which have caused some countries to withdraw from the organization over the years, may be characterized as "anti-Communist." When Asian countries with more neutralist foreign policies decided to withdraw, backers of the organization were successful in attracting new members from the South Pacific, and that is why the organization changed in name. APPU is headquartered in Tokyo, with two subsidiary centres — the Asian-Pacific Cultural Centre in Taipei and the Asian-Pacific Development Center in Tokyo (up to 1972 with offices in Manila and Saigon).

The *Asian and Pacific Council* (ASPAC) was organized by the Republic of Korea to organize efforts to prevent the People's Republic of China from joining the United Nations; when the China seat was removed from the Republic of China in 1971, ASPAC folded in a matter of a few months. Although ASPAC had no organizational headquarters, five autonomous organizations were set up under the aegis of the Council. When the Council ceased to meet, two of the organizations continued (the Cultural and Social Center for the Asian and Pacific Region and the Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region). The remaining three organizations (the Economic Cooperation Center for the Asian and Pacific Region, the Maritime Cooperation Scheme, and the Registry of Scientific and Technical Services for the Asian and Pacific Region) collapsed.

The *Association of South East Asian Nations* (ASEAN), which many observers feel is the successor to the former *Association of Southeast Asia* (ASA), is the most prominent of all the organizations. ASEAN has a headquarters in Jakarta, and several ASEAN-connected organizations exist throughout the member countries, including the politicized *ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization* (AIPO), which is not analyzed here because of its redundancy with ASEAN itself.

The *Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference* (IFMC), a body that meets twice yearly, largely addresses its attention to political issues. Although Vietnam has proposed other arenas for joint cooperation, Kampuchea and Laos have demurred.

The *South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation* (SAARC), the newest of the politicized organizations in the region, has decided to defer establishing a central office. Each member instead provides leadership for one or more technical committees.

The *South-East Asia Treaty Organization* (SEATO), which was established primarily to prevent Vietnam from becoming unified under rule from Hanoi, was dissolved when that objective failed. Headquartered in Bangkok, SEATO actually spent fewer funds for military than for civilian

projects, some of which were established subsequently on an autonomous basis. The former SEATO Cholera Research Center in Dacca (now Dhaka), for example, now operates as the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, a nongovernmental international organization (NGO). Meanwhile, the Manila Pact, the treaty on which SEATO was based, continues to remain in force for all signatory countries except for Pakistan, which withdrew in 1971.

The *South Pacific Forum* (SPF), alone among the various organizations, brings together heads of government for annual meetings to discuss common problems of the region. The Forum's secretariat is the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) in Suva.

The paper, thus, consists of a comparison of seven organizations. Two no longer exist (ASPAC and SEATO). Two are considered highly successful (ASEAN and SPF) by most observers. APPU almost collapsed but somehow has survived, so its status is intermediate between the two successes and two failures. IFMC and SAARC are too young to classify, though they appear to have weathered several tests with flying colours, as we shall see below. The rank order of relative success of these organizations is portrayed in Table 3, with most successful IGOs on the left, defunct IGOs on the right, and IGOs with intermediate status in the middle.

III. BASES FOR COMPARISON

The aim of the paper is to delineate factors disposing some organizations to survive and others to fail. The basic research method is to compare seven organizations to see whether there are any factors systematically differentiating survival from failure. Variables will be selected from the theoretical literature reviewed above. The seven organizations will be ranked for each variable in a series of comparative tables, then subjected to a correlational analysis.

IV. PREDICTOR VARIABLES

DEUTSCH'S VARIABLES

According to studies by Karl Deutsch and associates, greater harmony among countries occurs when at least 12 factors are present. These are also examined in Table 3.

Mutual compatibility of main values, first of all, certainly explains why all six Asian and Pacific organizations were established in the first place; over time, when values diverged in three cases, the organizations began to falter. APPU, as noted above, survives because its anti-Communist focus is broader than the single issue of the UN's China seat or the nature of the regime in Vietnam, issues that framed the attention of ASPAC and

TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF REGIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC FOR PATTERNS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE: CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES PROPOSED BY KARL DEUTSCH AND ASSOCIATES (1957) CORRELATED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL (CORRELATIONS SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL UNDERScoreD)

Variables	ASEAN	SPF	SAARC	IFMC	APPU	ASPAC	SEATO	Tau	
								b	c
<i>mutual compatibility of main values</i>	++	++	+	++	+	=	=	.88	.86
<i>mutual responsiveness</i>	++	++	+	+	=	-	=	.88	.92
<i>mutual predictability of behavior</i>	+	++	=	+	=	=	=	.73	.67
<i>expected economic gain</i>	+	++	+	=	=	=	=	.73	.67
<i>increased political and administrative power</i>	+	++	=	++	+	=	=	.62	.63
<i>superior economic growth</i>	++	=	=	-	++	++	=	.00	.00
<i>social economic ties</i>	++	=	=	-	=	=	=	.76	.61
<i>broadened political elites</i>	-	++	=	+	+	=	=	.24	.24
<i>mobility of populations</i>	+	=	=	+	=	=	=	.40	.41
<i>multiple range of communication, transactions</i>	+	+	=	+	=	=	=	.72	.82
<i>balance of rewards</i>	+	++	+	=	+	+	+	.30	.24
<i>interchange of roles</i>	++	=	+	-	-	-	-	.65	.61

Source: Michael Haas.

SEATO, respectively. ASEAN was formed partly to bring about an end to bickering over territorial and border disagreements, partly to serve as a vehicle to promote regional solidarity in the United Nations and thus to attract greater attention to needs for technical assistance, and partly to provide a basis for intraregional technical cooperation. IFMC's *raison d'être* has been to articulate peace proposals for Southeast Asia, based on a shared socialist perspective. SAARC has agreed to avoid discussing bilateral issues and has focused its political pronouncements on policies of UN-related agencies, much in the tradition of ASEAN. SPF has continued to advance the South Pacific regional interest since its inception, compromising wherever disagreements emerge on particular issues by avoiding resolution of divisive questions. In their own way all seven organizations have served to build increased compatibility of main values, but two were tied to unrealistic objectives and foundered as a result.

Mutual responsiveness, that is, the habit established by one country of providing assistance to another country in time of need, has been ASEAN's most impressive characteristic, illustrated by the Swap Arrangement and commodity arrangements for petroleum and rice. APPU was on the verge of collapse when its APCC and APDC began to articulate programs more tailored to the individual needs of its poorest members, though crisis response has not been a characteristic of the organization. Despite the ASPAC program-oriented Centres, the Council showed no willingness to respond to crisis but itself succumbed to a crisis and has been outlived by two of its Centres. Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO due to lack of support for its position in the Bangladesh War of 1971 illustrates one case of lack of mutual responsiveness; the civilian projects, however, were responses to the needs of the poorer member countries. Efforts of Kampuchea and Laos to resist Vietnam's domination and the latter's resulting reluctance to push IFMC too quickly into nonpolitical areas suggest some responsiveness in IFMC, an organization that otherwise shows considerable political solidarity. The 1985 example of Bangladesh mediation to secure Sri Lankan participation in the SAARC midyear meeting, despite a lack of Indian responsiveness to Sri Lanka's domestic crisis, evidenced by an undiplomatic comment on the subject by Indian Foreign Minister of State Khurshid Alan Khan on the eve of the SAARC Foreign Ministers' Conference in May, 1985, suggests that SAARC may well grow and survive due to increased mutual responsiveness. SPF has set up a variety of frameworks for technical cooperation, but its mutual responsiveness is perhaps best illustrated by the establishment of the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). Under SPARTECA Australia and New Zealand have dropped most tariff barriers on imported goods from Pacific island member countries of SPF.

Mutual predictability of behavior is a two-layer concept. At one level, one state in a cooperative organization should ideally be able to anticipate what other states will do after a meeting in which joint plans are

drawn up; no country should renege on a mutual agreement. At a higher level, countries should also be able to predict reactions of other countries in advance of any such meetings. APPU merely adopts resolutions. ASEAN agreements have been observed for the most part, and reactions have generally been anticipated, but there are some occasional exceptions; statements by Indonesian General Ali Murdani over the past year on Vietnam have shocked the Thai Foreign Ministry, leading to efforts to clarify and smooth over apparent differences. Murdani's gaffe is not unlike that of Khan in India regarding Sri Lanka, indicating that SAARC has not risen to the second level of mutual predictability, though its committee work has clearly been successful at the first level. Vietnam's effort to make IFMC more formal was rebuffed in a manner suggesting some lack of predictability. SEATO meetings to plan civilian and military projects generated no later surprises, but France's nonparticipation in the Council after 1966 and Pakistan's feeling of betrayal over the Bangladesh War of 1971 demonstrate the failure of SEATO at level two. SPF has been more successful than the other six organizations at both levels; this may be attributed perhaps to the fact that it is attended by heads of government on a regular basis.

The first three of Deutsch's (1957) factors are seen as most essential for the formation of pluralistic security-community, that is, a grouping of states that avoid war and undertake cooperative ventures but do not wish to amalgamate together into a confederation, federation, or unitary political merger. The remaining nine conditions are seen as helpful to pluralistic security-communities but not essential.

Expectations of stronger economic ties or gains have been particularly important for SPF, a dream only partially realized by ASEAN and SPF, and a hope of SAARC's various committees. The other four IGOs are not oriented toward economic matters.

Marked increase in political and administrative power of at least one or a few countries, as when countries achieve political independence, has been crucial for SPF, as it is composed primarily of newly independent countries, some of which also are joining APPU. IFMC has three new socialist countries with far more power than the predecessor regimes. The strengthening of dictatorships and democracies in ASEAN has given the countries a more solid basis for implementing joint plans. ASPAC, SAARC, and SEATO arose indifferent to this element.

Superior economic growth of one or a few countries has characterized ASEAN, the newly industrializing countries (NICs) at the core of APPU and ASPAC (South Korea and Taiwan), but no such growth can be found in the other organizations. IFMC countries have negative growth.

Social communication linkages have increased in ASEAN, where a wide variety of NGOs have arisen with ASEAN titles, holding exhibitions and meetings on a wide variety of subjects; SPF's various subsidiary bodies and related organizations have served to bring together South Pacific island leaders as never before. The other organizations have neither flowed from

nor resulted in any particular density of social communication networks.

Broadening in political elites has occurred in organizations composed of newly independent countries (APPU and especially SPF), or where corrupt elites were replaced by people's democracies (IFMC), but otherwise has not occurred in the other IGOs. In the case of ASEAN the Marcos and Suharto distastorships have actually become stronger over time.

Mobility of populations has occurred in only two special cases among the seven IGOs. Under IFMC Vietnamese ethnics have returned to their former lands inside Kampuchea; persecution under Pol Pot had forced them out. The waiver of tourist visas for intra-ASEAN seven-day travel, soon to be mirrored in SAARC, has played a role in population mobility by permitting much greater access of Indonesian and Malaysian relatives to visit each other. The movement of at least 100,000 Moslem refugees from the Philippines to Malaysia to escape persecution is also a new development but hardly likely to promote greater solidarity within the organization.

The variable *multiple range of communications and transactions* has improved with ASEAN, IFMC, and SPF but not elsewhere. Most of the increase is associated with elite interactions and trade, though social communication in sporting events has occurred within all three, and SPF countries also have had much interchange in matters of higher education and religion.

A balance of rewards, with no countries deriving the lion's share of benefits, has been carefully calculated in almost all organizations. SPF's SPARTECA is a spectacular example of an intent to redistribute rewards to poorer countries, though Fiji has thus far derived the most benefit. Ironically the lone exception, IFMC, is of an organization in which the poorer members have resisted generosity from the richest country, hoping to avoid domination thereby.

Interchange of group roles is the final variable listed by Deutsch and associates (1957). In the Asian and Pacific political IGOs decentralized operations and rotation of the role of convener of meetings has been perfected by ASEAN and is now being followed by IFMC and SAARC as well. In SPF efforts are undertaken to rotate responsibilities so that one of the island nations will become dominant, but the superior economic capabilities of Australia and New Zealand cannot be interchanged with any of the remaining countries. The remaining three organizations have been oblivious to any need to rotate roles.

ETZIONI'S VARIABLES

Turning to the variables suggested by Etzioni (Table 4), which are presented in part as a critique of the formulation by Deutsch and associates as being inappropriate to the twentieth century, we find that his analysis of the Nordic Union most resembles the cases in Asia and the Pacific. Etzioni has four measures of success in integration and several predictor variables.

By *level of integration* Etzioni classifies unions that merely seek harmonization from those that progress to integration. Only ASEAN and

TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF REGIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC FOR PATTERNS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE: CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES PROPOSED BY AMITAI ETZIONI (1965) (DEPENDENT VARIABLES CAPITALIZED) CORRELATED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL (CORRELATIONS SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL UNDERScoreD)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>ASEAN</i>	<i>SPF</i>	<i>SAARC</i>	<i>IFMC</i>	<i>APPU</i>	<i>ASPAC</i>	<i>SEATO</i>	<i>Tau</i>	
								<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
<i>LEVEL OF UNION</i>	+	+	=	=	=	=	=	.79	.82
<i>SCOPE OF UNION</i>	+	++	=	=	=	=	=	.75	.61
<i>DECISIVENESS</i>	++	++	+	=	-	-	++	.42	.43
<i>STABILITY</i> ^a	++	++	=	=	=	--	--	1.00	1.00
<i>identive power</i>	++	++	=	=	=	--	--	1.00	.98
<i>number of elite units</i>	=	+	=	+	+	+	++	-.53	-.49
<i>economic impetus</i>	+	+	+	=	=	=	=	.72	.82
<i>rewards before burdens</i>	+	++	-	=	-	-	+	.42	.43

Source: Michael Haas.

^a This variable is coded as "organizational survival", the main dependent variable of this study.

SPF have made any efforts of this sort in Asia and the Pacific. ASEAN's Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) provides for tariff reductions of nearly all commodities traded among the six member countries. SPF has integrated shipping through the establishment of the Pacific Forum Line, and its SPARTECA is even more comprehensive than ASEAN's PTA. The remaining organizations have sought only to harmonize foreign policies.

Scope of integration refers to the number of sectors in which integrative efforts are undertaken. Codings, thus, give a higher score to SPF than ASEAN, with the remaining organizations lagging behind.

Decisiveness means the extent to which the organization makes decisions that are implemented. For implementation to occur, there must either be responsive national bureaucracies or a strong organizational secretariat. The success of SPF is credited not only to the power of Heads of Government, who make its decisions, but also to the efficiency of SPEC in preparing the groundwork for SPF meetings. The efficient headquarters and enthusiastic participation of armed forces in military exercises gives a very high rating to SEATO as well. Although APPU and ASPAC Centres served well to implement decisions by the plenary organs of the two bodies, national bureaucracies generally ignored both IGOs. IFMC has not really made any decisions requiring implementation by a bureaucracy. ASEAN and SAARC are moderately positive in coding, the former with a mixed history, the latter with a promising one.

Stability is the tendency of a union to stay together rather than backslide due to internal disagreements. This variable is coded identically with our notion of organizational survival in the case of Asian and Pacific political IGOs.

Etzioni first looks at three types of power. *Identive power* refers to level of popular commitment for the IGO. ASEAN and SPF have a high level of positive support throughout the region. SAARC and IFMC are too young to have built a popular basis of support just yet. APPU has never quite caught the popular fancy. ASPAC and SEATO were not highly revered even while they were in existence. *Utilitarian power* relates to economic sanctions that a union can use to compel compliance from wayward members, but this is more relevant to political unification than to progress of an IGO in Asia and the Pacific. *Coercive power*, similarly, refers to military power of the union to quell disunity among member countries; this is not relevant to our discussion.

The distribution of power is a second interest. The *number of elite units* is hypothesized by Etzioni to vary inversely with success in unifying countries. ASEAN and SAARC correspond to his notion of egalitarian unions. One country has provided leadership for APPU (Japan), ASPAC (South Korea), IFMC (Vietnam), and SPF (Fiji). Many cooks spoiled the SEATO broth. External elites quite often as donors, play a role in most IGOs in the Third World, and Etzioni expresses concern that *external elites reinforce the IGO power structure* rather than try to pry loose an internal modus vivendi. As all seven Asian IGOs have experienced reinforcement

from the outside, this concept has no variation and will not be used to code differences.

Sequences of integration are a final concern to Etzioni. He notes various theories that predict success based on the initial sector or focus of a union: identitive, military, economic, and technical issues are hypothesized as possible take-off sectors. We should add the political focus to his list, as it characterizes all seven of our cases, though some (ASEAN, SPF, SAARC) have also had a significant *economic impetus* motivating efforts to start the organization. *Rewards before burdens* is seen as more auspicious for an organization than the reverse. This formula particularly describes SEATO and SPF, which have not burdened the poorer member countries. ASEAN awaited rewards over almost a decade before establishing a Secretariat with fixed member contributions. IFMC has no burdens or rewards at this time. APPU, ASPAC, and SAARC asked members to fund projects before any tangible results could be observed.

HAAS-SCHMITTER VARIABLES

Haas and Schmitter divide their variables into three parts — background conditions, conditions at the time of economic union, and process conditions (Table 5). Looking at the first of the background conditions, *functional similarity in size of units*, we find that only ASEAN countries have any claim to an equalitarian distribution of relevant resources within the seven IGOs; marked differences in size and power exist in the other six. *Rate of transactions* among members of the organization are particularly high for IFMC and SPF, moderately so for ASEAN, ASPAC, and SAARC but far too disparate within SEATO. The *balance of pluralism*, a measure of homogeneity among members along the universalistic-particularistic modes of development orientation, is particularly difficult to assess, as there are mixed ratings of most organizations (some countries are achievement-oriented, some particularistic), but ASEAN, ASPAC and IFMC are somewhat more uniformly universalistic. The variable *elite complementarity* refers to homogeneity of values of political elites and business leaders in each member country of an IGO. IFMC countries are highest on this attribute, SAARC countries the lowest due to a wide range of dissident political activity. Moderate homogeneity characterizes most of the remaining IGOs, though ASEAN has an intermediate coding due to the existence of continuing insurgencies as well as the rivalry between Chinese and indigenous bourgeois elements.

Among the two conditions at the time of economic union, commitment to eventual political union, may be modified here to *commitment to higher levels of cooperation*. ASEAN and SPF are notable among the IGOs with this higher level of commitment, and SAARC seems to hope for technical cooperation as a springboard to a more peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, but the other IGOs had no such ambitions. Changing "power of union" to *top power of the organization*, we find that all seven were established in a loose framework with limited powers allocated to a central

TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF REGIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC FOR PATTERNS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE: CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES PROPOSED BY ERNST HAAS AND PHILIPPE SCHMITTER (1964) CORRELATED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL (CORRELATIONS SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL UNDERSCORED)

Variables	ASEAN	SPF	SAARC	IFMC	APPU	ASPAC	SEATO	b^{Tau}	c
<i>equality of members</i>	++	-	-	-	-	-	-	.51	.51
<i>rate of transactions</i>	+	++	+	++	=	+	-	.49	.49
<i>balance of pluralism</i>	+	=	=	+	=	+	=	.00	.00
<i>elite complementarity</i>	=	+	-	++	+	+	+	-.19	-.18
<i>commitment to increased cooperation</i>	++	++	+	=	=	=	=	.80	.73
<i>power of IGO</i>	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	.79	.82
<i>expert decisionmaking</i>	+	+	=	-	-	-	-	.80	.73
<i>growth in transactions</i>	+	+	=	+	-	-	-	.77	.73
<i>adaptability</i>	++	++	+	-	+	+	+	.53	.49

Source: Michael Haas.

office, though ASEAN and SPF have increased power as they have developed free trade schemes for their members.

The first of the process conditions, *expert decisionmaking*, seldom characterizes political organizations, which we are studying. Nevertheless, ASEAN and SPF have a number of lower-level organs in which experts are given authority to act without instructions from their governments. SAARC's structure is set up to promote this objective as well, though the technical bodies are only in initial stage of operation. *Growth in transactions* has occurred in ASEAN, IFMC, and SPF, did not occur in APPU, ASPAC, and SEATO, and it is too soon to tell in the case of SAARC. *Adaptability*, that is, the growth in new functions and other responses to the new pressures and realities generated by the organization, is particularly evident in the case of ASEAN and SPF. The establishment of subcenters of various sorts by APPU, ASPAC, and SEATO was an example of adaptability, and SAARC's committee structure is a step in this direction as well. IFMC alone has failed to grow in this manner.

VARIABLES IN HAAS' LATER STUDY

In Haas' later formulation 10 variables were used (Table 6), 5 dealing with changes of scope of regional IGOs (independent variables), 5 dealing with changes in level of regional integration (dependent variables). Increases in policy issues taken up by the IGO, or *changed number of issue-areas*, has characterized all the Asian and Pacific IGOs except IFMC, though ASEAN is particularly notable in expanding in almost every conceivable technical policy arena. *Increased intensity of issue-areas*, which refers to strong preferences translated into greater stakes in the outcome and higher salience of the policies discussed by the IGO, has not occurred in the case of APPU, ASPAC, and IFMC. The plethora of agreements with ASEAN following the Summit Conference of Heads of Government in 1976 and 1977 enables us to give ASEAN the top coding. SAARC and SPF have picked up steam, although more moderately. SEATO members lost interest in the organization over time. *Increased budget or personnel* characterized the early years of SEATO, but in later years there was a decline. IFMC has had neither a budget nor an organizational structure. All of the other organizations have increased support for their bureaucracies, though not spectacularly. *Increased IGO-government consultation*, a variable that is designed to measure increased energy and commitment on the part of national bureaucrats on behalf of the regional organization, is particularly descriptive of ASEAN's myriad committees and task forces. The establishment of technical committees by SAARC is beginning to follow the pattern of ASEAN. None of the remaining organizations has penetrated the national bureaucracies to any important degree, preferring to centralize organizational activities in central organs. *Increased IGO-private sector consultation*, the fifth scope variable, applies the previous variable to contacts with businesses. Once again, ASEAN is by far the regional organization with the most involvement externally. Only IFMC qualifies

TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF REGIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC FOR PATTERNS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE: CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES PROPOSED BY ERNST HAAS (1975) (DEPENDENT VARIABLES CAPITALIZED) CORRELATED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL (CORRELATIONS SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL UNDERScoreD)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>ASEAN</i>	<i>SPF</i>	<i>SAARC</i>	<i>IFMC</i>	<i>APPU</i>	<i>ASPAC</i>	<i>SEATO</i>	<i>b^{Tau}</i>	<i>c</i>
<i>changed # issue-areas</i>	++	+	x	=	+	+	+	.30	.24
<i>more intensity in issues</i>	++	+	x	=	=	=	+	.79	.80
<i>more budget or personnel</i>	+	+	x	+	+	+	-	.51	.41
<i>more IGO-gov't consultancy</i>	++	=	=	=	=	=	=	.51	.41
<i>more IGO-private sector consultation</i>	++	=	=	-	=	=	=	.30	.24
INCREASED MEMBERSHIP	++	++	=	=	=	—	-	.97	.98
BINDING DECISIONS	+	++	+	+	—	+	-	.45	.43
IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS (see Etzioni's variable <i>DECISIVENESS</i>)									
INCREASINGLY COOPERATIVE									
DECISIONMAKING	++	++	+	+	+	-	—	.97	.98
CENTRALIZED DECISIONMAKING	++	++	=	=	=	=	—	.87	.80

Source: Michael Haas.

for a negative coding, as it eschews contact with the private sector while building socialism. The remaining IGOs have not moved into this area.

Increases in level of activities are measured, first of all, by *increased membership*. Gradual increases in membership in SPF, as new countries became independent in the South Pacific, give a top score to SPF. ASEAN added Indonesia and Singapore to ASA membership, and later admitted Brunei. IFMC and SAARC have been static in membership. APPU has both gained and lost members. After 1966 France refrained from participating in SEATO'S Council, and Pakistan withdrew in 1971. Most countries decided to withdraw from ASPAC in 1972. IGO technical recommendations in Asia and the Pacific rarely are perceived as *binding decisions* for the member countries; when decisionmakers are Foreign Ministers or Heads of Government, the resolutions have become official policies of member countries in most cases. For this reason APPU, composed as it is exclusively of parliamentarians, has been regularly ignored by the governments of its member countries. Since SPF regularly has Heads of Government in attendance, decisions usually commit each country. IGOs with Foreign Minister representation have positive codings, with the exception of SEATO, which was not taken very seriously in its later years. Haas' *implementation of decisions* is nearly identical with Etzioni's variable *decisiveness*, so codings are not repeated here. *Increasingly cooperative decisionmaking* characterize all the Asian and Pacific IGOs but SEATO; consensus decisionmaking has been the style for IGOs with members in the region. ASEAN and SPF have established particularly impressive records in ensuring that no policies have been adopted when even one country has demurred. IFMC and SAARC, which are only a few years old, appear to be following the same style of decisionmaking as ASEAN and SPF, while APPU has sought consensus albeit somewhat less strenuously than the latter two IGOs. The presence of Western-oriented members in ASPAC and SEATO accounts for some of their uncooperativeness perhaps, the latter especially, but the unpopularity of both alliances was the most decisive factor in their demise. *Centralization in decisionmaking*, that is, a movement from national-interest-oriented decisions to community-interest-oriented decisionmaking, was clearly the reverse of what happened over the history of SEATO, ASEAN and SPF exhibit a spirit along these lines often described as "the ASEAN Way" and "the Pacific Way," respectively. The remaining organizations have no progress to report on this variable.

OTHER VARIABLES

The observations of Hansen, Sohn and my own study should not be left unconceptualized (Table 7). Hansen and I both stress the degree of politicization of issues in a regional organization. Hansen and Sohn point to the extent of penetration of outside powers as a key element in the success of a regional IGO. Hansen and I look at economic issues as crucial.

As each political organization differs in the degree of *importance*

TABLE 7: COMPARISON OF REGIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC FOR PATTERNS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE: CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES PROPOSED BY OTHER SCHOLARS (HAAS, 1985, CH. 10; HANSEN, 1969; SOHN, 1971-1972) (DEPENDENT VARIABLE CAPITALIZED) CORRELATED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL (CORRELATIONS SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL UNDERScoreD)

Variables	ASEAN	SPF	SAARC	IFMC	APPU	ASPAC	SEATO	Tau	
								b	c
Importance of political issues	=	=	-	++	+	+	++	-.47	-.49
shield against outside interference	+	=	=	=	=	-	-	.84	.80
enhancing prosperity	+	+	=	=	=	=	=	.79	.82
<i>Organizational Survival (see Etzioni's variable stability)</i>									

Source: Michael Haas.

attached to political issues, we may code the IGOs accordingly. Interestingly, SAARC has attached the lowest importance to political pontification, whereas IFMC and SEATO have existed primarily to issue resolutions. Because of their technical subcenters, APPU and ASPAC are not the most politicized, although their plenary organs have a record of considerable political concern. ASEAN and SPF are intermediate in coding because technical bodies balance out political manoeuvring, despite Malaysia Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Mohamad's recent criticism of ASEAN for spending too much time on Kampuchea and too little on regional economic cooperation.

External penetration can be avoided if the organization operates as a *shield against the outside*. ASEAN is the only Asian or Pacific IGO to work toward this end. ASPAC's failure to serve as a shield was its downfall. And SEATO probably increased domination by outside powers in the affairs of members in the region.

Among the regional political IGOs only ASEAN and SPF have operated to *enhance prosperity*. The other organizations have only paid lip service to this goal.

Finally, we need to include the key dependent variables that have motivated this study. Organizational *survival*, however, has already been coded under Etzioni's variable *stability*.

V. ANALYSIS

We are now able to use the codings for predictive purposes. Which variables best and last predict the organizations that have been most and least successful in surviving over the years? The first algorithm to be used is to look for variables that show + or ++ for the cases of most success, - or -- for the two defunct organizations, and = for the intermediate three cases, or vice versa.

VI. DISCUSSION

Using theories usually applied to regional cooperation in other contexts, we have attempted to identify variables accounting for the survival of some political IGOs in the Asian and Pacific region and the failure of other organizations. Out of 40 variables we have found 8 that are significantly associated with organizational survival.

Not surprisingly, 4 correlated variables are indicators of success in other respects. The more an organization seeks integration rather than mere policy harmonization, the more it tends to survive. IGOs that add members survive more than those with static or declining membership. Where decisionmaking is increasingly cooperative, survival is assured; otherwise, survival is in doubt. As countries in an organization think less of national

interests and more of community interests, an IGO is on the right track; otherwise, survival may be in doubt. In short, political IGOs must either get stronger or their days may be numbered.

At the same time, some variables thought to be indicators of organizational success were not associated with survival. The number of sectors in which integrative efforts are undertaken is not a predictor to success, largely because so few sectors have been subject to integrative efforts in Asia and the Pacific. The same logic explains why the variable "binding decisions" did not predict to organizational survival in our sample of seven IGOs. Decisiveness is unrelated; SEATO, for example, had a very effective bureaucracy on behalf of an unpopular organization.

Are some organizations doomed to failure from the beginning? We find that when members have a compatibility of main values, survival is assured; otherwise, the IGO simply cannot create a new ethos among its member countries. The greater the level of popular support for an organization, the more it will flourish; if controversial goals are sought, the public will have a particularly harsh judgment when those goals are unfulfilled. If the IGO is given increased power as it develops, this is also a sign that it will survive. And organizations designed to bring prosperity to their members are likely to outlast those that define their political concerns entirely in terms of rhetoric.

This paper should conclude on a tentative note. Concepts were mostly borrowed from formulations that did not focus on political IGOs, and we should therefore not be surprised to have so few significant correlations. The data are, of course, qualitative, and my codings are always subject to challenge. Nevertheless, this is the first effort to take a large set of conceptual variables, apply them to specific cases, and to emerge with correlational findings. A subsequent project might wish to add more IGOs, focus on organizational success beyond the question of survival, and new conceptual variables might be developed as a part of a new theoretical formulation. Of these many possibilities I am happy to be the one demonstrating an empirical direction for data collection and data analysis.

We find only three variables that conform to our stringent requirements. Ernst Haas' increased membership and increasingly cooperative decisionmaking are highly related to organizational survival, though both variables are considered to be indicators of organizational success. The only predictor variable to pass the test is Etzioni's identitive power: the popular affection for an organization well predicts its eventual success. Fourteen other variables seem to sort out successes from failures but are ambiguous with the three organizations coded in the middle categories.

Converting ++ to a score of +2, + to 1, = to 0, - to -1, and -- to -2, we can use a measure of correlation (Kendall's two *tau* correlations, *tau_b* and *tau_c*, as other measures wash out with so little variability and only 7 cases) to make more discrete observations. Correlations are found on Tables 3-7, where significance levels demonstrate that we can add five variables that were missed by visual inspection. Among measures of organizational

success other than survival, we find that Etzioni's level of union, and Haas' centralization of decisionmaking are highly associated with the ability of a political IGO in Asia and the Pacific to endure. Three predictor variables also come to the fore. Deutsch's complementary of main values, Haas' and Schmitter's power of the organization, and Hansen's and my own focus on IGOs that enhance prosperity for their members turn out to be important predictors of organizational success. Each theorist has found at least one useful concept for our study, though most variables have not been very illuminating.

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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Both the practice and the analysis of international relations have suffered from ethnocentric assumptions which veil the true interests, attitudes, and objectives of participating states. This has been particularly true in the West, the home of the Metternich tradition, where the smaller and non-Western states still tend to be viewed as units, or pawns. In reality the 'facts' of international conflict and diplomatic interaction are always enculturated perceptions. Those perceptions need to be the prime focus of analysis. They may be approached through specific cultural concepts of the self, of the nature of authority, and of the meaning of the state, within an historical context. Examples drawn from the Indochina imbroglio illustrate this thesis.

Let me say at the outset that my calling is not specifically the study of international relations, but cross-cultural history. Over the past thirty-odd years I have worked in several parts of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. That experience has necessarily involved some broad reflection on multiple cultural interaction. It has induced me to look at international relations within a very different framework from the one originally bequeathed me by my Australian education. I now see a crying need to interpret international disputation primarily in terms of enculturated perceptions of 'facts' rather than of 'facts' themselves — if, indeed, any philosopher worthy of his podium would contend that objective 'facts' exist.

It seems so obvious that enculturating experience should be a crucial part of international diplomacy, not to mention the study of international relations, that it is difficult to accept that it is generally ignored. Some little time ago my university in Australia sponsored a national conference on the

theme of preventing nuclear war — the current 'in' theme for academic conferences — and there were papers on various areas of superpower conflict and the arms race and the balance of terror, and so on; but there was not a single contribution on what I would regard as the core issue: Why are various peoples perennially at one another's throats? What are the *fundamental* reasons for human conflict? What are the preconditions for peaceful co-existence?

Some years ago I was also struck by a statement in Frances Fitzgerald's marvelous analysis of America in Vietnam — an analysis owing much to the cultural insights of Paul Mus — when she noted in the introduction that in 1966, when she first went to cover the war — with some 350,000 US troops already on ground — "there was little American scholarship on Vietnam and few Americans were engaged in a serious effort to understand the political, economic, and social issues at stake for the Vietnamese" (Fitzgerald, 1972, p.9). How could the world's greatest power embark on a major Asian commitment without a thorough appreciation of what the jargon today calls the 'cultural inputs'?

One of the troubles, I suspect, lies in the overall concept of nations, of national interests, and of international conduct applying to those interests, that has developed in Europe alongside the concept of the nation-state itself. Grotius in the 17th century was necessarily extrapolating from the experience, going back to Greco-Roman times, which had determined European politico-legal perspectives at a time when Europe was expanding to dominate the rest of the globe. Consequently, the concepts and values appropriate to the European nation-state came to be taken as universals. By the 19th century Europe's dominance had proceeded so far and continued for so long that Grotian assumptions slotted in with that line of Social Darwinism which saw human development, including the growth of political units, in a simple linear framework which tended to obliterate cultural differentiation. There were nation-states and emerging nation-states.

In short, autonomous political units came to be seen as precisely that: units, in the European image. Some were big, some small, and some in-between; some powerful and some not so powerful (and therefore open to coercive co-operation); but the essential problem was one of managing relations centered on the relative authority and ambitions (usually toward territorial or economic expansion) of the political units involved. As conflict arose, pressure (sometimes called 'persuasion') could be applied to see that the power order remained unimpaired. The biggest and wealthiest and militarily strongest units arrogated to themselves the right to dictate the overall shape of relations.

That was the age of Metternich (Henry Kissinger's historical mentor): an age of Europe rampant, when the elements of potential conflict could be mechanistically manipulated to suit the purposes of the major powers. Because they were all European — the rise of Japan at the end of the century began to introduce a perplexing new element — a whole range

of assumptions could be made about their perceptions of international relations and relative spheres and degrees of authority. Essential cultural homogeneity allowed issues to be seen in relatively straightforward terms, with some pretense to legitimacy. Determinants were taken as internationally congruent.

The world today, however, is a vastly different place. Since 1945 the nation-state concept has been extended to the furthest reaches of the earth — often in circumstances where it has great difficulty in establishing a functional toe-hold — but the old assumptions have persisted. The idea and methods appropriate to diplomacy and conflict resolution a century or two centuries ago are therefore still held to be relevant. That is undoubtedly one of the key problems within the United Nations, which began with 51 'old' states and now has 159 predominantly 'new' states in its membership.

What has not been adequately perceived is the fact that the cultural homogeneity which previously allowed statesmen to approach international relations and resolve conflict no longer exists. In fact, it has been shattered almost totally. On balance, the world's nation-states are only nominally states in the original European sense. Most of them now comprise scores, sometimes hundreds, of traditional 'nations'; and the resulting syncretic state cultures negate the old Europe-derived assumptions. I do not need to mention specific cases; but it is patent that many states reject both the pretensions of the older nation-states (including the so-called superpowers) and the international rules which those states originally developed.

European scholars often still assume that Grotius was defining, or attempting to define, 'the law of mankind' — the phrase still turns up in the literature — as a general category embracing international law. But the attempt involved peculiarly European conceptions, having Roman and Judaeo-Christian foundations, of the very nature and province of law. It was culturally specific. Nation-states today with very different cultural bases — for example, the many with Islamic or Buddhist backgrounds — naturally give priority to sets of concepts, values, demands, and loyalties which can and often do override the assumptions previously underlying international relations and the rule of law. Even during the colonial period the British had to learn to their cost in Burma that local notions of law — what it is — were utterly different from theirs.¹ As David Marr of Canberra put it in a recent issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "in serious conflict situations, one 'must know thyself, know thine opponent'" (Marr, 1958).

The world has been plagued by conflict stemming from national ethnocentrism ever since the emergence of the nation-state; but the complexities and dangers have multiplied many times over since 1945 through the proliferation of states whose international attitudes, biases, ambitions, and consequent diplomacy represent the whole spectrum of cultural orientations. Yet the mechanics of international relations remain

¹ See Donnison (1970, pp. 84-85). Donnison had been Chief Secretary in British Burma.

tied to the assumptions of Metternich, Bismarck, and Clemenceau. The concentration on hostility between the superpowers has perpetuated an atavistic outlook, with the new nations of the Third World, despite their manifest disparateness, continuing to be viewed as units to be dragooned, to be simplistically categorized in the language of the Cold War: 'communist' or 'democratic'; 'free' or 'totalitarian'; for us or against us.

The ostensibly moral aspects of such categorization, and of the power-bloc attitudes flowing from it, only cloud the essential cultural differentiation. The United States under Woodrow Wilson briefly tried to assume that kind of moral leadership based on a universalistic conception of self-determination; and after World War II, American governments took up where Wilson had left off, picturing international relations in self-righteous terms tied to the US model. That approach ignored the basic cultural dimension. Thus, had the United States recognized, *in a more fundamental way*, the right to self-determination of the Vietnamese — a way which acknowledged their need to construct a nation-state on different premises from those in the US itself — a great tragedy might have been avoided. It is proving very difficult for the old states to break free of ideas which focus on them as custodians of the international moral order: an order tied to Western conceptual and institutional precedents.

It has become vital that we try to substitute the realities of international pluralism, perceived as objectively as we can manage, for the old Europe-centered and moralistic international order. But power plays and legacies of 19th century European ethnocentrism continue to maintain a global block. Perhaps the most notable recent instance of debate around this issue was provoked by Edward Said's *Orientalism*, in which he argued passionately that international approaches to what has become known as 'the Palestine problem' have been distorted (or aborted) by longstanding Western prejudices about Arab culture. He traces those perceptions back to some of the earliest and most distinguished Western scholars of Islam — not forgetting their modern counterparts — who never succeeded in thinking beyond a set of Western reference points. The conceptual and value differentness of Arab culture — and, therefore, of the Arab states — became the very rationale of Western impositions in the Middle East. Arab culture has been analysed in terms of what it is not, rather than in terms of what it is (Said, 1979).

A few years ago Said's accusations provoked acrimonious debate which gave promise of getting to the core of international relations; but emotion eventually obscured the essence of the argument. The fact remains, however, that by picturing *international relations* as being inherently *inter-cultural relations* he brought to the fore the crux of the analytical problem. He asked why apparently highly educated men (statesmen, advisers to statesmen, even specialist scholars) see international phenomena as they do. That is also the question I am raising briefly here.

There have been times of crisis when Western scholars have asked a similar question (though in post-crisis times it tends to be forgotten). For

example, in the 1960s the American historian Arthur Schlesinger Jnr. (and by American historian I mean primarily historian of America) was induced by his former role in the Kennedy administration and his country's agony in Vietnam to begin confronting this fundamental issue. As he then saw, a set of American ideas and values had been taken as universal absolutes, regardless of countervailing cultural or international considerations. Flexibility was correspondingly discounted:

Perceptions of reality become obsolete with new and disconcerting rapidity. This would be all right, if the way we perceive reality changed as reality itself changes. But, as we all know, it doesn't. Our perceptions of reality are crystallized in a collection of stereotypes; and people become so fond of the stereotypes, so much at home with them, that they stop looking at actuality. In this way they protect themselves from the most painful of human necessities, which is of course, the taking of thought (Schlesinger, 1967, p.9).

About twenty years earlier Emery Reves had made a similar point; but it would appear that no-one had been listening. Reves had written:

Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the centre of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such a method of observation should create an entirely false perspective ... Within such a contorted system, of assumed fixed points, it is easy to demonstrate that the view taken from each point corresponds to reality ... but we arrive at a hopelessly confused and grotesque overall picture of the world (Reves, 1949, p.23).

The problem then becomes that, in a sense, of stepping outside one's own mind, one's enculturation, and of dramatically extending the intellectual reference points to be used in analysis. I will argue here that that can be done only through the more sophisticated techniques of modern anthropology; but specialists in other disciplines have also staked a claim. For example, the pioneer of contemporary history as a recognized intellectual activity, Geoffrey Barraclough, has called for the study of global rather than national history "as part of an overdue re-assessment of our basic values". He bewails the failure of historians in preparing people to examine international issues rationally. "If history is falling into disrepute, if for many people it seems to be lost in unessentials instead of guiding us to the threshold of the world we know, the reason is not far to seek; what it needs is a larger vision, a breakthrough to new dimensions ... and a vision of historical reality which measures up to our experience and to the perspectives opening out before us ..." (Barraclough, 1962, pp. 108-109).

But I see the problem as being vastly more complicated than Barraclough appears to allow. It is not susceptible to real attack simply by the expansion of educational syllabuses to take account of Buddha and Asoka alongside Lambert Simnel and Titus Oates. The problem of enculturated interpretation remains. I find a better clue in a passage from Peter Burger, who is primarily a sociologist of religion, where he outlines the manner in which each culture creates its own global vision: "Every

human society is an enterprise of world-building, an imaginative construct, or myth, which supports and gives a central place to that society and the self within it." (Burger, 1969, p.27).

Now I see the essential clue in Burger's use of the term 'self'. Specific cultural determinations of self-image are closely linked to the 'world-building' (including the picture of one's own society in relation to other societies) of which Burger speaks. In general courses on politics within my own university I have stressed the perceptions and methods of political anthropology rather than the standard institutional approach which forms the core of most analysis, precisely because the latter inevitably tends to incorporate grassroots Western conceptual assumptions, and therefore obstructs rather than facilitates cross-cultural understanding. I focus on three central concepts which are familiar to anthropologists rather than political scientists: the shaping of self-image; the basic nature of authority; and the meaning of the polity. It is necessary to begin with the self.

Many anthropologists over the past seventy years have refined techniques for the study of the self, and for analysing relations between self-image and society. An Australian scholar, Geoffrey White, has published some interesting work on Melanesian societies in this genre. The point is that the conceptions of the self formed by a culture are as distinctive as the culture itself, and are interactive with the culture. Studying the shaping of self-image provides a fundamental entree to the culture as a whole, in a way intrinsically free of the analyst's own enculturated biases. As a child comes to see the external environment in congruent terms, the analyst is then placed to comprehend those terms. These determine the entire self/group nexus which dictate how the individual perceives himself in society, and *that* society in relation to other (perhaps radically different) societies.

Clifford Geertz, who has worked for many years on the societies of Java and Bali, noted in an influential paper that their conceptions of the self offer a sharp contrast to those in Western society, where the self is viewed as "a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe" (Geertz, 1974). That Western conception is exceptional. In other societies the self exists to a greater or lesser degree within a social and ritual framework which makes negligible provision for the individualism often taken for granted—indeed, elevated into a general ideal — by Western analysts. If one understands that, one is less likely to invoke Western criteria. For example, it has been pointed out that the Vietnamese language has no equivalent to the pronoun 'I', 'Je', 'Ich', in Western languages (Fitzgerald, 1972, p.23). That elementary realization should have given some warning about introducing Western political institutions and social 'reforms' incorporating conceptual and value assumptions implicit in the West's high individualism. Neither the French nor the Americans were listening.

I say this in order to emphasize that what may seem an abstruse aspect of social analysis can in fact have profound implications for a

rational approach to international relations: to keeping discussion and policy-formation within realistic bounds. Much the same applies to notions of authority. For example, what we understand in the West of 'democracy' depends on concepts of the self and of the nature of authority which are specific to societies in the Western historico-cultural tradition. In a society such as that of Java, as Benedict Anderson pointed out in an important essay, political power, rather than being an abstract quality, is a concrete discernible substance that concentrates in those destined for leadership and radiates like light from a bulb. This concept derives from a period of Hindu-Buddhist dominance more than 1,200 years ago, and so has very deep roots (Anderson, 1972). An appreciation of that basis of political power can make relations with Indonesia, where Javanese influence is predominant in government, more rational and productive. Yet very little acknowledgement of it can be noted in Western diplomacy or, for that matter, in the Western media. Apparently Javanese constructs are so far removed from the Western norm as to seem irrelevant.

There is some movement in the West, even among international lawyers, explicitly to recognize cross-cultural differences of this fundamental kind: for example, in the definition and validation of individual rights. This will be important both within and among states, particularly those states which are inherently plural (comprising many different traditional polities) and which have only nominal politico-legal integration. Richard Falk of Princeton has recently questioned the emphasis on Western-defined human rights as always and everywhere pre-eminent, arguing, as I understand it, that such an approach, because of its cultural specificity, can work to the disadvantage of minorities and various indigenous peoples whose very coherence depends on a less individualistic juridical interpretation of the self (Falk, 1985).

The message to the rest of us is that the integrity of societies, and the cultural bases of political legitimacy within many states, require more profound understanding and, consequently, greater flexibility in international forums than have been shown to date. Grotius would have to do a great deal of re-thinking if he were to return to earth today.

What I have been emphasizing is that international relations can be managed smoothly, and conflict minimized, only through a clear recognition of the phenomenal international pluralism now reflected in the 170 or so states constituting the global community. This must mean that we have to jettison the stereotypes and models, narrow and ethnocentric, which derive from an era of Western dominance and can no longer be sustained. That applies also to single ideological models, which are intrinsically anti-pluralistic. What we can substitute, perhaps for the first time, is a respect for differentness; but such respect will come only from fundamental understanding, of the type sought by anthropological science. As long as politicians, diplomats, and commentators are allowed or encouraged to think in labels and talk in slogans, we have no hope of approaching that understanding and the rational conduct of international relations which

would could flow from it.

Perhaps most of us would agree that the superpowers to date have given no luminous lead in the international recognition of pluralism on a state scale. The crude Cold War dichotomies tend to persist. The US and USSR governments continue to refer to one another in terms of ideological stereotypes which are seen as ethically antipathetic and incompatible. Their leaders, even by the accounts of insiders, have not been conspicuous for cross-cultural insight: an alarming state of affairs for the rest of us. I am reminded of Stanley Karnow's recent delineation of Lyndon Johnson as so interculturally innocent that he was infuriated by the reluctance of Thai ministers to shake hands; and he remained convinced that Congress-style wheeling and dealing could be effortlessly translated to negotiations with the North Vietnamese (Karnow, 1983). (Nixon and Kissinger substituted bombing them to the conference table: hardly a sound basis for meaningful negotiations or a lasting settlement.) What was needed at that time, and is still needed, was a thorough grasp of Vietnamese culture and history — as Paul Mus and his disciples had vainly been trying to tell Washington — with an emphasis on the bases of differentiation.

I am often disconcerted by the statements and initiatives of my own (Australian) government which reveal negligible insight into the cultures of other states with which it is dealing. Along with other Western governments it tends to have an obsession with the idea of 'fair and free elections' as a universal panacea in disputed areas (e.g. currently in Kampuchea). But this ignores the fact that the Western concept of elections depends on particular concepts of the self and authority in relation to a known polity, and that elections in non-Western situations, where relevant constructs are anti-thetical — as I indicated above — may confer only a spurious legitimacy. The indigenous constructs and indications need careful analysis.

Patently what I am suggesting, given the number of nation-states and peoples presently interacting around the world, would make the conduct and dissection of international relations vastly more complicated. But complexity has to be faced rather than ignored. The United States University is currently promoting the study of complexity itself as a distinct discipline.² This appears to be a sound move. My initial reaction, I must confess, was that the concept of interdisciplinary study, which has been with us for a long time, itself incorporated provision for inherent complexity; but I now realize that the specific difficulties of interrelating the application of usually discrete disciplines, in both the social sciences and the natural sciences, can and should be subjected to appropriate analysis. The functions of the constituent disciplines could thereby be more effectively refined and, possibly, extended.

I imagine that I have already been proposing something of the sort in suggesting that the study and conduct of international relations — which in

² *UNU Newsletter*, Vol. VIII, 3, May 1985: the whole issue is devoted to theories of complexity.

recent years seems to have veered towards the mathematical — should be grounded in the science of man. Previous micro techniques in a traditional micro setting could be extended to the macro level of the nation-state. For example, anthropologists for many years have been interested in inter-tribal feuding among small-scale societies. Such feuding is often itself institutionalized and serves a variety of social, political, and ritual purposes: in other words, it is functionally integral, not peripheral. It may be that the same applies to conflict among nation-states. At the very least, it may be possible — if it has not already been attempted — to extend known analytical techniques to larger and more complex examples. A focus on the nature of authority and the needs of integration would not be altogether novel — at least, not to political anthropologists, who are also familiar these days with adding a historical dimension (e.g. Geertz's work on the idea of the state in Bali) (Geertz, 1980).

Perhaps I may briefly illustrate some of these points by taking the present conflict over Indochina, where tensions revolve around the continued occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese troops and the problematical future of the country. Difficulties arise, not from a set of objective realities, but from subjective realities perceived through historico-cultural screens by each of the interested parties. Back in the 1960s the general Indochina problem was commonly interpreted in terms of super-power conflict. We have moved on from there, to recognize the pre-eminence of divergent national and cultural perceptions as the key causal factors. What it is now necessary to do is to analyse those perceptions systematically within an anthropological/historical frame.

The People's Republic of China was long viewed simply as a category: as a 'communist' state. That explained nothing. It has always been clear from an anthropological perspective that very complex cultural transformations have been taking place, being reflected in fluctuating regional policies — especially policies on Indochina. Not only was China, with great travail, working towards a distinctive form of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and practice, but that was occurring within a broader, more massive process of selective acculturation, under increasing pressures to modernize. What one would expect is a partial adaptation of extraneous elements, with the pre-existing historical forms substantially determining the nature of the adaptation. Western notions of progress and national sovereignty took on distinctive meanings by being filtered through long-standing Sinic linguistic/conceptual patterns. What we find today, surely, is a highly syncretic social philosophy and national outlook incorporating much from the past.

It may well be, for example, that state leaders and public servants are still seen essentially as exemplars of public morality, as in the old Confucian-Mencian design; and that images of the world beyond the borders, of relations with neighbouring peoples, have also not moved far from ancient conceptions. The determining theme may still be that of the Middle Kingdom, so that peripheral polities in Southeast Asia — and

particularly Vietnam — should depend for international legitimation, not so much on ideological rightness in Marxist-Leninist terms, as on the acknowledgement of the PRC as the essential power reference: the locus of the One True Way. Failing the realities of true great-power status, China for the present has substituted symbolic international authority within the region, with the prime focus on Indochina. Universalistic conceptions again embrace the Overseas Chinese, according to age-old concepts of sovereignty and 'belonging'; and these have been applied to Vietnam's Chinese minority, adding another element of conflict.

Vietnamese perceptions of the problem have been shaped by the fundamental cultural factors adumbrated by Mus and McAlister (1970) — with a unique view of revolution — and concomitantly by the attitudes referring to the long Chinese occupation which ended in 939 AD. As Keith Weller Taylor recently made clear, the conceptual legacy of that original struggle for independence continues to dictate Vietnamese perspectives on the world and their place in it. They see themselves as standing isolated, dependent on their own resolve, between a threatening giant to the north and a circle of self-absorbed realms elsewhere. Those 'self-absorbed realms' have little comprehension of the price paid by the Vietnamese for their national survival. The present diplomatic impasse is rooted in that historical incomprehension (Taylor, 1983).

To the Western observer, who thinks of the 19th century almost as the distant past, such determinants are puzzling; but the Vietnamese sense of historical continuity, which is related to the permanence of village culture, compresses the millennia into one pattern of connectedness. Moreover, their traditional idea of progress includes a distinctive emphasis, in and out of government, on "the cultivation of virtuous conduct". In that light, it may not be too much to suggest that hostility towards the PRC is now partly conditioned by the perception that China is not merely minatory but deviationist, in the sense of having departed from true virtue in the light of her own creed. Perceptions of the Thai also, as both alien and dangerous, stem from a long process of cultural polarization (symbolised in Mahayana v. Hinayana) and regional competitiveness, each claiming a particular spiritual-cum-political mandate — and the nexus is significant.

As for the ASEAN states, though fear centered on China and Vietnam was a prime factor in the formation of the alliance, in fact a distinctive mix of historical/cultural elements has given each of the member nations a different set of reference points shaping approaches to the current Indochina imbroglio. These are not necessarily 'rational' in any objective sense. As indicated above, the religious dimension to Thailand's antagonism towards Vietnam has to be understood. The Vietnamese blending of Mahayana Buddhism with elements of Confucianism and Taoism many centuries ago offends the doctrinaire sentiments of Thailand's influential *sangha*, or monkhood. Moreover, the 13th century *Phokun* (or paternalist) concept of authority has been revived since the anti-monarchy coup of 1932 to legitimize rule by strongmen backed by a bureaucratic elite: and it may

well be argued that concomitantly there has been a revival of the external outlook of the founding dynasty, under the revered Ramkhangheng, which threw off Khmer hegemony and then fought the Vietnamese for regional predominance. "Power justifies itself," both domestically and in the conduct of foreign affairs. The cultural mainsprings of policy need to be analysed.

Thus, each of the ASEAN states has its own interests, its own perspective on Indochina, its own interpretation: for each of them, in a profound sense, the Indochina problem is a different problem. Only a careful dissection of the cultural determinants allows us to see why; and those determinants must figure in any approach to a resolution. One would imagine it to be so obvious that policies or negotiations based on sheer power politics or superficial assessments of 'facts' must fail, that it would hardly need saying. Sadly, that is not so, I am not infrequently embarrassed by the blithe pronouncements on foreign affairs which issue from my own government. I know American scholars who feel the same about Washington.

In contrast to Thailand's attitudes, Malaysia takes a relatively benign approach to Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea. This patently owes something to historical reserve towards Thailand, the one-time suzerain of the Malay states. It is also tied, of course, to Malay antagonism towards the historical and current roles of the Chinese in the peninsula; and, by extension, towards China and the Chinese as a whole. But it goes further than that, relating to Malay cultural claims and nationalism. That factor is so fundamental, being linked also to Islam, that it is not susceptible to change due to the vagaries of regional power balances. Any Chinese influence is seen as inherently antipathetic.

Indonesia similarly shows more reserve towards China and less towards Vietnam. That stems partly from the role of the Chinese within Indonesia, culminating in the near-dominance of the PKI in the latter years of the Sukarno era. But it goes much deeper than that, flowing from efforts by the Javanese leadership to interpret the state ideology, Pancasila, in terms of cultural assimilation. Sukarno, the father of the nation, was the modern exemplar of traditional Javanese authority, according to the notions of power as a discernible substance that I mentioned earlier. That concept is inherently charismatic; but it was threatened by Sukarno's ultimate dependence on the organizational network of the PKI, which was seen as referring to China. To a man with Sukarno's outlook, every bit as Javanese as Sukarno's, that makes China and the Chinese model especially dangerous. At the same time, it may well be that Vietnam is perceived as culturally closer to Java's pattern of age-old syncretism, and so less 'communist'.

I have cited these examples to try, in a sketchy way, to illustrate my point about the cultural bases of international relations, which demand appropriate analysis. To indicate how we might achieve that kind of analysis as the basis of a happier world order is more difficult. Many world leaders, and their advisers, have the wrong kind of education, and prefer to

deal in stereotypes and ideological categorization (remember Lyndon Johnson?). Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs often leaves its officials in crucial 'hardship' posts less than two years (interspersed with spots of leave) so that they have negligible opportunity to learn local languages and get inside cultural systems. Inevitably, they fall back on superficial models related to mechanistic power plays.

Few journalists do better; though there are exceptions: for example, much of the material appearing in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* relates current problems to cultural determinants (I am reminded particularly of articles on the Philippines written over several years by Sheila Ocampo);³ but that kind of assessment seems to founder on the rocks of particular national preconceptions, exemplified by the present confusion in US policy towards the Philippines.

The electronic media represent a notable disaster area: such analyses as accompany the pictures on television usually incorporate crude models, anachronistic stereotypes, and home-grown prejudices. These are what the public expects and understands: so a vicious circle is set in motion. I recall a recent statement attributed to one of the presenters of NBC's *Today* show in the US, that she has mastered the art of 'covering' anything (and everything), no matter how inherently complex, in less than six minutes.⁴

The bulk of popular opinion, even 'educated' opinion — as I know from dealing with undergraduates in Australia — reflects such potted simplification. Over many years in Australia attitudes towards neighbouring regions and peoples, at both the popular and elite levels, have been marked by a phenomenal ignorance of the cultural basics. What one finds is an extrapolation from metropolitan concepts and biases, buffered by a crude form of unilinear socio-political evolutionism: in other words, Western paradigms. Unsurprisingly, politicians carry those paradigms over into national policies on international relations.

Ultimately we will get a recognition of international pluralism — not simply of the reality, but of the rightness of the reality — only through more responsible and more mature public education on a world scale: education which explicitly and deliberately breaks with the tradition of national ethnocentrism and focuses dispassionately on the mainsprings of disparate cultural systems. How we are to arrive at that is the real question. For many years, in several parts of the world, I have been involved with organizations and programmes aiming to reform attitudes and syllabuses. These have all been lamentably unsuccessful, largely because national ethnocentrism continues to be perceived, essentially in tribal terms, as the vital social cement: the core of coherence and purpose in the society, regardless of its wider ramifications. It is much too easy for politicians to preach what is

³ For example, see Ocampo's article relating the bases of the padrino system to religion and political leadership: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 February 1981, p.18.

⁴ As quoted in Media Supplement, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 August 1985, p.2.

already comprehensible within an established intellectual framework, rather than seeking to sponsor the re-examination and re-structuring of the framework.

Many years ago, when working East Africa (then colonial), I was bemused by the analyses and paradigms of itinerant American political scientists who dwelt on the evils of colonial government while looking forward avidly to something labelled 'emergent democracy'. I became interested in the origins of their paradigms. To understand these, I got hold of some of the history texts used in American high schools. There I found the answer. What they were perceiving was a replication of the struggle of the American colonies in the 18th century. It appeared to follow that, as the nationalists replaced the colonialists, a comparable era of freedom and justice and enlightened self-government essentially along US lines would be ushered in. Their own enculturation substantially obliterated present realities. Historical ignorance contributed to a mythical *Weltanschauung*: one widely used text skipped over slavery and the Deep South and made no mention at all of contemporary racial problems in the United States.⁵ So much for *An American Dilemma*!

The irony was that those of us who had spent rather longer in that complex environment well knew that British practice had been founded much more realistically on a recognition of pluralism — on what Sir Ernest Barker once called "the development of civilizations *sui generis*" (Barker, 1944, p.134) — and that the national syncretic outcomes would, quite properly, have little in common with Western models.

Frances Fitzgerald, whom I mentioned earlier, made similar enquiries while trying to fathom the cross-cultural blunders of her compatriots in Indochina. Back in the United States she made a detailed examination of the processes of world-building — to cite Burger again — incorporated in American education (Fitzgerald, 1979). Her results were similar to mine. The moral rightness and universality of the American paradigm saturated everything. Other cultures and systems automatically became deviant, whether specifically represented or not. In later life it is extremely difficult for people, no matter how widely read or experienced, to correct those perceptions and that perspective. That then becomes the problem in, and of, leadership.

Let me hasten to add that many American anthropologists are at least as conscious of this problem as I, and I would commend the introductory section of Milton Singer's classic study of modernization in India.⁶ I am also indebted to the work of the late Melville Herskovits, particularly to an essay titled 'Cultural Diversity and World Peace', which is essentially a plea for a tolerance of pluralism based on the kind of understanding for which I have been arguing here (Herskovits, 1973).

⁵ See Casner & Gabriel (1950). Gabriel was a Professor of History at Yale.

⁶ See Singer (1972) for the essence of his method.

International relations, no matter the particular or transitory foci, essentially involve the interaction — often the multiple interaction — of cosmological biases and determinants. They can be placed on a more rational basis only through thorough and appropriate analysis.

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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

Ritualized ideology is used by national decision makers to maintain the moral mobilization of society. Leaders, however, are also products of their societies and are therefore also influenced by morally absolutist ideas. If some position is repeated often enough, even absurd thoughts may eventually be accepted. In a parliamentary society adherence to ritualized ideology is an absolute prerequisite for elective office and the means by which powerful special interest judge the worthiness of prospective candidates. The end-result is a mindless conformity employing slogans rather than a meaningful discussion of values expressed in ideological systems. The desirable thing would be to have an open dialogue between systems.

Understanding the parameters of the arms race is crucial to survival of humanity in the 20th century. It is not alarmist to state with measured probability that unless the present trend is reversed, a nuclear exchange is probable, and would result in the end of civilization. That the arms race continues despite this certainty speaks to almost compulsive weapon dynamics.

A central concern of this paper is the apparent momentum which suggests that weapon development proceeds from dynamics internal to technology. Have we unleashed a monster which acts independent, and perhaps even contrary to political decision makers? The question of technological determinism is of most profound importance to the future of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and indeed to the future of the world.

Many researchers have come to the conclusion that technology has a life of its own. If this perception is veridical, awareness may assist decision

makers in taking precautions. There is also an obvious danger. If the arms race is a function of technology, independent of social-psychological parameters, decision makers and opinion leaders may conclude that arms reduction is hopeless. There is substantial evidence to suggest that people behave consistent with expectations and perceptions. A belief in technological determinism may produce a conflict resolution paralysis at the most crucial time of human history.

The reverse of the coin is doctrinal determinism. What is the function of military strategic doctrine in the spiraling arms race? Are there long-term perspectives which determine arms quality and quantity? This question suggests the possibility that doctrine, a significant super-structure in the arms race, plays a role independent of technology (or even a determining factor). Perhaps a more realistic assessment is a synergistic interaction between these determinants resulting in new and ever-rising levels of arms development.

A major thesis of this paper is the importance of social psychological factors in the arms race. In this model, technology and strategic doctrine are perceived as second-level determinants shaped as they are by dogmatic ideology. It is argued that the arms race is conducted within the framework of ideological competition. The perceived threat, which has for decades served as justification for arms lunacy, would not exist independent of ideological competition. It is also argued that any self-propelled technological momentum would screech to a halt if ideology was accepted as a mutually valued and differentially ranked set of human values. It is the absolutist moral nature of ideology which prevents political decision makers from acting rationally and decisively to end the arms race.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL MOMENTUM

Thee (1984), in an extensively documented paper, focuses on "the role of military technology in the complex process of shaping the categories and policies of the great powers, and consequently of the international scene at large" (p.1). Observing that the arms race is principally characterized as one of qualitative expansion, Thee notes, "A self-sustaining technological momentum has overtaken whatever may have been achieved in the number-counting control exercise. While not claiming technological determinism military thinking is dominated by technology and not ideology" (p.2).

An overview of military technology and strategy after World War II indicates the crucial role of the development of nuclear weaponry. The massive destructive capabilities of these weapons have shattered traditional Clausewitzian ideas since war is clearly no longer a rational continuation of state policy. This fact, according to Thee, led to the doctrinal notion of deterrence. However, the evolution of this doctrine indicates that nuclear war is thinkable to political decision makers. Thee notes "the doctrine of

deterrence, as reflected in theory elaborated in the United States, has evolved from pure dissuasion through "massive retaliation" and "flexible response" into the distinct war fighting course inherent in "counterforce" and "countervailing strategies" (p.9). The idea is to prevail and "win" a nuclear exchange.

A major problem is in the nature of research itself. Brooks (1975) notes, "Each time the independent scientists recommend against development (of new weapon systems), they also advocated more research aimed at the next level of improvement, principally on the ground that we could not afford to be taken by surprise over what was technically possible (p.78). Yet, history eloquently shows that once a weapon system is developed it is also deployed. Moreover, we have no examples of deployed systems which were not eventually used in the waging of war.

Thee (1984) writes, "Technological opportunities — situations when the feasibility of new weapon systems appear on the horizon — create near-irresistible pressures to make use of these opportunities" (p.43). The deployment of the cruise missiles indicates the "opportunistic" nature of the technological momentum. Betts (1981) notes, "Cruise missiles have evolved without a well-defined conception of why they are needed, and without an assessment of their full implication" (p.1). In other words, what is technologically feasible is deployed. If either side in the arms race can produce a better weapon system, it is built and deployed. The link between research and deployment use is irresistible.

Strategic doctrine likewise is a function of availability. The development of tactical field weapons was a direct function of the availability in quality of fissile materials. The strategic doctrine of "flexible response" likewise follows an adequate supply of tactical field weapons. The very existence of massive nuclear arsenals produce "...animated pressures to make use of these increased and improved arsenals by widening the range of objectives to be targeted" (Thee, 1984, p.150).

The general trend of the technological momentum is toward more explicit strategies for the waging of war. In that sense, nuclear war is becoming more realistic and therefore more possible. With doctrine based on capabilities, decision makers are decidedly playing a secondary role. "The possibilities that welled up out of the technological programme and the ideas and proposals put forth by the technologists eventually created a set of options that was so narrow in scope of its alternatives and so strong in its thrust that the political decision maker had no real independent choice in the matter" (Thee, 1984, p.32).

Although the acquisition of weapons occurs through conflict and bargaining in bureaucratic politics, the very essence of this process which is *compromise* indicates an ever-increasing spiral of arms acquisition. The reason for the increase is that *some* acquisition occurs always as a function of compromise and the accumulative effects are considerable over a historical period. While some delay may occur through special interest attachment to existing weapon systems, results do accumulate with no time

limit on self-destruction.

Although Thee explicitly denies technological determinism, his discussion almost assumes such. Large projects "...gain a technological momentum, acquiring a life of their own" (p.17); in bureaucratic politics "...the role of technology itself as a determinant factor behind this process" (p.27); the momentum is so strong "that the political decision makers had no real independent choice in the matter" (p. 32); in regard to the MIRV programme "the internal momentum of the programme was urging it on toward deployment" (p.50); a "compulsion has grown to pursue technological innovation as the cornerstone in the arms race" (p.50); "technology was the driving force behind the emergence of the SCM" (p.55); "a distinct causal position correlation between technological military hardware and behavioural doctrinal software" (p.69); "technology as the controlling factor..." (p.75); "nuclear deterrence has become deeply enmeshed with the velocity of their operational development and the science-based incessant revolution in military technology" (p.89); military technology never ceased interfering with the political process" (p.95); "Military technology has come to play an increasingly crucial role, as its impact on the political process has accrued" (p.116); it "imposes itself on politics, dictating readiness and planning for war" (p.118) and "precede all other moves in the arms race unless we seriously address the problem of military technology and check military R&D" (p.177).

WHY IS MILITARY TECHNOLOGY A DETERMINANT OF THE ARMS RACE?

The aforementioned discussion insists on a causational link between the technological momentum, the arms race and resulting strategic doctrine. However, little in this discussion illuminates why military technology has an internal momentum which is compulsive, controlling, incessant and imposing. This question subsumes other significant issues such as why is availability invariably associated with the momentum. There is no apparent reason *a priori* why availability of weapon systems should invariably lead to deployment, especially by the side leading the arms race, unless other factors play a more basic determining influence. *It will be argued that threat perception within the framework of absolute ideological competition is a major contributor to complete the link between availability and deployment.*

Yet, Thee devalues the effect of ideological competition declaring "ideology has landed in deep crisis... relations which were at the time of the Vietnam War mutually portrayed in extreme ideological good/evil terms... are no longer fundamental" (Thee, 1984, p.173). If ideology is not central to the technological momentum, what factors determine its compulsive nature?

Greenwood (1975) argues the importance of large organizations protecting economic self-interest: "Large organizations have been created

that owe their continued existence solely to their ability to invent or design new weapons and sell them to political decision makers (p.51). It is reasonable to assume the causational effect of economic self-interests. One reason is the mutually beneficial relationships in what Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex. Often decision makers, whether military or political, become board members in large organizations which have direct economic interests in the arms race. Personal survival and career progress are frequently intertwined with organizational missions.

Furthermore, social entities which determine armaments policy perceive a convergence between technology and the maintenance of their political power. This is true in all varieties of societies from military banana republics to the superpowers. The compulsive nature of the technological momentum may greatly be determined by threat perception and the drive for personal and class survival. This analysis calls into question the idea that technology dictates policy since this relationship may be secondary to underlying class interests and ideological assumptions.

Lord Zuckerman (1984) declares, "I believe that even if the members of NATO had met the conventional force goals they had set themselves in Lisbon in 1952, nuclear weapons would still have been developed and deployed" (pp. 7-8). The implication of this statement is that nuclear weapons were somehow developed independent of armaments dynamic and subsequently rationalized into strategic doctrine. While there is undeniably an increasing "push" brought about by the *availability* of weaponry such availability is linked to the special interests of armament scientists and manufacturers. However, the role of special interests cannot be understood apart from arms race dynamics. Why does society permit special interests to spend vast human resources under frequently wasteful conditions? Availability as a determinant is secondary to the function of ideology which is the creation of threat perception.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL MOMENTUM

There are sound social psychological reasons for the technological momentum. Technological development does not occur in a social vacuum but is motivated by the functions it serves to special interest groups and society. Special interests include a variety of scientists and other workers who labour directly or indirectly for the armaments industry. Eisenhower described this broad category of motivated people as the military-industrial complex. The motivations which fuel the technological momentum are personal career advancement and corporate profit. These motives are rationalized by ritualized ideology but are independent of concerns for social welfare or patriotism. The recent profit scandals by General Dynamics and General Electric show corporations willing to fleece society in a mad rush for increased profits.

A restraining factor of some importance is the bureaucratic process

within armament decision-making organizations. Attachment to current weapon systems, upon which large military groups have based their careers, only delays deployment. It takes energy and is therefore personally costly to adapt to new systems. For these career reasons, some groups continue an attachment to certain weapon systems. However, any restraining influence affects only a delay of the technological momentum. The very nature of the bureaucratic process is bargaining and compromise. Whenever a compromise is struck, it assures that *some* development will occur. Development accumulates at a geometric rate due to many parallel programmes of technology. Furthermore, the prestige of being at the frontier of new developments counter much of the aforementioned restraining influence.

Thee (1984) points to the self-sustaining nature of large projects and asserts that technology shapes the world of ideas, hopes and fears. The recent vote on the MX would indeed suggest that once a weapon system is begun there is no force which can prevent eventual deployment. However, investigating the reasons for the 'swing vote' which provided the Reagan administration with its victory point to ritualized ideology as a primary factor. It was to give Reagan a 'bargaining chip' at Geneva, or the fear that voters would blame them for not 'backing' the country which explains this 'victory.' This example raises the question: is the momentum anything other than perceived threat and special interests?

Why does feasibility of new weapons systems create irresistible pressures to proceed? It would appear that when new systems are developed a void is created. This void is filled by pressures created by the perceived threat of the opposing side, the special profit interests of armaments organizations, and career objectives of individuals.

Where technology exerts a direct effect on the armament race is in defining options for new armaments which in turn affect strategic doctrine. Despite pretensions to the contrary, there exists an unspoken desire to prevail if possible. Therefore, the general shift in technology is toward both quantitative and qualitative changes. It is this perceived unspoken objective which causes 'defensive' Star Wars systems to be evaluated as first strike weapons. If one side is invulnerable to first strike attacks there exists an incentive for a first strike attack.

Consensual agreement suggests that deterrence has contributed to growing tensions in the world. The essence of this doctrine is to view all armaments decisions as defensive in nature (regardless of actual first strike possibilities). Although doctrine may change from passive deterrence to flexible response nothing really is changed. Neither technology nor strategic doctrine can compare in importance to the underlying ritualized ideological struggle. True, availability of fissionable material and growth of nuclear arsenals may allow more flexible response. However, in the sum of things the controlled *use* of nuclear armaments does not depend on availability or doctrine but on the underlying conflict (only *deployment* depends on availability). There may exist a causal or correlational relationship between technology and strategic doctrine but is this a question of any importance?

The question of actual war and peace depends on the underlying conflicts. If the outcome is war, it is of no importance whether the doctrine is 'massive deterrence' or 'flexible response', the destruction of civilization is assured in either event.

THE NATURE OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE

The rationale used for the armaments race is deterrence or threat. In actual fact, perceived threat, whether valid or not, is likely the major dynamism of the race. Is the arms race internally determined by the technological momentum? In such a model, threat perceptions are viewed as dependent phenomena rather than the major etiological agent. The break-through thrusts and cumulative effects of technology are seen as internally determined independent of ideology and decision making.

There is much to support the importance of internal dynamics. Research and development institutions often visualize the research process as endless with no ultimate solutions. Bureaucratic inertia and corporate pressure produce the end-result that projects are seldom halted. Whenever military research proves the technological feasibility of new weapons, nothing stops deployment. However, the end-result of this line of thinking is a sense of *fatalism* about the prospects of arms reduction. Rather the question must be raised, why? Why is it that the armaments race is correlated with internal technological and organizational pressures? Why is the research and development process seen as endless? Are threat perceptions only dependent phenomena in the 'political-doctrinal superstructure of the arms race'?

PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE ARMS RACE

The arms race is the complex result of both an ideological straight-jacket and volitional decision making. In either case perceptual processes serve primary roles in determining deployment. Bell (1984) notes that a general war in the nuclear age is more likely to derive "... from uncertainties about the will of the chief decision maker in the adversary camp than about the strategic capacities of the two systems..." (p.503). Although declaratory signals appear fiercer than operational policies each perceived conflict is rooted largely in moral terms. Kull (1985), in his recent article, points to the prevailing significance of perception theory as a primary determinant of the arms race. Although deterrence is the primary strategic doctrine, both sides possess overkill capabilities yet build weapons far beyond requirements of deterrence *to achieve important psychological objectives*. The question "Who's ahead?" in a world of redundant arsenals is truly nuclear nonsense and yet the race continues. The basic thesis of perception theory is that an important relationship exists between the

political behaviour of leaders of nations and the perceptions of strategic nuclear defense. The reality of mutually assured destruction with existing arsenals is irrelevant compared to the power of perception and value judgment. Kull has shown that even though studies have questioned the assumptions of perception theory ("it is generally felt that both sides have more than enough") decisions regarding weapons procurement continue to be made on the basis of impressions they are supposed to create in adversary and ally alike.

The result of perception theory is that delusions and double thinking characterize the morass of psychological games played between the superpowers. This, according to Kull, includes taking steps which, at one level, pretend a belief in the possibility of prevailing in a nuclear conflict, while publicly disowning such thoughts. Clearly, psychological phenomena not only affect the arms race but may be considered primary determinants in the continued build-up.

A major problem of accepting an unconscious momentum in military technology is the fatalism implicit in technological determinism. The notion of the inevitability of deployment of any weapon system entering research and development implicitly reflect fatalistic thinking. An analysis of the technological momentum reveals that underlying components consist of the motivations of special interests, individual career-based or corporate profit, and threat perceptions. The dangers of fatalistic thinking are the results of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Decision makers and the public-at-large behave in ways that are consistent with their expectations. If the expectation is an unstoppable technological momentum which by violation or accident lead to war, then resignation may replace the patience required to solve the underlying social-psychological factors sustaining the arms race.

The function of ritualized ideology cannot be overlooked in the current momentum. There are those who would agree that ideology is in deep crisis (Thee, 1984) and that therefore the arms race cannot be attributed to ideological competition. This criticism is aimed at alleged discrepancies between the stated ideals of society and manifest reality. Yet this criticism overlooks a yet more profound role of ideology, the ritualization of conflict. Ideology often serves to bolster the arms race through ingrained dogmatic and ritualistic thinking. This cognitive process in decision makers and the public at large is *perhaps the key to understanding why research and development inevitably lead to deployment*. Ritualistic ideology serves as the perceptual screen which continually confirms threat perception. Further, ritualistic ideology serves implicitly as a warning to those in society who do not submit to confirm or face sanction. Our elected representatives are afraid of voting against arms expenditures for fear that they will be perceived as soft on communism. The implicit threat created and maintained by ritualistic ideology best explains the technological momentum. It helps us understand why companies with arms interests get away with outrageous profits and scandalous corruption because ritualistic ideology implicitly assumes that all armament projects

are in the service of the great crusade against the enemy.

A study of attitudes toward disarmament helps explain the importance of ritualized ideology. The study employed a Likert-type scale measuring attitudes toward nuclear disarmament (Larsen, 1985). An item analysis study yielded 21 statements with part-whole correlations $> .75$. The reliability study produced a corrected split-half correlation coefficient of .84 ($p < .001$). The scale differentiated between Reserve Officer Training Corps students (assumed to have a pro-armament bias) and a group of Citizen's Action for Lasting Security (CALS), thus supporting scale validity. In the construct validity phase the disarmament scale was related to the Fascism scale, ethnocentrism, attitudes toward the Soviet Union, religious orthodoxy and Machiavellianism. Of these hypothesized relationships only two proved significant: a sense of chauvinism ($r = .63$, $p < .01$) and negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union ($r = .51$, $p < .01$). Chauvinism and stereotypic views of the Soviet Union explicitly express what is meant by ritualized ideology. In short, a perspective which is high on emotive content, bolstered by chauvinistic symbols and threat perception. Such ritualized ideology rationalizes any arms extravaganza without reference to actual threat, needs for interdependence and common goals.

Without ritualized ideology how does one explain the apparent lack of understanding of the real nature of nuclear weapons. If the public supports the arms race it is because it does not understand the real destructive power of these weapons. Ritualistic ideology serves to obfuscate the obvious mutual vulnerability in a world of absolute over-kill. Ideas of symmetric parity (or for that matter superiority) is nuclear insanity as long as almost any level of retaliatory arms survive a first strike. Yet, this insanity is accepted because it serves the purpose of ritualized ideology.

Ritualized ideology removes the armaments race from the level of rational discussion to the realm of moral absolutism. This is the meaning of Reagan's use of cold war rhetoric describing the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Morally absolutist thinking cannot be compromised. Negotiations and bargaining require a willingness to give up some objectives in order to attain other valued goals. However, when the opposing side is viewed through the perceptual screen of ritualized ideology then bargaining and compromise are replaced by a desire for decisive advantage. This factor best explains the failure to halt or reverse the armaments race since World War II.

CONCLUSION

Ritualized ideology is used by national decision makers to maintain the moral mobilization of society. Leaders, however, are also products of their societies and are therefore also influenced by morally absolutist ideas. If some position is repeated often enough, even absurd thoughts may eventually be accepted. The sanction of society for failure in repeating and

believing ritualized slogans is also a powerful motivator for decision makers and the public at large. In a parliamentary society adherence to ritualized ideology is an absolute prerequisite for elective office and the means by which powerful special interests judge the worthiness of prospective candidates. The end-result is a mindless conformity employing slogans rather than a meaningful discussion of values expressed in ideological systems.

What to be done? No one has a monopoly on truth. Ideological systems have grown out of the experiences of people and, therefore, are subject to all sorts of human error, misperception, and misjudgment. Moral absolutism has created closed-mindedness and rigid thinking precisely at a time in history when tolerance and flexibility are required. Open-mindedness does not imply one social system may not have many advantages over another. It is, however, impossible to discern what these advantages are in an atmosphere of dogmatism, hostility, and mutual suspicion. The desirable thing would be to have an open dialogue between systems. Values held by differing social systems are not necessarily conflicting but may be complementary. Accepting that some values are complementary and many differences are relative is an initial step toward eliminating ritualized ideology as a motivator of the arms race.

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MASS BOMBING: SOME MORAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

This paper is an account by a military historian, who participated in the bombing of Germany (1944-45), of attitudes towards the campaign on the part of military personnel at the time and since. It examines the attitudes of the British Government and their military, and comments on the way historians have responded to the evidence since 1945. The problem of responsibility and justification is presented in some of its aspects. The treatment is a mixture of the personal and the professional. By implication the present problem involving nuclear weapons is addressed.

Certainly the most provocative book about mass bombing in World War II was written by the American novelist Kurt Vonnegut. It was about Dresden, and entitled *Slaughterhouse Five* (Vonnegut, 1971). In it he quotes two military men commenting on the raid on Dresden as presented in the book by David Irving on the same subject (Irving, 1963). They were Lt. General Ira C. Eaker, USAF retired, and Air Marshall Sir Robert Saundby, KCB, KBE, DFC, AFC. He begins with Eaker.

I find it difficult to understand Englishmen or Americans who weep about enemy civilians who were killed but who have not shed a tear for our gallant crews lost in combat with a cruel enemy... I think it would have been well for Mr. Irving to have remembered, when he was drawing the frightful picture of the civilians killed at Dresden, that V-1's and V-2's were at that very time falling on England, killing civilian men, women, and children indiscriminately, as they were designed and launched to do. It might be well to remember Buchenwald and Coventry too.

As Vonnegut repeatedly says:

'So it goes.'

What Air Marshall Saundby said, among other things was this:

That the bombing of Dresden was a great tragedy none can deny. That it really was a military necessity few, after reading this book, will believe. It was one of those terrible things that sometimes happen in wartime, brought about by an unfortunate combination of circumstances. Those who approved it were neither wicked nor cruel, though it may well be that they were too remote from the harsh realities of war to understand fully the appalling destructive power of air bombardment in the spring of 1945.

'So it goes' (Vonnegut, 1971, 187-88.)

Vonnegut later introduces this dialogue:—

'Americans have finally heard about Dresden,' said Rumfoord [a would-be military historian] twenty-three years after the raid. 'A lot of them know now how much worse it was than Hiroshima. So I've got to put something about it in my book. From the official Air Force standpoint, it'll all be new.'

'Why would they keep it a secret so long?' said Lily.

'For fear that a lot of bleeding hearts,' said Rumfoord, 'might not think it was such a wonderful thing to do.'

It was now that Billy Pilgrim spoke up intelligently.

'I was there,' he said. (Vonnegut, 1971, 191)

I was there too.

A subject that is cross-disciplinary, and one that takes an historian outside his accustomed accumulative and clinical or analytical roles invites caution. However, it is my view that it may be wise to let emotional overtones ply more freely than is customary with historical papers if we are to get more balanced assessments from our consultations with the past. Furthermore, it may be wise to look at the consequences of having great technological capacities lying ready to hand in times of desperation. What military men, politicians, and indeed populations do in these circumstances seems to me to be eminently worthy of discussion in this nuclear age. Indeed, it may be that the history of a non-nuclear age may have something to teach this present time. Finally, it should be said that this paper does not search for scapegoats. It is not a rush to judgment. Questioning the effects of the bomber campaign, and the origins of its programmes, ought not to be construed as an attack on the participants, certainly not on the motives of my surviving friends or those of our dead comrades. Hitler's Reich seemed to me then, as it does now, to have been an infamous political horror. I did not regard my own country or the United Kingdom, or even the United States in this light then, nor do I now. However, as for old veterans who look at any attempt to discuss their past as an attack on some sort of Holy Grail, and who regard criticism as some sort of treason, I have nothing to say except that it is forty years on, and a new generation must be served.

On the other hand I have some right to speak. I was a member of the Mass Bombing forces in the War against Hitler. I was at Dresden, — overhead on its night of terror.¹ I have had my face slapped by a German woman who was a victim of bombing when she learned what I had done. My daughter-in-law was born of German parents. I have had German

students. I have also taught the history of the so-called "Strategic Bombing Offensive" to graduate and undergraduate classes since 1962. I was also a friend of one of the few British people with the courage to denounce mass bombing when it took place. Both during the war and after it Captain (later Sir) Basil Liddell Hart (Hart 1947) denounced this, what he regarded as a retrograde method of warfare.² I have remembered with some sense of frustrated misgiving my own part in it. On the other hand I still remember my own comrades with affection, and I attended a reunion of my own bomber "crew" in 1984. I do differ from supporters of the bombing offensive in that I do not resent present day attacks on it because some of my friends were killed carrying it out. Finally, I have made some attempt to keep up with the burgeoning historical literature on the subject. After all I am an historian by profession.

But I would not undervalue the usefulness of having a participant trained as an historian consider this matter. On a topic like this one is inclined to get views on air war from people who have had no direct connection with it, except that they have developed, in these tense times, a sense of immediacy about the need to control war from the air; or, conversely, one gets talks from those who want to justify the use of air threat as a deterrent, and who are associated in some way with the development of public military policy. Both kinds of activists have laudable objectives. I am different only in that my present sense of immediacy comes from my memory of past involvement as a very ordinary participant and this experience is filtered through subsequent professional study as the facts have become more generally available.

Let us go back in time. During the war, of course, every airman who could think had some idea of what we were doing. Nobody was much fooled by talk concerning military targets around which civilian houses "just happened" to be grouped making it unavoidable that some of them would get the odd stray bomb. I sometimes thought about that, as did most of us. However, we were very young and we thought it a good idea at the time to kill Germans. We also had it in mind that the British had had a good dose of bombing in 1940-41. Some people knew about the German bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam. It was retaliation. We also knew that on our squadron (in 1945) there lingered the ghosts of those who had perfected the system back in 1943, and they were not simply retired from

¹ My aircraft did not actually bomb Dresden, but used the cover of the Main Force to come in range of our target, which was Böhlen. Nevertheless we could see the colouration of the sky clearly, and we know what was going on at Dresden. The night was distinguished by the fact that the weather path across Germany offered limited scope for height movement, so we went out and returned with the Main Force. I remembered the red sky after the war, long before it all became a general subject of public controversy and remark.

² Liddell Hart thought the bombing campaign a logical extension of Britain's naval blockade methods; a cheap but ruthless way of dealing with continental nations. (Lidell, 1947, 90-91).

operations, they were retired from life.³ We were not mindful of those ghosts, whom our ground crews had known personally, when we set out on trips.⁴ Furthermore, there was the fact that the opposition was still there, even in the winter of '45, with real anti-aircraft fire and real night-fighters to greet those who thought the war was over. Finally, I freely admit to strong feelings of satisfaction with the intelligently deployed techniques of Bomber Command generally, and with the personal and practical performance of my own crew in particular.

When it ended and we got on the boat for Canada, Bomber Harris came to say good-bye. He said to us in the mess on the *Empress of Something* or other, that "when we came to dandle our children on our knee, and they asked 'what did you do in the last war, daddy?' you can tell them that you won it, because you did."

In my case, for the moment, the war ended there. The University that was to be my life gobbled up my time. I did think about the war from time to time. A "sincere" but juvenile essay on the bombing of Dresden got me a well-deserved D+ from my English professor. I took the hint and majored in history. Later I went to England again, in a new capacity, that of a research student in history. During my time in Cambridge I read the reports of the Nazi atrocities written up for the Nuremburg trials until I was too disgusted to read more. It did, then, occur to me more strongly that bombing women and children was not too civilized an occupation. I noticed also that Bomber Command did not seem to be receiving the accolades that a successful and decisive campaign seemed to demand. What was the matter with us? As I began to think about it it seemed that there were three central questions. Who ordered it? Was it right? What good did it do for the war effort? These are still very difficult questions. At one level, of course, Harris ordered it, but a little reflection makes it clear that he did not rule the British Cabinet. Generally speaking the moral question, then as now, was sluffed off on the basis of the notion that it was total war, and after all, it was comfortably but uncritically held, the Germans began the bombing. This was denied by Liddell Hart (1947). Practically speaking it was held to have been essential for eventual victory. Many intelligent people believed this then, and they believe it still. The question of my own responsibility I have lived with, as have all the surviving members of the Bomber Force then and now, some more successfully than others.⁵ Some of us are not such passionate devotees of pursuing every "war criminal" as others have been.

³ My squadron was # 429 (Bison) latterly of Leeming, Yorks. The squadron was formed in 4 Group, and transferred, on April 1, 1943 to # 6 Bomber Group. 6 Group was formed in January, 1943: AVM C.M. McEwen, RCAF, was Officer Commanding from February 1944. See Middlebrook and Everitt (1985). Note that the Bison squadron suffered the heaviest losses in Wellington aircraft in 6 Group; mostly in the "Valley of the Ruhr" attacks of 1943.

⁴ Bombing Operations were called "trips" by us. They were not "Missions", a word used by the United States Army Air Forces, which, for all we knew, might have referred to converting heathen in Flying Fortresses.

I got down to reading the evidence. What was the evidence? There was F.J.P. Veale's (1953) *Advance to Barbarism*, in which the whole concept of unrestricted warfare against civilians was presented as a return to the days before war had any rules at all, any code, or any of what might be called the Red Cross mentality. The whole thing was indicted as a policy, —which the British and the Americans had been perfectly willing to execute, and did, despite the fact that it was a barbarous way to make war. Another book that became available then was Hans Rumpf's *The Bombing of Germany* (1963). Rumpf had been a German urban survival expert, who, as professionally and dispassionately as he could, chronicled what happened to Germany from the underneath person's point of view. When I finished reading Rumpf I could no longer be horrified by tales of frying flesh. As I had discovered before in reading the Nurnburg trials documents, the human mind can only take in so much horror reading. Many people seem to have had a similar reaction to such compulsive detailed fact-finding.⁶

However, help was at hand for confused airmen like myself. Books on the bomber offensive began to surface. As mentioned, Hans Rumpf's book came on the market giving the picture from the enemy on the ground. The four volume official history, entitled *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany* was published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, over the signatures of Noble Frankland and Sir Charles Webster (1961). Also, in the year 1962, in the pages of Esquire, R.H.S. Crossman (1963), the British Labour M.P., wrote of his horror at what had happened at Dresden: of how an innocent, non-industrial town was flattened and treated to round the clock bombing by both the Americans and us, and how a firestorm had made the old historic city one vast flaming coffin (Crossman, 1963). It had, it turned out, happened before at Hamburg (Middlebrook, 1980). However, Hamburg was an important port. Crossman was an indignant man, and he was interested in assigning responsibility. Perhaps this Labour politician was aiming at Churchill?

In any event I had some idea of what the issues were, and of what the recipients on the ground thought of it all. When David Irving's (1963) book on Dresden came out, I was advanced enough in knowledge that he did not tell me anything significant that I had not known before. The exact casualty figures are still disputed. Estimates of the Dresden dead have been put up to over 200,000, and down to about 30,000.⁷ Every dead man counts in Heaven's scheme of things, but the numbers game does not alter the moral problem, does it? In all the war Bomber Command lost some 50,000 men.

⁵ No doubt the backlash from the strain of operations has been imperfectly understood by the general public and even the medical profession, then and now. In the same way it would be quite wrong to think that because bomber crews do not talk about their past activities and the results of them, that they do not think of them. Canada's young airmen were not all naive by any means.

⁶ A good example of overexposure on an author's part is A.I. Solzhenitsyn (1975) *The Gulag Archipelago*. Three volumes is too much despite the obvious need for accurate information!

Almost immediately after the war (1945) the Americans conducted and published most of the results of a survey of strategic bombing (US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945). It has since been expanded and amplified, with comment by David MacIsaac (1976). As (Middlebrook and Everitt 1985) indicate, it is surprising that with the full and intact records available nothing similar has ever been attempted for Bomber Command (Middlebrook & Everitt, 1985). Whatever the reason for this, it had the result that, as Chester Wilmot's 1952 book, *The Struggle for Europe* set the boundaries for the general European strategic debate for the next thirty years, so the American Bombing survey established American credentials as specialized bombing experts almost by default. Recently, the Ultra part of that body of information has become available (Kesaris, 1980), and from this source it can be seen that the dominant power of American "strategic" bombing is founded largely on the immediate speculations of American air propagandists. The idea that its precision capacities were highly developed seem to have been meekly accepted by many Americans. English and other air historians have not strongly questioned this idea.⁸ It is important to note that this does not involve an argument between advocates of precision bombing and area bombing at the core. It is really an argument that American air forces flying to targets that the Germans perceived as vital or strategic, invited air combat, and from *that* would flow "command of the air" consequent on the decimation of the fighter section of the Luftwaffe. Referring to the "Ultra" Report (Kesaris, 1980) it is extraordinary how arguments about command of the air over Germany are interspersed with arguments about how this fight over Germany took air command away from the Luftwaffe on the Russian Front. Furthermore, German speculations about the effect of particular raids are meshed with American speculations about the same things: that is to say, if a raid was supposed to achieve such and such an effect then if the aircraft took off it is almost invariable that that effect is proven to have occurred.⁹ Harris, with his photographs of night bombing, did better than that: indeed he provided

⁷ David Irving himself wrote to *The Times* (7 July 1966) to confirm a high figure of 35,000. As late as 7 March 1985 the 35,000 figure was quoted in a letter from Arsene Okun to the *New York Times*. In that letter Mr. Okun also mentioned the book by Gotz Bergander, *Dresden im Luftkrieg* (Cologne, 1977), and in paper (Verlag, Munich, 1979), which provides much information on the raid from the German viewpoint.

⁸ In Vol. 4 of Frankland and Webster (1961), (Annex 1 of *Annex and Appendices*, entitled "The British and United States Surveys of the Strategic Bombing Offensive", pp. 40-56, the authors give a complicated account of the British and American evaluation techniques. They do not come to strong conclusions, but do reveal that Churchill was averse to the British Air Force producing a comparable document to the U.S. Survey. On the other hand MacIsaac frankly states that controversy "has subsequently evolved on the question of the degree of accuracy attained by 'precision bombing'. Looking back, it would appear that the term precision bombing represented an unhappy choice of words for the level of capability attainable in the 1940's"... The "choice of words offered more than could be delivered in the event, thereby contributing to both controversy and — in this case unnecessary — confusion." See U.S.S.B. Survey, preface to vol. III, p. viii-ix.

evidence of his own Command's limitations as a strike force. The Strategic Bombing Survey has the opposite object and achieves what it sets out to do. Of course the USAF played a large part in stretching the German Air Force, but so did the Russians, the Royal Navy, the Mediterranean Front, the Scandinavian Front, and, of course, the persistent attacks of Bomber Command. Quite apart from questions of morality and target utility it is difficult to determine whether the interdiction of parts and fuel moving to squadrons of the German Air Force was more due to attacks on communications centres (cities) than it was to direct attacks on refineries and oil fields. Cumulatively there can be no doubt but that Germany's pressing need to defend its cities contributed to the total stretching of German resources which was the best help that could be given the Russians who were, after all, the ones who defeated the Wehrmacht. This paragraph is merely to show that the argument between "precision" and "area" bombing is mostly a sham. The only question that any moralist or indeed realist can ask, once air war and bombing has begun is, what determined target selection, terror, or military purposes (with communications, strategic supplies, and the attempt to secure 'command of the air' over Germany) is included in the term 'military'? The choice was not, as will be shown, clear cut. But it was largely determined by past thinking about bombing policy.

(As an aside it may be suggested that what tends to distinguish the anti-nuclear from the anti-war people nowadays is the numbers game. Moral revulsion rises at the prospect of the whole human race frying in a couple of hours. It is the threat to us, not to the supposed enemy, that brings crowds of liberals out into the streets. It's a point worth digesting. World hunger does not really hit home, media or not, because it is still them and not us. Is it not so? Even the threat to us is believed by only a minority of the population, when the risk of nuclear warfare is being debated.)

Back to the conventional material. Who said anything against the bombing of Germany during the war? I discovered that George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, had asked, in the House of Lords, what the Government thought they were doing at this mass bombing game. He was supported by Lord Lang, the ex-Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords, (*Debates*, 9, February, 1944). Bell also carefully distanced himself from any idea of attacking the bombing of military targets, or of the airmen who were the agents of the Government. But he thought the idea that to strike an industry justified the obliteration of a city somewhat out of proportion. He asked whether or not "old German towns" might not be next attacked. Archbishop Lord Lang supported Bell and argued against the tendency to "gloat" over the capacity for retaliation, which, he said, showed "real moral deterioration." Viscount Carnborne, replying for the Government, denied

⁹ Kasaris (1980) gives an example of how flights over Rumania were supposed to have produced massive effects. This report is, in fact, replete with examples of the optimistic reading of evidence. MacIsaac (1976) carefully states that the lack of competent historians hampered the ability of the Survey's authors to assess 'evidence'.

deliberate terror, and promised no abatement due to the duty to "our own people, their allies, and to the world. (Cheers)" Richard Stoke M.P. (1943) also spoke out. He said, among other things, "we have forgotten our aim, the preservation of civilization." Similarly, Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1942) questioned the wisdom of the Government's policy. He thought that Churchill should consider that bombing (and blockade) "tend to leave a deeper scar, and have a more degrading effect, on civilized life, than what has been experienced in any modern war." He thought blitzkrieg, conceived as an army-air military support system, was humane by comparison. This was not his only assault on such methods and writing after the war, Hart (1947), stated that the mass bombing "inevitably produced a deepening danger to the relatively shallow foundations of civilized life." Neither Bell nor Liddell Hart were then popular for their views, but both are remembered for them now, with honour — in some quarters.

All that the proponents of air power had to offer was that the bombing shortened the war by smashing at industrial targets and specialized industries; that the invasion would have been impossible without it; and by some it was argued that the war would have been over if the bombing had been supported as a priority weapon and Harris had been allowed to go all out (Saward, 1984).

Frankland and Webster (1961 Vol III) came down on the side of the idea that the invasion needed the air support, but they refrained from estimating its total effect, cautiously stating that the bombers produced "indispensable military advantages" for the invading armies. Like Harris himself the authors seem to have been unhappy with estimating army support effects. The fact was that the bombers were never entirely moved from a strategic to an army support role. *The American Strategic Bombing Survey*, which had become available shortly after the war, claimed that terror bombing was, and had proved to be, much overvalued and that specialized target bombing did the most to cripple German industry, and bring on the final victory (1945). Frankland and Webster (1961) agreed with this partially, but claimed that the capability of both British and American bombing forces precluded this pinpoint accuracy before 1944, when the invasion was made a priority for support bombing by the Supreme Command and when the Norden bombsight became generally available to the RAF. Their argument was that bombing competence was a product of a developing skill and technology. Certainly an argument that bombers were all that the British had to offer in 1942, had strength. Heavy bombers had begun to roll off the production lines in numbers at the precise moment when the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was producing crews in numbers, and when Mr. Churchill felt the greatest pressure due to the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*. Furthermore the British felt the need, then, to offer their new allies something in the way of offensive capability. At that precise time Harris, not yet chief of Bomber Command, was in the United States. He was there at the same time as the Prime Minister, and he did have a plan of attack! (Saward, 1984). War is, as

General Wolfe once put it, an option of difficulties. It was not an open option of clear *available* choices. No matter what the consequences, and to the very last days of the war, Harris (in Kesaris 1980) stuck to his terror bombing plan. He was a hard man to convince.

Harris did have his engaging side. This was revealed in his unshakeable conviction that in total war all means were necessary, and that if the Germans had won he would have been hanged as a war criminal. No doubt! And his crews would have been condemned as the equivalent of the SS. In a way the crews sensed this. It is possible that the solidarity of his Command in the face of exceptionally heavy losses had something to do with a sort of complicity in unpleasant work. That is a speculation that will be unpalatable to many, and nothing more than a speculation.¹⁰

There has been no attempt here to dwell on the fact that when targets were selected in the last months of the war it meant devastation on a vast scale. It was the *scale* of the destruction in the final months of the war that made even Churchill recoil somewhat (Saward, 1984). The photos of the German cities bombed provide clear examples of this. I am not attempting to state that the Germans as a people did not invite much of what they received. Their own methods do not bear much close scrutiny. Revenge was not, however, the avowed purpose of the Allied governments. The purpose was to win the war, notwithstanding Richard Stokes' (1943) remark about "civilization". It is more interesting to reflect that for almost fifteen years *after* the war the number of commentators who even *raised* moral or practical questions concerning mass bombing in World War II could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Why?

Partly, no doubt, it was because the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by their very power of destruction in relation to their size, had obliterated the memory of previous methods. Also it was due to the fact that, both from the point of view of effectiveness, and from *the point of view* of bomber casualties (to our own crews), it raised unpleasant questions. Winston Churchill (as referred to by Saward, 1984), no stranger to bearing responsibility, felt it necessary to duck this burden though privately he recognized Harris' contribution to the war effort. Yet the restraint in public recognition was marked by many. He shunned Harris, and he avoided a real appraisal of the subject in his books. Churchill was certainly not over-anxious to give emphasis to the bombing campaign as the war concluded. He stopped the official survey from going forward (Frankland & Webster, 1961). This is surely not surprising! The effect was debatable. The crew casualties were high 55,000 killed; 8,403 wounded and 9,838 prisoners of war (Middlebrook & Everitt, 1985). The destructive results were horrendous. This was not encouraging material for a political apologist to work with!

In this context it must be noted that for many years after the war, the moral question of whether it was right to terror-bomb whole cities was not

¹⁰ Suggested by John Keegan, R.M.A., Sandhurst, on a public occasion.

seriously raised. When Harry Truman had to make the decision about destroying Japanese cities with nuclear weapons, he had *at least* the ability to state that he would be able to save lives on both sides, even if they were American military lives at the expense of the deaths of Japanese, both civilian and military. Churchill agreed with Truman. Even Leonard Cheshire, the distinguished R.A.F. airman who flew with the Americans as an observer, did not object *at the time* (Boyle 1955). Churchill's use of the bomber weapon, although it caused as much destruction, did not even have the luxury of that clear cut choice. At any rate the morality of bombing cities in a mass way was never the premier question, but I say this in the belief that Churchill, if I read him at all correctly, must have found the choice agonizing. Liddell Hart would doubtless have questioned this judgment, as other historians may, on the grounds that it ascribes too much in the way of humanist scruple to Churchill. This is a subject too complex for easy judgment, and I simply record that this view is controversial. What else could he wage war with, — before the Americans were invasion capable?

Let us pause and go back to before the war. In World War II, when it broke out, what was to have been expected? The Germans had used population bombing against London in 1916-17. The results were unpleasant. The population was nervous (Fredette, 1966). The 'experts' interpreted this to mean that weight of attack would smash morale. After World War I it was widely believed by exponents of Air Power in the United Kingdom that "the bomber would always get through" and that the terror resulting would swiftly break an urban people's will to resist. This became, along with the Italian Douhet's theoretical backing, Royal Air Force doctrine (Siersson quoted by Fredette, 1966). They tried it within the British Empire. If peoples in the Arabian Desert, or on the North-West frontier of India, resisted a call for apology for some "outrage", then the airmen bombed their tents, flocks and waterholes. This had an effect that tremendously encouraged submission to the forces of "civilization". Airmen remembered how effective this had been! Arthur Harris was involved in developing this technique in Mesopotamia in 1922. Its financial and practical advantages are described in Seward (1984). It has been suggested in a recent and most perceptive study that this testing ground was partly responsible for not only the survival of the RAF as an independent entity, but also for its tendency to identify offensive capability with the bomber and not with a more balanced force (Cox, 1985). It is even more remarkable that it was Winston Churchill, in his capacity as Colonial Secretary in the Lloyd George coalition government, who supported the use of air forces in such a way, *and* that he supported it mainly on the grounds of saving money and sparing British men. On that grounds it was effective. It is also interesting to note that when reports reached Churchill of women and children being strafed in a lake where they had withdrawn for safety, he condemned the brutality without stifling the method (Cox, 1985). The first Labour Government did not change this money-saving situation, although

that redoubtable M.P. George Lansbury acted as the conscience of the nation when he stated that the Air Minister and his department were "the lineal descendents of the Huns", and Cox (1985) went on to say:

I know there is a sort of feeling that a coloured person is of less value than a white person, but I do not think so. I think you are baby killers, and inhuman baby killers, whether you kill a black baby or a white baby. I do not see any difference. I think that one is a crime and the other is a crime.

The point was that terror bombing was perceived to work. Charles Portal, who was to play a major role in the second war bombing, told the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1932 that "criticism of police bombing was 'well meaning but ill-informed'" (Cox, 1985).

When the rearmament campaign began after 1935 it was immediately apparent that air would get a substantial slice of the defence budget. In fact it got a healthy 40 percent, *and it maintained that ratio of procurement until 1945!* (Millward, 1985). It is interesting to note that when a joint services committee was set up in 1936 to study *defensive measures against enemy attack*, they credited the German air planners with a horrendous ruthlessness in respect to air bombing. In Manfred Messerschmidt's yet unpublished paper, "Industrialisierte Krieg und Völkerrecht in den beiden Weltkriege", he states that the British were programmed to use mass bombing in such a way that it is not accurate to state that it was merely a response to an enemy that was National Socialist. (Used with permission.) They estimated 400 tons of bombs a day for two weeks would be dumped on the United Kingdom in either attempts at interdiction of food supplies or terror, and on balance they leaned to the notion that the Germans would favour the latter, due to their supposed temperament. Outlining the defensive measures the committee, chaired by Arthur Harris, refused to assign priorities, but opined that without the threat of bomber retaliation for both terror and interdiction other defence measures would prove to be inadequate (Philips, Bart and Harris 1936 also, RAF Narrative). Three things are to be noted here. The first is the evidence that if terror was available a foe would use it, secondly that the best antidote was counter-terror, and third the underlying assumption was that terror would work.

Of course when the war began, in the days before France fell, Bomber Command was no more physically able to deliver accurate counter-terror than the Germans were to initiate it (Watt, 1975). The bomber argument was largely frustrated, to the chagrin of the Air leaders, by civilian officials (Watt, 1965). The priority was just switched to the marriage of fighters with radar in time to allow the "Few" to work effectively in the Battle of Britain. Meanwhile, as Donald Cameron Watt says, trenchantly, "For nearly twenty years the Air Force High Command had been preaching a strategy without reference to its operational possibilities, a strategy of the Emperor's clothes being preferred to one of cutting one's coat to fit the available cloth (Watt, 1975).

Airmen in fact believed what they wanted. In Spain the horrors of Guernica were remembered, but the fact that the Republicans did not

submit easily to air terror was not. The point was made in the Paris papers by the most famous French aviator of the time, Antoine de St. Exupery, but it was not digested. His biographer (Cate, 1970) writes:—

Years before the analysts, the statisticians, and the autopsists of the Second World War were to proclaim what the Goerings and the Bomber Harris were too obtuse to understand, what the Curtis Lemays and their ilk have never been able to fathom, Saint Exupery had put his finger on the pathetic futility of mass bombardments. 'A moral role? But a bombardment is self-thwarting. It defeats its very purpose. Each shellburst in Madrid provokes a gradual hardening. What was wobbly indifference stiffens. A dead child matters when it is yours. A bombardment, it seemed to me, does not disperse: it unifies. Horror induces a clenching of the fists, a closing of ranks in the same shared shudder. . . . Madrid is there, taking its blows in silence. But so it is with man: hardships slowly fortify their virtues.'

We now look back at Warsaw and Rotterdam as moral outrages. No doubt; and the Germans were capable of much more than that. Nevertheless, militarily speaking, it was the defeat of the Polish Army, not the bombing of Warsaw, that defeated the Poles. Rotterdam was bombed as part of the military offensive and, it was claimed, as a "mistake" after the city had surrendered, and had no real campaign significance. The Battle of Britain was *militarily* important in the war; the Battle of London was not. There was moral outrage against the Germans for the Blitz, but it was accepted, as St. Exupery had predicted it would be. The British certainly had no doubt about what they wanted to do to Germany. Despite the scale of their effort they failed to conquer by terror and achieved a debatable success in the strategic or military sense, as any reader of Speer's (1970) diary knows. To be sure Speer thought that concentrated simultaneous attacks on all ball-bearing factories would have brought German industry to its knees. He was ambivalent towards the effect of area bombardment. I am not suggesting here that the Germans have hesitated to obliterate London if they had had the power. I am not advocating German morality as opposed to British. I am simply saying that the moral indifference to mass bombing was international, and also that, until Hiroshima, it was based on the questionable premise of efficiency.

Two other aspects remain. The first is the fact that the British Government was more concerned to give an impression of reasonable behaviour than it was to carefully delineate important targets. Perhaps the nature of the weapons available and the slow progress towards their most efficient use dictated strategy, but Churchill considered the ramifications of terror bombing and deliberately chose it. Discussed many times in British decision making circles. However, specifically, on 30 October 1940, Churchill declared in the War Cabinet, for bombing "military targets", yet at the same time "the civilian population around target areas must be made to feel the weight of the war." The War Cabinet approved what they specifically termed "the Prime Minister's Proposal." To say the least of it Harris did not try to dissuade him. It was only the shock waves of Dresden that caused Churchill to cringe a little. Harris did not cringe (Saward, 1984). I think, however, that enough has been said here so that one can see

that it was a whole background of theory and practice that developed the mind-set with which the air war was fought. In this sense Harris was a proponent and agent of an accepted way of waging air war, and it is manifestly unfair to saddle him with special moral approbrium, when manifestly he was merely carrying out the wish of his countrymen, both in Whitehall and in the streets, when the subject is looked at from a national point of view.

For it cannot be too strongly emphasized that very few objected in public. I have named them in England. In my country, Canada, Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, thought that more airmen waging war by terror would have saved many lives and money for Canada (King, 1942). The Minister of State for air, Mr. Power, stated that the matter had never been discussed in Canada's wartime Cabinet.¹¹ There was a consensus. No Canadian churchmen objected.¹² When Cologne got its 1000 bomber raid in 1942 the *Globe and Mail* stated that it was a good way to deal with that "Hunnish hive". It also said that of the 1000 Canadians thought to have assisted in that precedent making operation, none, "we may be sure, shirked their duty!"¹³ No doubt!

To quote Vonnegut (1971)

'It *had* to be done', Rumfoord told Billy, speaking of the destruction of Dresden.

'I know', said Billy.

'That's war.'

'I know. I'm not complaining.'

'It must have been hell on the ground.'

'It was,' said Billy Pilgrim.

'Pity the poor men who had to *do* it.'

'I do.'

'You must have had mixed feelings, there on the ground.'

'It was all right,' said Billy. '*Everything* is all right, and everybody has to do exactly what he does....'

So it goes.

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¹¹ Personal Conversation with Mr. Power.

¹² Based on information provided by Ben Greenhous, of the Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, Canada, who has looked for it.

¹³ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 1 June 1942, editorial entitled "City by City." 60. Vonnegut (1971), p. 198.

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ADDITIONAL PRESENTERS UNDER TOPIC II ABSTRACTS

ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SRI LANKA — METHODS OF RESOLUTION: AN APPROACH PAPER

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ABSTRACT

The current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is as old as its history (more than two millennium) and although latent during the British colonial rule was given impetus during this period. The independent Sri Lanka with its colonial legacy is facing a grave crisis as a unitary British model parliamentary system. Several thousands have lost their lives and the economy is seriously affected. This paper explores the possible short-term and long-term solutions and suggests a viable way out.

BEYOND WORLD PEACE

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ABSTRACT

World peace can be achieved; however, 1) the prevailing flawed view of aggression and conflict as intrinsic to human

nature must be corrected; 2) religion cannot be ignored; 3) universal acceptance of the oneness of mankind is essential 4) world order must be established; 5) issues, such as racism, disparity between rich and poor, unbridled nationalism, religious strife, emancipation of women, and universal education must be resolved. But, beyond peace, unification of all peoples in one family is the ultimate goal for the development of humanity.

SEPARATISM AND REGIONAL CONFLICT IN CANADIAN SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

Separatist movements represent severe challenges to nation-states most typically because they are organized around ethnic differences. In Canadian society, the geographic concentration of the francophone population in the province of Quebec has fuelled strong separatist sentiment.

Less well-known are other separatist activities in other regions of the society (such as in Western Canada in 1980-81) where ethnicity as a differentiating factor was absent. Separatism is discussed as a bargaining tool to overcome economic imbalances, and as a response to regional alienation and intrasocietal conflicts.

THEATRE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ON THE COMMUNITY LEVEL IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Inter- and intra-communal tensions (rooted in class, clan, ethnicity regionalism and party and religious affiliation) have been major obstacles to the success of development programmes. In a number of experimental projects in Africa (Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Kenya), community and theatre workers have joined forces to use theatre as a means of objectifying issues, and to motivate both rural and urban people to participate in self-help programmes, cooperatives, adult literacy schemes and public health campaigns. By reference to the projects in East and Southern Africa, this paper proposes to offer the application of theatrical methods as an effective catalyst in the reunification of fractured communities.

TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION; A CASE STUDY OF A SOUTH INDIAN VILLAGE

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ABSTRACT

Conflict resolution as the socially accepted mode of regulating the expression of innate aggression denotes prevention of the conflict, that is to say one party imposing injury both verbal and physical upon the other, and secondly restoration of sense of amicability by means of appeal to social image of village. At non-institutional level, this operates in the form one party adjusting with the other (internal) and secondly in the form of interference of the third party (external). The traditional society of Palaiyurpatti village has built up a value system and culture in which conflicts are limited from within. The classical example would be the ability of wives to adjust with their husbands. The internal factors limit conflicts.

SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT

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ABSTRACT

The Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 and has therefore had great difficulty in being included in Middle East peace negotiations. Israel, which favours bilateral talks with Arab states, opposes any significant Soviet role. However, the Soviet Union has made many overtures to Israel in order to gain access to the negotiations. This paper will examine Soviet-Israeli secret diplomacy since 1967, emphasizing Soviet peace proposals for resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THROUGH PRO-EXISTENCE TO CO-EXISTENCE

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ABSTRACT

Theme: The earth and her resources belong to *all* people, none can choose where to be born; fortunate and advanced nations must share their abundance and technology; hunger and war can and must be eliminated.

Focus: Transnational Corporations, their exploitation of, and adverse effect on, developing nations. People to pressure their governments through peaceful means, to restrain Transnational Corporations' power, to emphasize their co-responsibility for peoples' needs and progress.

NORTHERN IRELAND: INTER-ETHNIC GROUP VIOLENCE AND THE RECORD OF RESOLUTION SINCE 1968

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ABSTRACT

Confronted by two diametrically opposed perspectives on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, i.e. Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist, successive Westminster administrations since October 1968 have attempted to effect a durable and equitable resolution to the inter-ethnic group violence in Northern Ireland. All initiatives have failed.

Several distinct phases, crucial incidents and explanations for failure are identifiable. These all have implications for the future prospects of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.

ONE WORLD ALIVE AND THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

When nations regard others as adversaries, they seek security by increasing military means. In a world linked by communications, transport and geography, the latest weapons threaten the security of us all.

To survive, humanity must change from the adversarial approach to an "interdependent community" world view, and must act accordingly. Conflicts can be resolved in ways that satisfy the needs of all parties for security, recognition and justice.

A POLICY FOR A SCIENTIFIC POLITICAL PARTY

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ABSTRACT

Nowhere is there a political party that has been commenced to offer an alternative to East-West conflict. The paper envisages two main international political parties, an International Scientific Party and an International Peoples' Party, in symbiotic relation of equal importance at all times, within the framework of a World Parliament. Both energy and financial analyses are required to better assess detailed public policies.

BEYOND CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO PREVENTION: THE FIRST AUSTRALIANS

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I will argue that the Australian Aborigines devised institutional means for preventing the outbreak of major conflict on both a horizontal and a vertical plane. By this I mean that their clan-federative system on the one hand and their section system on the other prevented the emergence of ethnic and class violence. Seemingly paradoxically to the Western mind, this was accomplished by accentuating rather than "tearing down" boundaries.

THE POTENTIAL FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS IN IMPROVING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS

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ABSTRACT

It is apparent that there are strong differences in the approaches of psychologists in the USSR and the USA. The latter seem to stress unconscious forces, insights, and individual motivations, whereas the former take a systems approach that is biological, but under rational control, with great emphasis on the social context and the place of the individual in society. Psychologists of both cultures could interact to identify differences and discover commonalities, in order that each would understand the dynamics of its own group through the view of the other. Cross cultural perspectives are needed, since each may be misperceiving the values of the other. For example, does each need an enemy? Are there superiority/inferiority complications? It is recommended that healthy leadership become a focus rather than "looking on the dark side", and that the issues should be seen at the level of human potential. The analogy of the family could be used as a model for interpreting the relationships.



83 Dr Ivan Ivanov and Dr Douglas Corey.

TOPIC III: ECONOMIC FACTORS IN RELATIONSHIP TO CONFLICT

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A NEW VISION: AN ESSENTIAL STEP TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR PEACE

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ABSTRACT

While the industrially advanced societies are materially rich there is much evidence of serious system failure: unmet human needs, unemployment, resource depletion and pollution. Such domestic problems are obstacles to a reduction in international conflict. The Human Service Society is a vision of a political gratifying employment without endangering the liveability of earth. It is informed by the goal of reducing Western resource consumption and making possible ecologically balanced development for human needs satisfaction in the third world and is therefore a political economy of peace.

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK — A SCENARIO

The meeting was held in late January. In attendance were the leaders of most peace organizations in the US, bringing together for the first time anti-interventionists, the Freeze, and church activists. Also present were a couple of angels; one was the widow of the founder of a large department store chain, the other owned several television stations. Legitimately concerned with the arms buildup, they agreed to bankroll the effort.

A grand political strategy was devised: Political action committees

would be organized in every congressional district, every election contested. The best techniques would be used: sophisticated polling, direct mail pitches for contributions, and persuasive television and radio advertising.

The movement subjected incumbents to a rigorous test in return for endorsement and support: a pledge to vote for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, cuts in military spending, adoption of a strict policy of non-intervention in other countries conflicts, legislation banning overt or covert transfers of funds, by government or private individuals, for the purpose of weapons acquisition, and a time-table for the negotiated elimination of NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances.

The movement had considerable "success." A near majority of incumbents in Congress suddenly discovered they were for peace and were returned to Washington with the movement's participation. There were great expectations for the next session. Though not all its demands were met a considerable number were and on those that it could not win the movement was able to frustrate the administration's efforts. It confidently looked forward to the next election and the consolidation of its position. Perhaps even the Presidency could be won.

It was not to be. Just four months after the new Congress was sworn in came the first set back: Confident of non-action by the US, a coalition of debtor nations declared a moratorium on interest payments. It was not an impetuous move but had been planned for quite awhile. Though the banks threatened the suspension of new loans, the debtors followed through, prepared for that eventuality with complementary import substitution strategies and region trade plans.

The central bankers were paralyzed, not knowing what to do. Hundreds of financial institutions were forced to declare tens of billions of dollars in loans as non-performing and faced bankruptcy. The indecision of the monetary authorities initially resulted in a large contraction of the money supply and a dramatic slowdown in the economy. When a decision was finally made to guarantee the loans the subsequent increase in the money supply sent prices up dramatically.

It might have been manageable had the crisis not been compounded by other events. Seeing how the US had reacted to the debt situation gave courage to revolutionary forces in the Middle East and a civil war broke out in a country that was a major supplier of oil to the West. Its exports were cut by three quarters. This exacerbated the inflation and brought the return of gasoline lines. After that revolutions seemed to happen everywhere — cutting access to other strategic materials and reducing trade.

Soon, the militarist politicians and intellectuals, whom the movement believed it had sent to the dustbin of history, were back, emerging from the refuge of conservative think tanks with their predictable calls for weapons programmes and the willingness to use power. Allied with fundamentalist churches they organized mass support for a renewed commitment for defending American interests and a rearmament programme unprecedented in history. The next election was no contest...

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Peace cannot be attained by good feelings, it requires sustained political action and coherent planning. The politics cannot be top-down and centralized, it must involve people actively participating at every level. They must be included in defining peace and in the development and implementation of strategy and tactics.

Some define peace as the absence of overt force or threats. Our definition is more stringent — it requires the elimination of "structural" violence. Our formulation of stable peace is congruent with that of the World Order Models Project (WOMP): Peace requires the solution of five interrelated problems — large scale collective violence, poverty, injustice, environmental imbalance and alienation (Falk, 1975). Our objective in this paper is the identification of a security doctrine and a complementary economic vision which will permit and encourage advancement towards the attainment of peace.

There are at least as many security paths as there are definitions of peace. Johan Galtung identifies four: conflict resolution, balance of power (terror), disarmament and "alternative security policies" which include transarmament to "defensive defense," inner strength, and outer usefulness (Galtung, 1984). In our own analysis of the American policy debate we also discern four roads to peace. These are: Current US policy, which is "balance of power with a margin of safety" (translation: peace through strength). This has been, to a greater or lesser degree, the goal of US policy since the end of World War II and there is now much nostalgia for those times (eg. Cuban missile crisis) when threats of military power could be used for political gain. Others believe that peace can only be secured through the relinquishment of national war making authority to a supernational agency with police powers (corresponding roughly with Galtung's conflict resolution). Third are those who favour arms control and disarmament, who divide tactically into those who advocate bilateral negotiations (Forsberg, 1984) and those who propose unilateral initiatives (Johansen, 1983). Finally, there are those who would adopt a policy of non-intervention, renunciation of alliances and strict homeland defense (Ravenal, 1980). Some of these are incompatible while others are naturally complementary.

Present US security doctrine and foreign policy are major obstacles to peace. The US regularly intervenes, militarily and through covert action, in the internal affairs of other nations. The interventions are organized in support of repressive regimes which routinely violate human rights but identify with US goals (South Korea, Pakistan, El Salvador, Indonesia, and Thailand are just a few of the most recent examples) and to destabilize and overthrow those governments "hostile" to American interests, eg. Chile, Nicaragua (Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Dixon and Jonas, 1984). The right to intervene is the very foundation of American foreign policy; and while mainstream scholars provide legal defenses (Cutler, 1985) those who question intervention place themselves "beyond the bounds of thinkable thought" (Chomsky, 1985).

The USSR is also an interventionist power, and though there are

asymmetries — America's are worldwide, the Soviet's principally on their borders — it is not our purpose there to argue which is more or less aggressive — the policies of both must be altered for purposes of global security. The logic of an arms race follows from intervention; the size and configuration of superpower nuclear stockpiles are designed not only to prevent a central nuclear exchange but also to deter a conventional conflict and make credible threats of force against third parties. As Forsberg has said, "What drives the arms race is the desire to deter conventional warfare" (Forsberg, 1984). Defense analyst Earl Ravenal, fellow of the libertarian Cato Institute, describes the "deadly connection" well: "America's drift to counterforce nuclear strategies is neither perverse nor accidental... Few realize how intertwined American weapons and strategies are with American commitments" (Ravenal, 1982).

We propose for the US a security doctrine based on non-intervention, negotiated disarmament of all offensive weapons (having counter-value potential) and transition to strict territorial defense. The US should take the initiative by declaring a moratorium on the testing of all *weapons systems* with continuance conditional on the Soviet response.

Such a doctrine will not be easily realized, as our scenario was meant to imply. Intervention follows from the logic of our political economy just as the arms race formidable obstacles to the formulation of an alternative security doctrine, and these must be understood if they are to effectively overcome. Those most recognized by peace scholars are ideology, domestic systems failures, bureaucratic competition, strategic and economic interests. We discuss these briefly. *Ideology* — Militant anti-communism has played an important role in shaping US foreign and military policy, though its influence has waxed and waned. We are now in a period of Cold War II, in which there is a "concerted and sustained attempt by the USA to subordinate the various dimensions of its foreign policy, and that of its allies, to confrontation with the USSR (Halliday, 1983). In the view of the current administration "Soviet expansion has posed the major obstacle to world peace and stability" (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1980). The Soviets are accused of fostering "International terrorism" and plotting the assassination of the Pope.

We believe there must be concern with many aspects of Soviet behaviour and its nil capabilities, but the history the ideologues tell is unconvincing. The US has not reacted to the USSR but initiated the latest round of confrontation. US and NATO decisions to increase defense spending and deploy new Euromissiles preceded the Afghan invasion and even while the powers were negotiating SALT I the US was MIRVing missiles and in other ways upgrading strategic forces, prosecuting the Vietnam War and destabilising Chile. Claims that the Soviets took advantage of SALT and embarked on a geopolitical offensive and an unprecedented arms buildup while the US showed unilateral restraint are contradicted by the facts (Booth and Williams, 1985). Ideology contributes to the trivialization of mass politics and it must be responded to through

education and a deeper understanding of issues. *Domestic System Failure* — There have been three peaks of hostility in US/USSR relations: from the end of WW II to the early 50s, Cold War consolidation during the mid- and late-50s and the later Carter years through Reagan. While anti-communism is a permanent fixture in American politics, these periods are separated by relatively lower levels of confrontation. Our analysis leads us to believe that serious failures in the domestic system contribute to these cycles. The "Soviet Threat" is used to deflect attention from high inflation or high unemployment or otherwise used to generate a sense of shared values, goals and belonging in an alienated and centrifugalized society. A similar argument has been made by Wolfe who argues that the fragmentation of the centre, patterns of economic growth and other domestic factors explain the "rise and fall of the Soviet threat" (Wolfe, 1984).

Bureaucratic Competition — Many individuals and agencies take part in the construction of American foreign policy. Each has its own objectives and sees the national interest through its own (myopic) lens. The result is "bureaucratic politics" where each individual or agency attempts to aggrandize power or at least maintain status and resources. Thus, the competition between the State Department and the National Security Council and the interservice rivalries within Defense, all pressing for larger budgets and greater responsibility. Each request for more resources is justified by a correspondingly increased threat to the security of the US (Russett and Hanson, 1975; Wolfe, 1984).

Strategic Interests — The choices of policy makers are limited by their perceptions of American interests. As Colin Gray, a supporter of peace through strength, puts it, "A defense analyst is not totally at liberty to select a favoured strategic posture and doctrine. The United States does have global commitments" (Gray, 1984). The commitments, however, become universal, encompassing the globe — from the guarantee of European security the commitment extends to the Gulf States and the safeguarding of petroleum supplies, whence on to the protection of sea routes and eventually to minimal interests on the periphery which must be fought for to maintain credibility. The implications of strategic logic are illustrated in the following forthright statement: "In a world becoming smaller every day, the United States cannot protect its interests by drawing an arbitrary line around certain areas and ignoring the rest of the world. No region of the world can be excluded in advance from the agenda of our concern" (Committee on the Present Danger, 1980).

Economic Interests — Economics is a fundamental determinant of US security doctrine, and the requirements of the political economy shape policy in many ways. First, economists and politicians, unwilling to entertain extensive government economic involvement, use a debased "military Keynesianism" to maintain a sufficient level of aggregate demand to keep unemployment within politically tolerable limits. Second, defense spending is lobbied for because the industry is sheltered with profits guaranteed by sole source contracting and cost plus pricing. Though the

profits flow to a few, the lobbying is effective because they *are* concentrated and therefore some have a strong interest in maintaining the spending, while the perceived benefits of spending cuts are diffused. Moreover, it is no secret that there is a considerable exchange of personnel between the industries and the government agencies that procure the weapons. Third, with increasing productivity and the generation of excess capacity the US needs to open and maintain markets in the developing world for American products, and fourth, the US requires stable environments for the investment of capital.

We will not argue here how much each of these factors contributes to the making of policy — all have influence and are mutually reinforcing. Our scenario suggests, however, the importance of domestic politics and economics and that the adoption of an alternative security doctrine by itself is insufficient. In fact, it is a political impossibility. There must be a complementary change in economic policy as well. Ours is a proposal for economic conversion. Conversion is an idea for reducing the dependence of the economy on military spending. It does so by transferring resources from the military to civilian production. Careful attention is given to where and for whom employment is generated in order to protect the workers and communities now dependent on defense work during the transformation, thus reducing resistance to cuts in military spending. If new employment is also generated, social needs are met and the environment protected the potential for a broad coalition exists.

Some detailed plans for conversion of particular companies or industries have been developed (Wainwright and Elliot, 1982) and there is a growing literature on practice and theory (Gordon and McFadden, 1984; Dumas, 1982). The most common approach is the direct conversion of a defense plant into one that makes peaceful products. This is certainly preferable to current spending-priority and input-output analysis demonstrates that it will generate employment increases (Leontief and Duchin, 1983). Nevertheless, it is inadequate as a basis for the transition to an alternative security doctrine or as the foundation for a stable peace. The production would still be only minimally related to human needs and continue to deplete finite resources and pollute the atmosphere. It also does not take into account likely changes in the world economy to which the US must adjust.

Developing nations will seek greater self-reliance, adopt import substitution strategies and as a result world trade in commodities will contract. As more resources are used to raise the living standards of the world's poor, less will be available for the already industrialized. The reduced availability of resources and the contraction of trade in commodities means that much of the capital now invested in military production, and many other industries as well, will become redundant. This is a different challenge, in kind as well as degree, and requires a whole new economic vision for advanced societies, to which we now return.

WHAT IS A VISION?

We call for a new economics as an essential component in a transition to a stable peace. The goal of such an economics is the attainment of a universal quality of life society without endangering the liveability of earth. Key to such a goal is reduction in material consumption in the developed world. Such an economics restricts the production of certain goods and services and encourages the production of others. The logic that determines the incentives and disincentives is the quality of life that is realized on the one hand and the environmental costs incurred on the other. The process by which these decisions are made we call an "ecological theory of value." Since the goal of the economics — quality life — is long range and the economic decisions are made daily, and plan must be guided by a future perspective. This we call a vision.

A vision is not a listing of slogans, nor is it a set of principles or caveats. A vision is a clear and integrated proposal for the future. It is a depiction of society so precise and so detailed that it is possible for everyone to see themselves in it. They see how and where they work, what kind of home they live in, how they transport themselves, what kind of schools they live in and what they do for leisure. A vision is a flexible blueprint — every aspect of life is written into it, but not so indelibly that it cannot be amended by democratic discussion and debate.

THE PURPOSE AND REQUIREMENTS OF A VISION FOR PEACE

America, as a nation, is spinning out of control; it has become a centrifugal society; its centre evacuated to single issue, zero sum politics. The loss of the centre paralyzes. It results in political and personal malaise. Our vision is a tactic to recreate a centre for peace and economic reform. It is intended to be bold and daring and thus to excite, invite counter-proposals, stimulate debate, and to draw new people into politics and induce them to act.

To be effective as a tactic, a vision must be informed by a theory of human decision making. We part company with those "peace activists" who argue that human values must change. There is nothing wrong with human values — poor choice is a consequence, not of poor values, but from a lack of information, or the inability to use information in efficacious ways. Everyone exercises poor judgement when they lack essential knowledge or opportunity for the political expression of values. Human decisions are made, not solely on the basis of values, but on expectations — the perception of likelihood that desirable values can be attained from particular choices of action. Vision, as a tactic attempts to alter perceptions of the future and must satisfy three conditions if it is to be successful. It must be desirable, feasible, and coherently unifying.

— To be desirable a vision must provide what most people want and

need, not what some group of well intentioned authorities, self-proclaimed or otherwise, decide they should want.

— A vision must not only be something people currently want or can be taught to want, as distinct from being indoctrinated or coerced into, it must also be real. It must be achievable with what is currently known and not depend on scientific breakthroughs or intervention from outer space. Ordinary people, using the resources and insights that they have available, must be able to produce it. It is by its feasibility that a vision is distinguished from illusions and delusions.

— To be unifying a vision's appeal must be to everyone. It must hold out the promise of an improvement in the quality of life for the vast majority — the unemployed, underemployed, poorly employed and nonemployed, the victims of discrimination, labour, youth, and aging, consumers and environmentalists. However, to be coherent, it must also be internally consistent. Its logic must be compelling. It cannot offer something to women, something else to minorities, and still something entirely different to environmentalists without showing how all the components connect and fit into an integrated whole.

A vision, as a depiction of the future which guides present choices is integral to any democratic *strategy* for change. There are, however, special requirements for a vision of a United States political economy of peace. They were suggested by the scenario and discussion with which we opened this paper: The economy must be organized for full, fair and gratifying employment that is not dependent on maintaining aggregate demand through military production or access to foreign markets, it must achieve self-reliance in strategic resources through conservation and reduced material consumption, it should include a reduction in trade of commodities and commercial and financial services and an increase in cultural exchanges, there must be strict adherence to democratic processes domestically and moral support for democratic movements abroad, and committed to the satisfaction of all humans' needs and the attainment of universal quality life.

HUMAN NEEDS AND QUALITY OF LIFE

The foundation for our vision is a theory of human needs. The relationship between human needs and international conflict has been recognized by a number of researchers and a recent point of view is that failure of domestic systems to satisfy individuals' needs is a major contributor to international tension (Burton, 1985). The importance of human needs satisfaction to a stable peace informed much of the work of the World Order Models Project (see, for example, pp. 112-113 in Lagos and Godoy, 1977; pp. 17-22 in Falk, 1975).

Perhaps the best and most concrete exposition can be found in the development and peace writings of Johan Galtung. For Galtung human

development is the "sustainable satisfaction and development of human needs so as to facilitate, or at least not impede, the human development of others, with neither under-nor over-consumption of 'satisfiers'." Galtung identifies four broad classes of material and non-material needs: survival needs, well-being needs, identity needs and freedom needs (Galtung, 1980).

For our purposes — the construction of a detailed vision — Galtung's system is useful, but requires greater specificity. There are two dimensions to our framework. Along one axis are those gratifications essential for a fulfilling life. These are: *security, relief from unnecessary pain, competence, belonging, usefulness, understanding, hope, excitement and creativity*. Our second dimension is context. Needs are situation specific and are realized in different ways in different social circumstances. Just as commodities which may have the same apparent substance but are delivered or available at different times or places are treated distinctly in neo-classical economics (Debreu, 1959), so too needs have different meanings and are realized in distinct ways depending on time and place. We identify eight social spheres of activity — arenas of life — where most of us, if not all, spend the better part of our lives. These are: *economic, politics, cultural, recreational, personal relations, educational, medical, transit*. Putting these elements along the respective axes of a matrix we get what we call the Quality of Life Matrix. The goal of our vision is a society in which each person can see how his or her needs are satisfied in all arenas of life.

THE VISION OF THE HUMAN SERVICE SOCIETY

Our vision is of a post-technical society in which social and economic life is organized to meet human need. We call our vision a Human Service Society because the principle activity is humans assisting other humans to achieve quality life. A major goal of the vision is the substitution of human service in every arena of life for energy now derived from fossil fuels, hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants and is designed to allow people to regain control over their lives which has been lost to a runaway dependence on technology and experts.

We certainly believe that goods are important — to a point. There is no question that quality life requires extraction from the earth — foods, metals, petroleum — and manufacturing — houses, communication devices, clothes, transportation vehicles and even some trinketry. However, once a sufficient amount of quality goods have been produced for everyone's needs to be met, any further production is environmentally wasteful, denies opportunity for development of poorer countries, and binds the United States to a policy of intervention.

The Human Service Society is best described in terms of its work. Just how much employment do we propose? What is the nature of the work? Which occupations would grow and which decline? Who would work and how will they be educated and trained? How would our future differ

from official projection and how does it contrast with current employment?

In the future we propose opportunity would exist for every American to be employed at compensated work. More specifically, a Human Service Society in the year 1995 calls for nearly 210 million human service career opportunities, a near doubling of employment in just ten years. Much of the work is part time — still as full-time equivalents the employment would equal 142 million, over thirty five million more than currently working and nearly ten million more than the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) forecasts. The increase in opportunities is more than enough to eliminate unemployment, but it does much more.

Tens of millions of persons are presently not counted in the labour force. Some are excluded because they are officially too young (under sixteen). For many others it is supposed that they do not want to work. Not counted are twenty million young people between the ages of 16 and 24, nearly 30 million persons over the age of fifty five and an addition 20 million women. Our vision includes them all — old, young, handicapped or disabled there is a place. Young people are able to phase into work, the aging to phase out. Child and other dependent care is offered, removing an obstacle that prevents many women, parents and those caring for an aging parent, from working.

The contrast between our plan and current and projected employment is even more dramatic when we compare by occupational distribution. Currently, about one quarter of American workers could generously be described as offering an, often deformed, human service. We include in our estimate lawyers and judges, teachers, health practitioners, mail carriers, librarians, firemen, police, in-home providers of day care, bus drivers, barbers, dry cleaners, tailors, waiters and even Big Mac wrappers. The other three quarters are making, selling and servicing things: They are in manufacturing, construction, mining, agriculture, finance, real estate, transportation, wholesale and resale, public utilities, services to the automobile (an inefficient and expensive human service perhaps), and public administration (which should be a human service, but is rarely perceived as such). The BLS forecast calls for growth in some human service and declines in others, with increases for occupational and physical therapists and legal assistants and decreases for postal workers and university and college faculty.

In our alternative human service dominates — far more than fifty percent of employment is in human services with much of the increase of employment attributed to education, care of the young, health care, care of the aging, research, public transit, culture and recreation (see Table 1).

These statistics, while they provide a good overview of our vision and its underlying logic, by themselves are inadequate to describe the Human Service Society. If we are to be persuasive then you need something to hold. Consequently, we turn now to a qualitative description of the Human Service Society with sketches of some of its most salient features and programmes.

TABLE 1: OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
BUREAU LABOUR PROJECTION versus HUMAN SERVICE SOCIETY
1995
UNITED STATES
 (Population aged 16 and over 199,300,000)

	<i>BLS*</i>				<i>Human Services</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>FTE#</i>	<i>Percent</i>
	<i>(millions)</i>		<i>(millions)</i>		<i>(millions)</i>	
Total Work Force	142.8	100%	210.9	100%	142.3	100%
Total Unemployed	8.7	6.0	1.0		.6	
All Occupations	134.2	94.0	209.9	99.9+	141.7	99.0+
All Professional and						
Technical	21.8	15.3	57.9	27.7	41.2	29.2
(Health Services)	(7.5)	(5.9)	(15.0)	(7.1)	(11.0)	(7.8)
(Teachers)	(4.7)	(3.4)	(20.0)	(9.5)	(14.0)	(9.9)
(Computer Specialists)	(.9)	(.1)	(1.0)		(.6)	
(Social Specialist)	(.3)		(1.0)		(.6)	
(Engineers, etc)	(3.8)	(2.8)	(7.0)	(3.3)	(5.0)	(3.5)
(Writers, Artists, etc.)	(.4)		(4.0)	(1.9)	(3.0)	(2.1)
(Accountants)	(1.2)	(.9)	(.5)		(.4)	
(Lawyers, etc.)	(.8)	(.1)	(.4)		(.3)	
(Social Workers)	(.4)		(3.0)	(1.4)	(2.3)	(1.6)
(Recreational Workers)	(1.2)	(.9)	(6.0)	(2.8)	(4.0)	(2.8)
Managers & Administrators	12.2	8.5	9.0	4.2	7.0	4.9
Sales	8.8	6.2	15.0	7.1	11.0	7.7
Clerical (Inc Mail)	24.0	16.8	12.0	5.7	8.0	5.6
Craft & Kindred	14.8	10.4	25.0	11.9	16.0	11.3
Operatives	15.4	10.8	12.0	5.7	8.0	5.6
Services Workers	27.7	19.3	49.0	23.0	32.0	22.6
Labourers (except Farm)	7.1	5.0	10.0	4.8	6.5	4.6
Farmers & Farm Labour	2.4	1.7	20.0	9.5	12.0	8.5

* Monthly Labour Review November 1983 — Projections to 1995

Full Time Equivalent of 40 hours per week

Less than .05 percent

Transit — The automobile is a major contributor to international conflict. Its operation in the United States accounts for nearly fifty percent of petroleum use, more than all the oil America imports yearly. This does not take into account the energy used to manufacture the cars, or to build and maintain roads. The auto is a major consumer of many other strategic resources — as much as 20 percent of steel and iron castings, 68 percent of lead, 33 percent of zinc, 9 percent of copper and aluminium and 65 percent of rubber (Barnett, 1980). The automobile, because of its need for oil, binds the United States to the support of unstable and often repressive regimes. It is the impetus for the creation of the interventionary Rapid Deployment

Force. More than anything else, it was the experience of waiting on gas lines after the Iranian revolution that transformed the Vietnam experience from a lesson learned to a syndrome to be overcome.

In the Human Service Society the problems of the automobile are not solved, they are eliminated. Ours is a vision of a society no longer dependent on the private operation of the automobile made possible through the alternative of high quality public transit coordinated with economic disincentives for ownership and operation of motor vehicles. Such a system cannot be imposed, it must be introduced by democratic action and that means on every variable of comparison it must be superior to the car. It must be more secure, comfortable, economic, convenient, understandable and dependable.

The primary means by which such a system comes into being is services. Such a system has portal-to-portal escorts for the elderly, the handicapped and even persons travelling with young children. It has information providers, child care, attendants to assist persons on and off the system. The hardware of the system would be light and heavy rail along major corridors and arterials, and as the system attenuates and serves fewer people smaller vehicles — propane powered minibuses, jitneys, taxis and rent-a-cars — are used. The trolleys and trains have special cars for food, entertainment, reading, and working. Such a system reverses a half decade of ill-advised policies that have reduced services and substituted machines and technology for people in the operation of public transit with a consequent loss in security and understandability. Transit is one reason we propose 49 million service workers (32 million full-time equivalents).

Artists and Writers in Residence — As technology becomes more and more pervasive in modern society the opportunities for individuals to participate actively in culture diminish. Radios, television, audio and video recorders and players seduce us into increasingly passive lifestyles in which competence is possible only for a few "superstars". A healthy culture is a pluralistic culture in which all persons have the opportunity to participate. The Human Service Society provides that opportunity and also assistance to do so.

One element in that effort is a programme to support one million artists and writers in residence in schools, neighbourhoods centres, community colleges, hospitals, nursing homes, large housing projects, seniors' centres and rural communities through grants to these institutions. The artists and writers are chosen at the residence by elected boards. The support extends from part to full time. Included among the artists are painters, sculptors, dancers, actors, directors, musicians, composers, singers, photographers, architects and any other plastic or performing art. The writers might be authors of fiction, exposition, journalism, poetry, humour, drama, science or utopian fiction. The recipients have considerable latitude to use their stipends to pursue their own creative activity, but they are required to give periodic shows or readings of their work. Additionally, they are community resources — they act as instructors, coaches,

facilitators, directors, schedulers, etc. assisting others to become active participants in cultural activity.

Some special grants are available to support exchanges between communities to encourage diversity and pluralism where it is lacking. The artists and writers program also includes an exchange programme with other countries. The foreign exchange programme allows artists and writers to apply for competitive grants to live, study and work abroad and also supports foreign artists and writers to come to the United States. Priority is given to exchanges with developing and Eastern bloc nations.

Support for Active Participation in Constructive Leisure — Supporting constructive leisure is among the priorities in the Human Service Society. It begins with construction of athletic facilities, theatres, studios, community centres, museums, playgrounds, urban parks and wilderness areas. More important is subsidization of supportive services and staff to supervise and assist persons to become competent at sports, dance, theatre, crafts (sewing, knitting, crocheting, pottery, woodworking), etc. The staffs include instructors, equipment and business managers, facilitators, coaches. On any given night one has a multitude of choices of activities to participate in: several nights one may act in a community theatre production, another night there's basketball practice for the neighbourhood co-ed, under six foot team, and still another night takes music lessons in a small group or just listens to the neighbourhood symphony play.

Family Services — A factor which prevents many persons from working or participating in leisure activities is availability. Another is access. Access for many, mostly women, is limited because of in-home responsibilities, for example for care of a young or aged dependent (though often it means a "dual career" one compensated for and the other not). The most far-reaching change in America has been the rapid increase of women's participation in the labour force. While the trend may slow it will continue. A second major change is the greying of America. Both represent new challenges and responsibilities for families.

The Human Service Society provides considerable help to families. Quality childcare placements are available for every child under the age of five. The care is offered in a variety of service modes — day nurseries, in-home care, sibling groups, childcare homes, twenty four hour drop-in centres. There is after-school supervision in youth cultural and recreation programmes.

Intergenerational housing is available for aging individuals and families as well as in-home care (e.g. house cleaning, bathing, cooking), supplemental nutrition programmes ("meals on wheels"), escort services, and even companion services which make special use of the part-time employment of youth.

Agro-Ecology Corps — After the automobile the single greatest consumer, directly and indirectly, of energy and material resources is

probably agriculture. The Human Service Society mobilizes efforts to reduce agriculture's dependence on chemical, energy, capital and water intensive methods. This accounts for our proposed increase in numbers of agricultural workers from the three million projected by the BLS to 20 million. One source of that increase comes from part-time employment of youth in community gardens and on cooperative farms in urban areas (with the elimination of the automobile much of current urban land now set aside for the operation and storage of the automobile is available for alternative uses). We also propose an Agro-ecology Service. This agency consists of professional and technical workers who research and develop new methods for pest control, restoration of soil fertility, erosion prevention and reduction of water use. The service provides technical assistance to commercial farmers for a transition to systems of sustainable agriculture. The service operates branches within cities as well, assisting community gardens, cooperatives and individual gardeners in efforts to realize high levels of productivity in ways compatible with environmental balance.

A National Environmental Corps — The very substantial problems of air and water pollution, hazardous waste dumps, deterioration of wilderness of areas, etc. can only be overcome with direct programmes for the repair, maintenance and extension of the environment. In our vision one-half million persons are employed by an Environmental Corps working to restore ecological balance. The Corps consists of both career and temporary workers (the latter primarily youth). The work extends from unskilled physical labour to highly trained technical and scientific personnel. Its charge includes the restoration of water systems, reforestation, water and air purification and the control and elimination of toxic wastes. The Corps has research and education responsibilities as well — it studies the environmental costs of manufacturing activities and is involved in environmental education campaigns. *Education* — The Human Service Society is a learned and learning society. To realize such a lofty goal requires an emphasis on education. This is one reason our proposal calls for an increase in teachers and educational personnel to 20 million (full-time equivalent 9.5 million). The changes are qualitative as well as quantitative. Our schools are places where students learn to create the future and from entrance in school until and after graduation, inventing futures and debating them is the primary activity of education. Students take responsibility for solving pressing problems: peace, economic well-being, justice, ecological balance, and the creation of human institutions. They begin with the school itself and extend their solutions to the community, city, region, nation and eventually the world. The learning combines formal didactics with experience. They study Utopian thought from Plato, H.G. Wells, Ursula LeGuin, Herman Kahn, Kirpatrick Sale and others. They reflect and analyze the benefits and weaknesses of each. In the process they learn to solve problems. They learn how to develop rhetoric and thought. They are able to calculate and compute, to design experiments and carry them out. They learn to think tactically and strategically. They make cases for desirability and feasibility.

Our schools are an experiment in quality life. Developed there are climates and environments that can be applied to all social arenas. In such schools students learn democracy. They learn the theory: they study the diverse and contradictory roots of democracy — democracy as freedom from the oppressiveness of the state and democracy as the opportunity to participate meaningfully in decisions that determine the policies and practices of the state. And they learn to resolve the contradictions by practicing democracy.

New Careers — In our vision youth phase into work and the aging phase out. There is also great employment mobility, with opportunities for vertical and horizontal career moves. It is truly an equal opportunity society with advancements based on actual merit and not irrelevant credentials or academic endurance. It is a society with humane institutions (as opposed to bureaucratic) and the services provided meet a rigorous test of quality. Without reforms to guarantee these objectives it will be impossible to generate the support needed for the creation of a Human Service Society. These goals are realized through *New Careers* (Pearl and Riessman, 1965). *New Careers* is the redesign of work and the reform of work preparation. It begins with a functional task analysis of human service activity. Such analysis reveals that all professions reduce to a hierarchy of responsibilities, and some of these tasks could be performed with supervision, by people with little previous knowledge, skill or experience. The work, however, can be designed to satisfy a human need and at the same time give the provider a legitimate sense of usefulness while enabling him or her to gain mastery of new skills and knowledge and through this a sense of competency and meaning. *New Careers* is thus a strategy for creating doors for the young, poor, women, minorities and others to enter or re-enter the work world. *New Careers*, though, is much more than access to entry level jobs, they are truly careers. There are steps of progression that permit advancement. If a person is permitted to begin with already acquired competence and allowed to build on that competence with skills learned on the job combined with theory and new insights obtained through didactic study at a college or university, that person is limited only by talent, motivation, maturation and opportunity. *New Careers* thus allows a person to be evaluated truly on merit and offers alternative pathways to professional status. For example, a person could begin as a physician's aide move up through several well-defined steps of progression to become a physician's assistant, thence onto physician's associate and finally to a practicing physician and perhaps even further to a supervising or teaching physician. The idea can be applied to law, teaching, social work, counseling, child and infant care, geriatric care, scientific research and others and is a means to bridge the gap that exists between the didactic learning of the classroom and the social reality of the everyday world.

Essential to the programme is the presence of supervisory personnel, educators, counselors and professionals to work with *New Careerists*. Also necessary are multi-level training programmes that include on-the-job

training, skills enhancement, self-study courses in academic and technical subjects in community colleges and universities. It is in part such activities that account for the great increase in educational employment that we propose.

Paying for the Human Service Society — A Human Service Society requires no more physical wealth or resources for its achievement than does the present economy. On the contrary, the principle wealth and resource in our vision are the knowledge and skills that people possess and it has been carefully crafted to reduce consumption of environmental capital and stocks. It is the present economy, depending as it does on borrowed money and borrowed earth that cannot be afforded; creating a full employment Human Service Society is a question of will, not wherewithal. For consider the following GEDANKEN experiment.

In the US, today there are 107 million "producers", that is persons being compensated for employment, and 133 million non-working persons who we might call "dependents", supported by parents, a spouse, other relatives, or through transfer payments from the government. Through these relationships, the "dependents" consume some fraction of the nation's output in the form of clothing, shelter, and food meeting their basic needs.

What if we were to transport the "dependents" to a very large island (except some paper and ink), totally out of contact with the US. Let us further assume that the fraction of the national output consumed by the "dependents" continues to be transferred to them, so that they will still have the basics: clothing, food, shelter, but not much else. It would be a bare existence, nothing resembling quality life. And the island has no resources.

But there are resources! — namely the people themselves — they can trade services. A barter economy of human services emerges, on the one hand to give people something to do and on the other to mutually support one another and improve the quality of life. Initially the exchanges are simply between two individuals: childcare, looking after an elderly person, etc. (there would be a disproportionate number of children, youth, women and the elderly on the island relative to the total US population). Soon, though, the services offered become more complex — some people offer entertainment, others teach. The story telling of the elderly is especially in demand. A division of labour evolves. As the transactions involve larger and larger groups, simple barter is no longer sufficient and, using the ink and paper, "island dollars" are introduced and all the elements of an advanced monetary economy are present. Moreover, it would not cost the "producers" in the regular US economy anything more than it does now. In fact, since the services improve the quality of life — of the providers and the recipients — new income has been generated, and the new skills and knowledge that are required represent the creation of new wealth as well.

Nothing in this requires the "dependents" be isolated from the US. Let us return them and consider the implications. If the exchange of services continued to involve only the "dependents" and "island dollars" there still is no affect on the "regular" economy (in fact, a proposal for such a programme has been made, see Raspberry, 1985). But why shouldn't the two economies be integrated and use the same currency? The objection of some will be that a single currency gives the "dependents" shares of the "regular" economy that can compete with those of the

"producers" in bidding for the output of the "regular" economy and, hence, it is a redistribution of physical resources. But it is not a simple redistribution because there are quality human services flowing in the other direction.

As the scenario suggests, paying for the Human Service Society is not a question of resources but of the uses we choose for those resources. Our vision for a Human Service Society is financed by redirecting priorities in government expenditures and using tax and wages policy for redistribution. It begins with the military budget. A non-interventionist, non-provocative, defense oriented security policy requires a fraction of the current \$300 billion now spent. Another instance of misplaced priorities are government transfer programmes. These account for \$400 billion. Many such programmes perpetuate poverty rather than solve it. The solution to poverty is not income without work (nor is it enforced workfare employment in dead end jobs) but meaningful and gratifying employment with opportunities for advancement. A third source of revenue is corporate profits. Many large corporations pay little or no taxes despite high profits, and many of these are defense contractors. A considerable fraction are undistributed as dividends and reinvested. The investment creates frightfully few jobs and is often in earth depleting activities and intensifies the concentration of the nation's wealth and control of the economy. Increasing taxation on corporate profits can raise tens of billions of dollars.

There is another reason we advocate increased corporate taxation as necessary for a peace economy. Smedley Butler, Commandant of the Marine Corps perhaps put it best:

War, like any other racket pays high dividends to the very few... But there is a way to stop this racket. It cannot be smashed by disarmament conferences, by peace parleys at Geneva, by resolutions of well-meaning but impractical groups. It can only be effectively smashed by taking the profit out of war.

The only way to stop it is by conscription of capital before conscription of the nation's manhood (Butler, 1984).

Finally, there is taxation of personal incomes. In the vision there are floors and ceilings on wages and salaries enforced through progressive taxation and the elimination of tax shelters, with a ratio between minimum and maximum incomes of five-to-one (the current ratio between the aggregate income of the bottom and top quintiles in Japan (Thurow, 1980)). Such a policy is not only important as a source of revenue, but it also eliminates the factor that most contributes to the corruption of politics—excessive wealth. Tom Paine, James Cannon, and Thomas Young understood this when they introduced the following resolution as an intended article for the Pennsylvania State Constitution in 1776:

That an enormous Proportion of Property vested in a few Individuals is dangerous to the Rights, destructive of the Common Happiness of Mankind; and there every free State hath a Right by its laws to discourage the Possession of such Property (see p.133 Foner, 1976).

GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE

A Human Service Society/Peace Economy is wonderful in thought and theory but how do we break through the cynicism, the malaise and start a peace movement. We suggest that with a final scenario:

THE BEGINNING OF PEACE — A SCENARIO

It started in an intimate setting, in the living room of a house on the California coastline. There were twenty people there. The meeting was organized by a high school teacher and a professor from the nearby University. It was the seventh year of an unchecked militarism which was spreading and penetrating every institution of the nation. The final straw for the professor was a student sitting in his class monitoring every word he said for "accuracy." It was then he decided that the militarism had to be first contained and then rolled back.

In those very words was the germ of an idea. Just as the United States had attempted to contain supposed Soviet expansionism by encircling the USSR with hostile regimes and military bases, the peace movement would surround Washington with local communities for peace.

Their community, Oyster Bay, was an ideal place to begin — the city council was controlled by a progressive majority. The politicians, though, were reluctant at first, afraid of the negative effects of a polarization of the community.

The group, which now called itself the Oyster Bay Committee for an Alternative America (OBCAAM), was nevertheless, determined and resolved to organize and demonstrate support for the idea. One member, who had once been an AMWAY distributor, suggested using some of that company's techniques for the purposes of political action. "Each of us can make use of our personal sphere and appeal to friends, co-workers, lovers, neighbours and bowling teammates. If we each bring ten new people to the next meeting we'll have over two hundred, then they do the same and we have two thousand, and we do it over and over again."

It didn't quite work out as planned, but everyone did manage to bring five or six new people and the OBCAAM meeting drew well over a hundred. Most had never been involved in political activity before, and many had not even voted in the last elections. Moreover, efforts to ensure diversity paid off — in attendance were Blacks, Hispanics, Native and Asian Americans, some persons concerned with the problems of women, others who called themselves environmentalists. There were many youth and seniors, and even small businessmen and farmers. They came because of the appeals, promises of music, food, socializing and good cheer. It was also promised that the meeting would start and end on time. It was as advertised and more.

The discussion was lively and enlightening. It was proposed that the city council should pass a resolution calling for a non-interventionist

foreign policy, negotiated disarmament of offensive weapons, abolition of military alliances and transarmament to non-provocative defense. Further it was proposed that the US should offer a demonstrative initiative by halting all testing of new weapons. There was considerable consensus until one person, who agreed with the goals, suggested that there might be unanticipated consequences if the movement were successful and the policy did become official US security doctrine. "There are revolutions all over the world. US policy is to resist those revolutions. We oppose all of them, even those that are not especially important to us, to show that our power is credible and we will defend vital interests, like oil. Success of even some inspires others. A non-interventionist policy will accelerate this process. There will be domestic implications — trade might diminish, oil might be more expensive, and perhaps not even available. Those changes, if unprepared for will affect all of us. There will be greater unemployment and higher inflation. I'm not against the resolution, but we need a plan for adjustment if we expect to succeed."

The issue of adjustment was the topic of the next meeting and by then there were two hundred and fifty present. To maintain the intimacy of the early meetings they broke up into small groups. The reports of the groups revealed a remarkable similarity of ideas — the resolution for the city council must also include a process for envisioning and planning for the future of Oyster Bay, of California, and of the country itself.

The council scheduled hearings. The local newspaper attempted to derail the movement with negative editorials deriding the politicians, suggesting they confine their attention to local problems like the loss of revenue sharing funds. The movement held fast, organizing a massive letter writing campaign which demonstrated support for the hearings and was educational as well, relating local economic problems to military spending and trade policy.

Similar processes were begun in other communities, at first the ones you'd most expect — Berkeley, Burlington, Madison and Ann Arbor. Real impetus for the movement came shortly after the Oyster Bay City Council passed a resolution which among other things created a Commission On The Year 2000. As part of its charge, the Commission was to hold forums, debates, interviews, and in other ways to involve the community and all its peace. Included also was a funding provision — the council resolved that it would not transfer to the US Treasury those taxes that it withheld from its employees and would use the funds instead for local projects. When a federal marshal took the entire city council and the city manager's staff into custody the imaginations of groups across the country were sparked, and shortly there were Committees for an Alternative America everywhere. A national peace newspaper was organized using the AMWAY technique and discussions were begun over the possibility of holding local, state, regional and national conventions to choose candidates for political office...

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UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING THE CONFLICT ESCALATION PROCESS AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: EXPERIMENTS USING THE DOLLAR AUCTION GAME

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ABSTRACT

The dollar auction is a simple, n-person game useful in the study of conflict escalation. Both the highest and 2nd-highest bidder must pay while only the highest bidder wins the prize. This structure produces a "social trap" that induces players to bid more than \$1 for a \$1 prize — an irrational outcome that is achieved through a series of "rational" steps (not unlike the current arms race). One way to control this process is to apply a "bidding tax". We discuss the implications of our findings for control of the arms race.

INTRODUCTION

Negotiations to control the arms race are much in the news, but the words ring hollow in the face of skyrocketing defense budgets on both sides. The Reagan Administration speaks of the need to develop the "Strategic Defense Initiative" ("Star Wars") aimed at providing security through technical means using "defensive" space-based weapons. Star wars has little chance of succeeding in this because of the virtual impossibility of designing a leakproof defensive shield. In fact, SDI is at least as destabilizing as conventional offensive weapons for two reasons: (1) it encourages the Soviets to build more offensive weapons in order to be able to penetrate the defense; and (2) SDI increases the incentive to strike first since it would only be effective against the decimated counter-attack that would follow a first

strike and would not be effective against a first strike by the other side. Thus, the Soviets would be encouraged to strike first since, if they did not, their retaliatory blow would be effectively shielded by SDI and they could not be assured of "mutually assured destruction." Likewise, the US would be encouraged to strike first since if they did not SDI would not be effective. If Reagan were to actually follow through on his campaign promise to "donate" the technology to the Soviets, or if they develop a system on their own, matters would be no better since both sides would still have an incentive to strike first since their defenses would only be effective against a counterstrike. In fact, SDI would encourage the belief that one side could actually "win" a nuclear war by striking first with an attack potent enough to reduce the counterattack to one that the defensive shield could handle. In a crisis this set of incentives would be extremely destabilizing because of the paradox that when nuclear war seems inevitable, it is better to strike first, but the one thing most likely to make war seem inevitable in a crisis is preparation to strike first.

It is not hard to see why the Soviets are so opposed to SDI. Far from ending the arms race, it threatens to escalate it to new heights and increase the chances of a major nuclear exchange that will leave most of the world a charred and frozen cinder. If the goal is "security" then the nuclear arms race is most certainly not a rational path.

Why then does this "irrational" escalation of the arms race continue? Part of the answer may lie in the social psychology of "traps". Social traps are situations which abound in everyday life, inducing US to act against our own long-run best interests by enticing US with short-run payoffs (Cross & Guyer 1980). Cigarette smoking, alcohol abuse, and overuse of agricultural pesticides are common examples. Studying these and other common social traps can help US better understand their social psychology and determine what steps are most likely to yield true progress.

Recognizing and escaping from the nuclear trap may be the greatest challenge ever to face humanity. It may, however, require disarmament strategies quite different from those currently being pursued, strategies that (like quitting smoking) may be difficult and painful in the short-run. Before elaborating on these it is necessary to: (1) explain the nature of social traps in general (2) discuss some experiments using the "dollar auction game", a simple social trap useful in studying the escalation process, and (3) summarize the short-run benefits that drive the arms race and estimate its short-run and long-run costs.

SOCIAL TRAPS

A social trap is any situation in which the short-run, local reinforcements guiding individual behaviour are inconsistent with the long-run, global best interest of the individual and society (Platt, 1973, Cross & Guyer, 1980, Teger, 1980). We go through life making decisions about

which path to take based largely on the "road signs", the short-run reinforcements that we perceive most directly. These short-run reinforcements can include monetary incentives, social acceptance or admonishment, and physical pleasure or pain. Figure 1a shows the situation diagrammatical-




Figure 1. Social traps as misleading road signs and some potential solutions (on Pages 239, 241-242).

ly. In this figure the "correct" path seems obvious from the signs. In general, this strategy of following the road signs is quite effective in getting us where we want to go. Problems arise, however, when the road signs are inaccurate or misleading. In these cases we can be trapped into following a path that is ultimately detrimental because of our reliance on the road signs. For example, cigarette smoking is a social trap because by following the short-run physical road signs of pleasure associated with smoking we embark on the road to an earlier death from smoking-induced cancer. And once the road has been taken it is very difficult to change to another.

Social traps can result from several causes. Table 1 is a taxonomy of these causes (from Cross & Guyer, 1980) along with some representative traps associated with each. Cigarette smoking is mainly a "time delay trap" resulting from the fact that the positive and negative reinforcements are separated in time.

Traps can also arise out of simple ignorance of the relevant reinforcements, from the change of reinforcements with time (sliding reinforcer traps), from the externalization of some important reinforce-

TABLE 1: SOME CAUSES AND EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL TRAPS
(FROM CROSS & GUYER, 1980)



<i>Cause of Trap</i>	<i>Examples</i>
1. <i>Time Delay</i>	Discounting, Smoking, Drug addiction in general
2. <i>Ignorance</i>	Slot Machines, Gambler's Falacy
3. <i>Sliding Reinforcer</i>	Pesticide Overuse
4. <i>Externality</i>	Pollution, Prisoner's Dilemma
5. <i>Collective</i>	Tragedy of the Commons
6. <i>Hybrid</i>	


ments from the accounting system (externality traps), from the actions of some individuals affecting the group in adverse ways (collective traps), or from a combination of these causes (hybrid traps).

Social traps are ubiquitous in everyday life and have become the basis for some important social psychology research. For example, the "prisoner's dilemma" game is a much studied externality trap that has been used recently to study the conditions necessary for the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). The "tragedy of the commons" is a well known collective trap used to study over-exploitation of natural resources (Hardin 1968).

ESCAPING FROM SOCIAL TRAPS

Cross and Guyer (1980) list four broad methods by which traps can be avoided or escaped from. These are: (1) education (about the long-term, distributed impacts); (2) insurance; (3) superordinate authority (i.e., legal systems, government, religion); and (4) converting the trap to a trade-off, i.e. correcting the road signs. Figure 1b-1d illustrate these methods using the road sign analogy. Figure 1b illustrates how education can be used to warn people of long-term impacts that cannot be seen from the road. People tend to ignore warnings, however, particularly if the path seems otherwise enticing. Figure 1c indicates the superordinate authority approach to avoiding social traps. Governments can forbid or regulate certain actions that have been deemed inappropriate. The problem with this approach is that it must be rigidly monitored and enforced and there is a strong incentive to try to ignore or avoid the regulations. Figure 1d indicates the method of changing the trap to a trade-off by imposing compensatory fees. Most trap theorists believe that this method is the most effective in avoiding and escaping from social traps. This is because it does





not run counter to our normal tendency to follow the road signs — it merely corrects the sign's inaccuracies by adding compensatory positive or negative reinforcements.

THE DOLLAR AUCTION GAME

The "dollar auction game" is a social trap that was designed specifically to stimulate conflict escalation (Shubik, 1971). The dollar auction is just like a normal auction except that both the highest and the second highest bidder have to pay the auctioneer their bid at the end of the game, but only the highest bidder gets the prize. This leads to some unexpected behaviour that is a useful model of the arms race. Players in the dollar auction game frequently bid much more than \$1 for a \$1 prize — an irrational result that is the product of a series of "rational" decisions by the bidders. This happens because the structure of reinforcements in this game is a trap. If player A had bid \$1 and player B had the second highest bid at \$.95, player B reasons that if he drops out he loses \$.95 while if he raises to \$1.05 he only loses \$.05 (assuming he wins the \$1 prize). So he usually raises, and this pattern of "rational" escalation (beyond the point where the

overall outcome is rational) continues quite often to well beyond the \$1 point. Individual and group behaviour in the dollar auction game has been extensively studied by Teger (1980).

As already mentioned, one of the most effective ways to eliminate social traps, or to escape from them once entered, is to change the reinforcement structure that creates the trap in the first place. In the dollar auction game this can be done by adding a "bidding tax" large enough to make dropping out rational in both the short-run and the long-run (Costanza, 1984). For example, if when player B was at \$.95 he was told that it would now cost \$2 to enter a bid of \$1.05 (a \$.95 bidding tax) he would reason that if he drops out he loses \$.95 but if he raises he loses \$1 even if he wins the prize! So the chances that he would drop out and escape the trap are increased. Extrapolating these ideas to controlling the escalation of the arms race is tricky, but it is possible that a "nuclear weapons tax" may prove to be an effective control method (Costanza, 1984).

AN EXPERIMENT WITH A TAXED DOLLAR AUCTION GAME

To test these ideas, a preliminary experiment was undertaken. Students in an introductory Sociology course for non-majors were asked to volunteer for an experiment where they could "win as much as \$10". The students were led to one of four microcomputers, which they believed to be connected on a network. The computers were partitioned from each other so that the students could not see each other during the experiment. They signed in on the computers and were presented with the rules of the game.¹ They were given \$5 to bid with. After reading the rules they could decide not to play and walk away with their \$5, or they could bid on the \$1 prize. All of them decided to take the bait and bid.

All students were in fact playing against a program in the computer and not against other students. The program would continue to outbid them in a manner that simulated the play of a human opponent until they stopped bidding. In half the games a random bidding tax was imposed at a random point in the bidding. The average age of the students was 20.3 years and their mean number of years in college was 1.5. Eighteen students played the game a total of 37 times for an average of just over two games per player. Their average high bid before dropping out on a \$1 prize was \$2.20. Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution on the student's bids. Fifty-seven percent of the games had an ending bid larger than the \$1 prize.

The study was intended to test the effectiveness of a bidding tax on the student's high bid before dropping out in the dollar auction game. Imposing a bidding tax is one way to convert the dollar auction trap into a tradeoff. The results of this preliminary experiment did indicate that a bidding tax has a significant negative effect on bidding. Unfortunately, the small sample size prevents any general conclusions from being drawn about the effectiveness of a tax at this point.




Figure 2. Frequency distribution of highest bids for all games ($n = 37$). In 16 (or 43%) of the games the players bid \$1 or less for the \$1 prize. In 21 (or 57%) of the games they bid more than \$1 for the \$1 prize. The mean bid was \$2.20.

Of the 37 games played only 10 activated the tax. The mean highest bid for the taxed group was actually higher than the mean for the untaxed group (although not significantly). This was due to the fact that the tax was not usually activated until well into the bidding. Low bidders would therefore not be as likely to activate the tax and the mean for untaxed games was therefore lower.

A better way to look at the tax's effectiveness is to look at the relationship of the point in the bidding where the tax was activated (tax start, or TS) and the size of the tax (tax value, or TV) to the highest bid (HB). Figure 3 is a plot of these two relationships for the 10 games which activated the tax. There was a definite positive relationship between TS and HB. The earlier the tax was activated the lower the player's ending bid. TV showed a negative relationship with HB. High tax levels tended to reduce bidding levels. These two factors were used in a linear multiple regression equation for HB. The equation and coefficients are shown on figure 4,




Figure 3. Plots of: A) the size of the tax (TV) and B) the level at which the tax was implemented (TS) versus the highest bid for games in which players bid high enough to operationalize the tax ($n=10$).




Figure 4. Predicted vs. actual highest bid for games in which players bid high enough to operationalize the tax ($n=10$). Predicted highest bid (PHB) was a positive function of the level of bidding at which the tax was implemented (TS) and a negative function of the value of the tax (TV). The equation was significant at the .05 level and all of the coefficients were significantly different from zero.

along with a plot of the predicted vs. observed values for HB. The equation explained about 65 percent of the variation in bidding based on the size and starting point of the tax.

Without putting too much emphasis on these results because of the small sample size, the following conclusion can be put forward. The earlier and larger the bidding tax the more effective it is in discouraging bidding. Small, late, taxes are less effective. This result seems intuitive and we would expect it to be upheld in general by future research on larger samples.

The implications of this result for controlling the arms race are not totally obvious. It does suggest, however, that (to the degree that the arms race is "dollar auction" type of escalation process) the imposition of some form of bidding tax may be effective in bringing it under control. Before continuing with this line of reasoning, the analogy between the arms race and the dollar auction is elaborated by estimating the value of the current prize in the nuclear arms race, and the costs of the current level of bidding.

THE RESOURCE COSTS OF CONTINUING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

The directly tangible impacts of the arms race involve the ongoing costs of maintaining the defense establishment. The defense budget, as conventionally defined, currently accounts for about 4.8 percent of GNP in

the US and 4.5% worldwide (Sivard, 1984). As Figure 5 illustrates, US defense expenditures have been rising dramatically during recent years and are now larger in real terms than during the peak of the Vietnam war.




Figure 5. US military expenditures from 1900 to 1982 in billions of constant 1980\$ (from Sivard 1984).

This total, as Mosley (1985) points out, does not include many other military-related expenditures, such as a portion of NASA, and the interest on military-incurred debt. When defense spending is corrected to include these costs, the budget is almost double the conventional total. In 1980 the conventional US defense budget was \$135.9 billion while broadly defined defense spending totalled \$237.7 billion (Mosley 1984).

Assuming that broadly defined defense spending for the world exhibits the same ratio to conventionally defined defense spending as it does in the US, we can estimate total global defense spending at about 8.5 percent of Gross World Product (GWP) of about \$850 billion. This huge total is probably still an underestimate of the true economic burden of defense, since many of the environmental resources consumed by the military are priced well below their true social value. For example, the US military uses almost 42,000 square miles of land (an area about the size of Ohio) and large percentages of the total consumption of fuel and nonfuel minerals, the extraction of which causes much unpaid environmental damage (Mosley, 1984). Accounting for these items would no doubt push the world total military expenditure close to \$1 Trillion or 10 percent of GWP.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

The earth is not immune to global scale environmental disasters. The massive extinctions in the late Cretaceous (65 million years ago) that ended the dinosaur's preeminence are now thought to have been the result of either a large meteorite impact (Alvarez et al. 1980) or a series of intense volcanic eruptions during a geologically short time (Officer and Drake 1985). Either of these events produce massive dust clouds that would shroud the planet for months, reducing surface temperatures dramatically and limiting photosynthesis. On a smaller scale, major "recent" volcanic eruptions have been shown to correlate with significant short term global cooling events leading, for example, to the disastrous "year of no summer" in New England following the explosion of Tambora in 1883 (LaMarche & Hirschboeck 1984).

The discovery of these events led scientists to wonder whether a nuclear war might have similar global environmental effects. Several recent studies have investigated this question and have estimated the indirect environmental consequences of a nuclear exchange. The results are the "nuclear winter" scenarios (Turco et al. 1983, Ehrlich et al. 1983, White & London 1984). Unlike meteorite strikes and volcanic eruptions, which inject huge quantities of dust into the stratosphere, the major source of atmospheric opacity produced in a nuclear war would be the black, sooty, smoke from the many massive fires ignited by the explosions.

It has been estimated that a 5,000 megaton nuclear exchange "could have a major impact on climate — manifested by significant surface

darkening over many weeks, subfreezing land temperatures persisting for up to several months, large perturbations in global circulation patterns, and dramatic changes in local weather and precipitation rates — a harsh 'nuclear winter' in any season" (Turco et al., 1983, p.1290). The effects would not be limited to the combatant countries but would be felt worldwide, and could lead to reductions in the human population to prehistoric levels or even to extinction of the species. While there will always be much uncertainty about the precise environmental ramifications of a nuclear exchange, the estimates produced thus far serve to highlight the sheer magnitude and potential danger of the effects to the world at large.

ECONOMIC RISKS OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

A major nuclear exchange would essentially destroy the entire global economy and environment. It may seem absurd to worry about the economic costs of such an event if there will be no humans left to bear it. The calculation is useful, however, because it puts the magnitude of the risks we are now taking, in perspective. These risks affect people's economic behaviour on a day-to-day basis by affecting their valuation of the future.

**TABLE 2: ESTIMATED ECONOMIC VALUE OF US AND WORLD
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CAPITAL STOCK
(IN BILLIONS OF CONSTANT 1980 \$US)**

	<i>United States</i>	<i>World</i>
<i>GNP (1980)</i>	2,200	10,000
<i>Total Economy Capital</i>	14,630	66,500
<i>Human</i>	8,558	38,900
<i>Business</i>	2,596	11,800
<i>Government</i>	3,476	15,800
<i>Environmental Capital</i>	34,034	154,700
<i>Total Capital</i>	48,664	221,200

All estimates are based on the ratios of GNP to capital stocks in the US economy in 1969. Human, business, and government capital stocks and GNP in the US economy in 1969 (in billions of \$1967) were respectively: 3322, 1009, 1352, and 855 (Kendrick 1976). US environmental capital in 1969 has been estimated at 13229 billion \$1967 (Costanza 1979). The ratios of the capital stocks to GNP based on the above for human, business, government, and environmental capital are respectively: 3.89, 1.18, 1.58, and 15.47.

Table 2 summarizes some estimates of the economic value of US and world economic and environmental capital stock in 1980. The total estimated value for the world economy and environment is over \$200 Trillion. Another way to estimate the value of the world is to simply take

the present value of the stream of benefits represented by future GWP. Assuming a constant GWP of \$10 Trillion and a 5 percent discount rate implies a present value of \$200 Trillion, very close to the estimate based on the value of capital stocks.

As enormous and imprecise as these numbers are, there is an even larger source of imprecision that must be factored in — the probability of a major nuclear exchange actually occurring. This probability affects the "risk cost" that citizens of the world must bear as a result of the existence of nuclear weapons. The risk cost is simply the cost of the event multiplied by the probability of its occurrence in any given year, something we do not know precisely because there are (fortunately!) no examples. But what one assumes this number to be is critical to one's evaluation of the dangers of the probability of nuclear war are understandably rare and are ultimately little more than subjective guesses. Kenneth Boulding (1983) guesses that the probability of nuclear war is about 1 in 100, with jumps up to 3 to 5 in 100 during times of high international stress like the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan. This probability implies an annual risk cost of roughly \$2 Trillion based on the previous estimate of the costs of an exchange. A recent Gallup poll published in the May, 1985 issue of *Harper's* indicated that 47 percent of Americans thought that the chances for nuclear war were greater than 50-50 in the next decade. This implies a much higher risk cost.

A more formal analysis of the risk of accidental nuclear war has recently been completed by Wallace, Crissey, and Sennott (1986). Based on an analysis of the number of false alarms in the US and Soviet early warning systems and the time necessary to resolve them during a crisis they arrive at some startling conclusions. They conclude that for a crisis lasting 13 days or longer (the length of the Cuban missile crisis) and a false alarm rate of 75 or more per year (there were 255 false alarms in the US system in 1983) the probability of an accidental nuclear exchange is one in two under *de facto* launch-on-warning. Translating this to the overall probability of accidental nuclear war requires a probability for international crises lasting given periods of time. If, for the sake of argument, we choose an optimistic estimate of one in 50 years then the overall probability for an accidental nuclear war is 1 in 100, which agrees well with Boulding's guess and corresponds to a risk cost of \$2 Trillion using the above estimates of the cost of a nuclear exchange.

One way we protect ourselves from high risk situations is to buy insurance. The above calculations imply that if it were possible to buy insurance for the planet against the possibility of a nuclear war, the premiums would cost roughly \$2 Trillion a year (approximately equal to the current total US GNP). Of course it is absurd to take this literally, since the insurance company and all the facilities to rebuild would also be destroyed, and there would be no beneficiaries. It does, however emphasize the magnitude of the risk that world society is currently bearing. Since we cannot buy insurance, the only way to reduce the risk is to reduce the change of a major nuclear exchange. Some nuclear strategists would have

us believe that more and better weapons lead to reduced risk of war. This is like saying that climbing higher on an already unstable ladder will reduce the risk of falling.

REAL AND IMAGINED BENEFITS: THE NUCLEAR TRAP

What are we buying for these huge defense expenditures and high risks of annihilation? The standard reply is that, while it may be expensive, this is the price of freedom and national security and we must pay it. In fact, there are alternative, much less expensive paths to global freedom and security that are not being adequately pursued because of our entrapment in the existing structure.

Like in the dollar auction game, escalation of the arms race continues because decision makers see no viable "rational" alternative in the short-term, even though they may recognize the long-term irrationality of the process. Players continue bidding in the dollar auction game because they believe they have "too much invested to quit" (Teger, 1980). They will sometimes bid \$5 for a \$1 prize hoping to justify their past commitments and to best their opponent. The analogy with the arms race is frighteningly obvious. We have so much invested in the defense establishment that it seems irrational in the short-run to simply stop since that is perceived as giving up the game to the other side (Costanza, 1984).

The short-term economic reinforcements that entrap US in the arms race are the perceived positive economic benefits of military spending on the domestic economy, the economic benefits of trade with "friendly" governments in our sphere of influence, and the vested economic interests of defense contractors and the military. Although these may be real benefits, they are short-run reinforcements that amount to little compared with the costs of the defense establishment and the risks of nuclear war. Besides, they are benefits that can be had much less expensively through other means. As Mosley (1984) points out, stimulation of the domestic economy via social spending is much more productive of jobs and of GNP than military spending. And the economic benefits of international trade would be greatly enhanced in a world not so rigidly divided into uncooperative, east and west trading blocks.

By way of example, Figure 6 is a plot of economic growth versus defense spending for selected OECD countries. The plot shows that higher defense budgets are associated with lower rates of economic growth for these countries and that defense spending is a net economic burden rather than a stimulant, even when measured in the narrow sense of GDP. The regression equation shown on the plot estimates that each percentage point of GDP spent on defense lowers GDP growth by .7 percent.

The first step is recognition of their entrapment and new members to AA are required to announce to the group their name and the fact that they are an alcoholic.




Figure 6. Military expenditures versus economic growth for selected OECD countries. Data are from Mosley (1985) and are averages over the period 1960 — 1979.

CHANGING THE PATTERNS OF REINFORCEMENTS

The long-term viability of the planet's environment and economy requires that we escape from the nuclear trap. Like escaping from most traps, however, escaping from the nuclear arms race will not be easy. A familiar analogy is trying to quit cigarette smoking. To quit smoking, one must first recognize the trap: that while smoking may be enjoyable in the short-run, it causes cancer in the long-run. Then one can work to change the pattern of short-run reinforcements that make the situation a trap. Often this involves seeking outside help to add positive reinforcement to the act of not smoking or to increase the negative reinforcement associated with smoking. One of the most successful strategies for helping both smokers and alcoholics to regain control has been the method used by Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). This method involves forming a network of others with the same problem who can be relied on to offer immediate, appropriate, positive and negative reinforcements whenever the urge to indulge arises.

Likewise, to escape the nuclear trap we must first recognize the problem, and then work to change the pattern of reinforcements that make the situation a trap. We must acknowledge that we have become "arms-aholics" with a strong "need" to continue imbibing in our eventually fatal habit. Within the US the pattern of reinforcements can be changed through public education on the costs and dangers of the arms race and by electing candidates truly committed to disarmament. Public opinion has less influence in the Soviet Union, however, and its leadership must be convinced directly.

Since the threat of nuclear war affects the entire planet, the entire community of nations should take a more active role in helping escape from the nuclear trap. The US and the Soviet Union are so ensnared by the reinforcements driving the current escalation process that it may be impossible for them to escape without this outside participation.

A global tax on weapons production (United Nations, 1982, Costanza, 1984) has been suggested as one mechanism to change the short-term reinforcements associated with the arms race (and at the same time to provide funds for third world development). This tax would be intended to make arms production as expensive in the short-run as it is in the long-run and would discourage unnecessary defense spending. The results of the experiment with the dollar auction game indicate that since we are already far along in the bidding a fairly large tax may be required to arrest the escalation process.

Implementing a global weapons tax, or any other significant modification to the rules of the nuclear game, would require an unprecedented amount of cooperation and resolve among the nuclear-free nations. Similar degrees of solidarity are necessary in labour unions to achieve bargaining leverage with management. Leverage to implement the tax or other modifications might be gained by threatening to cut off flows of strategic materials, or by simply applying the tax to these flows.

The third party intervention approach to disarmament has received little attention up until now, because it has only recently become obvious that the nuclear-free countries would also be destroyed in a major nuclear exchange. If the US and the Soviet Union wanted to destroy only each other, then it might be acceptable to allow only them to negotiate (or fail to negotiate) arms control. Since the fate of all nations is at stake, however, nuclear-free countries have much more of an obligation to participate in the negotiations. If they can unite on this issue and apply pressure to change the rules of the nuclear game, there may still be hope for escape.

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APPENDIX A.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DOLLAR AUCTION GAME IMPLEMENTATION ON A MICROCOMPUTER USED IN THE BIDDING TAX EXPERIMENT.

In what follows the boldface sections are explanations, the normal text is what appeared on the players screens, and the italicized text only appeared if the bidding tax had been activated.

Students were instructed that they had \$5 (in cash) to bid with and were directed to a computer which appeared to be connected to other computers separated by partitions in the same room. They were told that the game was self-explanatory, to read the instructions carefully and make sure they understood them, and to call one of the proctors if they had any questions. When they first sat down at the computer they were asked to type in the following information:

Please enter your NAME (first name, space, then last name) & RETURN

Please enter your MAJOR & RETURN

Please enter your year (freshman = 1, sophomore = 2, etc.) & RETURN

Please enter your gender (M or F) & RETURN

Please enter your age & RETURN

After they entered their age the following explanation screen appeared:

This is an auction game which allows you to win REAL MONEY. You bid against other PLAYERS playing on other computers on the network (usually there will be 2-5 players) or against a program in the computer. The computer serves as an unbiased AUCTIONEER.

The prize for this auction is \$1. You have been given \$5 to bid with and you keep any of this amount remaining at the end of the bidding plus any winnings from the auction.

The computer will inform you of your net financial status at each stage.

The auction works just like a normal auction with one important exception.

In this auction BOTH the highest bidder AND the second-highest bidder have to pay the auctioneer their bid while only the highest bidder gets the prize.

The computer will prompt you concerning when to bid, your current bid level, the current highest bidder and their bid, and other pertinent information.

When the bidding is over you will be credited with the value of the prize minus your bid if you were the highest bidder, or your bid will be subtracted from your account if you were the second-highest bidder.

If you were neither the highest or second-highest bidder at the end of the auction you will not be charged anything (but you also will not win anything).

In the interest of privacy, the auctioneer assigns pseudonyms to all players in the form of numbers.

If the bidding gets too stormy, the auctioneer may impose a bidding tax at some point in the auction.

The bidding tax will be explained to all players if and when it becomes operational.

Type Y if you would like to begin the game, N if not, or ? for more explanation.

If they typed ? they were presented with the following screen:

Let's look at an example of how the auction might work.

If someone bids \$0.40, someone else bids \$0.50, and someone else bids \$0.60 and if the bidding had stopped at that point, then the person who bid \$0.60 would be the highest bidder.

He would pay his bid of \$0.60 and would receive the $\$;V\%$ prize, yielding a net winnings of $\$;V\%-.6$. The person who bid \$0.50 would be the second-highest bidder.

He would pay his \$0.50 and get nothing.

The person who bid \$0.40 would not have to pay anything, and, of course, would get nothing.

Remember, both the highest AND the second-highest bidder when the auction ends pay their bids while only the highest bidder gets the prize.

If you still have questions about how the auction works get up from the terminal and ask the person administering the experiment.

Type Y if you would like to begin the game, N if not.

If they typed N at the end of either of these screens, they were shown the following screen:

Since you decided not play you may collect your \$5 now

Raise your hand and someone will come to settle your account

If they typed Y at either screen the game began. They iteratively went through the following set of screens, where B1 is the current bid by their computer opponent (Player X), B2 is their

Vas268

current bid (0 to start) and ACT is the amount in their account. The lines in italics only appeared after the bidding tax had been activated. TV is the size of the tax.

The current high bid is \$B1 by Player X
 The current second high bid is \$B2 by you
 If you drop out now you may lose your bid of \$B2
 plus the tax of \$TV for a total of \$(TV+B2)

If you raise you still have a chance to win the \$1 prize
 You currently have \$ACT in your account

Please enter your bid (with the decimal point but without the \$ sign) and RETURN
 to continue bidding, or 0 to stop bidding

If they typed in a bid higher than the current highest bid they were shown the following screen (where BP is the bid they just typed in)

Your bid of \$BP is the current highest bid...
 Your total cost for this bid is \$BP plus the \$TV tax for a total of \$(BP+TV)
 Please wait for others to bid....

After an appropriate random-length time lag to simulate the play of another human they were shown the following screen, where B1 is slightly higher than their bid (with a random variation):

You have been outbid by Player X who just bid \$B1
 You are now the second highest bidder at \$BP

From here the program returned to the screen showing the player as the second highest bidder and continued in this loop until the player dropped out.

Once they did drop out they were shown the following screen:

You are now out of the bidding. Wait while the auction continues

After a brief time lag they were shown:

The auction has ended
 You were the second highest bidder when the auction ended
 You bid \$B2
 In addition you were assessed a tax of \$TV for a total of \$(TV+B2)
 This amount subtracted from your account leaves a balance of \$ACT

Would you like to play again?

If so hit A

If not raise your hand and someone will come to settle your account

If they entered A the game was restarted and their account was updated. Otherwise they were paid in cash the amount remaining in their account.

The bidding tax became operational if the player's bid exceeded a randomly set starting value (TS) and the tax was set on (with a 50-50 probability). The size of the tax was set randomly (as the variable TV) with a mean value of \$2 and a uniform distribution on the range \$0-\$4. If these conditions were met in a particular game the players were shown the following screen:

The AUCTIONEER has decided to impose a \$TV bidding tax from this point forward. The tax is added on to the cost of making your next and all subsequent bids, but does not increase the value of the bids in terms of winning the auction. In other words, if the tax is \$1 and you want to bid \$2 it will cost you \$3 but your bid will still only be worth \$2.

All players are being taxed at the same rate

Hit the RETURN key when you are ready to continue

If players bid more than the amount in their account they were shown the following warning screen:

WARNING!

You are bidding more than the amount in your account

If your account ends with a negative balance you will be charged the amount of overdraft

If you would still like to continue reenter your bid or a smaller bid

Otherwise hit 0 or RETURN to stop bidding

Overdrafts were not actually collected from the students...

DISARMAMENT, DETENTE AND THE DIALECTICS OF INTERPLAY

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the interplay between detente, disarmament, and the process of development, stressing that peace and international security are the most constructive atmosphere, and are prerequisites for the latter. The author shows what damage can be caused to the third world by global nuclear conflict; the price developing countries are paying for arms imports, and their own conflicts and military build-up. Under analysis are ways and means by which the third world could benefit from disarmament and the civil reconversion of the military industries. A special section of the article deals with the recent state and prospect of the NIEO¹ in connection with the evolution of the political-military situation in the 70's and 80's, and two alternative ways for implementation of this programme — a moratorium on continuing confrontation and arms race, and promising prospects in case of recovery through detente. Detente, disarmament and development are closely interrelated, and thus need common efforts.

It is hardly disputable nowadays that the prevention of nuclear war, disarmament and detente do definitely influence the rate and pattern of the developmental process in the third world, these being concerns of global dimensions. Through both the general political climate and a distribution of the resources for growth, these factors predetermine, to a significant extent, the very abilities of nations to bridge the development gap, and to change radically their dependent status within the world capitalist economy. As a result, there is a broadly based interrelation between disarmament, detente

¹ New International Economic Order

and development conducive to progress in all these directions, each being of paramount importance for mankind.

Originally visualized by V.I. Lenin, such an interrelation has since repeatedly manifested itself on the crucial crossroads of contemporary history. As to the socialist countries, this concept is embodied in the peace programmes and initiatives, adopted by their party and states in the recent political declarations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Similarly, it meets nowadays a growing recognition and support among the developing nations as well. Contrary to some previous sceptical or even ignoring voices, which have counterposed detente to development or put them into an artificial priority order ("first development, afterwards detente"), the interrelation under review is now codified in the documents of the last conferences of non-aligned movement in Havana and New Delhi; in the UN strategy for the Third Development Decade; and is reflected in the Buenos Aires platform, tabled by the "Group of 77" before the UNCTAD VI in Belgrade in June 1983.

It is also remarkable in a way, that the recent attacks of the western conservative forces are simultaneously directed against detente and an economic decolonization; that the deterioration in the world political-military situation has virtually baffled the negotiating of a new international economic order. This simply can not be otherwise, because cold wars and neocolonialism grow from the same imperialistic roots, cultivated on militaristic ground.

Consequently, the dialectics and mechanisms of the interplay between disarmament, detente and development needs to be analysed, particularly taking into account, that their positive interrelation is no more a mere slogan, but the very fact and feature of present international life.

SOME BASIC EVIDENCE

Needless to say, that, as a long-term historical process with many crucial international facets, development may flourish only in an atmosphere of peace, security, mutual confidence and cooperation between the states. Similarly, economic and social progress in every country, a steady improvement of world economic relationships, free from inequality and discrimination, plays a major role, contributing to diminishing international tension, confrontation and hostility.

Being true on a global scale, this is equally true within and around the Third World. For example, the desire of its countries to defend their economic interests collectively has repeatedly pressed them to seek a common language in their mutual relations, including peaceful settlement of the conflicts concerned. In particular, the Lagos Declaration, envisaging ways and means for all-African cooperation has certainly contributed to the peace-keeping efforts of the OAU. A strengthening economic integration among Andean states does facilitate their goodneighbour relations despite

the previous border disputes in the area (Ecuador-Peru, Bolivia-Peru etc.).

To the contrary, the political controversies, the menaces by force, and conflicts have undermined often enough, and even destroyed, many regional endeavours aimed at development cooperation. One may refer, to this end, to the frictions among Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which were fatal for the East-African Economic Community. In Central America the hostile policy of Honduras, Guatemala and Salvadorian junta towards Nicaragua, inspired in Washington, has practically put the Central American Common Market into a collapse. The numerous intra-Arab conflicts still paralyze the economic performance of the League of Arab States, and keep plans for an Arab Common Market merely on paper, completely discredited for themselves the attempts to associate economic integration with regional military pacts, and neither SEATO, nor SENTO had anything to show in that area, despite proclaiming "economic branches" in their structures.

However, the interplay under review manifests itself not only in its indirect, "exogenous" influence on development. In fact, the same dialectics, mentioned above, provide the developing countries with many direct, real and tangible economic dividends from detente and disarmament, whereas an anti-detente and arms race produce for them not less tangible losses, particularly in cases of escalating the recent confrontations.

PEACE AND WAR: AN ECONOMIC BALANCE SHEET FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS

These gains and losses are easily visible on international levels, in the context of the state of relations between countries having different economic and social systems.

V.I. Lenin (1960) was really prophetic when saying that "the war between the advanced countries would be not only the greatest crime against the mankind", but would inevitably result in "an undermining the very conditions of its existence". It is beyond any doubt that a global nuclear conflict, with no winners at its end, would not leave the developing nations unaffected too. It would contaminate their ecosphere with radioactive wastes, by directly hitting the areas hosting foreign military bases. The oceans would be the battlegrounds for fighting fleets. All these events would cause the developing nations enormous material and ecological damage, close to a life-eradicating disequilibrium.

Moreover, even in a highly hypothetical case, if the bulk of the third world territory would not be under fire, and their development capacities would stay intact, it would signify for them a large scale economic disaster, perhaps depriving developing countries their ability to solve their problems for centuries ahead. Specifically, that would imply an annihilation of industry, science and culture in the advanced part of the world, that was recently supplying them with almost 100 percent technology, 86 percent

financial flows, 92 percent imported machinery and 66 percent imported foods. The global systems of transportation, communication, education, health care, insurance, payments etc., technically rooted in the advanced areas, will also be disorganized beyond repair, at least repair by the efforts of the surviving developing nations.

From the economic point of view, this will mean a deep deterioration of the economic reproduction process in developing countries. Structurally, the mechanism of this reproduction will lose the larger part of its heavy industry, now operating on machinery imports. An imbalance will occur in its consumer sector too, where imports cover a significant segment of the consumer demand, and the realization of GNP heavily attributed to exports of which three-fourths are destined to the western and socialist countries. It is true, of course, that since political independence the reproduction processes in developing countries have become more indigenous, more oriented on a national basis. However, this "nationalization" is still in a formative stage, and such a sudden and massive breakdown as nuclear conflicts within the hard core of the present world economy might well submerge developing countries back into a primitive economic life, nullify their achievements in export industrialization, create enormous social problems, particularly additional unemployment. In brief, even staying physically intact, the third world would be thrown by such "outside" nuclear war back to the centuries of colonial domination.

Certainly, one ought rather to be an optimist. The nuclear conflict is not fatal, and peaceful forces nowadays are stronger than ever. However, even in the case of a protracted cold war without an open conflict, the developing countries inevitably feel the detrimental effect of the escalating arms race. It is well known, that the growing military outlays siphon off funds which otherwise could be partly reallocated for the development needs (as it has been suggested by the USSR in the United Nations). According to SIPRI the world military spending in 1980 amounted \$350 billion (in 1978 prices) and even their small reduction and reallocation would help the developing world, convulsing in recent economic and financial crises. However, the NATO countries instead have committed themselves to double their spendings over the next 20 years.

What particular parts of the military budgets might be reallocated for development depends on the respective international understandings, but in any case this sum might be equal to at least several billion dollars. In the meantime the implementation of all UN programmes on health, environment, education, food and technical assistance is estimated up to only \$2 billion annually. The financial and technical assistance for developing agriculture, able to make these countries self-sufficient in food is assessed as 0.5 percent of the annual world military expenditures. At least, the cost of one "Trident" is equal the amount needed to construct residential space for 2 million people (Castro, 1983).

On the surface, such a reallocation is, however, only one part of the total picture. Many problems the developing countries now face, are rooted

not within their own economies, but rather in the international business environment, surrounding and influencing them heavily. To this end, curbing the arms race might have an overall positive effect on the interdependent world economy at least along the following intertwined avenues.

First, a reduction of the military outlays would help to eliminate (or to limit) the budget deficits and thus to curb inflation, which these deficits regularly and mainly generate. For developing countries this would mean a moderation in import prices and terms of trade, and a slower depreciation of their currency reserves. There would be an additional chance to normalize the exchange rates and at least to keep their floating under certain control thus enabling the developing countries to combine appropriate and more or less stable reserve "baskets" of foreign currencies. However, above all a low inflation might depress the interest rates, every additional percentage point of which costs developing countries annually about \$2 billion extra to repay. As a result, the indebtedness might become manageable for both donors and debtors, let alone that the governments of the donor countries, after feeling themselves free from budget deficit, might wish to implement numerous suggestions on rearranging the current indebtedness of developing countries through a partial conversion of private debts into official development assistance, a repurchasing debt obligations from banks, refinancing etc. (*Business Week*, 1983a).

Secondly, a reduction of military expenditures might facilitate the revival of the world capitalist economy now in crisis. This revival is as yet rather weak and uncertain, particularly because the corporations have not sufficient money to finance their investment and cannot borrow them on the financial markets due to prohibitive interest rates. Besides, the governments play competitors to corporations on the money markets, collecting the bulk of the available funds with a view to finance their budget deficits or, in other words, military spending. Disarmament and detente could free the economy of this burden, making the recovery a full-fledged and sustained one. For developing countries, *inter alia*, this would mean new outlets for exports, more currency proceeds, less debts, a better general economic and development setting. According to Morgan Guaranty Trust, if the recent anemic state of the western economy will prevail till 1986, the total indebtedness of 21 leading developing countries may well increase up to \$850 billion, and 47 percent of the total export proceeds will be needed for annual repayments. If, on the contrary, the recovery will be more definitely shaped, playing a multiplier for the developing exports, this indebtedness may amount only \$650 billion and 30 percent of the total exports earnings for repay respectively (*Business Week*, 1983b).

The economists persist in saying that the recent crisis is simultaneously a cyclical and a structural one. To this end, disarmament and detente may also have some evident favours for Asia, Africa and Latin America in the interplay with development.

To start with, three-fourths of developing countries exports still consist of raw materials. The arms race gradually diminishes the com-

modities demand. It either takes less raw materials per unit of production or need specific and high quality materials, which simply cannot be offered by developing exports. To the contrary, the civil production is more material-intensive, absorbing the commodities of a variable quality.

A similar effect may be traced in consumer demands. Being partly covered by the imports from developing countries, it seriously pre-determines the volume of these imports. The militarization is detrimental in that domain too. Every one billion dollars spent for military purposes creates 50 thousand less jobs than the same billion spent in the civil sector. To this end, the notorious new Reagan military programme will cost the United States minus 900 thousand working places. Consequently, any even partial reconversion to civil production, as far as developing countries are concerned, implies for them new consumers, more demand, more exports etc.

The opposite effects of detente and antidetente are far from being exhausted by the aforementioned only. By engulfing the most advanced industries the arms race limits their opportunities to participate in civil exports, spoils them with preferential prices on defence contracts, that developing countries cannot compete with. The share of military shipments among the major Pentagon's contractors varies now in the magnitude 30-90 percent of the total sales against 20-70 percent in 1961-1967. The results are less goods for international trade, a weaker supply, less competition and thus higher prices and more restrictive business practices towards developing countries.

The military burden does not allow modernisation of the civil industries, and that makes the production less competitive, and over prices exports. On the other hand, the nonmodernized enterprises become obsolete, call for governmental protection, including "new protectionism", of which the developing countries are the major victims. In the meantime, the cost of "F-18" fighter project only is equal to the cost of a modernization of all US machine-tool industry (*New York Times*, 1981). As to the "new protectionism", it appears to be the second largest concern for the developing countries for the 80's (after debts).

This is the balance sheet of the detente and antidetente, disarmament and arms race for the developing countries on the global scale.

It is understood, of course, that, in case of disarmament, the positive impulses for development will be generated not only in the west, but also in the socialist countries. The latter are the strong partisans for detente and international security. Peace, according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the policy of the socialist states, is the fundamental principle of socialism. To this end, the USSR has put forward before the United Nations more than 100 peace proposals, and has done everything possible to normalize the international situation. However, we cannot be indifferent to the US and NATO challenge to gain "military superiority" with a view to dictate to us and the entire world their political will. Hence, the USSR feels itself pressed to undertake measures for its own in order to protect itself, its

allies and peace, including the pertinent financial implications. These funds, of course, might be also spent to improve the standard of living of the Soviet people, to modernize our economy, to cooperate with developing countries etc., thus providing both direct and multiplicative benefits for development. The chances to do so are still not lost and our contribution to the world development (now we are doing in that area relatively more than leading western states) in the future will be in general determined by the dominating trends in the international situation. We hope that these will be the trends towards peace, supported by the efforts of the developing countries too.

THE SEEDS OF MILITARISM: A PROLIFERATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

Detente and disarmament can also be applied to conflicts and local military "build ups" between third world nations. As it has been admitted by the Seventh Conference of Non-Alignment Movement in New Delhi, clashes between developing countries are now growing in number, generating human and material losses, menacing solidarity within the third world and global peace as a whole.

To be specific, total military expenditures of the developing countries augmented from \$27.8 billion in 1970 till \$81 billion in 1982, growing even faster than their GNP. The share of developing countries in the global military outlays amounted 16 percent in 1982, in weaponry import — 75 percent and the percentage of these outlays to their GNP (5.9%) is now even higher than that of developed countries.

The reasons to obtain arms are not the same among different nations. A number of them buy the weaponry in order to defend their sovereignty and freedom against the aggression and intrigues of imperialism and its local clients. They fight just, patriotic wars and the socialist countries in these cases render them moral, political and, if necessary, material and technical assistance in that struggle (Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, PLO). Sometimes the conflicts and wars are rooted in the colonial past, which mixed the political and ethnical borders between nations. In addition, there are racial and religious controvercies and newly emerging conflicts over the demarkation of the sea shelf. These types of conflicts are avoidable and may well be settled by political means. This is the major task facing the non-alignment movement, regional political organizations and, for example, the OAU has passed a special decision confirming the stability of the historical borders between states within the African continent. Unfortunately, a peaceful settlement is often out of reach and this colonial "heritage" still stands as the major reason for the local conflicts, involving dozens of the developing states.

At the same time, there are some developing countries, which have not faced any menace from their neighbours, but nevertheless undertake

active and far-reaching military preparations. The reasons for this may be the complexities in establishing the newly gained statehood, internal political crises, leader's ambitions etc. However, the most widespread explanation lies usually in their association with the imperialist forces, and their attempts to play "local policeman" against the national liberation movements. The examples are Iran (under the Shah), Hondurian aggression against Nicaragua, Pakistani backing the Afgani bandits etc. At last, some regimes use the army against their own people (Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Oman, Pakistan etc.).

Whatever may be the story, the military preparations overload the weak developing economy with an enormous burden, reduce the effective capital formation, exhaust the currency revenues, divert the skilled specialists to the army, thus lowering the rate and diminishing the room for development. According to the UN experts, developing countries now spend for military purposes 6 times more than for healthcare, 3 times more than for education. Some least developed countries, suffering from hunger, waste more funds for arms than they contribute for agriculture. Arms imports form half of the total trade deficit of the third world. Its armies number about 15 million soldiers or 60 percent of the world's military contingent. As a result, every dollar spent here for the military needs reduces their investment abilities by 25 percent (Castro, 1983).

The property losses, caused by the local wars may be quite impressive; that is the case in the senseless clash between Iran and Iraq. However, the same losses may occur from the weaponry purchases too. The prices for military articles are skyrocketing, and the developing governments intend to buy the latest models of tanks, ships, jets, rockets etc. The arms are now in the shopping list of 105 developing countries, including 95 countries purchasing heavy weaponry. Moreover, the arms trade accepts no credit, but demands primarily cash payments. This deteriorates the balance of payments of the purchasing countries or presses them to allocate for these payments the most valuable commodities, particularly oil (as do Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Indonesia etc.). Facing a lack of specialists, the developing countries feel themselves pressed to pay extra (up to 15% over contract prices) for servicing these arms, hiring experts and instructors etc. There are, for example, 60 French instructors in Niger; 60 — in Cameroun; 85 in Tunisia; 110 — Mauritania; 150 — Morocco; 500 — Gabon; 80 — Botswana; 85 — Gambia; 100 — Kenya; 150 — Ghana etc. (*The Economist*, 1983). In Saudi Arabia these instructors, mainly Americans, are counted by thousands. They pave the way for bases, "rapid deployment forces", marines and the like, all with political implications.

Being saturated with arms, the third world becomes more and more politically fragile, inclined to conflicts. In 1980 third world countries bought weapons, amounting \$18.3 billion. No wonder, that the arm-producing corporations in the West start to artificially "cultivate" these markets, being assisted to this end by their diplomatic and intelligence circles. The latter try once again to implement the old slogan "to divide and to rule", to provoke

conflicts, tensions, and political crimes with a view to create "new demand" for arms. In fact, almost all conflicts (about 150) with practical use of arms took place after the second world war between developing countries.

Whereas the arms-suppliers are the companies-multimillionaires, their customers in the third world are often the least developed countries. For example, while invading Ethiopia, Somalia bought weapons amounting to \$215 million or \$54 per capita, having per capita income only \$130. That produces poverty, hunger, massive migration, foreign indebtedness, internal political turmoil and repressions.

Moreover, with a view to be self-reliant in arms and to economize foreign currency, many developing countries set up military industries of their own. More than 30 of these countries produce various weaponry, including heavy ones. The reasons for doing so ought again to be judged on an individual basis. However, in any case this is an extremely costly endeavour and some countries are already starting to feel that they are nursing the local military-industrial complexes with all the well known consequences for the policy, democracy, public life etc.

TABLE 1: PROJECTED ECONOMIC GAINS IN THE POORER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER A DISARMAMENT SCENARIO BY 2000

Region	Scenario		Percentage change
	Continuing arms race		
	Base	Disarmament	
A. Per capita GDP (dollars)			
Arid Africa	143.4	353.1	146.2
Low-income Asia	136.1	190.4	39.8
Latin America:			
Resource poor	418.2	488.1	16.7
Tropical Africa	244.9	381.5	55.8
B. Industrial employment (millions of man-years)			
Arid Africa	20.6	48.4	134.9
Low-income Asia	134.1	177.6	32.4
Latin America:			
Resource poor	52.8	58.3	10.4
Tropical Africa	41.6	67.9	63.2
C. Capital stock (billions of dollars)			
Arid Africa	57.3	135.8	136.9
Low-income Asia	364.4	501.3	37.5
Latin America:			
Resource poor	327.5	378.3	15.5
Tropical Africa	110.6	185.4	67.6

Source: UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 1982, NY, p.124.

No wonder that, according to the UN assessments, the future trends in development for Asia, Africa and Latin America look quite different in the case of continuation of the arms race as compared to deceleration. (See Table 1).

DETENTE, ANTIDETENTE AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The major goal before the collective economic diplomacy of the "group of 77" and the non-alignment movement for the years to come is the establishing in the contemporary world a new international economic order. To this end, one ought to remember, that this programme has been put forward at the time of the "detente honeymoon" and to a large extent has been inspired by this new political phenomenon in international relations. The features of these relations at that time were a realistic approach to the inter-state affairs, a conviction that confrontation has no future and there is no alternative to peace. Being true in the domain of East-West relations, this was similarly true for North-South, or, more precisely, West-South issues, which started to be dealt with in the mid 70's no more through a confrontation, but rather a dialogue.

Unfortunately, the western policy has changed with a view to undermining strategic parity with the socialist states, and reanimate the "diplomacy of force". Focused mainly against socialism, these efforts simultaneously, directly and indirectly, have been addressed towards the third world too, having the aim of obstructing the dialogue, mentioned above and to preserve in the West-South domain a status-quo instead of a far-reaching restructuring of international economic relations. The results were the "depackaging" of the NIEO programme, the refusals of the West to implement the obligations assumed and the declarations of intentions previously agreed upon. In other words, the negative trends in both West-East and West-South relations look basically alike; this is another evidence of the detente-development interplay.

As it is, the antidetente-antidevelopment policy is zeroed in against the very principles of the NIEO, shared both by the socialist and developing countries. These principles are well known: the national sovereignty over the resources and economic activity, rights of the nations to choose their ways for political and social development; quality; condemnation of colonialism, foreign aggression and occupation, racism, apartheid and all forms of foreign domination and exploitation. Offended by these fundamentals, the imperialist forces during the last five years have undertaken military provocations against Angola, Argentina, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Libya, Iran, Nicaragua, Seyschelles, Vanuatu, Comores, Liban etc. South African regimes still dominate colonially over Namibia. The United Kingdom used military force against Argentina. The USA and Great Britain practically annexed Diego-Garsia island. The US marines and fleet practiced direct aggression against Liban and Grenada. Economic aggres-

sion is also on the agenda of antidetente-antidevelopment policy. The last conference of non-alignment movement in Delhi condemned such actions as sanctions, blockages, and retaliation measures in international trade and finance, which were recently applied against Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, Libya, Iran, Kampuchea etc. In other words, the measures, originally invented to stop socialism, are now in use to stop economic decolonization, and the strengthening by the developing countries of their national sovereignty. Regretfully, one ought to admit, that such a pressure sometimes shows itself effective and, for example, the rate and scope of the nationalization, in developing countries being impressive enough in 60's and 70's is less noticeable in 80's.

To be specific, the recent antidetente-antidevelopment actions are causing the greatest damage within such segments of NIEO as commodity trade, financial flows and collective self-reliance.

As is known, the NIEO envisaged the "integrated programme on commodities", aimed at a normalization of the raw material trade and commodity prices. This programme has been expected to include international commodity arrangements, covering 18 "core" products and three-fourths of the developing countries raw material exports. For management of these agreements and, specifically, for financing the "buffer stocks" as their instruments for market intervention, it has been decided to set up the "Common fund" amounting to about \$750 million. However, as the western diplomacy has clearly stated, it is interested not in a comprehensive commodity markets normalization, but rather in "orderly arrangements" within selected markets, namely the ones, which are now beyond the previous control of transnational corporations. This is why there are only 3 out of 18 suggested agreements now in force and the "Common fund" protocol is as yet not ratified by the half of OECD countries.

Consequently, the western economies enjoy the lowest commodity prices for the last 50 years, but one may see also another, pure military reason for keeping these markets in disorder. Under the NATO and national decisions many western countries maintain "strategic stockpiles" of raw materials, reserved for military use. In fact, their military industry is the end-user of 3-11 percent of the total world demand for 14 major commodities. France, for example, stores in reserves a two-month volume of consumption of some "strategic products", the same policy is effected in West Germany and Japan. In the USA the "strategic stockpiles" amounts to about \$7 billion worth and are assessed as sufficient to endure a three-years war (*The Economist*, 1983). If so, it is only "desirable" for these countries to refill these stocks at the lowest prices possible. Besides, these are used also as the instrument to manipulate the commodity markets to the benefits both of western governments and their transnationals, operating in that case side-by-side. For example, in December 1981 and January 1982 the US administration, by selling 5360 tons of tin from its stockpiles, literally turned the situation on the world tin markets upside down. The "strategic" oil stockpiles are now used to press OPEC to reconsider its posted prices.

No wonder, that out of about 30 "anti-cartels", set up by developing countries in commodity trade only about 20 have been as yet managed to survive.

The situation in financing is even more dramatic. Referring to their budget deficits, western government flatly refused to respect the UN targets for financial aid previously agreed with them by a consensus. The total volume of the official development assistance in 1984 was frozen at the level of 0.34 percent their GNP instead of 0.7 percent. For the rest of these funds the developing countries are invited to address either private banks or to establish "the favourable climate" for foreign capital. The share of the official development assistance in the total net flow of resources from OECD area to developing countries declined from 32 percent in 1970 to 23 percent in 1982, whereas the share of private credits and private investment increased from 39 percent to 50 percent and 8 percent to 14 percent respectively. With that in mind, one cannot but be astonished to see the shocking level of the third world indebtedness and the crippling trend to de-nationalization of its selected industries. At the same time, the NATO countries do expand their military budgets, particularly through an "economy on non-essential items", including the third world as one of the major victim of this "economy".

Being challenged by the stalemate in West-South dialogue on NIEO, the developing countries have recently pursued the policy of "collective self-reliance", that is the accentuated development of their mutual economic and technological cooperation with a view to mobilize the additional resources for development to overcome the asymmetrical dependence on the West and to set up a material basis for collective economic diplomacy. The framework for this policy is shaped in many collective documents of the "group of 77", including the Arusha and Caracas declarations. Being not merely an idea, but a promising reality, the "collective self-reliance" policy and programme are now under continuing attacks from the West, particularly through the attempts to disintegrate the common front of developing countries. The major instruments herewith are the stimulation of conflicts, wars and frictions among these states, which are not always unsuccessful. The Iran-Iraqi war, for example, is a stumbling block for many OPEC concerted measures and, in order to finance the fighting, both sides frequently violate the agreed discipline within "anticartel", and it goes without saying that the war, now extending over sea, may block the Persian Gulf. The conflicts in Chad, African Horn in the Western Sahara have repeatedly brought the OAU to a standstill. This line of illustrations may be continued.

One may also mention that the "new protectionism", arising from the lack of funds for industrial modernization (absorbed by military needs) now undermines the general system of preferences in favour of developing countries agreed in UNCTAD. Notwithstanding the official declarations, the West refuses to start "global negotiations". The US administration, by voluntary decision, cut off its contribution into the UN budget. There is

only a negative, irritated reaction from the west on the suggestion to convene a World Monetary Conference. Practically no tangible results were achieved by UNCTAD-VI in Belgrade. Here again, the West demonstrates the tactics of an ignorant, two-faced refusal to respect the assumed responsibilities so familiar as far as the disarmament talks are concerned.

Summing up, the Delhi Declaration of the non-alignment movement had every reason to condemn the arms race, wasteful military spending, international conflicts, and anti-detente. It particularly stressed that development and social progress may take place only in the atmosphere of peace, harmony and cooperation. The same was repeated by the leader of this movement, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her memorial lecture before UNCTAD-VI in Belgrade. As the Buenos Aires platform stated, "questions relating to the world economy, to international economic relations and to development are directly related to those of peace and stability. To treat them separately will prove damaging for world security, not only in military and strategic terms, but also because of the grave economic consequences, national and international, that it will generate. A world wide relaxation of tensions, the halting of the arms race, and effective disarmament measures which would release sorely needed resources for development, are vital necessities for global economic development (The Buenos-Aires Platform).

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ADDITIONAL PRESENTERS UNDER TOPIC III

NON-VIOLENT TECHNOLOGIES — ASSESSING THE VIOLENCE INHERENT IN EVERYDAY TECHNOLOGIES

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ABSTRACT

The hypothesis examined is that in a given culture many technologies besides guns and bombs, do us violence, while others such as a knife are neutral or non-violent.

The meaning of violence in technology is examined and a case study comparing violent with non-violent technologies is offered to illustrate. It begins by distinguishing between the "capacity" of technologies to be non-violent or peaceful, and outlines a framework for assessing the violence of technologies. The cultural-relativity of the violence-technology interaction is recognized. To illustrate, a case study of the bicycle used for daily commuting in a car-oriented Australian city is examined.

WORKER DISCONTENT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOCIALIST SYSTEMS: THE POLISH AND SOVIET CASE

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ABSTRACT

Worker disturbances in European socialist systems all have their origins in comparable economic conditions. Conflict between workers and elites develops when worker expectations regarding production quotas, work norms, supplies

of consumer goods and managerial behavior are contravened. The repetitive nature of worker protest in Poland suggests that conflict is *managed*, and not fully resolved, in that system. We argue that this inability successfully to resolve labour conflicts is also evident in the USSR, although intervening factors inhibit the formation of a Solidarity-style movement.



Dr Douglas Corey, Dr Elizabeth Stewart, Dr Jeannette Maas, Professor Hannes Alfven and Dr Robert Stewart at the New Year's Eve Party.

TOPIC IV: WAR AS ORGANIZED CONFLICT

NO PAPERS PROPOSED

TOPIC V: CONFRONTING THE NUCLEAR CRISIS

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NUCLEAR WINTER — BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR

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ABSTRACT

Nuclear winter and the US proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative may have outdated the current deterrence theories in such a way that without changes, nuclear war may be imminent. This paper examines some implications of the knowledge of nuclear winter and the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), jointly and separately.

INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR WINTER AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

There is a growing evidence that nuclear war would have severe climatic consequences. This evidence has developed mainly out of work by the TTAPS group which began to be publicized in 1983 (Turco, et al., 1983). The concept is that nuclear weapons explosions would project dust into the stratosphere and soot and smoke into the troposphere. Sunlight would be obstructed. This would result in dramatic temperature declines throughout the world. The degree of the effect depends upon the targeting strategy and the number and megatonnage of explosions. Counterforce nuclear explosions at or near surface create large amounts of dust. Counter-value targeting would produce fires which release large amounts of smoke.

Depending upon the nuclear war scenario (the number of explosions, the megatonnage, the targets), the temperature may drop tens of degrees below freezing. The cold may last weeks or months and gradually return to normal in about a year. The effects would be a severe food and water shortage, extinction of plant and animal species, collapse in aquatic food

chain. In general, there would be catastrophic consequences for the biosphere.

If nuclear deterrence fails, nuclear winter posits several implications for nuclear war-fighting. The megatonnage of nuclear warheads exploded must be kept substantially below the approximately 11,000 megatons presently in US and USSR strategic arsenals to avoid effects. As few as 700 surface explosions with high yields may trigger nuclear winter (Ehrlich et al., 1984). Urban targeting is more dangerous than counterforce targeting. However, there are still substantial uncertainties in predicting nuclear winter effects due to the lack of data (Maddox, 1985).

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced the Star Wars plan or the Strategic Defense Initiative. This involves ballistic missile defense or BMD. The plan consists of three levels of defense: boost phase, mid-course, and terminal defense. The boost phase is considered the critical phase, since the targets would be fewer and easily detected and tracked. However, this phase lasts from 3-5 minutes and this time may be reduced. The weapons to be used are chemical lasers, excimer lasers, x-ray lasers, particle beams and homing vehicles. Although BMD can be deployed to different extents, the concern here is with the three-phase proposal.

There are substantial technological difficulties which are discussed by Bethe et al. (1984). The boost phase requires an "intricate sequence of operations" which would have to be automated because of the time dimension. The mid-course phase would be overwhelmed with warheads and decoys. Furthermore, all components of the system would be vulnerable to attack.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR WINTER IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POSTURE

A. PRESENT US STRATEGIC APPROACHES

There are two basic schools of thought concerning nuclear doctrine. One supports the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD); the other is a nuclear war-fighting approach, also referred to as countervailing or nuclear utilization targeting selection (NUTS).

This discussion of MAD will follow the ideas of Jervis (1984). MAD involves having adequate second strike forces left to cause "unacceptable damage" to the population of the opponent. Cities are hostage. This is deterrence by punishment. It assumes that any nuclear war will be all-out. Therefore, despite plans for limited nuclear wars and counterforce targeting, the basic deterrent is still the vulnerability of populations. This deterrent is felt to cover the homeland and highly valued conflict areas. It is viewed as extremely stable since the risk component exists for all serious conflicts. There is always the risk of escalation from lower to higher levels and this risk gives greater deterrence than critics charge. Therefore the need for matching military capabilities at all levels is less. Jervis (1984) evaluates

MAD as decreasing the risk of crises getting out of control, and decreasing the usefulness of strategic forces in all but very extreme situations.

This discussion of the nuclear war-fighting approach follows the ideas of Gray (1979). The nuclear war-fighting approach focuses on deterrence by denial. The stress is on meeting the opponent at every level of military conflict and denying the opponent any advantage. Flexible counterforce targeting with minimal collateral damage is important in keeping nuclear war controlled and limited. Gray (1979) feels that deterrence is more credible if there is a realistic war plan if deterrence fails. One needs a "theory of victory in war" to establish seriousness about the use of nuclear weapons. Gray (1979) supports the approach of targeting the Soviet state (CPSU and government bureaucracy, communications, KGB and armed forces) as the war goal. This strategy requires BMD, air and civil defense for the US. This approach assumes that nuclear wars can be controlled and that the US could be blackmailed if its only response to the USSR is countercity attacks. This nuclear war-fighting approach is now the dominant position in the US government.¹

B. NUCLEAR WINTER AND STRATEGY

Assuming the nuclear war-fighting approach, nuclear winter reinforces the targeting policy toward counterforce with limited response alternatives. High accuracy weapons would be at a premium. Nuclear explosions at any one time would be limited to subthreshold. C3I would be critical. Emotions must be controlled along with pressure from the public to escalate. Wohlstetter (1985) expects the Soviet Union to accept this logic in their use of nuclear weapons and encourages the US to do likewise.

The deterrent would involve the threat to be able to carry out a long drawn-out counterforce nuclear war. A strong economy and control of the public would be benefits. Political consequences would be central to the dynamics of this sort of war. This would be similar to the present war-fighting approach except that there would be limits on the extent of retaliation which must be observed by both sides.

Romero (1984) in examining the problem of planning for nuclear war below the nuclear winter threshold discusses some near-term, mid-term, and long-term implications. For the long-term, improvement in missile accuracy, burrowing technology, development of weapons which minimize heat production in favour of blast or gamma rays, development of highly accurate conventional weapons would allow the US and the USSR to fight or threaten to fight a strategic war without triggering a nuclear winter. Second, the ability to fight a "slow motion" war of months or years should be developed.

In a similar vein, Gertler (1985) notes that the USSR might believe

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¹ Blair (1985) critiques the feasibility of this approach. The C3I network (Communication, Command, and Control Intelligence) does not allow for control beyond a few hours.

that the US is so afraid of nuclear winter that they will not respond with nuclear weapons and, therefore the USSR will be more aggressive. He suggests the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, ERW's (enhanced radiation warheads), more sophisticated conventional weapons, chemical weapons, and the ability of tactical weapons to cripple C3. The ideal nuclear first-strike scenario would involve the "generation of a large EMP (electromagnetic pulse) through a high-altitude detonations followed by low-yield counterforce strikes with ERW and penetrations" (p.12).

The stability of nuclear war-fighting strategy under the assumption of nuclear winter needs to be considered. Stability of deterrence postures involves lowered force vulnerability, command vulnerability, and urgency of decision, with increased robustness and relative benefits going to the defender and not the attacker. The urgency of the decision would be less if the plans were for a slow-motion war over months or years. Forces would be targeted more successfully, if weapon accuracies continue to improve. However, a first strike attack would not be contemplated and, therefore, overall force vulnerability would be low. It is to be expected that C3I will become more vulnerable. It will be an important component of this strategy to ensure controlled warfare with very limited responses. It would be in the interests of both sides to maintain the control. Therefore, the targeting of command and control systems and leadership, as suggested by Gertler (1985), would be contradictory. There will be few or no benefits to the side attacking first. The opponent will maintain most of its military capability and retaliation would be assured. In summary, three out of the five criteria for improved stability would be met.

MAD proponents would see nuclear winter as reinforcing their deterrence strategy. Cities would still be hostage. The option of attacking several cities still exists, although the maintenance of control in this situation would be lowered. The risk of escalation involved in conflicts between the US and the USSR and the increased unacceptable results of a large nuclear war would deter attacks.

The stability of MAD with the assumption of nuclear winter should be greater than without it. The only change would be in increasing the damage if nuclear war occurs. The punishment would be increased.

C. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND STRATEGY

Since BMD as a near-perfect defense which can protect cities has received no substantial support (Glaser, 1985), let us assume it would be 85 percent effective against ICBM's; SLBM's and bombers are partially vulnerable; cruise missiles are invulnerable. There would also be vulnerability of C3I and BMD components. With equal deployment by the US and the USSR, assuming the nuclear war-fighting strategy, we would expect an increase in offensive weapons with the greater development and deployment of cruise, SLBM's and bombers. ICBM's would be targeted. Whoever strikes first would hold a decided advantage if one could

substantially destroy BMD components. The deterrent under BMD involves the inability of an opponent to have a successful first-strike attack. The less vulnerable and less porous the BMD, the stronger the deterrent. An opposing threat is the destruction of defense components; therefore, one also needs to develop defense of the BMD.

Strategic stability would be substantially decreased under the likely conditions of deployment of BMD. Assuming the vulnerability of C3I and BMD components, there would be definite advantage to the side attacking first (Schlesinger, 1985; Velikhov, 1984). Substantial destruction of these components would allow the attacker to penetrate and destroy military targets. The possibility would exist that a retaliatory counter-strike would be insufficient to penetrate defenses of the attacker and cause substantial damage. BMD itself and the benefits to preemption increase the urgency of the decision. The system would also not be robust. Any changes in estimates of capabilities in BMD or the attack capabilities against BMD could lead to new estimates on benefits of preemption. Force vulnerability would be decreased until BMD is attacked.

If BMD is deployed by the US and not the USSR or deployed unequally against the USSR, the benefits of preemption would be even greater for the USSR. Bethe et al. (1984) "conclude that the pursuit of the president's program would inevitably stimulate a large increase in the Russian strategic offensive forces, further reduce the chances of controlling events in a crisis and possibly provoke the nuclear attack it was designed to prevent" (p.41). This viewpoint is also supported by Schlesinger (1985) and by Burrows, (1984) who states that the "most prudent reaction by the Kremlin would be the addition of new ICBM and IRBM complexes, thereby spreading out the targets" (p.855). Burrows (1984) further notes that a BMD system would force the Soviets to "vastly increase the number and variety of their missiles and warheads, improve their quality, develop new ways of delivering them, perfect advanced penetration aids, and deploy specific counterweapons, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) systems to thwart American defenses" (p.844). Furthermore, the USSR would probably increase its targeting of US cities, since with fewer weapons getting through, it would be easier to cause destruction with very few weapons on cities.

Another problem with unequal deployment would be increased risk of war. The side without BMD may conclude that it would be better off if it struck first, but also the side with an imperfect BMD may decide it is better off striking first and then using the BMD to handle the retaliation. In crisis, the doubts about the intentions of the other may lead one to take action first (Drell, Farley & Holloway, 1984).

On the other hand, Payne and Gray (1984) evaluate BMD positively. They note that stability would be a problem in the initial stages. However, new offensive weapons for the US (MX, small ICBM, B-1B, cruise, Trident) would alleviate this problem. The benefits Payne and Gray (1984) see in ballistic missile defense are several. First, the Soviet Union could have no delusion of success in a first strike against the US. Second, the Soviet Union

would lack confidence in its technological ability to compete with the US and therefore will be under greater pressure to enter into arms control talks with the US. Third, "if we assume that the United States and the Soviet Union will be political rivals for many years into the future, strategic defenses offer the only path to a nuclear disarmament agreement with which both parties could live" (p.840). They conclude that BMD may offer the potential for transforming the US-USSR deterrent relationship.

Assuming the MAD approach, BMD may reduce the ability to punish the opponent, depending upon the number of warheads destroyed. More likely it would reduce the perception that one could punish the adversary. There would be pressure to preemption to ensure the vulnerability of the opponent and a weapons buildup to guarantee enough weapons would get through to destroy populations. Stability of MAD would be decreased. Decision time is lessened. Benefits to attacker are increased.

D. STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WINTER AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The BMD assumptions of 85 percent effective, no reduction in offensive weapons, defense only for ICBM's and equal development hold throughout this section. Under the war-fighting strategy, nuclear winter and ballistic missile defense may not lead to any substantial changes in strategy from that under BMD alone, since BMD would appear to lessen the threat of nuclear winter from large attacks. The war-fighting policy may be maintained with greater focus on C3I and BMD components. Changes toward greater weapon accuracy, more offensive weapons and more nonICBM weapons are likely. BMD would be the first line of skirmish opening the opponent to limited counterforce attacks. A long drawn-out war may not be seen as necessary. The problems of maintaining control of military response would not be as great with BMD, depending upon its success rate and perceptions of this.

However, according to Sagan (1984), ballistic missile defense offers no solution. "The present world arsenal of strategic warheads is so much greater than the threshold for climatic catastrophe that, even if 5 to 30 percent of attacking missiles get through in something like a full exchange the catastrophe could be triggered" (p.282). And a likely response to deployment of BMD systems by one side would be the increase in offensive weapons by the other. The only safe approach would be reduction of nuclear warheads below that which might trigger nuclear winter — between 500 and 2,000 warheads.

Deterrence would not be stable. There would be an advantage to striking BMD and C3I components first, making the opponent's forces more vulnerable. There would be urgency in making the decision. Robustness would be low given the uncertainty concerning comparative force vulnerability and changes in technology. Initial force vulnerability before a strike against BMD would be lower than presently.

Assuming the MAD strategy, the combination of nuclear winter and BMD neutralize each other. Nuclear winter increases deterrence by punishment, while BMD appears to decrease the ability to punish. The stability, however, would be substantially decreased from the nuclear winter assumption from the present situation. The instability of the BMD situation would hold.

NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIOS AND IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR WINTER AND BMD

How might the assumptions of nuclear winter and BMD affect the probability of nuclear war scenarios? Four scenarios would be considered under four options: nuclear winter, BMD, nuclear winter and BMD equally deployed, nuclear winter and BMD deployed in the favour of the US.

1. THE BOLT FROM THE BLUE

This is a surprise attack which is deliberate. Nuclear winter substantially decreases the likelihood of a massive counterforce attack. Such an attack was unlikely before the information on nuclear winter given the uncertainties in ICBM destruction and substantial submarine capability left for the US (Beres, 1980; Bunn & Tsipis, 1983). With nuclear winter, this scenario is even more unlikely. As outlined by Sagan (1984), two warheads targeted on US ICBM's would require 2,100 explosions; on USSR ICBM's, 2,800 explosions. This alone may trigger a nuclear winter; however, a first strike would at least require targeting of submarine and bomber bases along with command and control targets. Furthermore, retaliation would be expected.

This sort of constrained counterforce was viewed as the most likely type of surprise attack by Kahn (1984). The USSR would want to minimize civilian and industrial damage to reduce the threat to their cities and industries from the US retaliation. A common version is one of "capitulation." After destroying US ICBM's, some of the bombers and ballistic missile submarines and trying to decapitate the US response system, the USSR would give an ultimatum for surrender. The US surrenders or does not retaliate. Kahn says this is very unlikely. The US would retaliate because it would have adequate weapons and the psychological and political incentives to do so. In the Utgoff (1982) version, the USSR would strike first and then threaten a long strategic war and have credibility in doing so. He thinks this is not unlikely until the US develops "an indefinitely survivable capability" to threaten Soviet military targets.

Assuming BMD (deployed equally, components vulnerable, 85% effective only against ICBM's), the Bolt from the Blue is less likely than under present conditions. There will be more uncertainty in being able to destroy the ICBM's. Assuming nuclear winter and BMD deployed equally,

the Bolt from the Blue is unlikely again due to the increased uncertainty of being able to destroy the ICBM's.

If BMD is deployed unequally in favour of the US and nuclear winter is assumed, the USSR would be unlikely to strike first. The US would have the capabilities to undertake a massive counterforce attack. However, even assuming no retaliation on the part of the USSR, there would be a very high risk of triggering nuclear winter. This risk may be reduced by burrowing weapons and increased accuracy. This scenario is still unlikely but less so than under prior assumptions.

2. INTENSE CRISIS — ESCALATION FROM CONVENTIONAL TO NUCLEAR WAR

(a) *The European Scenario*

The standard scenario involves unrest in Eastern Europe, usually East Germany, which threatens Soviet control. This spreads across the border into West Germany with clashes between East and West German forces. The Harvard Nuclear Study Group (1983) envisions NATO use of cruise missiles due to a losing conventional situation. Kahn (1984) sees the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe or the US with nuclear weapons to maintain their control of Eastern Europe in one version; in another, the USSR attacks conventionally with the US response at the nuclear level.

Irrespective of the particular details of the scenario, this is viewed as one of the most likely paths to nuclear war now. If NATO-WTO engage in violent conflict, it will likely become nuclear. The conventional-nuclear firebreak is being eroded due to the increase in dual capable weapons and the development of conventional weapons which approximate the destructive potential of nuclear weapons (Klare, 1985). Tactical nuclear weapons stored close to borders may lead to pre-delegation to field commanders with resultant less control. Vulnerability of Pershing II's may increase their probability of early use. Furthermore the US maintains the "first-use" option since it is generally felt that NATO is weaker conventionally.

Under the assumption of nuclear winter, nuclear war in Europe becomes more dangerous at lower levels than for the US and the USSR. The scenario of an extended nuclear war would be less likely in the European context. "Because of the marked contiguity of strategic targets and urban areas in Europe, the climatic threshold for attacks on European nuclear powers may be significantly less than for the United States or the Soviet Union" (Sagan, 1984, p.278). This should reinforce deterrence by punishment in the European context. It should also maintain a stronger connection between destruction in Europe and destruction in the US, since the US certainly could not be protected from the effects. For this reason, deterrence through coupling may be weakened under the nuclear war-fighting approach.

Under the assumption of BMD, there is a greater likelihood of

nuclear war in Europe alone. BMD breaks the connection between war in Europe and its escalation to war between the US and the USSR. US nuclear weapons would have less of a deterrent role for the Europeans. In fact, the opposite dynamics may come into play. A limited nuclear war in Europe may become more thinkable for the US and the USSR, since its escalation into a highly destructive strategic war may be prevented. Also, NATO allies would be open to increased probabilities of conventional war and the deterrent value of British and French nuclear forces would be gone (Glaser, 1984). The problems for NATO were also noted by Payne and Gray (1984).

Under the assumption of nuclear winter and BMD deployed equally, it is likely that the nuclear winter impact will overwhelm that of BMD, making a nuclear war in Europe less likely. Under the assumption of nuclear winter and BMD deployed unequally in favour of the US, a European nuclear war may be deterred both by the strong effect of nuclear winter and by Soviet estimates that the US might use nuclear weapons given its greater ability to protect itself.

(b) Persian Gulf

The Middle East is a second area of concern, given the oil supply interests of the West. Beres (1980) and Kahn (1984) see the control of the Persian Gulf oil fields as a potential conflict point between the US and the USSR. The scenario may involve civil war in Iran with the US intervening to control the oil fields. Soviet troops enter to counter this intervention. US-USSR violent interaction occurs and nuclear weapons are used. Kahn views this scenario as less likely than the European.

This scenario would involve few initial nuclear explosions. They would also be military targets more easily separable from cities than in the European scenario; therefore with less atmospheric impact. Nuclear winter considerations would have no direct impact on the decision to introduce nuclear use, but should lead to attempts to keep the use limited to the Gulf area.

With BMD in place equally for both the US and the USSR, the use of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf is more likely. There would be a probable perception that war would not extend to the US and the USSR. The view would be that the war could be kept localized.

Under the conditions of nuclear winter and BMD deployed equally, the original use of nuclear weapons is not likely to be inhibited. There would be attempts to limit the nuclear war to the Gulf but perhaps there would not be as much concern as under nuclear winter alone. Under the conditions of nuclear winter and BMD deployed to the advantage of the US, the US would be more likely to move to the use of nuclear weapons if militarily necessary. The US would be more confident that war would not escalate to its territory.

3. ACCIDENTAL WAR

At the present time in noncrisis conditions, the likelihood of accidental nuclear war is low (Kahn, 1984; Bracken, 1983). However, under crisis conditions, there is greater danger of an accident (Bracken, 1983 and Blair 1985). Wallace (1984) notes that the danger in crisis conditions increases due to the "vulnerability of the retaliatory forces of both sides to strategic preemption, and the unreliability of real-time tactical information concerning the actions of each other's strategic forces" (p.3). During a crisis, ordinary problems which are usually handled can lead to nuclear war. "In a crisis, each side's leaders are predisposed to believe the worst; they are bombarded with a plethora of information, much of it no doubt ambiguous, and some of it misleading or erroneous; ... the time available to check, confirm, or reinterpret this information before the 'use-them-or-lose-them' point is reached would only be a few minutes" (Wallace, 1984, p.5).²

The information of nuclear winter should increase the caution of the superpowers and therefore the likelihood of accidental nuclear war should decrease. However, each condition involving BMD would probably increase the chances of accidental nuclear war. The critical phase for successful BMD is the boost phase. This lasts from 3-5 minutes and therefore requires quick reaction with a complex series of operations which would be automated. The Union of Concerned Scientists (1984) discusses the places where increased danger of accidental nuclear war can occur. The software will be extremely complex and can never be fully tested. Human decision making time will be very short, because "boost-phase interceptions must be initiated within seconds of warning of an attack" (p.161). Components will be vulnerable and incentive to preemption would exist because BMD would be effective against a retaliatory attack but not a full-scale attack. BMD will increase the likelihood of accidental nuclear war.

CRISIS CONTROL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS

Ballistic missile defense more than nuclear winter should be the critical concern for crisis control. Under a range of likely defense deployments, strategic stability would be substantially decreased. The central difficulties would be the pressure for pre-emption and the decreased decision time. Ballistic missile defense also increases the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in two out of the four scenarios discussed — the Persian Gulf, and accidental war.

Prevention of deployment of ballistic missile defense systems would

² From 1978-1983, false alarms were occurring every two out of three days with the rate of increase exceeding 30% per annum (Wallace, 1984, p.7). The most serious false alarms lasted six minutes in 1979 and eight minutes in 1980. Wallace's (1984) simulation results show that "the most optimistic conclusion would suggest that a false alarm too long to be resolved within 10 days of the onset of a crisis" (p.11).

be a positive step toward crisis control. The first logical step is the maintenance and strengthening of the ABM Treaty (Glaser, 1985; Drell et al., 1984). Schwartz (1982) suggests a ban on all BMD systems and tests, "irrespective of form, function, mission, or location." He feels that a total ban would eliminate suspicion of a breakout. Garwin and Pike (1984) urge a ban on weapons in space. This also targets ASAT capabilities because anti-satellite capabilities "could be used to approach ballistic missile defense capabilities that are otherwise prohibited by the ABM Treaty" (p.45).

If both the US and the USSR were secure that neither would now deploy a BMD system, a second approach toward crisis stability could be undertaken. Substantial reduction of offensive weapons systems with subsequent deployment of BMD for defending silos is generally accepted as a stable situation (Schlesinger, 1985; Drell et al., 1984). An endoatmospheric system would be sufficient for this purpose of protecting ICBM's.

Nuclear winter presents some difficulties for democratic political systems, if the dominant nuclear war-fighting deterrence strategy is maintained in the future. In this case, nuclear winter may not make a major US-USSR war unthinkable. Such a war may be nuclear with high accuracy, low-yield, burrowing weapons which could destroy military targets. The war would be a protracted war extending over months or years with volleys from one to ten weapons. The military impacts of such a war have not yet seriously been examined, much less the economic and political impacts.

It is critical to begin the discussion of the political impacts of new directions in nuclear strategy. Falk (1982) has examined the political impacts on the United States of the present nuclear deterrence situation. He feels that nuclear weapons alone interfere with "democratic governance in fundamental ways." In support, Falk notes that serious consideration of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States has not been accompanied by sufficient information to the public. The US Government has not accepted the "notion of public accountability in the nuclear domain." Others have foreseen the possible need of the government to override the wishes of the public in the area of nuclear deterrence (Gompert et al., 1977). It appears that deterrence by planning to fight a protracted nuclear war may provide just such difficult circumstances for government. The targets in a protracted war would be the C3I network, the military and industries central to the economy. Mobility and concealment of military and C3I targets would be important. This would probably require increased military secrecy and the increase of areas under military control. Dispersion of military and economic targets would make the task of the attacker more difficult to accomplish with the limitations on number of nuclear weapons which could be used at any one time.

Some planning would require cooperation from a substantial proportion of the population. Plans must be devised to maintain the operation of the economy during the war, despite periodic strikes upon critical military-economic targets. The separation of critical sectors of the economy from military target areas may be one option. This may necessitate moving

industries to less urban areas. Such planning alone would require central government direction and counters the long tradition in the USA of minimal government interference in the economy. The US public would not easily acquiesce in such government planning, but the difficulties for the government in an actual protracted war would be extremely large. There would be civilian deaths and concerns about the increased radioactivity. The economy and standard of living would decline. The psychological state of uncertainty and pessimism for the future would take its toll. In such a case, democracy would most likely be substantially curbed. The general direction of nuclear strategy foreseen under the assumption of nuclear winter would present a potential threat to democratic government.

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Dr Anita Kemp and Professor Dorothy Seaberg at the Welcoming Party.

THE MORAL PREMISES OF NUCLEAR WAR

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ABSTRACT

We are often trapped in the preconceptions of a system of thought. The arms race is a moral issue with historical, social and psychological roots. In this paper I examine the thinking behind it: the myth of scientific expertise; the myth of the external present; the conceptual status of the 'other'; the consequences of defensiveness and its acceptable levels; the premise of mass genocide; the rights of children; the damage inflicted by undropped bombs; the harm inflicted by dual codes, and legitimate and illegitimate 'terrorism'.

In discussions of nuclear strategy and defense we are in danger of being drawn into an insane technical debate about types of weaponry and the levels of casualties that might ensue from a nuclear exchange.

A great deal depends of course upon the prior assumptions about the amount of megatonnage unleashed in such an exchange. There is a welter of 'rational' scientific argument about these assumptions. One finds apparently sane people talking poker-faced of acceptable levels of damage, when they are referring to hundreds of millions of casualties.¹

A recent study by SIPRI, an obscenarior for a nuclear exchange in the northern hemisphere (11,310 USSR missiles of 4,140 megatons against 12,840 US missiles of 3,510 megatons) estimates that within a day there would be 750 million dead and 340 million wounded. That is the scale of damage before the long term effects of radiation, ecological damage and pestilence have even been considered. Such a possibility makes the Jewish Holocaust look like a festival celebrating the brotherhood of man. Like many at the time of the Second World War, we know that preparation for

¹ For insane discourse see Scheer (1982) who talks about the long-term effects of radiation in the following way: 'if you spread the genetic damage over tens of thousands of years you have done something very useful'.

such a final solution are underway and many are willing partners in this global Treblinka (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1984).

The mere fact that we can even contemplate such horror is an extraordinary reflection on the emotional well-being of human kind. As MacLeish says '... knowledge without feeling is not knowledge, and can only lead to public irresponsibility and indifference, conceivably to ruin. When the fact is dissociated from the feel of the fact ... civilization is in danger' (in Grinspoon 1965, 126). Frequently, the fundamental moral issues of nuclear deterrence are concealed in arguments about levels of nuclear development, and in the extraordinary complexity of the strategic glossary. Grinspoon terms this propensity to seek refuge in expertise and facts 'used by those working on peace research as well as by those making preparations for war' — intellectualism (Grinspoon, 1965, 123). Another closely associated psychological defense mechanism, connected with the cult of the expert and the myth of detached scientism, is 'isolation' the means by which emotion is separated from fact (Grinspoon, 1965, 126).

It is a grotesque error to get lost in the more complex debates about levels of armaments and the banal technical glossary of psiloads and megadeath and all the tactical euphemisms which serve to disguise the awesome prospects of the end of life on this planet.² Obedience to authority (Milgram, 1974) and surrender to expertise is at the heart of this anticipated tragedy. We must reject the role of the expert and embrace our emotions when it comes to rejecting nuclear weapons as a means of defence. There are no experts when it comes to nuclear disarmament (Ford, 1982). We should be extremely skeptical about scientific 'rationality' and knowledge.

Consider a recent issue. Scientists had to go to Mars to discover that where there was fire there was smoke (Ehrlich et al., 1984; BMA, 1983). Since the discovery that a likely outcome of nuclear war will be a cloak of winter covering our planet, there has been some discussion of the likely drop in temperature should such a war happen and whether or not there would be any survivors. Scientists have not considered a vast number of other consequences of nuclear war. To the damage largely caused by smoke, we must add the hitherto ill-considered effects in addition to burns, fall-out, fire and smoke. Nuclear explosions will be augmented by silo explosions of target weapons, direct hits against nuclear power plants alone will cause radioactive contamination of vast areas of the planet. To this we must add the damage caused by hits on nuclear and industrial waste dumps, on toxic industries like Bhopal. We must also include the effects of releasing biological and nerve gas stockpiles and hits on genetic engineering laboratories. The apocalyptic vision of nuclear winter is magnified to unimaginable proportions when each of these dangers will be magnified a thousand fold by the synergistic presence of each of the others producing a complete and irreversible breakdown of the fabric of life on this planet.

² SIPRI glossary and Kidron and Smith (1983).

There is a danger that such a conclusion might prove an overwhelming and intolerable burden to humankind and result in a failure to adapt or an increased resort to denial, rationalization (It's so terrible it will never be used) (Grinspoon, 1965), and displacement (hyperactivity in related spheres of discourse). There is no doubt that movies like *Threads* and *The Day After* frequently produce this kind of response. However I believe we must face up to the overwhelming reality of a nuclear exchange and set out to create the therapeutic environment whereby disarmament begins immediately. Each faint ray of hope of survival after nuclear war aids psychological defense mechanisms and heightens the unreality of protagonists of deterrence. The denial of nuclear realities contributes to the possibility of nuclear war. Everyone should realize there is absolutely no hope of life remaining on this planet after a nuclear war. There should be no illusions, no quibbling on the temperature of nuclear winter or the number of post-holocaust survivors. The stark reality of the end of all life on this planet should provide the motivation for an overwhelming desire to destroy such weapons forthwith. But to understand the notion of a therapeutic environment we must first ask how is it possible to have arrived at this present position of utter lunacy. For it is real madness to have to discuss these appalling possibilities.

THE PREMISE OF INNATE AGGRESSION

It is important to consider this question, however briefly, because our image of humankind to a large extent determines our world view and our optimism concerning the arms race. It is often argued that people are naturally aggressive and that consequently war is inevitable. Even if true the connection between this proposition and the possibility of a reciprocal holocaust is tenuous, for we may be obliged to fight but not to destroy ourselves. Many writers have often sought to justify social hierarchy, dominance and war by myths of sociobiology. They build theories of human behaviour on an anthropomorphized natural world using highly selective accounts of animal behaviour. Such theories 'are demonstrably wrong' (Montagu 1978, 300). For example, our immediate relatives, the great apes, are extremely amiable.³ There is little that can be adduced from studies of animal behaviour to suggest that there is a drive to war. Even in warlike societies it is necessary to resort to a wide variety of sanctions and inducements to persuade people to fight.

Psychological theories of war are prone to move from individual acts to collective facts, an illogical procedure at best. The gentle side of human nature is proven by the relative infrequency of violence when it might be most expected between familiars in intense everyday contact and intimacy.

³ See also Caplan (1978). There are other more complex functional and ecological theories of warfare see Vayda (1976), Carneiro, R. (1970), Schorr (1974).

Even in these circumstances homicide is rare.⁴ It might be legitimate to talk about an instinct of aggression in individual acts of violence. But violent emotions are socially constructed as evidenced by the many cultural reasons stimulating anger and violence. Each form of violence is culturally moulded and constrained.⁵

Both ethological and psychological theories would presuppose a relatively fixed expression and incidence of warfare, but there has been a high degree of variation cross-culturally and, perhaps more crucially historically, within cultures. 'As an impulse, pugnacity is infinitely plastic. As a type of behaviour, fighting can be linked with an indefinitely wide range of cultural motives' (Malinowski 1983: 86). Modern ethnography suggests that many early human groups lived in relative harmony with one another or at the very least in balanced hostility with raiding between groups and warfare being highly regulated. Many traditional societies have elaborate procedures for the avoidance of violence.⁶ Amongst the most important of these is the principle of reciprocity within groups and hospitality between potentially hostile groups. Some peoples like Australian Aborigines share common rural practices, a source of communication and friendly intercourse. Social relations between such groups are lubricated by complex mechanisms of exchange and ceremony. There are other means of channelling potential violence like song contests, potlatches and organized brawls; and there is a difference between communal and intertribal fights. Most fighting when it occurs takes place between members of the same tribal group.

In those societies which practice feud there are many internal control practices prior to full scale violence breaking out. The feud itself contains strong elements of social control; and group responsibility which limits the extent of violence. It is important to realize that the pursuit of vengeance is a conscious obligation separate from an unconscious instinct of aggression.

The plasticity of human violence is shown by an historical look at the evolution of war: weaponry and the rules of war. Evidence from preindustrial societies points to the lack of uniform expression of aggression both in individual acts and organized fighting. Primitive warfare comes closest in appearance to agonistic behaviour in animals, since it is often highly ritualized and remarkably different from modern warfare. But certain types of primitive warfare may serve religious or ecological purposes; as such they are forerunners of modern warfare.

⁴ Even in violent prone societies evidence suggests complex social causes for violence see Brown (1969).

⁵ The following discussion draws on Westermarch 1912, 327 ff. and Malinowski, B. (1973).

⁶ Socialization for aggression varies considering see Montagu (1978) and Kahnert et al (1983). As Malinowski (1973) points out educational power in many cultures is directed towards the elimination of violence and there are many examples of elaborate intertribal avoidance (1971-83). The definition of human nature varies considerably between and within cultures.

Malinowsky makes a distinction between primitive and modern war saying that only when portable property and concentrated wealth appear does war as we know it occur; 'war is an armed contest between two independent political units, by means of organized military force, in pursuit of national policy' (Malinowski, 1973). In Malinowski's terms, the prototype of modern warfare is organized violence between opposing groups of political and territorial purposes.

Wright states that war, in the sense of a legal situation permitting groups to expand wealth and power by violence, began with civilization:

Only among civilised people has war been an institution serving political and economic interests of the community, defined by a body of law which states the circumstances justifying its use, the procedures whereby it is begun and indeed, and the methods by which it is conducted.

Wright (1965) follows Malinowski in restricting the definition of war to the organised pursuit of tribal policy. (In my view this does not necessarily stand up to close examination, although scale, and sophistication increase with centralization).

Otterbein in a study of 46 societies 'excluding peasant communities and modern nations' defines war as:

armed combat between political communities. Armed combat, which is fighting with weapons, is performed by military organizations. When warfare occurs between political communities which are not culturally similar, this is referred to as external war. If there is more than one military organization within a political community, and these military organizations engage in armed combat, this is considered feuding or civil war, depending upon the scope of the conflict (Otterbein, 1970, 3).

On the whole more centralized societies have more efficient military organisations, more hierarchy, initiate civil and external war more frequently and sustain heavier casualty rates.

Otterbein found that most societies fought for revenge or defense. In order of ascending cause in relation to centralization, defense, plunder prestige and control and causes of war with defense being one of the fundamental reasons for war, although it is frequently found in combination with the other reasons mentioned. There are some non-centralized societies who fight for none of these reasons. What emerges from this study is important to the main theme of my paper; defensiveness is a prime cause of war, and as Bodley (1976) points out, military sophistication is associated with increased incidence of warfare in primitive cultures and pre-industrial states. We might conclude from the data that the increased sophistication and defensiveness will provoke war rather than prevent it.

Another important feature of this research was the difficulty of defining the meaning of victory. The goals and outcomes of war Otterbein (1970) found to be largely indeterminate. (He finally decided to measure military success in terms of territorial expansion). This is borne out by a recent study of war in advanced societies which says that victors in a third of the many wars studied between 1816-1982 emerged with greater number

of casualties.

Perhaps more ominous with regard to anachronistic nuclear thinking is the finding that 'initiators "win" in almost 70 percent of the interstate wars, and they sustain fewer battle deaths than their "victims" in 60 percent of the cases' (Small & Singer 1982: 294).

Warfare, in broad evolutionary perspective, has always submitted to rules, but over the centuries larger numbers of people have been drawn into its orbit. Further evidence for the non instinctual nature of human violence and war is the way laws regulating violence between individuals differ culturally and historically and the way the rules of war have altered even within cultures. Only during the Second World War did we accept the notion of Blitzkrieg and the mass bombing of civilian populations. Prior to the Second World War the conventions excluding non-combatants were largely adhered to. This war saw a gradual acceptance of routine massacre of innocents:

There was, therefore, for the public at large, no decisive moment of change; no point at which the political or military authorities declared their repudiation of the belief that the deliberate massacre of civilians, of women, children, of people and any others not engaged in combat, was not a legitimate means of waging wars. Rather, we slid into a new attitude, eased into it by slogans about 'total war' and 'there are no civilians nowadays'. No one said that we were committing crimes of just the kind that we had instanced proving Nazi barbarism (Dummett 1984, 31).

This was ended with the unnecessary atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Townsend, 1984). Genocide and atomic war became accepted as potential instruments of national policy. Yet the rules of war would seemingly prohibit the use of nuclear weapons even in defense.⁷ The Hague convention limits unnecessary suffering and uncontrolled damage to property. The Martens clause, used at the Nuremberg trials, refers to conventions of civilized behaviour, 'the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience'. The '1925 Geneva protocol bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all the analogous liquids, materials or devices in addition to bacteriological methods of warfare' (Blackaby et al., 1984, 7). The 1949 Geneva convention strictly limits neutral power involvement. The Protocol of 1977 prohibited weapons causing 'widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment' (Blackaby, 1984, 8).

The sheer impact of even the smallest weapons and the nature of nuclear explosions makes the modern rules of war impossible to apply. The immediate damage to civilian life and property, the oxygen fires and the radioactive contamination immediately offends the rules of international law. Beyond this there are the long term ecological and meteorological effects.

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⁷ From *No-First-Use* SPR1 (1984: 6)ff.

In sum, war is often less an example of natural aggressiveness than of altruism. It is possible that the high degree of altruism and cooperation required by human groups was at least as important a factor in social success, coming to the force in certain ecological and social contexts. It could be argued that war as a cultural invention conferred an evolutionary advantage. This may mean that warfare is an intrinsic part of cultural behaviour; however since it is cultural it is possible to modify or eliminate it. Studies of war reveal its variability. They also suggest that far from evolution from a state of savagery the reverse is true. Our evolution seems to be towards a state of unparalleled barbarity. Evidence suggests that we are doing our gentle simian forbears a great disservice in attributing to them the responsibility for the evils of our civilization.

Wars are fought in cold blood not under the direct impulse of aggression for religious reasons, patriotism, ideology and indoctrination, nationalism, imperialism and totalitarianism. Pressing the buttons to destroy the world is probably the least imaginable act of aggression.

All arguments about the rules of war first strike and deterrence in relation to nuclear weapons are redundant because of the terminal character of nuclear war. Mass genocide is fundamentally immoral even if carried out in defense. It is of no comfort to know that millions of other children have perished in the holocaust. We should listen to the voices of the children of Hiroshima.

The puzzle remains how is it possible to have reached a stage in history where all rules of war have been cast aside? How can we contemplate inflicting on ourselves in the name of defense the most unspeakable horrors imaginable? I suggest we must look at the phenomenon of projection and examine the way human beings regarded strangers and enemies and the way we attribute to them all kinds of nastiness.

THE PREMISE OF EVIL

Each group sees itself as the centre of the universe, as the people and the nation. A consequence of this is that murder of a stranger is generally not as problematic as murder within the group. Many peoples regard the killing of a stranger as a prestigious act. There have been some notable exceptions like the central Australian Aborigines, the Veddahs and the Greenlanders. Sometimes strangers are at risk for religious reasons, for example the Mayas often fought to supply sacrificial victims for their guardian deities, satisfying their Gods at the same time as increasing their domain. In preindustrial society a stranger is often subject to special protection if only for a limited period. By and large 'primitive' societies with their rules of hospitality and avoidance, are much more civilized in their behaviour than 'advanced' societies. Even cannibalism has its advantages. Bertrand Russell once said that modern war might cease if we had to eat our victims.

Among many traditional holistic societies there exists a belief in witchcraft and sorcery. People in these societies think that illness and accidents are caused by personal malevolence, and there exist institutional means for diagnosis and cure. Primitive witchcraft was comparatively tame; although all kinds of events were attributed to human malevolence there existed the means to order and control it. Accusations of witchcraft were not necessarily directed towards outsiders.

In Europe the ideas about witchcraft and the conceptual status of the stranger developed differently. Early Christian thinkers totally condemned warfare. It was Saint Augustine who made it possible to take up arms on behalf of the state, although strict penance was often required for those who killed in war.

Under this system of belief any action against infidels was so full of merit that it obliterated the guilt of the most atrocious crimes. Fighting against infidels took rank with fastings, penitential discipline, visits to shrines, and alms giving, as meriting divine mercy. Thus the crusading church did battle against any unbelievers, Moslems, Jews and heretics. At the same time religious zeal was often a mask for avarice and power. 'The church was to be the master of earth rather than the servant of heaven'. Chivalry and religion were fused in the common purpose of conquest. The sword and the cross were identical; the state might lawfully make war upon a heretic people which was spreading heresy, and upon a pagan people which prevented the preaching of the gospel. Religion and conquest were identical, religion provided the ideological justification for homicide and theft on a vast scale. The violence of the crusades was paralleled and even exceeded by the European witchcraze, which lasted over centuries.

Many people may have perished in the European witchcraze. Over the centuries this kind of belief combined with ideas of heresy lead to massive persecution and the murder of large segments of the population.

Cohn, in an enquiry into the European witch hunt, puts it down to a specific fantasy of 'an inner society of antihumans engaged in abominable practices threatening the existence of society from within (Cohn, 1975). This collective fantasy, which focussed on the idea of the existence 'of a child-eating, orgiastic, Devil-worshipping sect' was the product of the Establishment. Monks, bishops and popes, kings and great nobles, orthodox theologians, inquisitors and magistrates... stalwarts of their law and their order. Witchcraft became a way of rooting out dissidents, manorial dependents like old widows, any who stood in the way of the Church and the state in thought and deed. Those who opposed the expansionist elites through different world views perished. Any notion of cultural relativity was deeply threatening to a self-righteous and expanding state.

As Westermarck (1912) has noted, dissidents were often those who upheld the peaceful values of the Christian Church. Historians write as if this murderous passion for destroying the pagan, the Other declined. Witchcraft accusations may have declined around the mid seventeenth

century in Europe, but greed and the bloodthirst for the demonic found rich pastures abroad in the expansion of Europe. The inhumanity to members of different cultures was a logical extension of crusades and the European witchcraze. As Galeano writes: "America was the vast kingdom of the Devil, its redemption impossible or doubtful; but the fanatical mission against the natives heresy was mixed with the fever that the New World treasures stirred in the conquering hosts" (Galeano, 1973, 23).

Non-Christian natives were by definition allied to the demonic, evil and inhuman category of beings. Bodley (1975) estimates 50 million tribal people perished between 1780 and 1930. The murder of Latin American Indians began much earlier of course; the foundation of this exploration and extermination was a categorization of Otherness.

Otherness and projection of evil, the Satanizing of the victim seem inevitable components of state formation.

In the twentieth century these crusading murderous tendencies have reached new heights of perfection culminating in the holocaust of the Second World War (Kenrick & Puxon, 1972). Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only possible by a similar kind of exclusion — as a race beyond the pale with antihuman characteristics. The Japanese, as much as anything else, were punished for having different definitions of conduct and contrasting concepts of the person.

The pathologizing of the Other is a necessary component of the most bestial human behaviour, stripping away the last vestiges of civilized behaviour, appealing to the basest bigotry and ignorance and tearing away the rules and conveniences of war that have so frequently governed face to face conflict between men, creating groups of people to whom the rules of conduct including the rules of war cease to apply (Hirst & Wolley, 1982). Because of their imagined crimes they cease to be seen as human beings and as a consequence may be submitted even in the imagination to the most mind-defying inhuman acts.

The main point here is that the premise of the possibility of nuclear war could only be based on a prior pathologizing of the enemy by the attribution of all possible means of evil onto that enemy. Without this dehumanizing ideology even nuclear retaliation would be inconceivable. It is only possible to consider such an act against something so absolutely evil that it no longer shares the remotest resemblance to a human being. It would appear that the capacity to stereotype large masses of the population prior to their extermination is preceded by, or highly correlated with, the technological means of their removal. 'Once a nation bases its security on an absolute weapon, such as the atom bomb, it becomes psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy.'

PROJECTION AND ENMITY

The most serious problem of maintaining a constant state of armed

readiness and a defensive posture is that it maintains the very conditions in one's own and the enemy's society that one wishes to avoid. May writes that William Fulbright pointed out how the Cuban missile and U-2 cruises were interpreted as aggressive acts and the USA responded accordingly; subsequently Khrushchev, who sought friendly relations with the United States was deposed by more Hawkish generals. 'Nations, in their misreading of the motives of other nations, can do what the paranoid patient does: they can work against their own interests because of their projection and aggression' (May, 1972, 186).

Each side is thus engaged in the social construction of a system of meaning which constantly reaffirms its worst fears. In this example it could have made as much sense, as May says, to perceive the Russians as acting from fear rather than aggression. Given Russian losses in the Second World War and their encirclement by missiles this could be a reasonable alternative to consider.

Since 1917 the West has often acted in such a way as to confirm Russian fears and therefore ensure itself the closed nature of Russian society. The most important part of this dispute about the social construction of reality is that the chief negative characteristics of the Russian social system as perceived by the West may indeed be the creation of the West and vice versa. Internally in the West the fear of communism has led to primitive witchhunts and externally to the labelling of a whole nation as an empire of evil. Each side's worst characteristics are thereby maintained by fear and projection.

PREMISE OF DETERRENCE AND PEACE

One of the most flimsy defenses of nuclear deterrence is that it has maintained the peace since 1945. We say that weapons must not be used, that they are only a deterrent; yet at the same time we must convince the other of new possible use by creating cleverer and cleverer weapons that are able to avoid the detection of the enemy. We thus convince the enemy that we are as evil and malevolent as he first thought. The presence of nuclear weapons confirms the hideousness of the enemy and is a direct cause of war. This reciprocal paranoia of the Cold War has fanned the flames of all the repression and proxy wars in the respective political spheres of the great powers.

Western wars against peoples in the Third World are considered pardonable in face of the perceived threat of Communist domination. Russia rationalizes its behaviour in crushing dissent in satellite countries under its domination. Each side views its side as defense and the others defense as belligerence.

At another level the spiralling economic cost of the arms race, particularly in poor countries, has had disastrous economic effects. An important point here is that modern weaponry not only impoverishes but

also stifles the development of freedom and creates the conditions of fear which feeds on itself. The use of money for weapons instead of welfare creates the conditions for opposition (Sivard, 1980, 1985).

The channelling of much needed development funds to weapons is in itself a direct source of dissent, internal revolution and internal repression. The unrest serves to confirm the paranoia which feeds the arms which cause the poverty which causes the unrest. The poor are robbed to arm the nation against its collective nightmares. The education, hospitals, food which might act as a balm to nations troubled by violence are denied.

The social deprivation and distortion which is a consequence of projection feeds the flames of the projective system which is its cause. The weapons portray the bearer's inner state of mind more than representing real threat. In the nuclear age this defensiveness is more absurd.

The Cold War is a system of primitive thought and projection which is worsened by each new phase in the arms race. It is a function of witchcraft accusations to define group boundaries and solidarity. The fears and hostilities of the Cold War function in a similar war. Thompson suggests that in the Cold War; 'Both adversaries need to maintain a hostile ideological position, as a means of internal bonding of discipline' (Thompson, 1982, 23).

I suggest that the situation is more complex than that since the behaviour exhibited in the Cold War contains embedded attitudes and ritual oppositions from the past. Indeed, although these fears unite in some sense, they also through an increasing burden on citizens fan the flames and internal dissent and threaten the state from within. By building up our defenses far and beyond any reasonable necessity we create the conditions of our own paranoia; we resemble a man advancing towards the enemy holding a gun at his head and threatening to shoot. Like Kafka's Vole we are so well defended we are totally vulnerable. Heretics and dissidents pay the price in both systems. And projection makes prisoners of us all.

THE PREMISE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

One of the premises of nuclear weapons is that they deter nuclear wars; their justification rests however on their potential use. Many writers have noted that a realistic deterrent must be incorporated into war plans. The presence of a nuclear deterrent is therefore a most grotesque piece of terrorism and an unforgivable piece of global risk-taking. Nuclear weapons are a direct source of conflict, their threatened use even in retaliation would be an absolute act of wickedness as well as an irrevocable act of folly. Genocide nor complicity in genocide should not, under any circumstances, be an instrument of national policy.

Condoning the threat of nuclear retaliation is totally bereft of any notion of morality. Aside from all other considerations the governments which take part in maintaining the state of nuclear terror have forfeited the

right to expect decent standards of behaviour from their own citizens. Governments cry out against terrorism when they have no standards of morality of their own to protect: a hijacker threatens only one aeroplane, nuclear states and nuclear allies threaten the whole spaceship earth and the rights of unborn generations. Internal unrest and growing violence stem not only from the economic and social distortions of the arms race but from the very immorality of the weapons themselves. Deterrence rests on the potential use of nuclear weapons, any use of which would lead to the unleashing of firepower 6000 times that of World War II (Willens, 1984). Thus nuclear terrorism places an intolerable burden of fear on us all.

THE THREAT OF IMPENDING DISASTER

A further premise of nuclearism is that and each new level of chimerical threat is an acceptable condition of existence.⁸ Research continues to show that children and young people are increasingly despairing about their prospects of survival in a nuclear world. The threat of nuclear war is one of the chief causes of suicide of young people.

Cynicism is replacing idealism as a natural phase of youthful development. Under these conditions personal development and choice is as distorted as the present becomes an intense substitute for an unreliable future. On its own the destruction of hope and optimism is too high a price to pay.

How we have reached this situation of civilized madness is of course extremely complex. Although modern states may be accused of all kinds of contemporary wickedness the danger lies in the way systems of thought and action become embedded during the process of evolution. The arms race carries with it the emotional and intellectual baggage of many centuries of systemic evolution. This process continues into the present, and disengagement is extremely difficult because of the modern bureaucratic apparatus of the state which includes the arms control and producing agencies. At the same time weapon systems develop, it is increasingly possible to get snarled up in the technological expertise apparently required to discuss disarmament.

Intrinsic to this system of behaviour is the cybernetic feedback of paranoia, each action being met with an equal and opposite reaction as long as mutual defensiveness is maintained. We have overcapitalised centuries of stupidity. At the heart of the Cold War, especially in the complicity of the citizens, in a projective system not very different at all from witch fears of the past.

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⁸ A most extraordinary feature of this situation is the way that each new phase in the arms race is regarded as normal so that reductions to a previous phase of nuclear terror is seen an advance (see Schell, 1984).

AGAINST PROJECTION

The mode of thought dominating the Cold War relies on ignorance and fear and differs little from patterns of hostility between individuals. The cure is the same. The more knowledge we have of the Other and the more communication there is between us the less we have to fear and the more possible are friendly relations. Firstly I suggest an international peace corps exchange between Iron Curtain countries and the West. Secondly I propose that disarmament should begin with one missile at a time. Because of the nature of the projective system large reductions in arms is deeply threatening. I propose we freeze all future developments and destroy one missile at a time on a tit-for-tat basis in televised public ceremonies of celebration.

What I also propose that we dismantle the structures of enmity and replace them with an unparalleled increase in international communication during IYP and after. There has been a vast increase in the possibility of international communication which has paralleled improvements in military technology. We should turn the technology that threatens us with extinction to our advantage. The technology exists for international networking on a vast scale prefigured by McLuhan's term the 'global village'. The two main instruments used would be international television networking and modern communication. The Geldorf experiment may not have altered the social structures of society but it did two very important things; it showed how quickly an international network of television communication could be set up, and secondly, and most importantly, it raised the hopes and aspirations of millions of young people around the world.

During the International Year of Peace I suggest that the same national television stations continue to remain open on weekly basis, if necessary under government subsidy. The same network should be used to broadcast feature documentaries about cultures on either side of the East-West divide and they also be used as open forums by means of which members of one culture may quiz members of another. In the international scheme the major parties should be the Soviet Union and America and the other nuclear armed states. One particular advantage of this system of international communication is that it cuts across official levels of interpretation.

Alongside the global network of twinning audio visual communications through television and telephone using new technology there should be a crash programme in films which enhance international understanding. Television companies in the west should be asked to broadcast at least 25 percent of their programming to films commissioned to remove barriers of ignorance. Although television stations programme managers and news-readers would be involved in this process it is essential that ordinary people have access to each other. Television world network should be public access. In particular children's questions and appeals should be answered across cultures and within cultures.

Part of this scheme for IYP would be that each of the nuclear

nations undertake a national children's TV/radio question and lobby session. Local stations can network with the capitol to provide feedback to children chosen to represent their district. Children have a right to ask for a meaningful notion of posterity. Our new technology provides a way of doing so.

AUDIO VISUAL COMMUNICATION

The networking should include at the very least two or three hours of top level audio-visual communication between Reagan and Gorbachev each week. There is no more important issue than global survival and both leaders could show how serious they are by committing themselves in this way. Other politicians in the west could be twinned with politicians in the Eastern bloc. Workers and their counterparts in East and West should be paired off in a similar fashion. In other areas of the world, in particular where conflict is ripe, such audiovisual communications systems between opponents could be subsidised by a special UN fund.

At another level administrative districts, cities, councils and schools should be twinned so that every Russian, East German, North Korean child and adult i.e. people living in the flashpoint areas of the world, would be in direct communication with partners in the west.

This mode of direct communication would in the first place be through computer modem systems via the telephone. The marvellous thing about this system is its immediacy which is a complete change from the past and the dreadful slowness of postal communications. It is also possible to send modified visual accompaniment via video cameras.⁹

Modern computer technology revolutionizes the possibility of international communication so urgently needed to counteract the fears generated by our projective system.

Nuclear war is a moral, not a scientific or technical, problem. It stems from an insane system of thought which we should totally reject. We now have the means to escape from it and create the atmosphere of trust and cooperation necessary to set peace in motion and put to sleep the 'dogs of war'.

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⁹ The school level radio communications might be established and videos exchanged. Video-pals could replace penpals.

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THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE NUCLEAR DEBATE

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with various nuclear questions and more precisely the debate over the dangers of nuclear weapons, the implications of nuclear proliferation, the underlying debate on the nuclear strategy and finally suggestions on the possibility and probability of nuclear arms control and disarmament. It also concludes that rationality and farsightedness are vital issues in the nuclear field, not only for the Superpowers, not only for their friends and foes, but for all mankind. Furthermore, every sensitive and informed mind has reason to hope that the decision-making elites in the nuclear weapons countries are capable of selecting rational options even amidst the vortices of acute crises.

In the almost four decades since the advent of nuclear weapons, debate over the dangers these weapons create has varied considerably. A preoccupation with these weapons has characterized only a very few, even among those few, anxiety over the possibility and probability of nuclear war has not been an inevitable factor. Beyond the nuclear analysts, strategists and their small entourage, the nuclear problems have not generated a steady level of attention, let alone of anxiety. On the other side of the spectrum of the nuclear debate, the attention of decision-making elites, and even more the general public, has vacillated from one extreme to the other with deep yearnings for resolution (Prasad, 1979).

It is fallacious to think in conventional terms about nuclear questions and, more particularly, about nuclear arms control and disarmament. But what is fairly clear to people speaking theoretically about certain problems in the present strategic environment, is not necessarily obvious and tenable to the decision-making elites. In simple terms, there lies an ensemble of differences between our traditional levels of thought and

action, and the objective situations in which we live.

The emergence of nuclear power, more precisely in the form of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems, has added a new chapter in the history of mankind which is different from all of the recorded history until 1945.

It is an undeniable reality that in the contemporary world the nuclear weapons and their vertical and horizontal proliferation, and the potential dangers of crypto-nuclear proliferation have not promoted, but have threatened the security of all nations, great and small. With the emergence of land-based, sea-borne and air-borne nuclear capabilities, even the homelands of the Superpowers have become vulnerable to attack. Aims for global peace are engulfed in greater trouble. The fundamental point is that there lies no credible military defence against the increased potency of offensive nuclear weapon systems. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so multifarious, is so staggering for human consideration, that it is inconceivable in view of the present technological breakthroughs to invent a credible defence against nuclear over-kill. The SALT Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was concluded in view of the fact that the development of fool proof ABM systems is both highly costly and technologically unattainable. But it should again be borne in mind how firm the efforts were on both sides to seek a defence against nuclear weapons, for once a defence against nuclear weapons was found, the principal deterrent against nuclear weapons would vanish. If the nuclear powers, and more particularly the USA and the USSR, could expect to come out of a nuclear war alive, then to fight or not to fight nuclear war becomes simply like the approach to conventional war.

If we try to consider tactical nuclear war as an attempt to wage nuclear war, we find that an ensemble of inter-related questions come to mind. The strategic schools in different parts of the world have debated these questions without ever reaching a conclusion. First, the distinction is not so much in the objective conditions on the battlefield as in the thought and action of the military planner, or director of the operations of war. Incidentally, the reality is that many nuclear weapons, including the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, of the pre-nuclear era are today characterized as tactical nuclear weapons, this reveals how far the domain of tactics can be extended to encompass what generally would be admitted as strategy. What might be considered by one side as a tactical initiative may thus be regarded by the other side as a strategic manoeuvre, and the response of the other side may either be regarded in tactical or strategic terms by the other side. Since in such circumstances both sides are inclined to adopt a worst-case interpretation to the conditions, that is to say the worst in the form of the objectives of the adversary, the distinction is destined to break down off hand. And we may find that both sides are engaged in an unlimited strategic nuclear war, not because either side intended it, but because the objective dynamism of the initial step leaves neither side an option. Second, there is a fallacy that nuclear weapons are safe with the five nuclear weapon countries. A vast volume of strategic literature has grown to foster the

impression that nuclear weapons are under the tight central political control of the nuclear weapons countries; that there were huge command and control mechanisms for the application of nuclear weapons; that these mechanisms check an unauthorized or accidental flow of nuclear weapons to the unauthorized. These assumptions and arguments could have been repeated in the late 1960s and the '70s, because the strategic literature on command and control was scattered and the issue was highly technical (Rajamohan, 1985). However, in the last few years the technology and doctrine of command and control of nuclear weapons have brought us face to face with a negative point, revealing that human limitations in formulating and communicating commands will be a principal difficulty in increasingly complex command, control and communications systems. In anticipating this problem, further researches have been initiated by the USA and the USSR and their respective allies. But contemporary thinking on the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons asserts that nuclear weapons can not be safe in the hands of developing countries; that these countries do not have access to the sophisticated technologies of command, control and communication systems; that many of them are politically unstable; that the politically hyperactive military dictators in certain ruling circles could recklessly resort to the use of nuclear weapons; that this kind of nuclear use in the present strategic environment would ultimately involve the nuclear weapon powers, tending to an unlimited nuclear war.

Moreover, the possible outcome of the use of nuclear weapons has become a point of serious concern. The more scientists endeavour conscientiously to compute the severest outcome of nuclear warfare, the more dreadful are the findings. Previously, it was normally endorsed that the most dangerous consequence of a nuclear warfare would be the enormous casualties in the northern hemisphere. It was presumed that large populations in the non-combatant regions would remain safe, though they would be entrapped by acute socio-economic challenges. As a matter of fact, the long-term consequences of a nuclear exchange tended to be underplayed because of the complexities involved in such predictions. However, serious apprehensions about possible long-term holocausts were expressed by a number of scientists and analysts on several occasions.

For example, a 1980 United Nations study on nuclear weapons, while focusing on the devastation likely to result from a nuclear war, drew the attention of the people towards its "physical effects influencing the environment" (UN Group of Experts, 1981). The United Nations study did caution that although the recovery period linked with possible "global climatic changes" due to a large nuclear war would probably be only a few years, contemporary knowledge was inadequate to definitely rule out more persistent effects.

The US National Academy of Sciences report in 1975 (NAS 75) concluded that: (a) it is possible that a large nuclear war would cause irreversible adverse effects on the environment and the ecological system; (b) in particular, it would not require very large changes to greatly curtail

the production of food; and (c) the physical and biological processes encompassed are not understood well enough to say just how such irreversible damage, if it occurred, would take place.

The findings of an international study sponsored by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences indicated that smoke from fires ignited by a nuclear war might bring about a world of "twilight at noon" (Crutzen & Birks, 1982). The TTAPS (an acronym of the authors last names — Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack and Sagan) study, "The Long-Term Atmospheric and Climatic Consequences of a Nuclear Exchange", popularly known as the nuclear winter theory, predicts that, in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict, large parts of the planet Earth could be subjected to protracted darkness, abnormally low temperatures, violent wind storms, toxic smog and persistent radioactive fallout. The TTAPS group believes that more recent studies based on more accurate models of the general circulation of the Earth's atmosphere than the models they used, have come to validate both their investigative approach and the central thrust of their speculations (Turco et al., 1983).

It tends to be confirmed by the findings of the US National Academy of Sciences report at the end of 1984 (NAS 85) that a large nuclear war would obscure the sun for a prolonged period and bring on freezing temperatures with disastrous long-term consequences in the northern hemisphere. It seems that the world may be confronted with a choice between darkness at noon in political terms or darkness at noon in literal terms.

Latest researches on possible global nuclear catastrophe tend to generalize about the effects of a nuclear exchange. As a matter of fact, scientists may strive to calculate the destruction likely to happen from the effects of a single blast; radiation; radioactive fallout; fire storms; the disruptions of the electronic systems due to the electromagnetic pulse; damage to the ecosystem; and climactic holocaust, or the devastation of the ozone layer in the stratosphere which safeguards life on Earth. What is far more difficult is to calculate the synergic outcomes of the simultaneous interplay of all these effects in conjunction with the economic, social and political disruption of life.

The TTAPS study and the NAS 85 report on nuclear winter theory give rise to a number of questions about the incompatibility of contemporary nuclear doctrines and plans in conjunction with the quantitative and qualitative developments in the nuclear weapon systems that back up those plans. Beyond the nuclear strategic postures of the Super-Powers, the nuclear winter theory has some arms control implications. The explosion of nuclear weapons near or above the threshold would be, one can admit, in contravention of the 1977 Geneva Convention on the Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, concluded by 48 countries and ratified by both the Super Powers. Furthermore, the nuclear winter theory, with its global hazards creates an irony of fate for any idea of nuclear weapons free zones in any region of the planet Earth and even in the space.

Many developing countries recognise that they have been entrapped in the vortex of nuclear threat. While their concern and irritation have appeared in the form of appeals for farsightedness and sanity from the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement and other popular organisations and forums ask for a greater awareness of the nuclear effects at different levels as a necessary pre-requisite for concerted political actions and dialogues on nuclear arms control and the related issues.

Contrary to the appeals of the developing world for meaningful negotiations on arms control, the debate on nuclear strategy continues. On strategy, the Soviets do not seem to have engaged in the process of protracted discussions that have taken place in the West. Although political decision-makers in the Soviet Union have stated that no country can survive a nuclear war, and that such a war is a delusion, one can argue that the Soviets here adopted the position that working for nuclear disarmament and at the same time having nuclear weapons to safeguard their interests and security in the contemporary world are not contradictory. Soviet strategic thinking runs along the line that deterrence can be achieved only by forces and programmes designed to fight a nuclear war, to win it, and to survive it (Hilsman, 1985).

And this Soviet position generates the debate on strategy in the West focussed on just what constitutes an adequate deterrent. The debate seems to suggest four different strategies. One is to adopt Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as a strategy. A second strategy constitutes a mix of deterrence and nuclear arms control to render what is deemed to be a realistic deterrent. A third strategy concentrates on the continuous endeavours of the United States to develop a technology that will strengthen counter-force capability as each new development becomes practicable. The fourth is to have the United States strive to create a defence capability against the missiles based in space — the US President Reagan's much debated Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (Popularly known as "Star Wars").

MAD as a strategy originates with the assumption that no one can be victor in a nuclear war, no matter what. Because of this, the debate moves ahead, a comparatively small force would be needed to act as an adequate deterrent. It may be a policy factor in the United States.

In a MAD strategy, nuclear forces would be designed solely for a second strike against population centres. The efforts would be to continue the policy for not providing for civil defence preparedness. The reasons are two fold. First, no one has developed a technology for restraining the missiles from reaching their targets once launched. Second, even a considerably ineffective preparation to save population centres is inconceivably expensive. As a result, very little attention has been paid towards civil defence. Thus in MAD strategy, civilian population would be left unprotected as a matter of policy, rather than because of inadequacy of technology and high costs. The population centres would be deliberately left hostages to the US insistence of not embarking either on nuclear war, or

on the jig-saw puzzle of decisions, with the prominent danger being the stimulating of a nuclear war. This strategy would provide enough opportunity to make a fresh endeavour to reach an agreement on arms control. Because the strategy is non-provocative, it would provide strong incentives to negotiate. But there seem to be two demerits in this strategy. First, it might be difficult to maintain its credibility. Second, if deterrence fails, retaliation against population centres is neither a moral action nor a comprehensive one in the sense of achieving any gains.

So far as the debate on realistic deterrence strategy is concerned, it is based on the proposition that the Soviet Union is as frightened of a nuclear war as the USA is. It assumes that a counter-force strategy that is only partially effective is still more effective as a deterrent than a counter-population strategy. The US advocates of this strategy are less optimistic that human race can abolish war in the short run, and they base their argument on the assumption that the Soviets are rational people with natural human fears and reasonableness.

The demerits of the realistic deterrent strategy are also two fold. The first is that the Soviet intentions on which the basic premise of this strategy is based may be too optimistic. The second is that some new inventions, technological advances and discoveries may make it possible to win a nuclear war, and any such strategy that fails to provide the inclusion of a programme of developing new weapons of aggressive designs runs the risk that the other side will develop first.

So far as "counterforce" strategy is concerned, it would necessarily prevail in terms of a defence buildup of all sorts of armaments. It would not provide much opportunity to devote endeavours to negotiating arms control, since its advocates regard these as worthless or even detrimental. Negotiations would be held primarily out of political indispensability and arms control treaties and agreements would be concluded only on approaches and measures that mainly add to the over-all US strategic posture. But one thing to be said is that, like the Americans, the Soviets will accept an agreement in the context to the over-all strategy they are pursuing to enhance their security.

So far as US President Reagan's "Star Wars" strategy is concerned, it begins with the proposition that, by now, the choice for defence is confined to deterrence, arms control, or a combination of the two, and it is necessary to embark on a massive research programme to resort to the possibility of defence. The proposal is to develop a defence system based in space that would stop the enemy missiles from reaching the United States' homeland.

At present, the main debate on the strategy is centred around Mr Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative or star wars strategy. The critics' objections to this strategy are numerous. Firstly, the necessary systems have yet to be developed and may not be even feasible. Secondly, it involves incomprehensible expenditure. A third objection is that even if the system can be developed numerous counter-measures are open to the Soviets.

Satellites are highly vulnerable, and unless adequate approaches are found to permit the satellites to survive a first strike, the SDI would be very destabilising rather than stabilising.

The critics' objections seemed to be substantiated by the confirmation made by the officials of the US Department of Defense, as Reported in the *New York Times* on 22 February 1985, that although the objective is to offer defence for cities eventually, the programme would start some time in the 1990s with a partial defence to safeguard US missiles, with the intention of having to develop into a defence system for cities in the next century.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Taken, finally, the question of nuclear arms control and disarmament, it can be argued, is fundamentally a different question from the problem of conventional arms control and disarmament efforts. For the dynamism which qualifies the conventional military balance does not suit nuclear stockpiling. To simplify the argument by only speaking of two countries, one may observe that both countries intend to obtain or maintain equilibrium between them by making the conventional arms race an inescapable function. When applied to nuclear weapons, an optimum which prevails in case of conventional weapons is completely incomprehensible. If one nuclear power is capable of destroying its enemy, say, 10 times over, under the worst situations, it seems entirely incomprehensible to compete with him for the sake of having the ability to destroy him 20 times over, and its enemy, who is only capable of destroying that nuclear power 5 times over, is by the same emphasis not inferior at all. This simple and clear point has escaped the decision-making elites in the nuclear countries in practice, because the yearning to have more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons has increased unprecedentedly. Such an arms race in the nuclear field is bound to prove, and has already proved to be, to a great extent, catastrophic. It is for this reason that some arms control negotiations on nuclear weapons have taken place at the bilateral and multilateral levels. For several current discussions on nuclear arms control and some of the extensions and possibilities they hold, one is referred to Carleton et al. (1977), Newhouse (1973), Talbot (1979), Wolf (1979), and Krepon (1984). But when political decision-making elites in the nuclear weapons countries get down to bargain and when they need to satisfy the cravings for military build-up, they find themselves entrapped in a vortex of concoctions when discussing changing their theoretical insight into practical steps of nuclear arms control and later on disarmament.

Arms control is a paramount condition of disarmament. It is fairly well known that the United States and its friends within the American bloc will not disarm unless there is confidence building, and effective control measures. They want to obtain an adequate base so that the Soviet Union

and its allies within the Soviet bloc will agree to pursue the terms of the agreement. The USSR has never denied the need for control. The bone of contention, rather, has been over its quantitative and qualitative levels. In the last few years, this contention has achieved such ideological sanctity that, on practical grounds, one may speculate that the formal arms control talks, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks may have outlived their meaningfulness. At the very least they will have to be supplemented by other reasonable measures if substantial success is to be achieved in controlling the arms race. Meanwhile, the current scientific and technological advances are evidently outpacing the negotiations. As a result, the "bargaining chips" and "essential equivalence" criteria of the arms control partners are incompatible. Each partner seeks to match the bargaining chips of the other, and this leads to an armament race to ever-increasing levels.

Furthermore, if a certain type of weapon is not included in the formally negotiated and institutionalised agreement or if an agreed ceiling has not yet been reached, then this stimulates a process for moving ahead with armament programmes which may not be required for security considerations.

A new approach to arms control, or at the very least a supplement, is needed. In their Geneva talks, from November 11 to 18, 1985, the US President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev have not denied the need for such approaches. But the prime need is to avoid ambiguity and the feeling that excuses for new arms programmes are being put forward. A new approach to pave the way to arms control can be suggested as reciprocal unilateral restraints. It may include any kind of unilateral restraints which would curtail the nuclear arms race, reduce the probability of nuclear war and create conditions for confidence building and strict control measures. Such unilateral restraints can be implemented without any adverse security considerations to either the United States or the Soviet Union. The myth of a delicate balance of terror does not last long. Both the Superpowers have armaments far in excess of those required to deter an attack by the other. Reciprocal unilateral restraints would be a far more advantageous approach of achieving arms control and maintaining flexibility in the wake of developments in the political arena or in the technical advances. There are many fields where both the Superpowers could pursue unilateral restraints which would substantiate the security of both sides, diminish the danger of a nuclear war, and curtail the unnecessary economic expenditure on armaments.

We may hope that the rationality of bureaucratic decision-making will have dominance over the forces of intermittent judgment that can worsen the situation. We may also have reason to assume that effective and realistic steps will be taken toward arms limitation, reduction, control, and towards enjoyment of the rewards of peaceful economic, scientific, educational, cultural and political cooperation.

We may thus conclude as we began: The point of rationality and

farsightedness is literally the vital issue in the nuclear field, not only for the Superpowers, not only for their friends and foes, but for mankind. The risks of the catastrophe confronting the human race will endure, no matter what we strive for, irrespective of deterrence or arms control and disarmament, or a combination of these. But on the basis of their past behaviour in the post-Hiroshima period, every sensitive and informed mind has reason to hope that the decision-making elites in the nuclear weapon countries are capable of selecting rational options even amidst the vortex of acute crises — particularly if they have acted intelligently during the crises.

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LEARNING TO FEAR THE BOMB

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ABSTRACT

The paper advances two major arguments: (1) that Americans in the mid-1940's did need to be taught to fear the bomb, and (2) that the resulting campaign of fear soon faltered for reasons that help explain other, similar failures in the postwar period. Fear has been taught and retaught, but unconfirmed by crisis and largely unconnected to hopeful political change, it has quickly dissipated into apathy, fatalism, or vague unease.

Almost immediately in August, 1945, American victory celebrations at the end of World War II were dampened by sober reflection about the way the conflict and finally been won. Two atomic bombs had been dropped on Japan, terrifying new weapons that had killed over 100,000 Japanese with dramatic suddenness and efficiency. "All thoughts and things were split," reported *Time* magazine. "The sudden achievement of victory was a mercy, but mercy born of a ruthless force beyond anything in human chronicle. The rational mind had won the most Promethean of its conquests over nature." It had split the atom and "put into the hands of common man the fire and force of the sun itself" (*Time* magazine, 1945).

Soon, detailed accounts from Japan documented the awesome power of atomic weapons. Pictures of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were published, as were drawings and charts showing the extent of the destruction. Visiting scientists like Philip Morrison returned home to tell Congressmen and the general public about the devastation caused by various phases of an atomic explosion — a ball of fire one-third mile in radius heating the air to four million degrees, a great expansion of air creating a shock wave of 500-1,000 miles per hour, hurricane winds, and extensive radiation. Radiation, he testified, "affects the blood-forming tissues in the bone marrow, and the whole function of the blood is impaired. The blood does not coagulate, but oozes in many spots through the broken

skin, and internally seeps into the cavities of the body" (*Newsweek* magazine, 1945).

Scientific descriptions of the bomb's effect were invariably chilling, but especially moving were accounts that penetrated beneath the faceless statistics of Hiroshima to consider the fates of particular individuals victimized by the heat, the blast, the radiation, and the civil chaos all caused by a single atomic weapon. Novelist John Hersey's long article for *The New Yorker* personalized, and hence made more understandable, the suffering experienced by tens of thousands:

There had been no breeze earlier in the morning when Dr Fujii walked to the railway station to see his friend off, but now brisk winds were blowing every which way; here on the bridge the wind was easterly. New fires were leaping up, and they spread quickly, and in a very short time terrible blasts of hot air and showers of cinders made it impossible to stand on the bridge any more. [From under the bridge.] Dr. Fujii saw a nurse hanging in the timbers of his hospital by her legs, and then another painfully pinned across the breast. He thought he heard the voice of his niece for a moment, but he could not find her; he never saw her again.

Just before dark, Mr Tanimoto came across a twenty-year-old girl, Mrs Kamai, the Tanimoto's nextdoor neighbour. She was crouching on the ground with the body of her infant daughter in her arms. The baby had evidently been dead all day. Mrs Kamai jumped up when she saw Mr Tanimoto and said, 'Would you please try to locate my husband?'

Mr Tanimoto knew that her husband had been inducted into the Army just the day before and had reported to the Chugoku Regional Army Headquarters — near the ancient castle in the middle of town. [Mr Tanimoto] knew he hadn't a chance of finding Mrs Kamai's husband, even if he searched, but he wanted to humour her. 'I'll try,' he said.

'You've got to find him,' she said. 'He loved our baby so much. I want him to see her once more.'

This special issue of *The New Yorker* sold out quickly and, reprinted, was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and national best-seller. It was even read in its entirety on the ABC radio network (Hersey, 1946; Luft & Wheeler, 1948).

The story of Hiroshima descended on an American people already anxious about the nation's future in international politics. Americans had emerged from World War II with a more highly developed sense of political realism than in the past. They tended to assume the inevitability of international conflict, were unconvinced that the United Nations could ensure an enduring peace, and were increasingly pessimistic about the state of Soviet-American relations. Moreover, as a highly urbanized, industrial society, the United States was especially vulnerable to a devastating atomic attack once potential enemies developed their own weapons and means of delivery. Thus, despite America's enormous power in late 1945, the years ahead seemed burdened with dangerous uncertainty (Gallup, 1972).

But were most Americans deeply frightened by atomic weapons, frightened enough to act on their fears? In the fall of 1945, a public opinion survey revealed that 83 percent of Americans perceived a "real danger" of the world's urban population being annihilated in another war. Yet, only 38

percent saw much chance of atomic bombs being used against the United States within the next twenty-five years, and 64 percent believed that the bomb made major war *less* likely (Gallup, 1972).

Even many early comments from government officials were disturbing to people who thought that Hiroshima had revolutionized military and political affairs. President Truman spoke of monopolizing the "secrets" of atomic bomb production, as did General Groves, the military director of the Manhattan Project. Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, predicted the development of an effective defense against atomic weapons and remained confident that civilization could survive an atomic war. Also, the Administration's May-Johnson Bill for domestic supervision of atomic development made absolutely no provision for international control of atomic energy (Smith, 1965; Truman, 1961).

Among journalists, politicians, and the general public during the half year after V-J Day, there was thus a peculiar compound of anxiety and complacency that did not auger well for meeting the political challenge of Hiroshima. Reformers concluded that Americans were not fearful enough, and that, since fear was the beginning of wisdom, it had to be nurtured and encouraged as an essential motivator of political action. Fear was once associated with the ignorant, uneducated, and credulous, but now it was the ignorant and credulous who complacently believed that there was nothing to fear "if only we keep our plutonium dry" (Hudson, 1946).

Such concerns among those informed enough to be alarmed led to a campaign in 1946 to frighten the American people. Writing for *Collier's* in January, Harold Urey, a Noble chemist who had contributed much to nuclear energy research, told his readers: "I write this to frighten you. I'm a frightened man myself. All the scientists are frightened for their lives — and frightened for *your* life." Radio commentator Raymond Swing observed that "fear is part of our stock equipment as human beings. Under its pressure, we take measures to protect ourselves. I am sure that the desire to be safe is much stronger than the desire to be good . . ." And religious writer Winthrop Hudson concluded in *Christian Century*: "Fear can be a tremendously powerful unifying force in society. What Pearl Harbour did for America, the atomic bomb can do for the world if mankind becomes aware of the peril. It is not a question of scaring people to death. It is a question of scaring them that they may live" (Urey, 1946; Swing, 1946; Hudson, 1946).

Coordinating this campaign of fear were the same people who had made Hiroshima possible, the atomic scientists. These men were in the best position to realize the significance of their new discoveries — they knew that the atomic bomb was not just another weapon, and they were well aware that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were only the first generation of deadly new methods of mass destruction. The scientists were among the first to perceive that military technology had made a qualitative, not merely quantitative, developmental leap, a reality that had profound implications for international politics. Could the nation-state any longer

offer much security to its citizens? What did warfare accomplish if both victor and vanquished suffered enormous loss of life and property? Might not civilization itself be imperiled?

Among the mobilized scientists were some of the stars of the Manhattan Project — Albert Einstein, who had originally proposed the idea to Franklin Roosevelt, Leo Szilard, who, with Enrico Fermi, created the first nuclear chain reaction at the University of Chicago, Edward Teller, one of the leading project scientists at Los Alamos, and Robert Oppenheimer, the man who supervised the actual making of the first atomic bomb. Along with hundreds of junior colleagues, these were the brilliant theoreticians and technicians who had competed successfully with their German counterparts to produce the weapon that won the war and who had unlocked the secrets of a new source of power likely to revolutionize human society. When Einstein, Szilard, Teller, and Oppenheimer spoke, Americans took notice, and, aware of this, the scientists were convinced that they could communicate their vitally important message.

That message was clear and uncomplicated and had the virtually unanimous support of those scientists who knew and thought about the problems of atomic weaponry. Essentially, the scientists argued that atomic bombs could be made relatively cheaply and that they would become increasingly destructive. There was no effective military defense against such weapons, and none could be expected. Indeed, atomic bombs did not even need to be delivered in the normal manner — they could simply be smuggled in and placed near their intended targets. Furthermore, there were no secrets of the atomic bomb that could be long monopolized. Relevant scientific knowledge was generally known throughout the world's scientific community, and other great powers could expect to develop a working bomb within three to five years. If war then occurred among those powers, the new weapons would inevitably be used, at enormous cost to modern civilization. Therefore, international control of atomic weapons was imperative, and, ultimately, war itself had to be eliminated as a means of resolving international disputes (Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, 1946).

By November, the atomic scientists had organized themselves for educational and political action. Various local groups such as the Association of Los Alamos Scientists, the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, and the Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists coalesced into the Federation of American Scientists with a national office in Washington. Soon thereafter the National Committee on Atomic Information was formed, supported by over sixty national, civic, labour, religious, professional, and educational organizations. And, in May, 1946, an Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, with Albert Einstein as President, was established to raise money for the movement. Meanwhile, in December, 1945, the Chicago group launched the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, a well-edited journal that printed news from local organizations as well as general articles relating to the problems and promise of atomic energy.

From October, 1945, to late 1946, the atomic scientists and their interested colleagues participated in a political effort unprecedented in the history of American science. Many scientists slighted or abandoned their research in order to organize national meetings on atomic energy, to arrange seminars and informal dinners for Senators and Congressmen, to testify before Congressional committees, to write articles for the popular press, and to deliver speeches to anyone who would listen. Even the prestigious Edward Teller was typically willing to spend a long day in May in Shaker Heights, Ohio, addressing a conference organized by the pastor of a local church (Smith, 1965).

Publications were produced as well. The Chicago scientists prepared a pamphlet, *The Atomic Bomb*, intended mainly for members of Congress. Linguist S.I. Hayakawa was enlisted to write *One Minute War*, and many scientists pooled their talents to produce *One World or None — A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb*. Introduced by Arthur Compton, Nobel laureate and former director of the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, this book contained articles by Neils Bohr, Robert Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, Albert Einstein, and journalist Walter Lippmann. Over one hundred thousand copies were sold (Masters & Way, 1946).

The scientists even offered advice to MGM on the making of a popular motion picture about the invention of the atomic bomb. The film, "Beginning or the End" (a title reputedly suggested by President Truman), was hardly a masterpiece. While it successfully chronicled the development of the atomic bomb from the University of Chicago chain reaction to Hiroshima, Hollywood could not resist melodrama: foreign scientists were given exaggerated accents; the chain reaction, in truth a quiet event, was pictured as a riot of humming equipment, blinking lights, and ear-splitting explosions; and there was added a stale love story of a dedicated scientist who neglected his lovely wife. Nonetheless, the film, especially in its re-creation of the great power of the atomic bomb, would presumably help scientists to deliver their message (Reingold, 1984).

One of the best examples of the scientists' campaign of fear was an article that the Washington office of the Federation of American Scientists prepared for the March 5, 1946, issue of *Look*, entitled "Your Last Chance." Within a dozen pages of dramatically presented pictures and text, the scientists hammered at their essential thesis. "Never again, so long as war is possible, will your home and hearthside be safe from direct attack. You have a last chance to save your civilization...." On the first page of the article was a large mushroom cloud and, nearby, was a drawing of a despairing woman standing in the ruins of her bombed out house. The caption warned that "in one night forty cities could be wrecked, forty million Americans killed." A terrible catastrophe — and something that might well happen in the middle of the night!"

Even the continued possibility of atomic war, the article insisted, would produce terrible consequences: "Your life will be unbearable in a

world where the atomic bomb may fall at any hour." Concern about sabotage would lead to frequent search and surveillance, harsh treatment of suspects, and gun battles between spies and counterspies. The need to be constantly alert would require a huge defense establishment, armed guards on American frontiers, tight restrictions on research, and unceasing vigilance even from the nation's frightened children. Lack of any defense against the atomic bomb would encourage wild rumours, panic, and a mass exodus from urban areas. The possible anonymity of an atomic attack, the inability to identify the nation responsible, would produce xenophobia within the United States, the creation of concentration camps for foreigners and riots targeted at various ethnic groups. And finally, the disadvantages of democratic government in facing secret, efficient, aggressive totalitarian regimes would force Americans themselves to accept dictatorship.

There were three realistic choices, the *Look* article argued. One was to prepare for atomic warfare, a course that might deter conflict for a while, but at considerable cost in military expenditures, civil defense requirements, and diminished political liberty. America would become a police state with a "giant Gestapo". A second choice would be to conquer the world while the United States retained a monopoly of atomic weapons, but this course also implied gigantic military expenses, the erosion of freedom at home and abroad, and a heavy loss of American lives. The third choice, the one advocated by the scientists, was to achieve international control of atomic energy and an end to war itself. A difficult task, the article conceded, but not impossible if, as Robert Oppenheimer observed, "it is recognized that this, for us, in our time, is the fundamental problem of human society, that it is a precondition not only for civilized life or for freedom, but for the attainment of any living aspirations" (*Look* magazine, 1946; *Life* magazine, 1945).

After nearly a year of this sort of speaking and writing, what did the scientists accomplish? At the governmental level, their press releases, informal lobbying, and Congressional testimony had considerable effect. President Truman's public statements indicated increased awareness of the dangers of atomic energy and the need for international control. The power of the atom, he told Congress, was "too revolutionary to consider within the framework of old ideas." In Congress, the May-Johnson Bill was sidetracked, and revised legislation for the domestic control of atomic energy was approved in 1946. The new bill, which provided for greater freedom of research and diffusion of scientific information and which accommodated itself to the possibility of international regulation, was far more acceptable to the scientists. Meanwhile the Administration gained British, Canadian, and Soviet agreement to consider international control of atomic energy by a special United Nations Commission. By June, 1946, Bernard Baruch presented an American control plan to the United Nations, an event greeted by scientists with cautious optimism (Truman, 1961, Smith, 1965).

The scientists could also be pleased by the co-operation they had won from the nations' editors and commentators. Most major magazines

and newspapers had approvingly communicated the scientists' message, and some publicists had enlisted in the crusade. Radio commentator, Raymond Swing; *Newsweek* columnist, Ernest K. Lindley; and *Saturday Review* editor, Norman Cousins, are good examples. From such individuals, if not from the scientists themselves, interested Americans became fully aware of the atomic bomb's implications.

As for the public generally, the results of the scientists' long campaign were mixed. Extensive polling was done in June and August, 1946, by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on the Social Aspects of Atomic Energy, an effort funded by Cornell University, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Discovering that ninety-eight percent of the American people knew of the atomic bomb and its destructiveness, the pollsters concluded that "the impact of the bomb on the minds of the American people has had few parallels in our history." Yet, further, probing demonstrated that the scientists were not experiencing complete success in their educational efforts.

Among Americans expressing an opinion on the issue, nearly all believed that "the secret of the bomb" could not be monopolized for long and that other countries would be able to make the weapon within ten years. Yet, ironically, the scientists' own case regarding the revolutionary significance of their atomic research encouraged Americans to assume that science could somehow provide a large measure of future security. Two-thirds of those who held an opinion thought that a defense against the bomb could be developed before other nations learned how to make it. The scientists could take comfort that negative responses on this question had declined during the previous year, especially among respondents well informed about world affairs, but basically Americans would not abandon their immense faith in science and technology. Somehow, American ingenuity and resources would allow the United States to "always keep ahead" by inventing an effective system of national defense.

Relatedly, public awareness of the horrors of atomic warfare nurtured hopes that the new weapons would never be used. Here again, menacing technology offered its own salvation. Intuitively grasping the logic of mutual deterrence, many Americans reasoned that no nation would use an atomic bomb against a similarly armed opponent. Indeed, atomic proliferation could contribute to peace: as the threat of retaliation became universal, all might be safe. In the short-term, no nation would dare attack the United States, but it was not obvious that the end of the American monopoly would bring inevitable doom. If war itself became suicidal, who would dare provoke it?

Even more discouraging from the scientists' perspective was the reluctance of the general public to *remain* deeply fearful about the atomic weapons. Few denied that the bomb constituted a danger, but only twenty-five percent of the respondents admitted to being more than slightly worried. Deep, abiding fear is a difficult emotion for people to sustain. From listening to a radio programme or reading an article, an individual

might be momentarily frightened and might later admit to a vague, generalized concern. But life demands attention to everyday routine, and, in the absence of an immediate crisis, most people will not long allow fear to dominate their thoughts. "I don't think I devote much time to worrying about it [atomic energy]," offered a man questioned in the Social Science Research poll. "The building business is too complicated now for me to worry about the bomb. It's too remote." Similarly, a labourer responded: "I got everything I need. From the morning, when I get up, I pick apples, and I get a dollar a bushel. So why should I worry about the bomb? I don't need to worry. I don't think about it" (Eberhart, 1947).

While most Americans did learn to fear the bomb in the abstract, its threat did not preoccupy them and needed to be constantly reinforced. One of the scientists noticed this in the midst of his political efforts: "It doesn't matter who it is. You have to go way back to the beginning every time and explain what a menace atomic energy is. You have to shake them by the shoulders." This state of affairs did not bode well for a mass political movement to achieve international control of atomic weapons or to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy. Albert Einstein seemed to realize this by the spring of 1947 when he told his associates that they should not devote so much time and attention trying to reach the masses. "We are scientists," he said, and we should "not use razor blades for chopping wood" (Szilard, 1946).

Einstein was particularly concerned about the dangers of public fatalism, the pervasive attitude that "there is no use worrying about something you can't help." Typically, pollsters were told, "I know the bomb can wipe out cities, but I let the government worry about it," or "To me, it is just like you were living in a country where there were earthquakes. What good would it do to go to bed every night worrying whether there would be an earthquake?" Here was a fundamental sense of helplessness or futility, a feeling that the complex problems of controlling atomic energy and preserving peace were beyond the capabilities of collective international management. To become politically influential, public fear needed a sense of direction. Fear by itself is unproductive. Indeed, it can be counter-productive if it breeds only resignation, cynicism, paranoia, and greater preparations for war. Fear of annihilation had to be wedded to the hope that political action could save humankind from its own scientific advance (Eberhart, 1947).

The atomic scientists had had an immediate goal, an American plan for international control of atomic energy. Due largely to their efforts, the United States promoted a United Nations Atomic Development Authority as an exclusive agency for the production and allocation of dangerous fissionable materials. It soon became obvious, however, that both the United States and the Soviet Union were shaping their atomic control proposals in ways to achieve maximum national advantage and that agreement was highly unlikely. Robert Oppenheimer would soon sadly conclude that control could not be achieved because of Soviet-American

distrust, and Harold Urey, one of Bernard Baruch's advisors, admitted that the United Nations authority would not have worked even if the Russians had accepted the American proposals. The United States would have retained superiority in the technology and industrial capacity needed to produce bombs in an emergency; balanced locations of atomic plants and acceptable inspection systems would have been difficult to establish; and control of atomic bombs could hardly have been achieved while arms races continued for every other type of weapon (Oppenheimer, 1948; Urey, 1948; Meyer, 1947).

Logic carried many atomic scientists well beyond America's Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy. If atomic weapons had transformed major warfare into an utterly irrational activity, then war itself would have to be abandoned as an instrument of national policy. And if this was impossible within the existing nation-system, then that system would have to be fundamentally reformed. Control plans and collective security arrangements would not be sufficient; war could be abolished only by establishing a relatively powerful world state.

Early converts to the cause of world government included Arthur Compton, Leo Szilard, Edward Teller, Harold Urey, and Harrison Brown. Ninety percent of the members of the Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists favoured a world state, and some of them formed a World Government Committee to study the subject, discuss alternative models, and publish a small book, *Primer for Peace*, in defense of their ultimate choice. Another group of scientists that eventually advocated world government was the small, but prestigious, Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists chaired by Albert Einstein and including as trustees Hans Bethe, Linus Pauling and Leo Szilard. At Einstein's insistence, the Committee endorsed the view "that our purpose — which is the permanent elimination of war — requires the establishment of a government of the world with powers adequate to maintain a peace based on the rule of law." Although many scientists were nervous about their lack of competence in economics and international affairs, the Emergency Committee's position was subsequently supported by the Federation of American Scientists.¹

The world government movement during the late 1940s, however, was hardly confined to concerned atomic scientists. To a great extent, the world government crusade was the peace movement immediately after World War II as Americans concluded that advancing military technology

¹ Memorandum regarding the formation of the Federation of American Scientists. University of Chicago Library. Federation of American Scientists MSS, box LV, folder 1; Gerber, Norton. Letter to AORES executive committee, December 5, 1946. And, AORES World Government Committee. Report, September 16, 1946. University of Chicago Library. Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists MSS box VIII, folders 8 & 9, box IX, folder 4; Szilard, Leo. Letter to Harold Urey, June 9, 1947. University of Chicago Library. Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists MSS, box IV, folder 4; Lake Geneva Conference of Scientists, Statement, June 21, 1947. University of Chicago Library. Federation of American Scientists MSS, box XIV, folder 1.

posed a serious threat to human survival. There were several world government organizations, of which the most significant was the United World Federalists led by Cord Meyer and Alan Cranston. These organizations were supported by many prominent Americans, including political leaders Rexford Tugwell, Harold Stinson, Thomas K. Finletter, Chester Bowles and Harold Stassen, lawyers Grenville Clark and William O. Douglas, labour leaders Walter Reuther, David Dubinski, and Philip Murray, editors Norman Cousins and Michael Straight, authors Thomas Mann, Margaret Mead, Lewis Mumford, Edna Ferber, and Upton Sinclair, journalists Raymond Swing, Edgar Ansel Mower, and Rex Stout, and celebrities from Hollywood such as Darryl Zanuck, Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., and a successful young actor named Ronald Reagan. Pollsters discovered that a majority of Americans favoured strengthening the United Nations sufficiently to create world federation, a principle endorsed by twenty state legislatures and about one-third of the United States House and Senate. Even President Truman, who reputedly carried in his wallet a copy of Tennyson's "Locksley Hall," was moved to predict publicly that "it will be just as easy for nations to get along in a republic of the world as it is for us to get along in the republic of the United States."²

Yet, despite such support, the world government movement dissolved with dramatic suddenness in late 1949 and early 1950. To some extent it was simply the victim of the worsening Cold War as Americans witnessed in rapid succession the Berlin blockade, the communization of China, the successful Soviet testing of an atomic bomb, and the outbreak of war in Korea. But there were also problems intrinsic to the movement as it struggled to maintain so many delicate intellectual balances between nationalism and supranationalism, ideals and self-interest, emotion and reason, despair and hope. Efforts to argue that supranationalism was in the American national interest, that idealism constituted atomic age realism, that emotional desires for peace should service cold political logic, and that people shaken by fear could enjoy energizing hope all collapsed under their

² (1946, February, March, & April). *World Government News*; (1947, October). *Common Cause*, pp. 151-53; Bowles, Chester. (1949, March). *World government: Yes, but. Harper's*, pp. 21-27; (1946, October 14). *Newsweek*, p.45; Brown Harrison. (1947, June). *The world government movement in the United States. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, pp. 156-57; United World Federalists National Advisory Board. *Statement of beliefs, purposes, and policies*, October 29, 1949. University of Chicago Library. Elisabeth Mann Borgese MSS, box 21; Fowle, Elenor. (1980). *Cranston: the senator from California* (p.85). San Rafael, California: Presidio Press; Gallup Poll. (1946, September 17). *Opinion News*, p.4; Gallup Poll. (1947, November 1). *Opinion News*, p.6; (1949, May, September & 1950, March). *World Government News*; Truman, Harry S. Remarks upon receiving an honorary degree from the University of Kansas City, June 28, 1945. In (1961). *Public papers of the presidents of the United States*, April 12 to December 31, 1945 (p.151). Washington: United States Government Printing Office; Truman, Harry S. Message to the Congress on the state of the union, January 21, 1946. In (1962). *Public papers of the presidents of the United States*, 1946 (p.39). Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

own enormous weight. Events combined with doctrinal problems to push the world government movement into steep, irrevocable decline.

Especially difficult was the problem of how to sustain a cause based essentially on fear. Fresh memories of world war and atomic destruction fueled the supranationalist movement during the 1940s, but with diminishing efficiency. There remained the old problems of stubborn faith in new technology and inevitable retreat into the immediate demands of everyday life. Also, predictions of "one world or none" began to lose force the longer the world managed to muddle along between those starkly posed alternatives. As a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee observed in 1949: "There is growing in the minds of the people of this country a reaction against being pushed by even the atomic bomb." The "bogeyman approach" is wearing thin, for "every day that the Russians have the atomic bomb and every day it has not been used is a day that makes people feel that the reasons given [for world federation] are that much less valid."³

Hard to maintain, fear was also a difficult emotion to guide or direct, for how can severely frightened people be encouraged to consider calmly and logically the case for a world state? Fear can easily be paralyzing and cause its victims to hold fanatically to traditional means of achieving security. Fear is also likely to produce irrational responses, desperate measures to relieve debilitating anxiety. Indeed, such measures may appear reasonable if other courses of action are perceived as either futile or disastrous.

In this regard, it was one of the sad ironies of the world government movement that its theoreticians indirectly made an excellent case for preventive war. For if the proliferation of atomic weapons among sovereign nation-states posed an inevitable threat to civilization and if supranational control of such weapons proved impossible to achieve, then a logical alternative was for the United States to forcibly defend its atomic monopoly. As relations with the Soviet Union worsened, it could be argued that Americans should defeat the Russians before their encroachments on vital Western interests threatened the survival of the planet. As scientist Philip Morrison concluded in 1949, the horrors of Hiroshima had inspired demands for total security, demands that implied American domination of all other major nations (Morrison, 1949).

However improbable that objective, there were enough public references to a *Pax Americana* during the late 1940s to cause considerable unease among world federalists. In October, 1946, Bertrand Russell insisted that "if utter and complete disaster is to be avoided, there must never again be a great war, unless it occurs within the next few years." While Russell

³ US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (1949, October 12-13). To seek development of the United Nations into a world federation. Hearings, 81st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 204-05.

(1946) preferred voluntary world government, he believed that the next best course would be an American effort to "compel the rest of the world to disarm and establish a world-wide monopoly of American armed forces." Similarly, the author of *The Managerial Revolution*, James Burnham, wrote in 1947 that only the United States or the Soviet Union could effectively control atomic energy, and, to do so, one of the two nations would have to control the world. Since the Soviets, according to Burnham, were already seeking global hegemony, the United States would have to do the same in order to assure its own independence and to protect civilized society from total destruction. Burnham's book, *The Struggle for the World*, was widely reviewed, and his basic argument was given wide circulation by *Life* magazine (Russell, 1946; Burnham, 1947).

Signals from the American military were also unsettling. In May, 1948, General George C. Kenney, commander of the Strategic Air Command, told an audience in Maine that present peace was "little more than a superficial armistice" and that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. In July, Air Force General Carl Spaatz lamented that "we who profited so much from the airplane and the atomic bomb now stand to lose most by it." Once other nations obtained atomic bomb now stand to lose most by it." Once other nations obtained atomic weapons and effective delivery systems, Americans would be highly vulnerable and could only protect themselves with the most powerful armed forces in the world. And, in August, 1950, Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, speaking in Boston, bluntly advocated "preventive war." Later apologizing to President Truman, he said that he had heard so many military officers talk about preventive war that he had repeated the phrase without realizing how much it deviated from Administration policy.⁴

Thus, although fear was a necessary ingredient of supranationalist success, it lacked both durability and predictability over a long period of time. Increasingly nervous about the less desirable implications of their own arguments, world federalists warned against preventive war and watched helplessly as America's sense of insecurity led to massive rearmament. In a speech to the United World Federalists General Assembly in October, 1950, William O. Douglas prayed that world federalist arguments would not be utilized for unworthy ends, and soon thereafter federalists believed it necessary to state officially that any proposed effort to "seek peace by launching an atomic attack is not only wholly immoral, but... would alienate our allies and bring in its wake the chaos and destruction on which dictatorship thrives" (Douglas 1950; UWF Statement of Purposes, 1950).

In the late 1940s, the cultivation of fear on behalf of arms control and peace thus proved to be an unreliable instrument. While Americans did learn to fear the bomb, they easily succumbed to fatalism, wishful thinking,

⁴ (1948, May 17). *Newsweek*, pp. 30-32; (1948, July 5). *Life*, pp. 34-44; (1948, August 16). *Life*, pp. 90, 103-04; Truman, Harry S. (1956). *Memoirs: years of trial and hope* (p.383). Garden City. New York: Doubleday & Co.

and the belligerent pursuit of renewed security. As the atomic scientists discovered, merchandising fear was not in itself sufficient to control the atom. They needed to provide an equal measure of hope, a sense of progress toward a useful political response to the threat of atomic war. International control of atomic energy offered immediate encouragement, but quickly proved both inadequate in scope and impossible to achieve. More intellectually promising, the world government movement provided a solution to the problem of war itself, but within a few years was generally dismissed as a utopian appeal for objectives of doubtful value. As people thoughtfully considered the probable nature of a world state, they wondered if the cure might be nearly as bad as the disease.

This pattern of behaviour has repeated itself throughout the postwar period. Fear has been taught and retaught, but unconfirmed by crisis and largely unconnected to hopeful political change, it has quickly dissipated into apathy, resignation, or vague unease. In recent years, people throughout the world have become resensitized to the dangers of nuclear war, yet, as usual, future prospects seem bleak. Americans have in part eased their sense of insecurity through massive military spending and renewed interest in an effective system of atomic defense. Concurrently, fear of nuclear war has been marshalled to support either simple proposals for arms control (the nuclear freeze) or utopian appeals for a world of freedom, justice, and peace — a world to be sustained apparently by popular good will.

It remains true that fear of nuclear war must be married to hope for a safer world. The peace movement cannot rely merely on a collective *crie de coeur*. The challenge is to find, before the pervasive sense of alarm again recedes, a political course that offers progress toward realistic objectives. Opposing new weapons systems of dubious utility seems wise, and some arms control may be possible. But, beyond that, the creation of a substantially less dangerous world depends on improved Soviet-American relations. Under the Nixon-Kissinger regime, *detente* led to the SALT Treaty; the treaty did not lead to *detente*. It will require considerable political sophistication for the peace movement to encourage better Soviet-American relations while accepting the reality of conflicting ambitions or to nurture Soviet-American *rapprochement* even if this helps perpetuate respective spheres of influence.

Fear continues to be the beginning of wisdom and the most important engine of positive change, but to ignore the severe limits within which change is likely to occur is to risk squandering the momentary influence of an aroused public opinion. In an anarchic world of nation-states, peace can only be secured through balances of power in defense of political relationships mutually satisfactory to the major powers. Under the influence of a global peace movement, we can hope that the balance can be struck at a less dangerous level to preserve a world order that the major powers are prepared grudgingly to accept. That goal would lie beyond determining the fate of some particular weapons system, but would fall short of creating a world of self-determination, justice, and general

disarmament. A Cold War thaw, not a nuclear freeze, leads most directly toward a safer planet.

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS¹

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ABSTRACT

This paper will discuss the nature and role of violence exercised by governments against their own citizens — violence which includes widespread and routine imprisonment without charge or trial, extrajudicial killings and 'disappearances', and the use of torture. Issues addressed will include: the types of political violence used by government, recent changes in the nature of political violence; the extent of such practices in various regions of the world and within different ideological blocs; and the underlying reasons for the resort to violence by so many governments today.

All people, regardless of ideology, culture, region or level of development, live equally under the shadow of nuclear annihilation. Paradoxically, this threat of global violence has helped divert us from recognizing the reality and immediacy of localised violence which has become a commonplace of political life in a majority of countries. Yet violence by the state against the individual exercise of fundamental human rights remains largely unrecognized by either the media, scholars, peace groups or aid agencies. Understandably, perhaps, most attention is concentrated on the escalating arms race, the proliferating dangers of militarism, the daunting problems of mass poverty and inequality in much of the third world, conventional wars between states, and recurring civil wars within various states. Against this background, the grisly and brutal political violence characteristic of

¹ The figures and examples cited in this article are based, unless otherwise indicated, on research by A.I. In general, its published figures underestimate the actual extent of political violence, as its stringent rules on evidence and narrow mandate consistently result in estimates well below those of most concerned voluntary agencies or journalists.

everyday life in so many countries, is easily ignored or interpreted as a mere political sideshow, an inevitable and unexceptional feature of politics in chronically 'unstable', 'developing' countries. This paper seeks to correct this common misconception.

For all people alarmed by the resort to violence, and concerned to reduce or resolve physical conflicts, the violence exercised by governments against citizens is a central and unavoidable issue. It is a practice which touches all regions of the world, and affects citizens in a majority of countries. It continues to exact an appalling toll in human life and human suffering. As a central aspect of political repression it serves to delay or deny the changes so necessary to ensure a more just and equitable world. And while the origins, nature and extent of political violence remain obscure, efforts to reduce or resolve such practices will inevitably fail.

In recent years, a majority of national governments have used violence to defend their interests against domestic challenges, both real and imagined. In most cases the estimates of the United Nations and Human Rights agencies, at least two million citizens have died at the hands of their own government as a result of overt physical violence. In addition, hundreds of thousands of people have been — and remain — imprisoned for attempting peacefully to exercise basic human rights, like the right of free speech, assembly, dissent, or religious observance, and tens of thousands have been subjected to torture and other cruel or degrading treatment by the state. Many millions of others have been forcibly 'resettled' or 'relocated' by governments. And these broad figures do not include the vast number of victims of 'structural violence', the powerless and economically disadvantaged people suffering actions which seriously violate the political and civil rights of citizens as defined in Articles 4 to 21 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In summary, these include: (i) the 'positive' rights to such things as recognition and equality before the law, freedom of movement and association, freedom of thought and expression, the right to dissent and peaceful assembly; and (ii) the 'negative' rights to freedom from slavery, torture or cruel and degrading treatment, freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, and freedom from forced relocation or resettlement.

The fact that this paper is concerned with these aspects of political violence is in no sense meant to imply that I view political and civil rights as more important than, or unrelated to, economic and social questions. Political and economic rights are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing. 'Economic reform is difficult without political reform, and political reform difficult without economic reform,' Harrison (1978) has commented appropriately: 'The two must go forward hand in hand, in the same way that political and economic privilege have done.' Moreover, I accept that direct political violence is related to structural violence in that it is generally used to reinforce the economic and social privileges of the few at the expense of the many. But fundamental political rights are not the same as

basic economic and social rights, such as the right to shelter, employment, adequate food, or education. It is necessary to disentangle the two strands if we are to discuss political violence in a specific and systematic way. The assertions made by many proponents of Third World development, that 'Political freedoms are illusory without [the] economic security they contend' (Ellwood, 1979), simply muddies the waters of analysis. Political rights and freedoms are fundamental and specific aspects of human rights, the violation of which is a critical question within both the developed and developing worlds. Those anxious to collapse political rights and economic rights into an amorphous single category of human rights, risk dealing in generalities which defy meaningful discussion. If the dimensions of political violence are to be grasped, those must be discussed separately and specifically. Hence this paper will outline initially the principal features of domestic political violence. It will then attempt to link — albeit briefly — this alarming phenomena to international developments which both undermine peace and threaten the achievement of balanced economic change appropriate to the needs of the majority of people in the developing world.

VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL 'ORDER'

In recent years political 'terrorism' has become a central and often highly emotive preoccupation of the Western media. Sporadic acts of extreme, overt violence by 'terrorist groups' against governments and civilians inevitably seize the attention of the international media and generate periodic outrage against the use of violence for political ends. Generally, political violence is equated with specific acts of terror against governments or their representatives. At times, however, the word 'violence' is applied to acts directed against a government which do not involve premeditated or widespread violence but do embrace various types of unruly behaviour, mass protest, or community conflict which threaten political order in a society (for example, 'student violence', 'violent demonstration', or 'racial violence'). But political violence is a double edged sword: while it is a tool for some groups which oppose particular governments, it is also used routinely and with great brutality by many modern governments. Rarely, however, are terms like 'violence', 'brutality' or 'terrorism' applied by the media to the actions of such governments — even when their power is imposed and sustained by the use of brutal physical coercion.

If political violence is defined as the use of physical force, both direct and indirect, to hurt, destroy or control a person or group of persons, then it is clear that the term can and should refer to violence employed by governments as well as to so-called terrorism or partisan violence directed against such governments. Moreover, violence directed against the authority of government is, arguably, relatively insignificant in comparison with the violence initiated by governments to preserve their power and authority. And, as van den Haag (1972) has stated: 'Violence used to

acquire, extend, or retain power or authority is political'. It is this aspect of political violence which is generally neglected and little understood. Often it is conveniently dismissed as an exotic or aberrant feature of political life in a few unstable, developing countries. At times it is characterised as a temporary and indeed necessary phase of political life in recently decolonised states which are grappling with the need for political order to foster social cohesion and economic change. Unfortunately, these images hide the actual extent and nature of political violence in the world today.

Much of the scholarly writing on political participation, and political violence has also contributed to these distorted images and the consequent neglect of brutality by the state. Many political scientists accept a very narrow definition of political violence. Gurr's (1970) pioneering work for example, identifies 'political regime.' Like most scholars, he excludes 'the violence used by regimes to maintain social control', viewing this as much less significant than partisan violence aimed at the state. Many other scholars, notably Huntington (1968) accept that coercion by governments is important, but argue that it is a necessary aspect of modernisation; a legitimate vehicle for establishing political and social 'order' so essential for stability and economic progress. The relationships between the rise of military governments, the growth of political violence and the widening gap between rich and poor under such regimes are often ignored. It would be wrong to imply that these views have been embraced by all scholars. The work of Arendt (1970), in particular, has changed the belief that violence by the state is either insignificant or a legitimate means of achieving political order. Nonetheless, the dominant scholarly view sees the state as the legitimate instrument for maintaining social order and managing conflicts which might arise between parties within its boundaries (c.f. Nadin, 1970). Such views ignore or understate the role of governments as partisan participants in, and initiators of, political conflict and violence. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that relatively few commentators have been concerned with why governments resort to violence against their own citizens, or with identifying the nature, extent or uses of violence by governments.

THE ASSAULT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

(A) POLITICAL KILLINGS AND "DISAPPEARANCES"

The European holocaust ended with the Allied victory in 1945. But the horrors of mass killings of civilians did not end with this war. In recent decades large numbers of people have become the victims of killings sanctioned and carried out by governments throughout the world. These brutal and deliberate killings are directed against political opponents and other individuals or groups suspected of constituting a threat to the vested interests of the government and its supporters in a particular country. Yet

with the possible exception of Kampuchea, Uganda, and South Africa the international community remains largely ignorant of the nature and scope of such atrocities. While it is impossible to compile accurate aggregate figures of political killings throughout the post-war world, human rights and UN agencies have exhaustively researched this problem since the early 1970s. As one agency, Amnesty International (1983) commented:

Hundreds of thousands of people in the past 10 years have been killed by the political authorities in their countries. The killings continue. Day after day Amnesty International receives reports of deliberate political killings by the army and the police, by other regular security forces, by special units created to function outside normal supervision, by 'death squads' sanctioned by authorities, by government assassins.

Such killings are usually categorised as 'extra-judicial' or 'extra-legal', as the victims are denied any normal or conventional protection under the laws of their country. (In some countries, of course, the law itself offers little protection for the powerless or poor segments of the community.) Very often, those victims are first abducted, illegally detained and tortured. While some killings are ordered at the highest level of government, it is often difficult to assign specific responsibility for such acts. The judicial enquiry into the assassination of Benigno Aquino in the Philippines offered unusual public evidence of this. In the majority of cases, however, governments simply refuse to investigate killings carried out by 'security' or para-military forces and implicitly encourage further killings by these forces.

Predictably, an upsurge in political killings is often accompanied by the imposition of martial law, or special 'anti-subversion' acts, or suspension of some constitutional rights. This inhibits possible prosecutions, protects government officials from effective public scrutiny, encourages intimidation of witnesses and relatives of victims, and diminishes the judicial protections available to those attempting to expose such acts or prosecute officials responsible for them. Almost every government which routinely uses political violence does so under the alleged mandate of such special acts: for example, President Marcos invoked Martial Law in the Philippines during 1972-1981; amongst many anti-subversive acts used by the white minority regime in South Africa is its broad 'Internal Security Act' (1976); the use of 'Disturbed Areas' declarations by the state of Andhra Pradesh in India (1969) has in effect sanctioned 'encounter' killings of members of the Naxalite movement; the Argentine government's introduction of state of seige legislation in 1973 encouraged the emergence of 'death squads' and widespread political killings; and the declaration by the Peru government during 1983-1984 of Emergency Zones coincided with the 'disappearance' of at least 1,005 people. Such legislation sanctions and encourages political violence and protects those at every level of government who perpetuate political violence.

Political killings and 'disappearances' are very often linked. The term 'disappeared' was first used in the mid-1960s in Guatemala by a

courageous human rights group, the 'Committee of the Relatives of the Disappeared'. In some, but by no means all countries, secret abduction of political opponents is widespread. These victims are then held in secret detention. Some are released; some are later acknowledged to be held in detention; others are found dead, recovered from secret, anonymous graves; some are never located, either dead or alive. Occasionally, as in Guatemala and El Salvador especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bodies of 'disappeared' people were left conspicuously in a public place in an attempt to further intimidate those unsympathetic to the ruling group.

The 'disappearance' of the victims of political violence is most convenient for those responsible. It, in effect, conceals both the act and responsibility for the act, as no victim is found. As relatives of the thousands of 'disappeared' in Argentina discovered after 1976, efforts to report to or investigate a 'disappearance' can be frustrated at every level of officials. Unable to establish the whereabouts or fate of those who 'disappeared', relatives and friends were powerless to help the victims of political violence. This technique also makes it easier for government officials to accuse opposition groups of responsibility for such 'disappearances'.

Such acts are perpetrated by numerous governments in various regions of the world. And these governments embrace the widest possible spectrum of political ideologies. Political killings range from individual and fairly isolated assassinations in some countries, to mass killings of opponents of government or minority groups. Sadly, the dimensions of such violence often reach the outside world long after the violence has become a routine feature of government. At times, as in the case of Kampuchea and Guatemala, initial reports of mass killings are often viewed as exaggerated or dismissed as politically inspired. Despite the growing work and sophistication of UN bodies, non-government agencies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists, the formation of intergovernment bodies like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the courage of domestic human rights investigatory groups, the international community too often has access only to fragmentary or outdated information about politically motivated killings.

The following examples illustrate the extent and nature of this type of political violence. It must be emphasised, however, that: (a) the figures given for each country do not include people killed in armed resistance or guerilla warfare; and (b) the information is by no means exhaustive — many other countries could have been included. ARGENTINA: In eight years of repressive government following the military coup of March 1976 at least 10,000 people 'disappeared', victims of the regime's 'war' against 'subversion'. GUATEMALA: An examination of the rule of President Romeo Lucas Garcia, 1978-1982, exemplifies the nature and level political violence in this unhappy country. In two years to February 1981, Amnesty International documented the seizure without warrant, and subsequent killing, of some 5,000 Guatemalans. PHILIPPINES: During the decade of Martial

Law, human rights groups documented in specific detail more than 250 cases of political killings, some involving 'disappearance', at the hands of officials and para-military forces of the Marcos regime. The end of Martial Law in 1981 did not end these acts. AFGHANISTAN: Thousands of people 'disappeared' following a military coup in April 1978 which brought the People's Democratic Party (PDP) government to power. When General Babrak Karmal took power in December 1979 he conceded that 4,584 people had disappeared under his immediate predecessors. Human rights groups maintain that this figure seriously underestimates the actual number killed, claiming that 12,000 unarmed civilians 'disappeared' in Kabul alone during this eighteen month period.

Political killings and 'disappearances' have occurred in many countries in AFRICA during the past decade. In general terms, these have followed one of the following patterns: (a) People viewed as opponents of a government were arrested or abducted and the government subsequently denied that they were held under its jurisdiction; or (b) People acknowledged by government as political prisoners 'disappeared' while in custody, but the government in question refused to account for the whereabouts of the prisoner (Amnesty International, 1981, 1983).

In some African countries, political killings and disappearances remain relatively isolated incidents, for example in Kenya and Namibia. In others, such abuses have occurred on a large scale, notably in times of political crises when security forces have resorted with impunity to arbitrary arrest, torture, extra-judicial execution and 'disappearances'. Countries included in this category since 1970 include the Sudan, Guinea, Zaire, Cameroon, and Angola. In a few countries, mass 'disappearances' reflecting a pattern of gross political violence have been carried out. Included in this group of countries are Uganda (under President Idi Amin), Equatorial Guinea (under President Marcias Nguema), the Central African Republic/Empire (under Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa), and Ethiopia (under the Provisional Military Government). 'With the overthrow of the rule of law by these governments, virtually all arrests on security or political grounds became "disappearances" at some stage', the USA Section of Amnesty International observed (1981): 'legal formalities of arrest and detention were ignored; detainees had no legal recourse or access to relatives; security officers arrested, tortured, and killed with impunity; the authorities denied or failed to acknowledge responsibility for the detentions.'

(B) TORTURE

'The growth of torture has been described as epidemic', Sean MacBride (in Power, 1981) observed more than a decade ago: 'To control dissent and maintain power, governments have... produced progressively more sophisticated methods of torture: Reporting on *Torture in the Eighties*, Amnesty International (1984) argued that in many of the sixty-six countries in which it had found detailed evidence:

The torture of political prisoners can be said to have become routine. But routine for whom? For the organs of the state that require torture to help suppress political opposition.

Whether used routinely or intermittently, it concluded: 'Torture is usually part of the state-controlled machinery to suppress dissent. Obviously, not all torture exercised by governments is politically inspired. Nonetheless, political prisoners, prisoners of conscience, and those eventually killed or "disappeared" are often subjected to torture, especially in the initial phase of their detention. The horrifying testimony of large numbers of former political prisoners, the marked and mutilated bodies of many victims of political killings, and isolated admissions by former torturers from various countries, are symptomatic of the extent of this practice. A wealth of concrete evidence now exists demonstrating the widespread use of torture as an integral aspect of political coercion in a variety of states. More than one third of all governments have employed or condoned this practice during the past five years.

The ill-treatment of political detainees often follows a pattern of abduction, isolation, secret detention, and incommunicado detention beyond the help of lawyers, friends or relatives. The specific techniques of torture vary from country to country, but all are horrific and intended to break resistance and intimidate opponents and suspected opponents of government. In a number of countries, agencies have been established to carry-out torture against 'subversives' who allegedly threaten the state. Protected by special acts such as state of emergency legislation, the suspension of habeas corpus, and trial procedures which permit the use of evidence obtained under duress or long periods of incommunicado detention, torture becomes an instrument of government policy. Predictably, such governments refuse to investigate allegations of torture, obstruct efforts by human rights agencies or relatives to enquire about torture or deaths in custody, censor information about such practices, and almost invariably give immunity from prosecution to alleged torturers.

No one example of torture is typical. However the following examples, while representing only small fraction of at least sixty countries where torture is used routinely, do illustrate the magnitude of this practice.

TURKEY: Shortly before the military coup of September 1980 an independent investigation group concluded that 'torture was widespread and systematic and that most people detained by police and martial law authorities were subject to torture which in some cases was alleged to have ended in death'. And in the four years following the coup, allegations of torture and death in custody increased.

IRAN: Persistent international concern with abuses of political detainees in 1980-81 induced the Iran's new revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to authorise an official investigation — the Torture Probe Commission. It announced on 17 May 1981: 'In general it could be said that torture is not an instrument of policy in the prisons, but certain exceptional cases of torture were observed in some of the prisons'. Since

this date, reports and firm evidence of torture have increased dramatically. The number and consistency of reports of torture and ill-treatment filtering out of Iran in the past five years confirms the worst fears of independent monitoring agencies: torture is widespread, possibly increasing, and in some detention centres is used systematically.

SOUTH AFRICA: Section 6 of the Terrorism Act (1967), and since mid-1982 Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, in effect permit security police to detain anyone incommunicado and without charge for an indefinite period. Denial of legal counsel, solitary confinement lasting many months, and physical assault and torture is a common sequence of events for those held under South Africa's security laws. Detailed allegations of torture have become routine in recent years from those detained for political reasons.

It must again be emphasised that the above cases comprise a small section of those countries acknowledged by human rights agencies as responsible for torture. The 1984 Amnesty International survey, for example, includes specific evidence of torture in the following regions: Europe, eight countries; Middle East and North Africa, 10 countries; Asia, 10 countries; The Americas, 15 countries; Africa, 23 countries.

(C) POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT AND 'PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE'

Estimates of the number of people imprisoned for political reasons at any one time throughout the world range as high as 500,000. Many of these are classified as prisoners of conscience — people who have not used nor advocated violence who are imprisoned or detained because of their political, religious or other consciously held beliefs, or because of their colour, language, sex, or ethnic origins. It is impossible to summarise accurately such a widespread and constantly fluctuating aspect of political violence. Suffice it to say that a substantial majority of national governments use imprisonment of political opponents, including prisoners of conscience, as routine instrument of government policy. In some countries large numbers of political prisoners have been held often without charge or trial, for decades. In others, short term detention — often involving torture or ill-treatment — is used repeatedly against political suspects. And as we have seen, in some countries political detentions are unacknowledged acts by government agents which precede political killings or 'disappearances'.

Summarising the extent of political imprisonment over a typical twelve month period, Amnesty International (1983) reached the following bleak conclusions:

The Americas — 'prolonged detention without trial were among the chief abuses of human rights reported';

Asia — 'the arrest and long-term imprisonment of prisoners of conscience remained major concerns';

Africa — 'political imprisonment was widespread... under varying political systems';

Middle East and North Africa — 'violations... included the holding

of prisoners of conscience and detention without trial'; and

Europe — 'Human rights violations... included the imprisonment of people for the non-violent expression of their beliefs'.

Consistently throughout the 1980s, these annual surveys have specifically associated more than 100 countries with such practices. In Asia for example, the following countries were listed as amongst those which detained prisoners of conscience and used detention without charge or trial: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Korea (both 'North' and 'South'), Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Although the pattern and extent of such practices vary dramatically, even within one region of the world, the following two countries in Asia illustrate in detail the deep-roots of this form of political violence.

PAKISTAN: Under martial law, imposed in July 1977, the regime of President Zia-ul-Haq has periodically arrested and imprisoned thousands of people for expressing their opinions, especially those identified as supporters of opposition parties or proponents of 'civil disobedience' campaigns aimed at restoring democracy. By late 1983 about 3,000 prisoners of conscience had been released. But many remained in jail, and the elections of early 1985 gave rise to a new round of political imprisonments. Martial law has effectively banned normal political activities, and candidates in 'elections' are required to stand as individuals without party affiliation. At the same time, an amendment to the Penal Code in December 1984 provides for a three year sentence for anyone advocating a boycott of any referendum or election. Military courts, floggings, long and short term detention, civilian deaths in detention, and periodic mass arrests of political opponents are a commonplace of Pakistan political life.

CHINA: Although the number of political prisoners held throughout the country is today 'small compared with the past', human rights groups remain convinced that political imprisonment of 'counter-revolutionaries' and 're-education through labour' are still routine features of political life in China. By the end of 1981 more than 300,000 cases had formally been declared 'unjust', 'frame-ups' or 'wrong'. New laws adopted during the period of 'liberalization' in 1979-1980 strengthened the protection of individual rights. However under these new laws, notably Article 98 and 102 of the Criminal Law, those guilty of the following offenses can be imprisoned: 'counter-revolution and agitation', and incitement 'to resist arrest or violate the law and statutes of the State'. Hundreds of 'counter-revolutionary' cases have been tried annually in the courts under these laws.

(D) FORCED 'REMOVALS', 'RELOCATIONS', AND 'RESETTLEMENT'

These types of violations are not well-documented by human rights groups, but they remain major instruments of political violence and social control. Victims are forcibly restricted, held in detention centres, confined under strict house arrest, obliged to live in a particular village or region, or

banished to a remote part of the country. Such restraints are alternatives to formal imprisonment. In Indonesia, for example, many political prisoners released after long periods of detention following the 1965 coup attempt have been forced to live on remote islands. Accompanying this restriction are others which limit the right to work, receive government benefits, or participate in political activities. The use of roughly similar removals of political 'dissidents' by the Soviet government to outlying regions of the North and East are, of course, well known today. The extent to which this device is used remains, however, largely unknown outside the official circles in the USSR. In South Africa, relocations and resettlements under the infamous 'homelands' policy have been used to concentrate millions of the country's black majority into only 13 percent of its land area. 'House arrest' and 'banishment' is also widely used by white authorities in South Africa. A number of countries have used force to remove indigenous minorities from their traditional lands — for example Brazil in the 1970s. Chile has recently banished some political offenders to villages in its isolated North. Israel has been criticised by human rights groups for confining some people to particular towns in its occupied territories. While often unreported and difficult to document, there is convincing evidence of widespread use of various forms of forced removals in many parts of the world during the last decade.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Obviously, these disturbing aspects of state violence do not exist in a political or economic vacuum. Nor are they independent of international forces or interests. Domestic violence and human rights abuses within any one society are linked inextricably to wider international pressures and developments, most of which are central features of our increasingly integrated and militarized global community. And it is these related influences which must be understood and addressed if the root causes of domestic political violence and human rights abuses are to be overcome.

It would be misleading to imply that the frightening pattern of human rights abuses outlined above is a product of decolonisation or an inevitable feature of new, inexperienced indigenous government. As Lappe and Collins (1978) have argued, 'the political and economic structures that preceded the present ones were among the most repressive in the world.' Moreover, the very fact that national independence often involved a long struggle with powerful European overlords, helped to institutionalise the resort to violence by governments in much of the developing world. And there emerged, as we have noted earlier, a persistent but inaccurate view that political order provides the foundation for economic development in newly independent states. Significantly, the emergence of this argument broadly concided with decisive historical changes which have made violence a widespread tool of government repression. These changes include the

proliferation of military-based governments; and alarming escalation of global militarism and arms expenditure; the growth of arms transfers from the North to the South; and the increasing diversion of domestic expenditure from areas of social and economic need to armaments and militarism. The cumulative effects of these trends can scarcely be overestimated. They have had a decisive impact on the dynamics of government within all states.

Commenting on the fact that external aggression has been of relatively little consequence for Third World states since World War II, Mack (1981) has correctly pointed out: 'The "enemy" turns out to be the very military forces which are supposed to act as guardians of civil society. The 'single greatest threat, to any single civil society is its own military', he concluded. An examination of the activities and priorities of these governments provide stark evidence in support of Mack's (1981) pessimistic argument.

Despite a sharp decline recently in the number of military regimes in South America, the number of such regimes throughout the world still hovers around forty. In contrast, as recently as 1965 there were only ten. The post-war world has witnessed more than 300 successful military coups, and more than 200 failed attempts. With few exceptions these took place in the developing world. Today, more than one quarter of the world's people live under military-controlled governments. According to the New York based group, Freedom House (1978) by the late 1970s only about fifteen percent of 123 so-called Third World countries were 'politically free'; about one quarter were de facto one party states; and about sixty percent were politically unfree, ranging from total despotisms to non-elected dictatorships. Most of these authoritarian regimes rested on explicit military authority. An overwhelming majority of military governments have vigorously opposed economic and social reforms. Usually, these regimes are short-lived. Since the late 1950s, more than half of all military regimes have survived less than two years in power. Those governments which have won office by the sword are usually replaced by a similar process, and very often political violence increases with a change in government as opposition groups are rounded-up and emergency legislation proclaimed.

The escalation of expenditure on conventional weapons by small and middle powers — especially military based regimes in the developing world — is another aspect of the arms race too often obscured from view by the preoccupation with nuclear weapons and East-West rivalries. But nuclear weapons consume less than one quarter of all military expenditure. In contrast conventional weapons account for almost eighty percent of this expenditure. Since 1945 the fraction of world output devoted to military expenditure has averaged about seven percent. In the developing countries, excluding China and OPEC members, military expenditure in the 1970s was equivalent to between 25-30 percent of net investment. Predictably, such countries import virtually all military equipment and weapons, and very often officers and technicians are trained abroad to manage and maintain an imported military infrastructure and weapons. Current

estimates, although necessarily crude, put the cost of the international arms trade at \$10 billion (US) annually — about one third of which is attributable to purchases by the non-oil producing countries of the developing world. Arms expenditures have fuelled the militarisation of government, and exacerbated the trend towards structural violence and human rights abuses — especially in developing countries. And the seemingly inexorable growth of militarism has encouraged the outbreak of conventional wars between these countries. As the International Council for Development Action concluded (1982): 'Since 1945, 130 wars have been fought, all of them in the South'. Nine million people have died in conventional wars since Hiroshima.

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the rate of increase in military expenditure for Third World states has been more than three times the average world increase during the late 1960s and 1970s. In the period 1965-1975 the value of arms imports to the developing world rose by a staggering 600 percent (Sivard, 1983). The rise of a modern, powerful military elite both results from, and further encourages, this tendency. As a consequence, Falk and Sakamoto (1981) have argued:

The armed forces are often the most well-organized systems of repression existing within a given country. If the military seizes power it achieves a monopoly of force and establishes an efficient system of repression.

The African states South of the Sahara, for example, have since the early 1970s accepted arms imports at levels above those of any other region of the Third World. At the same time, as Luckham (1983, 1984) points out, the power and prestige of military offices has grown — a majority of states on the continent are now ruled by the army or have recently been under military rule. No less than 21 of these countries possess guided missiles and most also have sophisticated combat jets. And as the military's fire power has increased, so too has its political power and resort to physical violence to maintain 'political order' and 'national security'. Authors, writing generally on these links, have concluded that the expansion of military expenditure by developing countries correlates closely with the consolidation of authoritarian regimes and repressive violence (Harrison, 1978, Falk, 1980). In addition the arms race has crucial economic and social consequences in the developing world. These, in turn, encourage human rights abuses. The dramatic expansion of arms transfers from the North to the South has diverted the pattern of economic change in many states away from human needs and autonomous development. Few developing countries can afford the dubious luxury of expenditure on armaments. Nor can they afford the hidden costs associated with establishing and maintaining an infrastructure to support the military system. These expenditures reduce imports and production of goods for civil use, squander scarce resources in materials, labour and expertise, drain away foreign exchange, and accelerate both financial and technological dependence of the developing world on the developed world. In 1983, for example, the countries of Asia spent \$85,000 million (US) on armaments. In the same year, the ratio of military

expenditure to health expenditure in some representative countries was: Pakistan 12:1; North Korea 30:1; South Korea 21:1; Taiwan 45:1; and Vietnam 16:1. And in many countries these priorities are accompanied by martial law or special domestic security legislation which stifles political opposition and pressure for increased expenditure on the material needs of the poor majority of people (Sivard, 1983, Falk, 1980, Mack, 1981).

Increased inflation, massive external borrowings and indebtedness, and a rush towards export-based growth to generate funds to pay for mounting military imports, are added by-products of militarisation — the effects of which fall most heavily on the developing world. Recent studies by the UN, Sivard, and the influential Thorrrson Report, categorically reject the long-dominant view that the consequences of military spending on economic growth are broadly positive. This research confirms the negative effects of such spending on economic growth and development, and indicates that the so-called 'spin-off' effects are very limited. Moreover, the multiplier effect is relatively lower for military spending than for equivalent spending in civilian areas. The wisdom of former US President Dwight Eisenhower echoes surprisingly through recent literature on the harmful consequences of defense spending: 'Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in a final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed' (Mack, 1981). In a similar vein, Sivard (1981) observed:

An arms race no country can afford crowds out social needs. Government budgets gives lower priority to deep-seated, debilitating problems than to military solutions and the latest technological advances in weapons.

It is now widely conceded that current levels of defense expenditure and arms transfers increases the likelihood of direct violence through war and, in Mack's (1981) words, 'also denies resources for the task of overcoming structural violence — a far greater cause of death and impairment of health than war'. But the negative consequences do not end with these disturbing trends. The nature and levels of domestic political violence and human rights abuses discussed above are influenced directly by the alarming international growth of militarism. Arms transfers from North to South, growing military and economic dependence of the South on the North, and the proliferation of arms races between countries in a particular region (for example Iran and Iraq) have helped to institutionalised military-based governments.

The protection of 'national security' provides a convenient rationalisation for political repression in a majority of countries today. And these countries are not restricted to the developing or decolonised world. In the guise of protecting 'national security' from enemies without and from 'subversion' within, many regimes have entrenched their own authority and privileges through a combination of military growth and domestic violence. The very militarisation of the governing process has made the types of violence discussed in this paper a normal and often a central feature of the modern sovereign state. And those courageous individuals or groups who

seek to redirect the priorities of their governments towards human needs and away from 'national security', 'defense', and escalating militarism are very often the victims of violence perpetrated by their own governing elites. This vicious cycle has received very little attention from commentators and scholars. Amongst these who have given it real prominence are Falk and Sakamoto (1981) who conclude:

In many Third World countries, arms serve as a means of maintaining a repressive internal political system. They perform a political function of reinforcing the domestic hierarchy, as well as modernising the military sector of the state bureaucracy more rapidly than other sectors, thereby inducing a military approach to government.

Significantly, it is this 'military approach to government' which reinforces the glaring social and economic divisions so characteristic of most nations. As the UN Secretary-General acknowledged in his report on the right to development (1981):

The process of militarization thus constitutes one of the most significant obstacles to realization of the right to development. It invariably entails heavy economic sacrifices; it frustrates the social and cultural aspirations of the people; it is essentially incompatible with the rule of law; and it undermines those principles such as accountability, participation and self-reliance, upon which the concept of the right to development is founded.

POLITICAL FREEDOMS VERSUS POLITICAL ORDER

It is often argued that economic development can only be built on foundations of political order; that human rights must be sacrificed to ensure a political climate favourable to concerted national action in the war on poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment (Huntington, 1968, Lappe and Collins, 1978). But as a number of concerned scholars have demonstrated recently, there is not an inevitable trade-off between individual political rights in a country and effective action by a government to ensure that the basic economic and social needs of its people are met. Such a balance is rarely sought or achieved. In the majority of states which resort to explicit political violence to sustain 'political order', development is heavily biased in favour of a small powerful minority of citizens — especially urban educated groups, the bureaucracy, land and property owners, and military officers. Increasingly, it is the poor people in poor nations who have become, in effect, the victims of biased development, modernisation, and the growing militarisation of political life. And it is these very people and their supporters in organisations like the church, trade unions, voluntary welfare agencies, human rights monitoring groups, universities and schools, or opposition political parties, who have become the principal victims of political violence — violence perpetrated ostensibly to guarantee political order and economic progress in the interests of all members of the country.

'Perhaps the most basic freedom is the freedom to achieve security for one's self and one's loved ones,' Lappe and Collins (1978) have commented. But in the majority of the world's countries today 'life is increasingly insecure'. Political violence does not exist in an economic or social vacuum. It is, overwhelmingly, a vehicle for protecting the status-quo within a country. It is not a legitimate or exceptional aberration of political life, excusable on the grounds that political order will facilitate an assault on the fundamental problems of mass poverty and inequality in developing countries. As prominent Filipino human rights activists Jose Diokno (1983) (himself a victim of abuses by the Marcos regime) has stated authoritarianism is not needed for development but to prevent meaningful change and preserve existing structures of power and privilege. Overt political violence is widely used to reinforce and sustain 'structural' or economic and social violence. In general terms, political violence protects the special interests of, and is perpetrated by, the strong and most advantaged sectors of a country. Citing the detailed surveys undertaken by the Freedom House (1978) group in New York, Harrison (1978) has concluded appropriately that the nexus between poverty and inequality on the one hand, and political violence by the state on the other, is strong and enduring. 'The poorer a nation is, the more likely it is to suffer from deprivation of political and civil rights', he observed: 'Inequality, too, is closely related to dictatorship. Generally speaking, the more unequal the nation, the fewer liberties it tends to possess.'

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FAMINE AND REGIONAL CONFLICT A CASE OF SAHEL REGION IN 1970s¹

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ABSTRACT

The Sahel region, which fringes the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, has been called the "hunger belt" because of the crucial need of external food supplies and an extremely low per capita income. The paper attempts to answer why and how this poverty and political instability have come about as a result of its links to the world economy in the quarter century since the independence of the Sahel countries. Three crises seem to be identified with the increasingly close relationship between Sahelian society and the world economy in the 1980's: the crisis of subsistence, the crisis of autonomy and the crisis of consciousness.

In analyzing the causes of local conflict in the Third World, it would seem that there are at least three main approaches, each one linked to the other. The first approach consists in attempting to place local conflict in the East-West relations. Local conflict in marginal areas is viewed only as a result of East-West political confrontation.

The second approach focuses on economic and historical facets of North-South issues. Less-development whose genesis stems from contact with dominant capitalist system is analyzed as one of the main explanatory factors in local conflict.

The third approach which to some extent is a derivation of the second approach attempts to focus on internal mechanisms of local conflict by admitting in the last analysis the global framework of North-South relations. In other words, this approach consists in asking why local political unity can not manage the negative consequences of North-South

¹ See map 1.

Map 1



Source: Club du Sahel: 1983

relations. The nature and extent of local political unity is analyzed mainly from the socio-economic viewpoint.

The present paper discusses famine and local conflict using the third approach primarily because the Sahel region seems to be too marginal to analyze its conflict and poverty in terms of East-West confrontation, and the second approach seems to be too rudimentary to explain complex internal mechanisms of regional crisis.

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAHEL

Poverty exists everywhere. Even in the highly industrialized countries that can be called "opulent society," poverty can be easily observed in the lowest category of the population. But, in general, this poverty should not be compared with the poverty in the less-developed countries. In this regard, it is suitable to distinguish relative poverty where the minimum needs for reproducing everyday life are met (that is the case of most of the developed countries) while absolute poverty makes the reproduction of subsistence difficult. It goes without saying that the ultimate expression of absolute poverty is famine.

What renders the Sahel economic issues drastic is that extreme poverty coexists with relative poverty. Therefore we may structure our discussion by looking at it in relation to the following characteristics: negative economic growth, emergence of famine and domestic socio-economic gap in the 1970s.

1. NEGATIVE GROWTH

In the two decades since the independence of the Sahel countries, gross national product (GNP) per capita in real terms has stagnated or recorded negative growth in some Sahel countries. Table 1 shows the evolution of the average annual GNP per capita growth rate for the period 1960-1979 and allows us to observe the deterioration of the life of the population since the independence of these Sahel countries.

TABLE 1: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF G.N.P. GROWTH PER CAPITA (1960-1979) (%)

<i>Mauritania</i>	1.9
<i>Senegal</i>	-0.2
<i>Mali</i>	1.1
<i>Burkina Fasso</i>	0.3
<i>Niger</i>	-1.3
<i>Chad</i>	-1.4


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Giri: 1983 p.153

The world in negative or zero growth can be seen in the Sahel region where absolute poverty predominates and is materialized by increases of

unemployment, degradation of food life, deterioration of life environment such as housing, public health, and stagnation of educational and cultural activities. In other words, zero growth means for the Sahelian people that the requirement of maintaining and improving their life, so indispensable for every human being are definitively impeded in all fields of everyday life.

In this regard, evolution of food production per capita in the sub-saharian region is revealing compared with other parts of the third world (see Figure 1). From 1960 until the beginning of 1980, we can observe a constant degradation contrasting with the relatively good performance in Latin America and Asia.



Source: World Bank: 1984

Figure 1: Index of Per Capita Food Production, 1961-65 to 1983
(1961-65 average = 100)

Under such circumstances it is obviously impossible for the Sahel States to achieve productive investments by means of governmental treasuries because of a very low level of domestic fiscal resources. Indeed, 70 percent or 80 percent of domestic revenue is eaten up by the salaries of public employees living mainly in towns. Meanwhile expenditures for agricultural development that could improve the food situation and the income of most of the rural population reach only 10 percent of the whole expenditure of the Sahel governments. In actuality, a large number of productive investments resources for the Sahel region stem from the aid of developed countries or international organizations.

2. DEGRADATION OF FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY

In the less-developed countries such as the Sahel Region where most of the population lives in rural areas, economic stagnation means first of all

the degradation of the life of the rural population. Indeed, for the period between 1960-80, production of the primary sector developed very slowly as we have mentioned previously. Table 2 which shows the evolution of added value per capita of the rural population allows us to observe clearly the degradation or stagnation of the life of the rural population for all the Sahel countries.

TABLE 2: EVOLUTION OF ADDED VALUE IN PRIMARY SECTOR PER PERSON LIVING IN RURAL AREA (IN CONSTANT FRANCS CFA IN 1982)

	<i>Global added value (billion F, CFA)</i>		<i>Added value per rural population (1000 F, CFA)</i>	
	1970	1980	1970	1980
<i>Burkina-Faso</i>	144	176	31	35
<i>Mali....</i>	222	259	49	47
<i>Mauritania....</i>	77	71	74	66
<i>Niger....</i>	219	246	61	51
<i>Senegal....</i>	178	239	60	72
<i>Total</i>	840	991	50	50

Giri: 1985 p.19

Furthermore, when we look at each item in the evolution of the primary sector (Giri, 1985:18), two things should be noted, apart from the stagnation of this sector as a whole. First, fish for the two decades and live-stock in the 1960s, underwent a relatively sustained annual growth of 4 percent and 3.1 percent respectively.

Secondly, vegetable production has increased only at the annual rate of 1.75 percent along with a slowing down of animal production in the 1970s.

Thus what is very serious for the rural population is the degradation of vegetable production which means that the Sahel rural areas can not provide necessary surplus for national development, nor adequately feed the rural population.

Under such circumstances, import of cereals (commercial import and food aid) have continued to increase every year at an approximate rate of 8 percent without taking account of climatic variations.

In contrast with the poor food supply, cash crops, like cotton production, have increased at an annual rate of production of 11 percent. It is worth noting that this remarkable development of the cotton crop is not due to expansion of culture, but to the spectacular improvement in yield which grew from 61kg of fibre per hectare in 1961-62 to 303kg in 1979-1980, or fivefold in two decades (Giri, 1985:12).

The fact that exporting of cash crops entails increasing imports of cereals constitutes one of the deep causes of poverty in the Sahelian States. We will deal with this shortly.


3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC GAP

What is critical for the majority of the population is that the stagnation or deceleration of the Sahel economy is not equally shared by all population. As in all societies today there are on one hand a small number of privileged people and on the other overwhelming majority of ordinary people who suffer from socio-economic degradation.

Without entering into an analysis of the complex social stratification of the Sahel countries, an example of the socio-economic gap we can observe at first glance is the annual pattern of nutrition of salaried workers and merchants mainly based on urban areas and peasants. No one can ignore that in the rural areas of the Sahel region that the most serious period of malnutrition is from the end of the dry season when the food stock of the previous year begins to be exhausted to the period preceding the harvest which is called "between seasons." Indeed the phenomenon of malnutrition occurring in between seasons was known even in West Africa under the name of seasonal hunger during the colonial rule.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that seasonal hunger in rural areas in the 1970s was aggravated by persistent drought and more strongly felt by the rural population because of the emergence of Sahelian privileged class in urban areas. Figure 2 shows two simplified schemes which allow us to recognize the fundamental difference or gap in nutrition between these two categories of population.

A. Peasants situation



B. Salaried man's situation (i.e. officials, soldiers, teachers, etc.)




Figure 2: Evolution of Annual evolution of nutritional situation of peasants and salaried men

Contrasting with the peasant's annual pattern of nutrition, the salaried workers pattern varies monthly above the minimum nutritional line independently of rainfall. It is also these urban classes who benefit first from international food relief coming from foreign governments and international organizations concerned by the information on the Sahelian drought.

This difference in nutritional patterns makes most of the rural population more frustrated with their own life and job.

Certainly the dichotomy between urban and rural areas seems useful for understanding roughly the unequal distribution of wealth because it reflects a fundamental contradiction of today's Sahelian society which will be dealt with subsequently. Nevertheless this approach should not neglect to mention the hidden socio-economic gap for each area.


Everyone knows that all big towns in the Sahel have an informal sector existing behind the colonial style or modern facade, of the central areas. For some villages after the poor harvest it turns out that drought amplifies the socio-economic gap between poor and rich farmers. Poor farmers can have neither the necessary food and seed, nor access to land in order to overcome climatic disasters.

On the other hand, according to a study by Watts on Northern Nigeria, rich farmers have adaptive flexibility in the sense that they have access to the resources necessary to offset drought while their domestic resources enable them to maintain a self-sufficiency in grain even after a poor harvest. Watts (1983) shows us clearly two different responses to the 1973-1974 famine. The poor had to sell everything, livestock, assets, farms, in order to meet their needs for food while rich households became richer by selling grain and livestock and offering a lending service (see Fig. 3).

II. ROOTS OF POVERTY

The factors causing poverty are numerous: from climatic disaster to a mono-culture economy inherited from colonial rule. Let us attempt to examine what seems to be the decisive roots of poverty in the Sahel. Questions can be formulated at different economic levels: distribution, consumption and production.

- In the field of distribution, where does the agricultural surplus go, produced by the rural people? In other words, what are the modalities of appropriation of agricultural surplus?
- In the fields of consumption, why are the towns in Sahel going to be hypertrophied in spite of the deterioration of rural production and quasi-absence of productive activities in towns?
- Finally, if the means of material development at their disposal are limited, why are the Sahelian people as a whole not mobilized to minimize the negative effects of drought and increase food production by participation themselves in national development?



1. CASH CROP MARKETING SYSTEM

An economy based on export of a small number of primary products such as peanuts, cotton, coffee has been criticized by the abundant literature which finds this one of the fundamental causes of poverty in exporting countries. Instability of their export prices due to broad dependence upon external markets and deterioration of their terms of trade are pointed out as the negative results of an extraverted economy.

Despite the importance of these external factors, internal factors which perpetuate and reinforce the monoculture system of the Sahel economy inherited from French colonization should be stressed. Excessive appropriation of agricultural surplus by the Sahel states constitutes one of the decisive reasons why the rural population is in a very poor situation and thus arrests the harmonious national development of their country as a whole.

In the early period of their independence, the Sahel governments drew up national social and economic development plans for converting their mono-culture economy into a diversified and industrializing one. Organization of rural cooperatives aimed at modernization and diversification of agriculture and improvement of the peasant's life could constitute one of the important means by which agricultural development would support industrialization by earning foreign currency for financing industrial plans through export of cash crops, providing the necessary food to people and forming later a rural market for industrial goods produced by urban workers.

Nevertheless, mobilization of rural people under cooperative systems did not work as well as they had expected. In addition to the lack of experience of peasants and governmental officers, a very low level government purchasing price for cash crops and a rigid and authoritarian approval to peasants' affairs by the states tended to discourage the willingness of rural people to participate actively in national development efforts.

In effect, the rural cooperatives which favoured only cash crops, not food crops such as cereals was a new form of appropriation of agricultural surplus rather than a means of global national development. Therefore it can be said that there are non fundamental ruptures on surplus appropriation for most rural people in the sense that Syro-Lebanese and French merchants (*Traitant* in French) who had exploited the rural people throughout *economie de traite* during colonial rule, were replaced only by the Sahelian state officials after their independence. Amin (1981) points out that transformation of rural communities in the Sahel consists in its maintenance by the state rather than its destruction due to capitalistic appropriation of the communal land.

2. HYPERTROPHY OF TOWNS

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We have mentioned that the excessive appropriation of agricultural surplus by the newly independent states is one of the main causes of rural

poverty but what we should also note in order to remove misunderstandings is that this appropriation by the State is not a vice in itself. From the point of view of national development, the important thing is to know for what the agricultural surplus is utilized as history shows that, for agriculturally developing countries, like China, Soviet Union, and Japan during their early period of modernization, the only financial resources at their disposal derived from the agricultural sector. Therefore, state appropriation is justified on the grounds that this resource from the rural sector contributes with effectiveness and justice to national development which improves the welfare of all the people. But, as we have seen earlier, most of the surplus absorbed by the Sahelian states has been spent for the maintenance of the state itself, and not productive investments.

In this regard, towns in the Sahel, particularly capital cities seem to fulfil double functions. First, they constitute a privileged place where the surplus distributed by the administration is spent on consumer goods most of which are imported from industrialized countries because of the quasi-absence of manufacturing industries. Hypertrophy of Sahel towns or urbanization without industrialization in agricultural countries like the Sahel constitute a handicap rather than a generator of national development. Under the stagnation of the Sahelian economies, towns have continued to grow by quadruplicating their population in 20 years 1960-1980. Today about 15 percent of the Sahelian people are urbanized (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: EVOLUTION OF URBAN POPULATION IN SAHEL (1920-1980)

	1920	1940	1960	1980
<i>Mauritania</i>	0	0	0	300,000
<i>Senegal</i>	60,000	240,000	650,000	1,650,000
<i>Gambia</i>	0	15,000	25,000	50,000
<i>Mali</i>	20,000	65,000	230,000	1,000,000
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	0	55,000	150,000	450,000
<i>Niger</i>	0	25,000	85,000	550,000
<i>Chad</i>	0	15,000	130,000	550,000
<i>Total</i>	80,000	415,000	1,270,000	4,550,000
<i>% of total</i>	0.7	3	7	15

Giri: 1983 p.55

Secondly, towns in the Sahel are the generators of urban consumption patterns in the rest of the country: the informal sector in towns and rural areas. Diffusion of urban consumption patterns gives rise to more frustrated people who can not afford to consume by this pattern because the local production capacity is too low to provide the required goods at prices accessible to all. We can observe the growing gap between the level of expectation and the level of local production capacity. This gap leads

people to neglect production and consumption of real basic needs to which the priority of satisfaction to all should be given because of the very low level of the existing production system.

Indeed, we can state in general terms that the less-developed society is characterized first of all by a distortion between the level of aspiration and the degree of realization to meet needs. In other words, the society is suffering from semiotic hyperinflation spread by the mass media, urbanization and state policy, facing the poor local capacity of supply (Katsumata 1982). Let us visualize this distortion of an underdeveloped society (Fig. 4-A) as compared with a developed society (Fig. 4-B). However, what is worse can be found in the fact that this distortion is extremely important because of the stagnation and even decline of local production.




Figure 4-A: Case on an underdeveloped society




Figure 4-B: Case of a developed society

Figure 4: Gap between supply capacity and expectation level

Thus, instead of promoting and regulating national development, towns in the Sahel in most cases turn out to actually modernize poverty.

3. ABSENCE OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION

Without entering into a delicate polemic on the right and wrong of birth control in the Sahel, it should be noted that the Sahelian population can not simply be reduced to a sum of human beings to be fed, but also to people who can participate in productive work. Human investment would be one of the instruments which could alleviate absolute poverty while their material means remain very limited. The main reason why the Sahelian states can not do it seems to be linked to their relationship with the local population.

From the historical point of view, it is a well known fact that present Sahelian boundaries were inherited from an administrative delimitation of colonial rule whose principles date back to the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. It means that the newly independent States preceded achievement of national unity when France decided to give sovereignty to the local elites in the Sahel. Thus, under the name of political integration, the important task of the new government was to figure out how to make a nation.

However, for the reasons we have stated, the State did not completely succeed in creating popular support for state policies. It often turns out that ethnic group interests prevail within the apparatus of the state. State space does not coincide with social space composed of different ethnic groups within the inherited territory. Therefore the fact that local people do not trust the state makes it very difficult to mobilize them for the sake of nation-wide development.

Development implementation often becomes the monopoly of state officials and foreign experts from international development organization, while the local people, watch it with arms folded although it is these people who are primarily affected by such schemes. Furthermore, the massive flow of external resources injected into the Sahelian countries by the North informed by the mass media which warned of the drastic droughts and famines in the Sahel and in other areas of Africa in the 1979's and early 1980's seems to reinforce this inert state structure based upon the distrust and indifference of the Sahelian population vis-a-vis state appeal to mobilization, although no one can ignore how many lives of starving persons during and after droughts were saved by emergency aid.

Table 4 which retraces the evolution of the net receipt of official development assistance (ODA) per capita in terms of current American dollars shows us a huge amount of ODA for the Sahel, compared with that of other areas in the Third World. In 1981, ODA per capita for the Sahel reached 44 dollars, twice that of the other sub-Saharan African countries, fourfold that of Asia and well exceeding Egypt supported by the Western world for strategic and not humanitarian, reasons.

It is also worth noting that, according to an OECD report (Club du Sahel, 1983:49), about a quarter of this aid for the Sahel during the period

1975-1982 has been spent on the item of operating assistance which means expenditure for governmental administration itself, not for development and a very small amount has been devoted to rainfall agriculture improvement to which the priority should have been given on account of the very poor rural infrastructure and importance of rainfall on traditional food crop production in the Sahel.

TABLE 4: NET RECEIPT OF ODA PER CAPITA
(IN CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS)

	1975	1979	1980	1981
<i>Sahelian countries</i>	23	40	39	44
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa (except Sahel)</i>	10	17	21	20
<i>Asia</i>	6	9	10	9
<i>Egypt</i>	67	38	35	32

Club du Sahel: 1983 p.56

Thus, the inert relations of Sahelian states with their populations and massive injection of external resources to these states which should be used to support country-wide development, but which are mainly used to maintain their survival, give rise to a crisis of autonomy in Sahelian society as a whole. A weak state without motivated nationals and increasing dependence on external relief creates a breeding ground for endless political instability.

CONCLUSION: CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE AND PEACE²

Awakened to the existence of extreme contemporary poverty on the other side of the world such as Sahel, thanks to the tremendous progress in communication, the citizens of industrialized societies can not remain totally indifferent to this tragic situation. Their exposure to the mass media forces them to become aware of the disastrous situation in Sahel.

Three reactions are identified. One is the position of those who urge the priority of domestic issues. They state that before extending a helping hand to African people, the government of developed countries should first of all eradicate domestic poverty. On the other hand, the reaction of those who argue the virtue of leaving African issues to Africans themselves through a self-purge process is like taking a passive position in the sense that citizens of industrialized countries have nothing to do with contemporary poverty in other regions of the world, although they maintain extensive economic relations with these poorer regions.

² This section is substantially based on a former paper, Katsumata (1985).

Nevertheless these passive positions in international relief seem to commit a double error.

As we mentioned, absolute poverty existing in Sahel or other extremely poor countries can not be identified with relative poverty which we observe in developed countries.

Secondly, it will be very difficult to know the extent to which the existing world system would allow African countries to undertake peacefully their own purge process even if they wish to do in the name of the sovereignty of their state.

The second reaction is represented by good will of citizens who want to do something about the misery of "others". This good will traditionally limited solely to the relief of people suffering from domestic disasters like floods and earthquake within the same country across the border. Indeed, contrasting with the previous position the transnationalization of good will should be appreciated because of its active position in the eradication of poverty in our time.

It might however be argued, subject to further research and reflection, that one of the most problematic points in good will reaction lies in the transnationalization of democracy. It is important to point out that in civil society such as the Western and Japanese societies, aid to citizens in distress can be checked and improved by the feedback mechanism between beneficiaries and donors within the same politico-institutional framework.

In contrast, aid to less-developed countries like Sahelian countries, even if all of it is supposed to be sent to the target population, could not be fully utilized in most cases by the target population because of lack of internal democracy. It is hardly expected that military government, like most of Sahelian countries, can leave the population to express their needs and to use external resources through their own initiative. International solidarity forged on the occasion of drastic reports about famines in Africa in 1970s and early 1980s, seems to raise the question as to the meaning and the effectiveness of transfer of good will from a civil society to a region without democracy.

The third reaction while appreciating a good will reaction, consists in recognizing the limits of good will and inquiring into the relations between opulence in the North and absolute poverty in the South.³ The

³ Wallerstein (1983) points out a very limited number of world's industrial workers by saying that:

Is not the industrial worker strikingly better off today than in 1800? The industrial worker, yes, or at least many industrial workers. But industrial workers still comprise a relatively small part of the world's population. The overwhelming proportion of the world's workforces, who live in rural zones or move between them and urban slums, are worse off than their ancestors five hundred years ago. They eat less well, and certainly have a less balanced diet. Although they are more likely to survive the first year of life (because of the effect of social hygiene undertaken to protect the privileged), I doubt that the life prospects of the majority of the world's population as of age one are greater than previously; I suspect the opposite is true. They unquestionably work harder — more hours per day, per year, per lifetime. And since they do this for less total reward, the rate of exploitation has escalated very sharply.

World system which simultaneously produces and reproduces poverty on one side and wealth on the other side constitutes the focus of reflection.

But, at the time when North-South dialogues are stalemated, power relations are not appropriate to establish a more equal world system which is morally acceptable, politically feasible and economically viable.

Thus the perspective of the crisis of conscience remains uncertain in the North. In the meantime, a vicious cycle between poverty and political instability is going to be established more and more deeply in Sahel. Poverty aggravated by successive droughts has turned out to intensify political struggles between local elites mainly based in towns for sharing the already limited wealth of the country without any participation of the rural population.

Political instability which stems from these conflicts of interests in turn disrupts the effort for country-wide development in eradicating poverty. The failure of development strategy requires an increasing flow of strategic external resources which, however tends to provoke the crisis of regional autonomy. Sobhan (1985) provides a very suggestive analysis regarding the pointlessness of any national effort at structural change by an increasing flow of external resources.

The simultaneous occurrence of the crisis of autonomy in the South and the crisis of conscience in the North would reflect the complexity and difficulties of the dynamics of the world system. In fact, local autonomy and transnationalization of good will would constitute two contradictory paradigms.

Unfortunately, the evolution of the world system can not arrest this contradictory movement. What is at least apparent in the opaque transition period of the world system is that there will be neither real development nor durable peace in Sahel for as long as the two crises are not overcome.

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WAR AND PEACE IN CHILDREN'S LITERATURE

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we will discuss the values depicted in the best of modern picture books and contrast these with the messages that are found in the second rate material that is more readily available in most places. We believe that children are influenced by what they read and that our attitudes towards other people, towards problems, towards the future, towards war and peace are formed when we are young.

INTRODUCTION

Books for children can be more than just entertainment or a vehicle for learning to read. The best of children's literature captures the child's attention through artistry and plot and then tells him more about himself and about life, helping him face personal difficulties, in order to survive in a world of conflicts and problems.

The best artists and authors of children's books present their views of life and their values to children, sharing their concern for human life, for peace and understanding.

We will limit our examples to English picture books and discuss them under the following broad and overlapping categories.

1. Books that deal directly with conflict and conflict resolution.
2. Books with a positive message about life.

Then we will look at two anti-war picture books aimed at an adult audience.

BOOKS THAT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

War and Peas by Michael Foreman was published in 1974. To many adults it is an unattractive picture book with its surrealistic art and disgusting Fat King representing gluttony, greed, selfishness and cruelty. Children are not repelled by it for there is humour in the illustrations, a comic-like quality they savour.



War and Peas

They understand the message immediately. The young child knows what it is to face the conflict between pleasure and reality, the pleasure principle and the reality principle as Bruno Bettelheim (Bettelheim & Zelan, 1982) describes it in his discussion of the importance of meaningful reading. A child is often tempted to be greedy, to eat or take more than his share. Through experience, through models, through stories he overcomes this

personal conflict and finds that life is happier when you consider other people, share and co-operate. Here we see the Fat King with his portly courtiers, shirt bulging over his fat stomach, his crown and robe decorated with food and cutlery.

He refuses to help the Lion and the Grocer whose country is stricken by famine, calling them beggars because they ask for any extra food the Fat King may have, and robbers when they offer to come and collect the food.

The Lion and the Grocer escape from the Fat King's soldiers, leap on their bicycles and pedal away. The army follow them but they are too fat. The drivers of the tanks have no room to steer, the trucks have punctures the horses collapse, scenes that delight children.

Older children will tell you straight away that the book is about 'peace', for the book can be read at several levels. As adults we see *War and Peas* as an allegory, a moral fable, where the Fat King symbolises tyranny, not just the tyranny of a dictator of feudal monarch but the tyranny that comes with overriding materialism and power.

In this story the poor people win, thanks to nature — rain and birds bringing seeds — and the evil ones are undone by their greed. Something, alas, that does not always happen.

Moose by Michael Foreman, published in 1973 is similar in style and again can be viewed on several levels (Foreman, 1973). As a story that shows the foolishness of boasting and fighting and as an allegory of peace and reason.

It begins

Moose was just an ordinary Moose.
He worked a little too hard, got
cross in hot weather, and was poor.

Bear and Eagle begin to shout at each other, "great angry waves of meaningless noise." Sticks and stones are thrown next and the adversaries order their friends to help. Moose who was very frightened used the sticks and stones to build a shelter, such an interesting shelter that the animals stop fighting and begin to help. They build a new community and are content. Bear and Eagle continue abusing each other. "Perhaps one day they will discover that it is more fun to sing," says Moose at the end.

Suho and White Horse, published in 1981 is a Mongolian legend retold by Japanese author Yuzo Otsuka and then translated into English by Ann Herring (Otsuka, 1982). The illustrations are by Suekichi Akaba. It is another story — this time a very ancient one that shows the evil of tyranny and greed.

A poor shepherd boy named Suho finds an abandoned newborn foal on the Mongolian steppes. He rescues it and cares for it devotedly. It grows into a splendid, spirited horse which Suho loves dearly. One day the governor of the region announces that he intends to hold a big race. As a prize he promises to give the winner his daughter's hand in marriage. Suho is encouraged by his friends to enter his horse which wins the race but when

the governor sees he is only a poor peasant boy he retracts his promise to make him his son-in-law. Instead he orders Suho to go back to his village leaving his horse behind. Suho refuses and is beaten.



Suho and the White Horse

Eventually the horse escapes and returns to Suho but in doing so it is shot with arrows and dies in Suho's arms. Its spirit returns to the grief stricken Suho and tells him to carve a fiddle from the bones, sinews, hides and hair of his beloved horse. Suho makes the first Mongolian horse-head fiddle.

Others made horse-head fiddles like the one Suho had created and the book ends with these words:

In time its music could be heard in almost every part of the grasslands of Mongolia. In the evening, when the day's work had ended, the shepherds would gather and listen to the song the horse-head fiddle sang. They forgot their weariness and their hearts grew warm with peace and delight, giving them new strength for the days to come.

Again children have no difficulty appreciating the values behind this book. They see that tyranny must be resisted and that love triumphs in the end but only at great cost.

Another children's book with an anti-violence message is Munro Leaf's *The Story of Ferdinand* first published in 1937. Again the moral is clear but this time the point is made lightly and with humour. The humour is particularly evident in the delightful black and white line drawings by Robert Lawson.

'Why don't you run and play with the other little bulls and skip and butt your head?' she would say.
But Ferdinand would shake his head. 'I like it better here where I can sit just quietly and smell the flowers.'



The Story of Ferdinand

Ferdinand is a little bull in Spain who likes to sit quietly and smell the flowers in his pasture. He refuses to fight and be aggressive. One day he sits on a humble bee by mistake. Of course the bee stings him. He jumps up snorting and pawing the ground. Five men in funny hats who have come to select the biggest, fastest, roughest bull to fight in the bull fights in Madrid see Ferdinand leaping about and pick him thinking he is just the one they're looking for. Later they realize their mistake when Ferdinand refuses to fight. Instead he sits in the middle of the bullring sniffing the perfume from the flowers in all the lovely ladies' hair. The story ends:

So they had to take Ferdinand home and for all I know he is sitting there still under his favourite cork tree, smelling the flowers just quietly. He is very happy. (Leaf, 1937).

BOOKS WITH A POSITIVE MESSAGE ABOUT LIFE

In this delightful retelling of *St Francis and the Wolf* by Elizabeth and Gerald Rose we see how love and kindness can overcome violence (Rose & Rose, 1982). The style is bright, and cheerful, no sentimentality. St Francis is a comical character, rotund, unshaven. The skinny, scruffy wolf is meant to be fierce and frightening. He is only hungry and St Francis easily persuades him to stop trying to eat people!



St. Francis and the Wolf

Taming a wild animal or overcoming our fears of what we do not understand, may not be so easy in reality. But kindness and patience, and trying to understand the reason for the aggressive behaviour of others can



help us out of difficulties. Caring for the needs of animals will lead to caring for other people, to considering how we live together on this planet and whether we will survive.

Crow Boy by Taro Yashima (1955) would be one of the finest picture books for children. It is one of our favourites for reading to children of all ages and to teachers. At first sight the book may not appeal, the cover is strikingly designed but *Crow Boy* looks odd and the artists impressionistic style a little rough and ready. It is a story of such beauty however, with the illustrations conveying story and mood so effectively, that you soon come to regard Chibi's face on the cover with affection.

It is of course a story with a Japanese setting. However it could be about a child anywhere in the world, a child who is different and who suffers further because of the way he is treated.



He liked Chibi's black-and-white drawings and tacked them up on the wall to be admired.



He liked Chibi's own handwriting, which no one but Chibi could read, and he tacked that up on the wall.

Chibi is small and shy and quiet. The teacher is cold and unsympathetic and his schoolmates not much better. One illustration shows Chibi sitting alone, with the teacher well apart from the children, teaching with a stick!

In Chibi's sixth and final year of school Mr. Isobe arrives, a fat, kind, teacher with time for Chibi.

There is no miraculous change as would take place in a trivial book. Chibi does not become an academic success, but his knowledge of nature and of the songs sung by crows is discovered and everyone thinks of his life in a 'far and lonely place', his patience and fortitude during his time at school.

We can all look back to the Chibi's in the School we went to, and alas to the Chibi's in the classes we have taught. Crow Boy has a message that is universal and timeless.



Verenka
STE

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Varenka by Bernadette Watts published in 1971 by Oxford University Press is another picture book with a positive message about life (Watts, 1971). Varenka, a widow lived in a little house in the middle of a great forest in Russia. One day she learns that there is a fierce war being waged not far from her home and that soldiers are coming near. Passersby urge her to join them and flee. Varenka is afraid but she says:

If I come with you who will comfort the travellers as they pass on their journeys, who will care for the children who wander and get lost in the forest, and who will shelter the animals and feed the birds when winter comes? There is no one here except me so I must stay.

A goatherd, an artist and a little child seek shelter with Varenka. The war comes closer and closer and inside Varenka's house they pray that the soldiers will not find them. As if in answer to their prayer, snow falls and covers the house. The soldiers pass by without finding it. The story ends with the return of spring and of peace to that part of Russia.

In Silver Cow is a traditional story from Wales retold by Susan Cooper and illustrated by Warwick Hutton. It was first published by Chatto and Windus in 1983. It's another book with a positive message about life but it could just as fittingly be regarded as a book that deals with



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The Silver Cow

conflict and conflict resolution. As with all the other books we have considered so far, the message is carried as much by the beautiful pictures as by the words. It also has a right thinking hero, Huw, who reminds us of Suho, Chibi, Ferdinand, Varenka and St Francis. There's also a villain or tyrant, Gwilym Hughes, Huw's father "a man with a heart as small and mean as his beady black eyes." Notice how the picture of Gwilym Hughes' tells us a great deal about his greedy, mean, aggressive character. Like Ferdinand, Varenka, and Chibi, Huw loves the beauties of nature and like Suho he loves music and plays his harp to bring joy to others including his magic silver cow. Perhaps it's not surprising that the hero of a Welsh story would be a music maker (Cooper, 1983).

ANTI-WAR PICTURE BOOKS FOR ADULTS

The two final books we have for you are so horrible you would not like children to see them. Partly because they would be frightened, partly because it would be very difficult to explain to them what is happening and why. They are books that make you feel ashamed.

The first one *When The Wind Blows* by Raymond Briggs is horrible and depressing (Briggs, 1982). An ordinary little couple as bewildered as we all are about the state of the world hear that there will be a pre-emptive strike (the wife thinks it is a workers strike) and goes on with dinner preparations commenting,

Oh not another strike. It's wicked. I'd have them all locked up. Blessed Communists.

The book is in comic form except for the double page spreads showing a missile launching, planes and nuclear submarine, all dark and menacing, and the pages showing the actual explosions, white tinged with crimson. For the rest of the book Jim and his wife are trying to cope with this vile situation. On the last page they die after dreadful suffering.

The Tin-Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman also by Raymond Briggs was published in 1984 by Hamish Hamilton following the Falkland War. The Tin-Pot Foreign General and the Iron Woman represent the protagonists (Briggs, 1984). These two characters are shown as huge inhuman and grotesque. In fact in some of the pictures they look almost obscene.

Briggs changes his art style completely in the pictures which show the ordinary people — the Falkland Islanders themselves — and the soldiers and their families. The pictures of these people have a suffering kind of dignity. Nevertheless, they are shown as victims. The picture of the wounded has the caption: "Some men were only half blown to bits and came home with parts of their bodies missing." The book ends with a sad, quiet picture:

and the families of the dead tended the graves




When the Wind Blows

CONCLUSION

Books such as *When The Wind Blows* and *The Tin-Pot Foreign General* and *The Old Iron Woman* are only bought and read by people who already feel strongly about the issues of war and peace, people who do not need to be frightened any further.

But the children's books we have discussed and many more fine



The Tin-Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman

are lifeless and dull. There is no passion or feeling, no real life. Books are reading material, not literature. They are for learning to read, and for gaining factual information. Books that stretch the mind imaginatively are regarded as frivolous in spite of research evidence to the contrary (Elley & Mangubhai, 1980; Ricketts, 1981).

Bookshops are often forced to stock mediocre books with trivial values and themes because such books are popular, mass produced and therefore cheaper. A diet of Enid Blyton, the Hardy Boys, Nancy Drew and worse still Biggles may entertain and amuse but in our view enriches no one's life and does nothing "to make the world more beautiful."

The last quotation is from Barbara Cooney's *Miss Rumphius*, the picture books and novels for young people deal with issues that all human beings face. Through meaningful books children learn that life is complex and full of problems. They also learn that they are not alone in this predicament and that there are positive ways of facing and overcoming conflicts.

As adults we can help by ensuring that children do have the chance to read such books. In many school systems the books that children have story of the Lupin Lady who tells her niece (as she had been told by her grandfather).

you must do something to make the world more beautiful (Cooney, 1983).

An appropriate end, we feel, to a discussion of children's books, and how they can help children take charge of their own evolution!

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UNARMED PACIFICISM AS A REALISTIC OPTION: THE CASE OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

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ABSTRACT

Unarmed pacificism stands out as a valid philosophy, a new paradigm which can save human kind from annihilation. Japan's Constitution forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation. Unfortunately, the US-Japan Security Treaty has resulted in a military preparedness programme that has made it the eighth strongest in the world. This is a disgraceful contradiction. However the Constitution is supported whole-heartedly by the majority of the people. What was once possible cannot be impossible today and in the future.

As we celebrate this year as the United Nation's International Year of Peace, it may be an appropriate occasion for us to give some thought to the true significance of the so-called Peace Constitution of Japan. The reason it has been called the "Peace Constitution" can be best illustrated by the following two quotations from it:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want (From the Preamble).

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (Article 9).

This Constitution of Japan was promulgated on 3rd November 1946 and became effective as of 3rd May 1947. As one can see clearly, it is strongly characterized by the national desire for the pursuit of peace, justice, and human rights. The majority of Japanese people are truly proud of its superb value, and in fact, opinion polls show that more than 80 percent of the population are in favour of the "Peace Clause" of the Constitution.

MORE IDEAL OR THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE?

Charges have been made quite often that unarmed pacifism instituted in the Constitution is but the expression of an ideal coupled with neglect of reality. Indeed, the charges would be pertinent if judged on the basis of time-worn common sense and the ordinary practice of nations in general. Unarmed pacifism would then be a sheer absurdity.

However, if we penetrate a step farther into present world reality and consider seriously the urgent problems which we, as global citizens, must address, it may not be so easy for us to dismiss unarmed pacifism as mere idealism. It seems rather that unarmed pacifism stands out as a valid philosophy, a new paradigm, which can save humankind from total annihilation.

There can be no question that all-out nuclear war between the two super-powers would terminate the present civilization as we know it. We are also aware that chemical pollution of the environment and hazardous wastes are bound to endanger the human species. Depletion of natural resources as the result of explosive population growth is another potential menace threatening to end the world.

If the predicament of the world can be characterized as such, unarmed pacifism like that of the Japanese Constitution regains a new realistic significance. At a time when Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is a possibility which gives credibility to the policy of deterrence, the traditional meaning of war as "continuation of politics by other means" is a deceptive anachronism. There are several concrete reasons why unarmed pacifism and a policy based on it are the only realistic alternative in the contemporary international situation.

FUTILITY OF MODERN WARFARE

First, the institution of war as such has been rendered meaningless vis-a-vis the magnitude of violence in modern warfare. Military strategists

are well aware that there is, after all, no perfect defense system against nuclear attack. Only the threat of massive nuclear retaliation, it is alleged, can substitute for this fundamental and fatal weakness. In reality, however, a policy based on the threat of retaliation reveals its own basic flaw. That is, it is always predicated on an overestimation of the potential strength of the presumed aggressor. Thus the increased force thought necessary to deter the attacker provokes a corresponding arms buildup of the other side, resulting in a vicious circle of endless escalation in the nuclear arms race.

Even conventional warfare constitutes a grave threat to highly urbanized industrial countries. An attack with non-nuclear missiles on New York, Moscow, Tokyo, or London would be more than devastating. Consider the paralyzation of computers, telecommunication systems, and other electronic installations. And consider millions of homeless, hungry, wretched, and perhaps wounded refugees from the burning metropolis. Remember the long queues in front of super-markets even at the time of the 1973 oil crisis triggered by the war between Egypt and Israel? The vulnerability of industrialized countries with their extremely urbanized population centres imposes a categorical prohibition even of non-nuclear warfare.

Moreover, if operating nuclear power plants were attacked with conventional weapons, the result would be a near nuclear explosion with spreading plutonium and other radioactive materials which are extremely dangerous even in infinitesimal doses. Should a meltdown, the "China Syndrome", take place the havoc would be comparable to or even greater than that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

WASTEFULNESS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Secondly, in the light of the economic condition of the world as a whole, expenditure on armaments constitutes an intolerable waste. The vertical and horizontal militarization of the world, if continued unabated, will precipitate the end of the world. In the vertical dimension, super-modern technology has brought forth qualitative breakthroughs in the production of new weapons of mass-destruction. A host of new generations of nuclear warheads and means of delivery have been developed. Novel electronic tools, guided projectiles, sensors, computer techniques, laser systems, etc. have been introduced, and now with the new proposal of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the "Star Wars" plan, the vertical proliferation threatens to extend itself to outerspace.

On the horizontal level, short-sighted "merchants of death" are relentlessly diffusing means of destruction on a global scale. In fact, 75 percent of conventional weapons are exported to Third World countries like Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, South Korea, Israel, Libya, and so on. "Merchants of death" are not private industries any more as in the past, but government agencies of such countries as the US, the USSR, France, West Germany, the UK, Italy, Czechoslovakia, etc (listed in order of the size of

their arms trade).

Such results have been brought about by the massive mobilization of resources in industrialized nations. Despite the famous warning of US President Dwight Eisenhower at his farewell speech, the military-industrial complex has grown unchecked. The military, the media, and others with a financial and ideological stake in that complex now serve to make up the horrendous Leviathans of the century.

It should be borne in mind that of the 4.8 billion world population less than 1/5 live in developed countries. The majority of this global village live under the poverty line, and in many African, Asian, and Latin American countries, there are always neglected areas where living conditions are not much different from those of the neolithic era. It is an inexcusable waste to consume the limited resources of the earth in order to prepare for destruction and massacre while millions are starving in the world today.

It is high time to convert the present short-sighted war-economy into an alternative peace-economy. Contrary to popular notion that "war pays", there are a number of credible research findings leading to the opposite conclusion that a peace-economy will create more jobs, and consequently be more productive. Gradual abolition of military institutions will make available the means to meet pressingly urgent priority needs on a global scale.

THREAT TO DEMOCRACY

Thirdly, militarism and militarization can never be in harmony with democracy, either in the capitalist camp or the socialist. Already totalitarian states exist in quite a few heavily militarized Third World countries. Whether they belong to the capitalist or socialist world is of little consequence.

The same is true with many developed countries where militarization has become a run-away social psychosis amidst economic recession and a high rate of unemployment. Surveillance, manipulation, deceit, bribery, concealment, misinformation, and skillful deflection of attention from the true intent of national policy have become matters of course. The world powers have almost systematically supported brutal military regimes in Third World countries where they seek to control client states to further their own interests. Secretive handling and hermetic administration of spent nuclear fuel containing the most dangerous radioactive materials require ever more stringent security measures to keep the public ignorant of hazards. Saturation of nuclear power plants will inevitably result in the death of democracy on the pretext of protecting the life of people.

STATES WITHOUT ARMIES

Fourthly, there are a number of countries which have actually no security need and accordingly could abolish their standing army on the basis of a certain timetable. For example, which country would ever attempt to invade Fiji or New Zealand? What would happen if the Benelux countries adopted a Peace Constitution similar to that of Japan and actually abandoned all military installations and equipments? With sufficient domestic police forces, nations could dispense with the burden of costly weapons of mass destruction. For some "hot zone" countries in Central Europe, an interim period might be required to reduce animosity and mistrust. After a sufficient period of the "Swedenization" of West Germany and "Finlandization" of East Germany, for example, both would be able to adopt the policy of unarmed pacifism without necessarily opting for reunification.

It is true that countries in some areas of the world have been in a constant state of warfare. Statistics tell us that more than one hundred wars have occurred since 1945, always involving one or more Third World countries. However, no two developed countries have ever fought against each other since the end of World War II. Industrialized countries appear to have reached the stage where they know they can or rather they *must* solve international conflict by peaceful means. Many of them seem to have no potential aggressors either. Unarmed pacifism could very well be a realistic option for them. There are already 12 countries which have no standing army for one reason or another; they are Maldives, Nauru, Western Samoa, Vatican (except for ceremonial Swiss guards), Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Costa Rica, Panama, Gambia, and Mauritius. Major nations should learn from these minor ones about non-military security systems. Is it not simply an obsession to think that a nation must have war potential?

Unfortunately, the Japan-US Security Treaty has *materially*, if not *formally*, overruled the Japanese constitution. As a result, the Self-Defense Forces (the euphemism for Japan's tri-service military) has become the eighth strongest in the world today. This is an *unconstitutional* entity under "legal" protection of the Self-Defense Forces Act of 1954 — a persistent and disgraceful contradiction.

The International Year of Peace certainly provides an excellent opportunity to strive anew to restore the order of the Constitution, viz. that of unarmed pacifism or unarmed neutrality which is the only realistic option today. Nuclearization of the world forebodes an impending holocaust. However, in a sense, the nuclear issue is a red herring. We must go beyond the nuclear issue and say "No" to conventional weaponry as well. Before the advent of atomic bombs, pacifists used to oppose weapons in general and not particular weapons only. To oppose nuclear weapons but acquiesce in conventional ones is to betray that historical heritage.

We must certainly continue our adamant opposition to the nuclear

arms race. Undoubtedly, our Number One priority is to eliminate nuclear weapons. That will, however, be but one big step toward the goal of an unarmed international order. It may be a long process, but it is not an illusion. The case of the Japanese Constitution shows that unarmed pacifism has been enacted at the highest national legislative level and was once a genuine national policy supported whole-heartedly by the majority of people. What was once possible cannot be impossible today and in the future.



Dr Herbert Feith, Dr Mitsuo Okamoto and Dr T.U. Sathyamurthy.

TREES, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND PEACE: THE PRESERVATION OF TREES AS A PRECONDITION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY

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ABSTRACT

The object of this paper is to stress that the human quest of peace, the resolution of conflict, and social stability, on both local and international levels, should not, and cannot be separated from the quest for environmental stability. There are countless examples. The preservation of forests and trees is seen as a critical precondition for environmental and social stability; peace in all its connotations... environmental, social and spiritual.

Politicians, statesmen, economists, lawyers, and the like argue for "peace" at the negotiation tables of the world. The French flatly refuse to cease testing their nuclear devices on the small ecologically-fragile atolls of French Polynesia. The *Rainbow Warrior* is sunk and a human being killed in an attempt to sabotage the "Greenpeace" operation. Conflict continues throughout the world, as well as in the "Peaceful" (Pacific) Ocean, where the indigenous peoples continue to strive for real independence and the control over their own natural inheritance. Negotiations continue, in an attempt to resolve conflict. Economic, political, or religious sanctions and compromises dominate the negotiations at the global level, while the deeper fundamental causes, the real causes of conflict at the local level, ecological scarcity, deprivation, and spiritual impoverishment are more often than not ignored. Aid, trade, and diplomacy, at the global and national levels, substitute for the elimination of poverty and the encouragement of husbandry, self-sufficiency, ecological stability, ... and peace at the local level.

In this paper, specifically, it is argued that, at the local level, trees are in fact perhaps the best symbols, or environmental and social indicators of self-sufficiency, ecological stability, spiritual wellbeing *and* peace. It is further argued that tree planting and protection must be seen as a logical first step in the elimination of abject poverty, while at the same time, reversing the hands of time and the millennia of thoughtless, short-sighted deforestation and environmental degradation, which has undermined ecological stability. In short, without the replanting and protection of trees, which promote ecological and social stability, self-sufficiency and food husbandry at the local level and peace and conflict resolution at all levels, global, national, and local, will remain problematic.

Although the focus is global, specific emphasis will be placed on the islands of the ocean, named the "Peaceful (Pacific) Ocean" ("El Mar Pacifico") by Magellan over four-and-a-half centuries ago, an area which arguably remains the most peaceful on earth, where tree protection and planting have remained integral to most resource-use and social systems, and where conflict resolution is still commonly accomplished through exchanges of fruits of the land. However, ominous signs that the Pacific will be less peaceful in the future can be seen in the increasing strategic, political, and economic interest on the part of the superpowers in the Pacific. Often associated with this have been the denial of peoples' rights to the habitation of their islands, increasing deforestation, and a general disregard for trees in the name of peace and economic development. Such open disregard for the traditional tree-conscious cultures of the Pacific does not auger well for the future.

In short, it is argued that peace will not, and cannot be won through the use of the fragile island ecosystems of the Pacific as bases for the development of deterrent forces, or through the sale of their natural forests or the elimination of culturally-important trees in the name of economic development. Such actions only serve to further compromise humankind's fleeting chances to resolve conflict once and for all. Without trees, the ocean, its island peoples, nor the world can be Pacific. If there is to be peace at all, it will necessarily have to be a "Green Peace".

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICAL STABILITY

Sustainable development and stability of political systems, whether on a global or local scale, must necessarily depend on the maintenance of the natural and cultural resources available within the ecosystem. As Schumacher (1973), stresses in his well-known book *Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered*, any system of development which treats its resource base as income to be spent rather than as capital for maintenance or growth must ultimately fail.

More specifically, he argues that development strategies which treat nonrenewable, and renewable resources and human, social and techno-

logical systems (and trees and their uses fall into all three categories) as income to be spent cannot lead to stability.

Despite these very logical assumptions, throughout recorded history, most of "modern humankind" seems to have been quite content to create political systems and development strategies which have little or no concern for how they fit into the larger pattern... our global ecosystem. More specifically, there has been little concern for the long-term implications of environmental destruction for these social systems themselves. In Ophuls' (1977, p. 2-3) analysis of the political, social and economic implications of the environmental crisis, he stresses that:

even some of the more prominent environmentalists appear not to have understood their import. At least in their public statements, they maintain that a sufficient quantity of reform — fairly radical reform, to be sure — would rescue us from our ecological predicament. To the extent that more radical changes are urged, the language used is often vague; concrete political and social arrangements are rarely discussed, and really fundamental change in our way of life or our constitutional arrangements are, one could gather, virtually unthinkable.

One all-embracing concept which Ophuls (1977, p.127) says that mankind, as a whole, has failed to understand is the concept of "ecological scarcity" which encompasses all the various limits to growth or costs attached to continued growth. Scarcity, argues Ophuls (1977, p.142), makes politics inescapable, for "to prevent the perpetual struggle for power in a war of all against all, there must be a civil authority capable of keeping peace by regulating property and other scarce goods". Unfortunately, regardless of political persuasion, the vision of ecological abundance has been rarely challenged except by pressure groups. Marx, for example, was even more utopian than either Locke or Smith. He envisioned the eventual abolition of scarcity; he merely insisted that, on grounds of social justice, the march of progress be centrally directed by the state in the interest of those whose labour actually produced the goods.

Even the "Green Revolution", held to be the panacea for expanding world food production, seems to have severe ecological as well as social flaws, and has contributed to an increasing social polarization and involves considerable ecological risk (Sachs, 1976:52).

Recent studies of the remarkable strides China has made in solving its food production problems, for example, indicate that China's modern agricultural policies, particularly those aimed at bringing marginal lands into production, have been environmentally disastrous. On Hainan Island, for example, indiscriminate destruction of trees since the 1950s, mainly due to the policy of grain growing as the key to agricultural development, the use of primitive slash-and-burn methods, the expansion of estate farms, and the lack of coal has led to a decrease of the natural forest of Hainan and its rich diversity of plant and tree species and timber and medicinal plants, from 863,000 to 245,000 hectares between 1954 and 1980 (Vermeer, 1984, p.10).

Similar trends are widespread in the Pacific Islands, where increasing emphasis on monocropping, primarily for export, but also to satisfy rapidly growing local urban markets, has led to deforestation, the felling and uprooting of a wide range of environmentally, culturally and nutritionally important trees to make way for the plough, a widespread neglect, on the part of the younger generation, to replant trees, and considerable cultural, nutritional, and ecological deterioration.

Heilbroner (1976, p.102), in a broader context, forecasts the doom of all developmental and political systems which fail to observe the principles of human ecology. In his book *Business Civilization in Decline* he predicts that capitalism will be terminated within a century because:

We are leaving a historic epoch in which the expensive drive of capitalism could be accommodated by an indefinitely rich and vast environment and entering an epoch in which that drive must be blunted ultimately stopped by the progressively intractable obstacles of nature.

He goes on to argue (Heilbroner, 1976, pp. 102-103) that "Industrial socialist as well as industrial capitalist countries must yield before, and adapt to the environmental constraints of a planet that is rapidly pushed to the limits of its usable capacity. "He does argue, however, that the only cultures that might be free of these "containments of the future" are "those few pockets of self-subsistence culture that may persist into the twenty-first century."

DEFORESTATION, INDUCED SCARCITY, AND CONFLICT

It could be argued then that scarcity is one of the major, if not the major, factors breeding discontent, poverty, and conflict, and that deforestation and the destruction of trees ultimately leads to scarcity. Numerous writers, including Plato, have described the vicious circle between deforestation, erosion, declining soil fertility, fuelwood shortage, poverty. Of particular relevance to the Pacific Island situation is Plato's observation (1952, pp. 110C-111D in Glacken, 1967, p.121) that:

And just as it happens on small islands, what now remains compared with what then existed is like the skeleton of a sick man, all the fat and soft earth having wasted away, and only the bare framework of the land being left.

Similar vicious circles involving deforestation, poverty and conflict are to be found throughout the world. Eckholm, for example, argues that the total destruction of El Salvador's tropical deciduous forests that once covered 90 percent of the country, by centuries of clearance for grazing, plantations, mining, charcoal manufacturing, and especially within the last century, the spread of subsistence cultivation, has made it one of the "most environmentally devastated countries of the New World." An organization of American states study concluded that 77 percent of El Salvador's land

area suffers from accelerated erosion, and that reduced fertility was reportedly a major cause of heavy emigration of El Salvadorians into neighbouring Honduras, which helped precipitate a war between the two countries in 1969 (Eckholm, 1976, pp. 167-168).

Similarly, Haiti, one of the few countries to surpass El Salvador in "nationwide environmental destruction", is now less than nine percent wooded. Its steep slopes have been cleared by the land-hungry, soil erosion has reached the point where it is now a major cause of poverty, and Haiti, which means "Green Island" in the indigenous language, is currently one of the poorest and internally conflict-ridden countries on earth. Nevertheless, "wealthy farmers and North American sugar corporations own the best valley lands, crowding peasants onto slopes where cultivation is a fertile temporary proposition" (Eckholm, 1976, p.169), which only leads to a tightening of the vicious circle of poverty, deforestation, environmental destruction, inequality, and inevitable conflict.

Eckholm (1975, pp. 170-171) cites numerous other examples from Asia, Africa, and Latin America where steep slopes have been cleared by the land hungry, and traditional fallow periods have been violated" and where oversized estates in the hands of a small minority, force the poor and landless into environmentally destructive and deforesting practices in order to survive. He argues (Eckholm, 1976, pp. 170-171) that perhaps the most rigidly institutionalized examples are Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) and South Africa, "where the small European minorities have reserved the best lands for their own use, crowding Africans onto an inadequate land area." Conflict as we know, has recently become the hallmark of South Africa. The tendency to replace long-lived trees with shorter-lived trees or other types of plants or totally artificial landscapes, although yielding undeniable benefits to mankind, Oedekoven (1962, p.55) in his article "Saving our Vanishing Forests" stresses:

In the course of history, civilizations have flourished and disappeared with a resultant depletion of trees and plants, leaving only steppe and desert behind. Only in recent centuries has man begun to realize that he was cutting off the branch that he was sitting on.

In short, mankind's continuing deforestation throughout history and prehistory may ultimately prove to be a more harmful change in the ecosphere than changes brought by warfare, nuclear disasters, starvation, degenerative diseases, and social and economic instability. Although a symbol of ecological and cultural stability in many cultures — the physical antithesis of desertification and the cultural antithesis of deprivation and neglect — forests and trees are rapidly disappearing from the earthscape. This global trend is in stark contrast to the teachings of Buddhism, wherein trees are seen as a symbol of peace, stability, and spiritual and material well being, as well as a non-violent means to achieve the needs of human kind. This realization is clearly echoed by Schumacher (1973) and Eckholm (1976) who argue that reafforestation and tree planting may be the most direct and economically beneficial means of improving the lives of the

poorest of the poor in the Third World. Planting trees could have greater benefit in terms of improving the quality of life than the Green Revolution or costly miracle drugs. Nor is there need for the expenditure of billions of dollars on research. The evidence is before us; all we need to do is to progress with the past.

THE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

In the Pacific Islands, large stands of economically and ecologically precious tropical forest remain on some of the islands, and small areas of mangrove and ubiquitous coastal strand forest have been preserved on others, but deforestation in the Pacific is proceeding at a frightening rate. Forests, both primary and secondary, continue to be transformed into degraded savannas and fern-grasslands, mangrove into housing and industrial estates or other lifeless land-sea interfaces, and polycultural tree-studded traditional gardens into monocultural plantations. The trends are the same from the high continental islands of Melanesia Pacific to the smallest low-lying atoll islets of Micronesia and Polynesia. A very comprehensive analysis of the ecosystems represented in most island groups of the tropical Pacific Ocean is now available in Arthur Dahl's *Regional Ecosystems Survey of the South Pacific Area* (1980). He includes descriptions and conservation status for all terrestrial ecosystems as well as lists of rare, endemic, or endangered species, and existing and proposed conservation legislation, and existing, proposed, and recommended reserve.

He concludes that all parts of the Pacific have ecologically and culturally important forest types or individual species that are in danger of depletion by human action. Some countries and territories have conservation legislation and forestry ordinances; Papua New Guinea and Hawaii have increasingly effective systems of forest reserves and conservation areas; and other places, such as New Caledonia, the Solomon Islands, Norfolk Island, Fiji, French Polynesia, and some of the American Territories have had similar developments recently on a more limited scale. However, forests continue to be shipped off for remuneration at a fraction of the world market price, while Japan continues to protect its existing forest resources (Richardson, 1981).

Although not currently of as great economic interest, the smaller islands have suffered hundreds of years of deforestation and have probably had more severe ecological and cultural impacts given their less extensive and poorer floras. Deforestation, often the result of repeated burning, has been endemic in the post-human contact Pacific and is responsible for the evolution of secondary forests, grassland savannas, and a degraded fern and scrubland. It has, for example, undoubtedly been the main cause of the extensive anthropogenic grasslands of highland New Guinea, the xerophytic *niaouli* (*Melaleuca lewucadedron*) savanna lands of New Caledonia, and the highly degraded "sunburnt lands" or *talasiga* found throughout Fiji.

Deforestation has similarly led to severe erosion in the Cook Islands, French Polynesia and Hawaii where most of the indigenous forest has been removed. Flenley and King (1984) go as far as suggesting that deforestation was responsible for the puzzling collapse of the pre-European contact Polynesian megalithic culture on Easter Island.

Although deforestation as such has received most attention, probably of tantamount importance is the decline in tree planting and the elimination of existing trees in agricultural and urban landscapes. In Tonga, for example, during the height of the banana boom, so many trees were cut to provide shooks for banana boxes, and to extend banana plantings, that sawmillers had to move from Tongatapu to the nearby island of 'Eua. Thus, mindless scavaging in the search for meager export earnings affected valuable native trees as well as valuable food species such as mango and citrus species (Thaman, 1975).

Most of the trees that provide food and medicines and have other values for today have been planted or protected in the past but are not being replaced by the present generation. Opening a tin of "Watties" peaches for a feast or going to a local dispensary is easier than planting a tree! Of particular concern is the almost universal senility of Pacific Island coconut trees, the main, if not the only source of income on many of the smaller, more isolated islands. Despite limited replanting, declining yields of palms, often planted before the turn of the century augers poorly for the economic future of these areas. On the other hand, expansion of coconuts can often only be accomplished at the expense of other land uses — often arboreal.

The situation is not yet beyond hope, however, as it appears to be in some areas of the world. Most traditional agrosilvicultural strategies of the Pacific have been preserved, if only in relic forms; nonetheless, the gradual but visible disappearance of time-tested agrosilvicultures in the face of monoculture, expansion of commercial livestock, population growth, demands for fuel, continued urbanization, and the "commercial imperative" (Tudge, 1977) must be reversed before Pacific Islanders cut off the branch they are sitting on!

TREES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

The primacy of trees, and their particular roles in providing for basic needs and in "peacekeeping" of traditional societies is perhaps nowhere better stated than in Turnbull's famous work *The Forest People* about the BaMbuti Pygmy people of the Ituri Forest of the Congo Basin who know how to hunt the game of their region and gather the wild fruits that grow in abundance there, though hidden to outsiders, and know the secret language that is denied all outsiders and without which life in the forest is an impossibility (Turnbull, 1961: 13-14).

More specifically, in relation to the role of the forest in conflict resolution, Turnbull argues (1961, pp. 124-125) that cooperation is the key

to Pygmy society and responsibility is thought of as being communal. He relates that:

If you ask a Pygmy why his people have no chiefs, no lawgivers, no councils, or no leaders, he will answer with misleading simplicity, 'Because we are the people of the forest. The forest, the great provider, is the one standard by which all deeds and thoughts are judged; it is the chief, the lawgiver, the leader, and the final arbitrator.'

Similar relationships with forests are also widespread in the Pacific. In Fiji, for example, *veikau* or forest as a part of Fijian land or *vanua* has as Ravuvu (1983, p.70) relates:

The people, their traditions and customs, beliefs and values, and the various other institutions established for the sake of achieving harmony, solidarity and prosperity within particular dimensions are a source of security and confidence.... The *vanua* contains the actuality of one's past and the potentiality of one's future. It is an extension of the concept of self. To most Fijians, the idea of parting with one's *vanua* or land is tantamount to parting with one's life.

The importance of forest resources is critical to all semi-subsistence groups throughout the Pacific. Thaman and Clarke (1983) in a study of Pacific Island "agrosilviculture" listed 56 distinct uses for trees. Some of the more notable uses included timber, fuelwood, boats, tools, weapons, containers, handicrafts/carvings, fishing equipment, toys, brushes, brooms, cordage, cloth, adhesives, dyes, plaitedware, insulation, abrasives, illumination, musical instruments, perfumes, oils, poisons, masticants, insect repellents, ornamentation, narcotics or stimulants, preservatives, cages, livestock feed, and of course a very wide range of foods, beverages and species. There are of course, also the very significant environmental benefits of shade, wind protection erosion and flood control, soil improvement, frost protection, and wildlife habitat preservation.

Glacken argues similarly (1967, p.320) that in Europe "from the Merovingians through the end of the Middle Ages, forests had so many uses for..." and "The intimate relationship is clear in the numerous customs relating to forest use, in the alarms heard in many countries regarding misuse of the forests, and in the forests as places of work." He goes on to stress (1967, p.322) that the forest histories of individual European countries are full of illustrations of the growth of a "body of rights, usages, and customary law which codified and regulated exploitation", and which are "the key to an understanding of preindustrial ecologies...."

Perhaps even more germane to the subject of the critical subsistence importance of forests and trees, is that "these usages and uses grew because there was no other way that people could exist". Accordingly, Glacken states that the Forest Charter of Henry III, is to be placed beside King John's Magna Carta (Great Charter) as "part of the foundations on which the English social scene was laid" (Stenton, 1951, p.106 in Glacken, 1967, p.323).

SPIRITUAL IMPORTANCE OF TREES

Spiritual impoverishment is arguably also an important underlying factor in increasing conflict, violence and social breakdown, and trees have long been associated with spiritual wellbeing. Sacred groves seem to be universal and different tree species are closely associated with important deities or legends throughout the world.

In the Pacific, for example, the native *pua*, *Fagraea berteriana*, the fragrant flowers of which are used in leis and to scent coconut oil, has great spiritual significance. In Tahitian legend, the *pua* tree was said to have been "brought from the tenth heaven by Tane, god of the forests. Hence tree is sacred to him and images of him were always made of *pua* wood." In Mangaia, in the southern Cook Islands, legend had it that the *pua* tree guarded the entrance to the land of the spirits of the underworld (Neal, 1965, p.684).

Countless other non-tree plants which grow in, and depend on the existence of forests, also have great spiritual importance. The maile vine (*Alyxia* spp.), for example, which is important in legend, songs and for making garlands and scenting coconut throughout the Pacific, was emblem of the Hawaiian goddess of the hula, Laka and was the central focus of a tapu-lifting prayer of hula dancers. As one Hawaiian wrote:

Maile is used for leis for the people; for men, women and children; for the chiefs, the noted people, and the rich people; for the farmer, the oppressed, the branded servant... and because it was so very much desired by the people, therefore it was greatly used in the composing of songs, hulas, chants, dirges, and various other compositions (Neal, 1965, p.690).

Fickeler (1962, p.113) in discussing the "religious-geographic significance" of sacred plants argues that: "Still more important than sacred flowers are sacred trees and the cult of trees." He relates how the birth and various conifers are especially sacred in Asiatic nature religions. He stresses (1962, p.114), that the temple grove is widely distributed. It surrounded many cult centres in ancient Greece, Rome, and Egypt, and still "surrounds with green most temples of the higher nature religions of East and South Asia. There are similarly the church and chapel groves of Christendom, and those of the "morainic hill crests of the Alpine foreland in Upper Bavaria."

Among the most sacred trees outside the Pacific are the banyans (*Ficus* spp.), which, as individual spreading trees, often serve as one-tree groves. The sacred fig, also known as the bo (*bo gaha*) or peepul tree, is particularly sacred to Buddhists because of its association with the birth of Buddha, who is said to have sat under this tree in meditation for six years, having attained *sambodhi*, the highest stage of enlightenment (Fickeler, 1962, p.113). The bo tree is also sacred to Hindus, as like Buddha, Vishnu is said to have been born under it. Hindus also believe that it is the female of the banyan and that it has the power of bestowing fertility upon women (Neal, 1965, p.311).

The evergreen spruce was dedicated to Poseidon the Greek god of the sea. The spruce was also sacred as a solstice-feast and Christmas festival tree to Germanic peoples, where it was connected with the "cult of light that is victorious over the evil forces of darkness and midwinter" and which "lives on, through in an altered form, as our Christmas tree" (Fickeler, 1962, p.113); "... seven million of which used to sparkle each winter in Germany alone, making the city streets and squares green for weeks" (Fickeler, 1962, p.113). He similarly stresses the sacredness of the cemetery groves of ancient Egypt, the Shamanistic funeral groves on high hills in unforested areas of Siberia and Indonesia, and the innumerable cemetery groves, grave-mound groves, and groves on emperors groves in China.

In Greek mythology, in addition to being god or personification of the vine, Dionysus was also god of trees in general, and the patron of cultivated trees. Prayers were offered to him that would make trees grow images of him were set up in orchards, and he was said to have discovered all tree fruits, amongst which apples and figs were particularly mentioned as being sacred. The pine tree was particularly sacred to him, the Delphic Oracle commanded the Corinthians to worship a particular pine tree, and the Athenians sacrificed to him to ensure the prospering of the fruits of the land (Frazer, 1963, pp. 510-511).

The olive tree is also of great spiritual and economic importance, and its branches along with the dove, are widely accepted symbols of peace and life. The importance of the olive is, perhaps best evidenced in Greek mythology, wherein the King of Athens proclaimed that the god who gave the best gift to mankind would be selected as the god of Athens. The little olive tree brought by Athena from the "paradise Beyond the Wind" and planted in a garden on the Acropolis was judged the best gift, and thus Athena was chosen the chief goddess of Athens. As Rouse (1957, p.54) relates:

... it was a wide choice. For the olive became the great wealth of Athens; it fed the people with its fruit, as it does to this day, and it provided a soft and precious oil for their use, to put in their food, and to rub their bodies with when they were tired. They planted the tree everywhere, and made oil for other people to buy, and so they become rich.

The oak seems to have been the most sacred tree of European Aryans, where "their primitive home must have lain in a land which was clothed in forests of oak" (Frazer, 1963, p.870). Both the Greeks and the Romans associated the oak with their supreme god, Zeus or Jupiter, the divinity of the sky, rain, and thunder. The great god of the oak is also common throughout central Europe, where the Celts or Druids of Gaul "esteemed nothing more sacred than the mistletoe and the oak on which it grew", chose oak groves for the sites of solemn rituals, and performed some of their rites with oak leaves (Frazer, 1963, pp. 209-211). To the Teutons, the Slavs, and the Lithuanians, the oak also seems to have been the most sacred tree of their supreme gods, who, like Zeus and Jupiter were the gods of thunder and rain and associated with "the great fertilizing power, who

sent rain and caused the earth to bear fruit..." (Frazer, 1963, pp. 212-213).

The seriousness of tree worship can be gathered from the ferocious penalty under old German law for those who "dared to peel the bark of a standing tree" was to cut out the "culprit's" navel and nail it the part of the tree which he had peeled, and to drive him "round and round the tree till all his guts were wound about its trunk. The intention of the punishment clearly was to replace the dead bark by a living substitute taken from the culprit; it was a life for a life of a man for a life of a tree" (Frazer, 1963, p.145).

Lesser penalties, such as a fine of a thousand drachmas for cutting down a cypress in the sanctuary of Aesculapius at Cos, in the Greek Isles, also attest to the sacredness of trees. Among American Indians there was also widespread worship of tree. Some never cut large trees but made use only of large logs of trees which had fallen. Some old men even declared that many of the misfortunes of their people were caused by this modern disregard for the rights of the living cottonwood (Frazer, 1963, p.147). Their wisdom should perhaps, be commended?

The Wanika of Eastern Africa believe that every tree, especially the coconut tree, has a spirit, and that "the destruction of a coconut tree is regarded as equivalent to matricide, because that tree gives them life and nourishment as a mother does for child" (Frazer, 1963, p.147). The coconut, is of course also of great religious importance in south India, is the centre of many legends in the Pacific (Neal, 1965, p.121), and, like the olive in the Mediterranean, is the tree of life of the Pacific and many other tropical areas.

Because trees are believed to have souls by so many traditional groups, their felling commonly requires forgiveness, sacrifices, rituals, or at least some recognition of their importance as being. Buddhist monks, will not break the branch of a tree, just as they would not break an arm of an innocent person, because to destroy anything is to dispossess a soul.

In some areas of India, if a Hindu has planted a grove of mangoes, "neither he nor his wife may taste the fruit until he has formally married one of the trees, as a bridegroom to a tree of a different sort, commonly a tamarind-tree, which grows near the grove". Families have reportedly been known to sell their gold and silver and to borrow what they could, for the expenses of such "marriages" are often considerable, "for the more Brahmans are feasted at it, the greater the glory of the owner of the grove" (Frazer, 1963, p.151).

Aboriginal tribes of Central Australia and some Philippine islanders believe that the souls of their ancestors commonly animate tall and stately trees, which they therefore protect, in fear of punishment, if they do not. Among the Igarotes, for example, "every village has a sacred tree, in which the souls of the dead forefathers of the hamlet reside, to which offerings are made, and which if cut down, the village would perish. Among aboriginal peoples of southern and western China, a sacred tree, which harbours the soul of their first ancestor and which rules their destiny, stands at the

entrance of every village.

Similarly, in Bantar-Kolong, a Javanese and Sudanese village in southwestern Java, the *gintung* (*Bishofia javanica*) is the most sacred tree, of their ancestors with a single tree, over 300 years old occupying an enclosure surrounding the village. *Bishofia javanica* is also of considerable cultural and spiritual importance in Tonga, Samoa, and Wallis (Uvea) and Futuna, where it is generally known as *koka* or 'o'a, and where the name for the ritual tapa or bark-cloth making ceremony is named after the red brown dye from its bark. Its true spiritual significance in Polynesian pre-contact culture has undoubtedly been forgotten, and until recently, in Tonga, where it was the second most common tree to the ubiquitous coconut (Thaman, 1975), it was never destroyed when clearing fallow vegetation for gardens, that is until recently, since ploughing and monocropping imperatives have begun to dominate Tongan agriculture.

Given recent research findings related to deforestation, desertification, climatic change, and ecological scarcity in general, the association between oaks and thunder and rain and the spiritual and ecological importance placed on trees by traditional societies would seem to have considerable scientific and functional underpinnings. As Bokchin (1976, p.6) stresses, in his description of the great spiritual importance that early agriculturalists placed in trees: the "mythical aspects of this mentality are evident enough, the fact remains that the mentality as such was immensely valuable to the soil community and therefore, in the long run, to man. It meant that no trees would be wantonly felled, but only when it was absolutely necessary, and then to the accompaniment of propitiatory rites which, if they did nothing else, served constantly to remind tree-fellers that they were doing dangerous and important work (Hyams, 1952, p.274 and 276 in Bokchin, 1976, p.6).

He argues that the change from "agriculture as a form of culture" to an impersonal business enterprise operating strictly for the purpose of generating profit for the market economy, has produced an agriculture with a "denatured outlook (which) stands sharply at odds with an earlier animistic sensibility that viewed land as inalienable, almost sacred domain, food cultivation as a spiritual activity, and food consumption as a hallowed social ritual" (Bokchin, 1976, p.4). He gives evidence that this "Western coercive attitude to nature (conflict with nature) dates as far back as Carolingian times, with the increasing use of the heavy European plough and the consequent tendency to allot land to peasants not on the basis of subsistence needs, but rather on their labour, contribution to plough teams. White (1962, p.56 in Bokchin, 1976, p.7) suggests that this changing attitude is reflected in Charlemagne's efforts to rename the months according to labour responsibilities rather than on nature and deities. The new Carolingian calendars showed a very coercive attitude toward natural resources and are definitely northern in origin, for the olive tree which was so important in Roman cycles is replaced by scenes of ploughing, harvesting, wood-chopping, people knocking down acorn for pigs, and pig-

slaughtering. "Man and nature are now two things, and man is master" (White, 1962, p.57 in Bookchin, 1976, p.8).

CONCLUSION

If trees *are* indicators of economic, social, spiritual and ecological stability, and given that deforestation and the wanton elimination of trees leads to ecological scarcity, deprivation and conflict over scarce and deteriorating resources, what can be done to break the vicious circle of deforestation?

Schumacher, for one argues (1973, p.26) for the maximization of self-sufficiency and the adoption of "Buddhist economics" in which simplicity and non-violence are closely related objectives. Therefore, "the foundations of peace cannot be laid by universal prosperity, in the modern sense, because such prosperity, if attainable at all, is attainable only by cultivating such drives of human nature as greed and envy, which destroy intelligence, happiness, serenity, and thereby the peacefulness of man". He argues (1973, p.83) that modern mankind is suffering from a metaphysical disease, which cannot be cured by organization, administration, or the expenditure of money, "even though the importance of all these is not denied." The cure must be metaphysical, thus leading to a "metaphysical reconstruction." If education, which must play a central role in such a reconstruction, fails to clarify our central convictions, then it can be seen as mere training or indulgence, which instead of ranking as man's greatest resource, will then be the agent of destruction as further metaphysical deterioration.

In contrast to the training and indulgence orientation of much of modern education, the teachings of Buddha, conversely stresses a "reverent and non-violent attitude, not only to all sentient beings but also, with great emphasis, to *trees* (my underlining)". Every follower of Buddha is encouraged to plant a tree every few years and to look after it until it is safely established. He argues that the Buddhist economist can "demonstrate without difficulty" that a universal observation of this practice would "result in a high rate of genuine economic development independent of any foreign aid." He then stresses (1973, p.50) that: "Much of the economic decay of southern Asia (as well as many other parts of the world) is undoubtedly due to the heedless and shameful neglect of trees."

In asking the question about what can be done to help the poor and unemployed in India and bridging the gulfs between the rich and the poor, between the educated and uneducated, and between city and country folk, which includes industry and agriculture, Schumacher (1973:161) argues that the successful adoption of many features of the rich man's economy would spell ruin for poor communities, and would, as it has in many places, destroy social cohesion, co-operation, mutual respect, and above all, self-respect. Current economic development dogma has failed to deal with these

problems, and has been content to focus on developmental solutions, such as aid, trade, private investment, or birth control, only the latter of which has really focussed on or helped the poor.

He argues that the common criterion for success, namely GNP is an utterly misleading gauge of success and "must of necessity lead to phenomena which can only be described as neocolonialism". This "unintentional neocolonialism", he argues is far more insidious and infinitely more difficult to combat than neocolonialism intentionally pursued, because:

Methods of production, standards of consumption, criteria of success or failure, systems of values, and behaviour patterns establish themselves in poor countries which being (doubtfully) appropriate only to conditions of affluence already achieved, fix the poorer countries even more inescapably in a condition of utter dependence on the rich (Schumacher, 1973, p.162).

The answer, he argues, is not in grants and financial aid, but in "intellectual aid" which can make people self-reliant and independent, "gifts of relevant knowledge on the methods of self-help. He stresses the importance of work and the problems which arise if things are done for the people instead of by the people, and that: "The greatest deprivation anyone can suffer is to have no chance of looking after himself and making a livelihood" (Schumacher, 1973, pp. 164-182).

To illustrate the concept, Schumacher (1973), pp. 182-183) gives us what he considers the "simplest of all possible examples of self-help."

The Good Lord has not disinherited any of his children and as far as India is concerned he has given her a variety of trees, unsurpassed anywhere in the world. There are trees for almost all human needs. One of the greatest teachers of India was the Buddha who included in his teaching the obligation of every good Buddhist that he should plant and see to the establishment of one tree at least every five years. As long as this was observed, the whole large area of India was covered with trees, free of dust, with plenty of water, plenty of shade, plenty of food and materials. Just imagine you could establish an ideology which would make it obligatory for every able-bodied person in India, man, woman, and child, to do that little thing — to plant and see to the establishment of one tree a year, five years running. This, in a five-year period, would give you 2,000 million established trees. Anyone can work it out on the back of an envelope that the economic value of such an enterprise, intelligently conducted, would be greater than anything that has ever been promised by any of India's five-year plans. It could be done without a penny of foreign aid; there is no problem of savings and investment. It would produce foodstuffs, fibers, building material, shade, water, almost anything that man really needs.

Examples of the practical application of this principle can be seen in China's attempts to make up for millennia of thoughtless deforestation. From the standpoint of what an individual can do, the Government recently honoured an 83 year-old man, Zhang Hula, who was known as a "forestry fanatic, madman and savage" for his tree planting efforts. Working alone, with only a hoe, since abandoning his life as a clothing merchant in 1966

Zhang had planted over one million trees and afforested over 20 hectares (50 acres) in a remote valley in Shanxi Province in North China (Beachcombers, 1984, p.3). On a national level, since the 1950's tens of millions of workers have been mobilized in China to plant trees in the slack seasons between crop harvesting and sowing. The effort expended has been "stupendous" and by the 1980s it was hoped that the forested area of China could be raised to 25 percent. Not only were mountains and marginal or abandoned farmlands planted, but also "a great green wall" of shelterbelts, reminiscent of China's famous Great wall, was to encircle the huge Gobi Desert to halt the march of the 'sand dragon'" (Eckholm, 1976, p.45). As Sartarius and Henle (1968:87) in Eckholm, (1976, p.45) argue:

The reforestation of China, however incomplete as yet, is now well-launched and definitely a fact. There is little doubt that this constitutes one of the major cultural accomplishments of our times, and the effects, both on the environment of China and on the development efforts of other countries, particularly wood-poor and ecologically disinherited nations, will not fail to manifest itself.

There are similar examples of successful tree planting, through self-help programmes in Indonesia, India, and the Pacific. South of Madras, for example, hundreds of hectares of coastal dunes have been stabilized through self-help plantings of *Casuarina*.

Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of self-help programmes and their role in eliminating conflict is that they make people less dependent and encourage self-sufficiency. As Schumacher argues (1973, p.49) "people who live in highly-self-sufficient local communities are less likely to get involved in large-scale violence than people whose existence depends on world-wide systems of trade." Whereas satisfying human wants from faraway sources and the increase in ton/miles per head of population carried by a country's transport system are commonly seen as an improvement in the standard of living and as proof of economic progress in the eyes of the modern economists, to the Buddhist economist the same statistics would "indicate a highly undesirable deterioration in the *pattern* of consumption."

Finally, to return to Schumacher (1973, p.51) who argues that industrial society with its stress on individual freedom must necessarily revert to agrarian existences and is unstable in its inability to avoid conditions leading to the composition of rigid organization and totalitarian control. He stresses that the incompatibility of the achievement of stability and the maintenance of individual liberty under "modernization" as currently practiced, with its disregard for religious and spiritual values appears to be disastrous as far as the masses are concerned and only seems to be leading to a "collapse of the rural economy, a rising tide of unemployment in town and country, and the growth of a city proletariat without nourishment for either body or soul."

TREE PLANTING AS A SOLUTION

Tree planting and protection, seems to respond to all of the ills which seem to afflict modern urban-industrial society. They promote self-sufficiency, help to alleviate poverty, reverse trends of ecological degradation and scarcity, and enhance the aesthetic and spiritual wellbeing of all. All of these improvements, as argued in the paper, would help to minimize social and ecological conflict and promote peace on both the local and global levels.

To do so individuals, local bodies, governments and non-governmental and international organizations must resolve themselves to creating an environment which will foster the protection and planting of trees. Extensive, primarily self-help programmes must be mounted to encourage the planting of food and other culturally and ecologically important trees, not only in rural areas and in marginal lands, but also in towns and cities. Education in human ecology must be promoted, which stresses the inextricable interdependence between the natural environment, trees and national development. Effective and reform programmes must be implemented because, as Eckholm (1980, p.55) argues:

The landless, the insecure tenants and those owning marginal plots too small to support a family constitute nearly always the poorest of the poor — those whose basic needs for food, fuel, shelter, education, health care and family planning are poorly met.

It is not too late to reverse the hands of time, especially in the Pacific Islands, where the ecological situation does not seem to have reached the critical, perhaps irreversible stage, that it has in other regions. As Klee (1980, p.283) suggests, although many traditional cultures and their eco-cultural strategies have disappeared from the earth, some, including most Pacific Island cultures, have maintained a high degree of cultural integrity because "several of their ways of life have assets which seem especially valuable to modern-day ecological problems." The critical question, however, is whether the rapidly emerging Pacific-Island "managerial elite" (Pacific politicians, policy makers, educators, and community leaders), will, like the Mayans (whose pre-historic population fell within decades to one-tenth of what it had been due to deforestation and mounting pressure on croplands, which in turn led to accelerated soil erosion and the gradual decline in the lands productivity) be "blind to the environmental signs of our times" (Brown, 1982, p.31)?

The time is right for the managerial elite from throughout the world to capitalize on the wisdom of their ancestors and strive for sustainable *arboreal development*. Whereas, the so-called "Green Revolution" of today may in fact lead to something less than a Green Revolution, or even a "Red Revolution", it is argued here that massive self-help tree planting and protection programmes, if pursued throughout the world, could be the basis for a real, and *sustainable* green revolution. Such a revolution could provide the underpinnings for the resolution of conflict and for peace in all

its connotations, ecological, economic, social, and spiritual, as well as, providing the basis for a true "Green Peace" which might insure that the islands of the Peaceful Ocean remain peaceful!

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Dr Ahmed Bony and Dr Mohammed Ellafi.

ADDITIONAL PRESENTERS UNDER TOPIC VI

UNEQUAL REPORTING OF ARAB-ISRAEL SITUATION

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ABSTRACT

The news media of the world reports in a biased manner on the Arab-Israeli situation. The plight of the Arabs gets little publicity, whereas the Israeli situation is constantly reported. Zionism is promoted in the media, but the helpless victims of terrorism who are of Arab origin get little attention. Peace is desired by all Arab States. It is hoped that there can be dialogue and exchange of ideas, but this is hampered by the pro-Zionism of the United States.

POLITICAL SETTLERIZATION: A CHALLENGE TO PEOPLE CONCERNED FOR WORLD COMMUNITY AND HUMANE GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

The Irian Jaya aspect of Indonesia's transmigration programme has been accelerated since 1982 and there are proposals for further acceleration in the current five-year plan. The consequent exodus of 11,000 refugees to Papua New Guinea has thrown new international searchlights on

the long smouldering context between Indonesian authority and West Papuan ethno-nationalism. This paper will discuss how this contest should be viewed by people concerned for world community, human rights, and humane governance.

A RECOGNITION OF THE UNDERLYING PREMISE OF REFUGEE LAW

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ABSTRACT

The objective of the paper is to elucidate the conceptual basis of refugee status, and specifically to challenge the assumed foundation of refugee law. It is intended that such a theoretical analysis may serve not only to shed light on the intentions of those who constructed the apparatus of international refugee law, but will offer some insight on the motives underlying the treatment afforded refugees by the legal system. The author's thesis is that neither humanitarian nor human rights concerns prompted the elaboration of refugee law. It is rather the author's view that the true premise of refugee law is the need to permit states to respond selectively to the needs of a very narrowly defined group of persons whose existence could, if ignored, jeopardize the continued ability of states to exercise sovereign control over immigration. Refugee law is seen as a means of allowing states to deal with perceived aberrations in the workings of the international system of state responsibility, thereby effectively safeguarding the integrity of their borders against most unwanted entrants.

THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND THE RECENT INTERNATIONAL ACT OF TERROR CONDUCTED AGAINST THE IRAQUI POW'S IN THE GORGAN CAMP, IRAN

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ABSTRACT

The investigation reported here thoroughly discusses the Gorgan incident in which a number of Iraqi POW'S were

killed while a team of The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were visiting a POW camp in north east Teheran on October 10, 1984. The Iranian action has been understood as a clear violation of international law and agreements, particularly the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, which prohibits maltreatment of prisoners of war. As the news of the incident came out, various international organizations including the United Nations, the ICRC, and many well known politicians have shown their concern and made statements condemning the act of violence that resulted in the deaths of innocent POW'S.

PROTECTION OF UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN

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ABSTRACT

Canada's role in the resettlement and treatment of Indo-Chinese and other refugees. Research is reported on refugee issues.

THE CONFLICT WITH THE EARTH AND THE IDEAL OF PERPETUAL PEACE WITH NATURE

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ABSTRACT

Industrial expansion has created a crucial conflict between economic growth and destruction of the ecosystem with resultant imbalance which will eventually end in disaster. Ethical consciousness is separated from economic, social, and political behaviour. Recommendations for new behaviours from reformed man are developed. Man is a microcosm in the macrocosm. Man mediates the world, and the world mediates man.

BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS OF AGGRESSIVENESS

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ABSTRACT

Both at the individual and the national level aggressiveness is often the ultimate means to defend the shared models. The paper is aimed to show the neuropsychological bases for which aggressiveness in its manifold forms is triggered in the human brain. Through the integration of sciences, promoted and achieved by CEU, it is possible to describe these mechanisms not only in their biochemical component, but also as wrong educational processes that do not provide the human being with clarity in understanding his/her actions, feelings and reactions.

DECOLONIZATION AND THE FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE SOCIALISTE (FLNKS) IN KANAKY

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ABSTRACT

The original indigenous population of New Caledonia was Melanesian. France annexed the islands in 1854. A penal colony was established there in 1854. There has been unrest and resistance from the indigenous population (Kanak) from early on. They were removed from fertile to arid regions. Disease and lack of adequate cultivatable land has reduced this groups to approximately one third. Education for Kanak children is inferior when compared with that of descendents of colonialists. France appropriated and developed the mineral resources without redress. The Kanaks ask for election reform, giving citizenship only to those with at least one parent born in New Caledonia. They hope for self-determination of the Colony through election by such citizens.

TOPIC VII: PEACE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF PEACE STUDIES

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ABSTRACT

I am concerned to examine the theoretical basis of schemes of 'Peace Studies' and similar subjects in the curricula of educational institutions and in higher education in particular, with the aim of establishing whether the criticisms recently advanced against 'Peace Studies' by such thinkers as Cox and Scruton and Marks, have any legitimacy. Such an investigation is especially important at a time when higher education institutions, at least in the UK, have to accommodate themselves to the demands for public accountability that come in the train of reduced funding, restricted entry, and the imperatives for respectable and 'relevant' research that the economic policies of some governments have imposed up the tertiary education sector. If the charges of Cox and Scruton and others are well-founded, then the possibility of research initiatives and student interest continuing to be found in the area of 'Peace Studies' may be attenuated; quite apart from the scepticism that might be entertained by institutions at the implications of imputations of indoctrination arising out of such charges. It is with the querying and assessment of such charges that this paper is concerned.

I take it the case for the promotion of aims that we may characterise as belonging to the broad area of 'Peace Studies', 'Peace and Conflict Studies', 'Peace Education', 'Education for International Understanding', or whatever, as conceded. Indeed the obligation on governments to give credence to such educational undertakings follows from their agreement with prescriptions emanating from the UNO itself. In 1978 and 1982, documents were produced as a result of a Special Session devoted to the topic of Disarmament (UNO 1978; UNO 1982) and in them we read that:

Governments and non-governmental organisations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels. (Para. 106);

In order that an international conscience may develop and that world opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament, with the full co-operation of Member States. (Para. 15)

These recommendations accord well with the weight attached by the UNO to the principles of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, in which it is stated:

Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms... It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

All these undertakings may be presumed to be shared by signatory States, who will then seek to implement their recommendations in programmes of public policy. That is why I was particularly glad to hear the remarks of the Secretary of State for Education and Science in the UK, Sir Keith Joseph in a speech he gave in March 1984 (Joseph, 1984). He supported the policies of the UK Government and stood 'ready to propagate and defend them in public on any political occasion'. He agreed that issues of peace and war should have a place in the classrooms of educational institutions; he deplored attempts to trivialise the issue, cloud it with inappropriate appeals to emotion and present it one-sidedly. He argued for a rational approach to the subject, urging that teachers' presentation of the issues should be balanced and objective and aimed at encouraging pupils to acquire competence in weighing arguments and evidence so as to arrive at rational judgements themselves. The only qualifications to these aims were found in Sir Keith's view that issues of war and peace would crop up naturally in the curriculum in such a way that no special provision ought to be made for a study labelled 'peace'; that the title of 'peace studies' ought really to be dropped because of its emotional overtones and superficiality; and that issues of the discussion of peace and war in the curriculum ought to be decided on 'educational' and not on 'political' grounds.

There can be little doubt that Sir Keith's views on this matter and of these kinds are shared by many both inside and outside the education service in the UK. Indeed Sir Keith's speech is only one manifestation of a point of view about the nature of educational institutions, curricula and programmes that has found expression from the time of the 'Black Papers' and before. The reservations Sir Keith articulated concerning the status and purpose of 'Peace Studies' in some educational *milieux* were followed up and expanded in the criticisms of such studies advanced by Caroline Cox and Roger Scruton (Cox & Scruton, 1984). Similarly, Marks (1984) maintains that 'politically contentious subjects should form no part of the curriculum for those below the age of 16'; he refers with approval to those

who 'would say that the teacher should at all times keep his political views to himself'; and he echoes the view of Sir Keith Joseph that

We are surely right to expect our schools not to encourage pupils to take a view of notions which are wholly alien to our society — for example that Government should be other than Parliamentary or that the rule of Law should be abrogated.

For Marks 'peace studies' should be subordinated to the clear requirements of our own system of education, which should teach children 'the facts' in an unbiased, objective way, that presents all sides to any question, keeps off politically contentious ground and is only concerned with the 'inculcation of such moral precepts' as have 'always been an essential part of education'.

A similar point of view is held by Caroline Cox and Roger Scruton (1984). They have a similar notion of the 'true aims and content' of 'essential education', and they contrast this with the indoctrination that they see present in many educational institutions and courses in schools and universities; and nowhere more so than in the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University, which is for them a test case. For, they argue,

If the Bradford School fails... to discharge the onus of justifying (Peace Studies), then we are entitled to assume... that it is not a genuine academic discipline.

Their implication is clear: 'Peace Studies' ought to be removed from the curriculum of any genuine educational institution concerned with the pursuit of truth and the promotion of academic ends, to receive no further research funds or public recognition and to be replaced by an education committed to 'the traditional concept of good manners... (that) has always been a part of education...' — if the criticisms of the legitimacy of the claims of 'Peace Studies' to academic status advanced by Scruton and Cox can be substantiated.

The criticisms by Cox and Scruton amount to this: 'Peace Studies' is not a genuine educational discipline; it is poorly taught; it represents a limited way of examining the current world situation; it is part of a trend towards politicising educational institutions and endeavours; the intentions of its proponents and teachers are disingenuous, in so far as these are concerned, whether tacitly or overtly, to call our own national interests into question in favour of those of an alien political ideology. These charges, if true, are grave; it would be reasonable for any educationalist or academic researcher to be sceptical about courses or teachers susceptible to them. For they strike at the root of what such people regard as valid and supportable and academic enterprises, capable of the serious-minded and scholarly investigation that is supposed to characterise the pursuits to which educational institutions, and higher education institutions in particular, are committed. The question must therefore be raised as to whether these criticisms are justified or not.

Perhaps we may begin with Cox and Scruton's (1984) criterion for

'educational' aims, methods and content. This is:

The truly educational subject forces the pupil to understand something which has no immediate bearing on his experience. It teaches him intellectual discipline, by presenting him with problems too remote or too abstract to be comprehended within his own limited world. In other words, it asks him to stand back from his immediate concerns and make a considered judgement of matters which are interesting in themselves, whether or not he can see their relevance. This is part of what is contained in the idea of intellectual discipline, and one of the reasons for believing that education is at war with propaganda.

Education, therefore, has nothing to do with 'relevance'; indeed 'genuine' intellectual disciplines are, for Cox and Scruton, 'respectable' *because of* their irrelevance to the lives of their students and all their main concerns. Their 'genuineness' evidently consists in their remoteness or abstractness; and their value is only assessed in so far as they are 'interesting in themselves'. On this basis, also, 'novelty' becomes suspect: any subject that is an addition to existing educational subjects or disciplines has to justify its existence on the criteria of admissibility against which previous claims for the inclusion of traditional intellectual disciplines were measured. For these and similar reasons, therefore, 'Peace Studies' cannot be accorded the title to intellectual respectability. And it is on the basis of this epistemological criterion that Cox and Scruton's rejection of Peace Studies largely rests.

Let us look at the claim that 'Peace Studies' is taught 'in a biased and irresponsible way'. As a matter of contingent fact, this may well be true. That does not of itself, however, disqualify Peace Studies from serious claim to academic consideration, for so many other subjects as well, from the teaching of English Literature by those committed to Leavisite principles or Structuralist approaches, through the teaching of Philosophy by those who allow no place in their courses for phenomenological or hermeneutic perspectives, to those teachers of the sciences whose views rest upon inductivist or Kuhnian preconceptions only. If Peace Studies is to be excluded on such grounds, so also must any subject that happens to be taught in that way.

The claim of Cox and Scruton is different, however: it is that Peace Studies is taught in what they call a 'biased and irresponsible way' and could be taught in no other way. Their support for this claim can only come from their account of the nature of the subject itself, therefore; and this they get not, or not so much, from any philosophical analysis of what the subject might be thought to consist in, what its cognitive content might be, the ends at which it might be aimed and so on, but rather from their examination of a restricted number of courses, quotations and visits to schools. Such analysis as they offer is, at best, partial; at worst, it is misconceived because respecting on assumptions about the proper content of 'academic' courses, the appropriate criteria for their evaluation, and the desirable concerns of educational institutions, that the authors themselves take for granted and simply do not question or justify.

In this respect Cox and Scruton do not differ from the view of Joseph that requires teachers to uphold principles that government should be parliamentary and that the rule of law should not be abrogated. But it is far from self-evident that the only — or even the best — form of government involves parliamentary institutions, nor that there are never going to be occasions when some concerns might take precedence over the rule of law, particularly if the law is widely regarded as outmoded, deficient or discriminatory. It might be thought that even such an obvious 'political' aim as preparing future citizens for their lives in a participatory democracy must necessarily involve encouraging students to ask whether there might not sometimes be a case for other forms of institutionalising a society's political arrangements than those found in advanced Western societies; or for going against law, precedent and custom in pursuit of objectives that might reasonably be thought to conduce to a wider public good.

So with Cox and Scruton's demand for irrelevance, remoteness and abstractness as determinants of academic respectability: their adducing such criteria suggests covert prescription rather than a well-founded analysis of what 'true education' (whatever that might be) might look like. For the demand for 'irrelevance' immediately rules out much contemporary higher education: medicine, law, engineering, economics, policy analysis. Now such subjects can hardly be held to be unimportant or 'remote' from students' lives and a society's concerns — yet all are lauded and laboured at throughout higher education. I conclude that the claims made for the academic respectability of a subject cannot be judged in terms of that subject's 'relevance', or lack of it; were that to be so, many subjects and departments would have to disappear from the modern university pantheon.

The criterion of 'remoteness' can, with parity of reasoning, hardly feature as a benchmark conferring warranted admissibility to academic status. For the activity and achievements of modern departments in institutions of higher education such as agriculture, Oceanography or Business Studies cannot be thought to be 'remote' from the concerns of their students or the interests of their countries, yet all are given highest intellectual credence and international repute. So their academic respectability cannot consist in that, either. From this consideration one can only infer that Cox and Scruton's real concern, in their demand for 'remoteness' as a feature of 'truly educated intellectual discipline', is the laying down of a prescription as to what 'truly' educational disciplines ought to look like. But work can be both far from remote and directly relevant — and yet at the same time intellectually demanding and academically rigorous. Nobel prizes will doubtless go to the discoverers of cures for cancer and AIDS and there would, one imagines, be few who would deny that the award of such distinctions is a mark of anything less than the highest intellectual respectability.

Further, given the emergence, complexity and importance of such novel subjects as those of the bio-sciences or artificial intelligence, it cannot be maintained that the relative modernity of Peace Studies is a legitimate

source of criticism against it. And the strictures of Cox and Scruton against the inclusion of the word 'Studies' in the title of any subject or area aspiring to academic status cannot be taken seriously; for the widespread regard for such schools or departments as 'Literary Studies', Modern European Studies or a Research School for Pacific Studies (for example) rests upon the acceptance of the work done by such institutions as involving standards quite as strict and motives quite as disinterested as those that can be observed in the work of students and researchers in, say, Mathematics, Philosophy or Sociology. For one could hardly contend that those working in the former fields are any less capable of 'critical appraisal', 'understanding', or the ability to 'assess or dispute a... proof' or what counts as one in the field in question, or to 'acquire any other intellectual accomplishment that would show itself in reasoned critical reflection, applicable beyond the range of examples which have nourished it' than the latter. Work can be done in such places that has as much rigour and respectability as that in more traditional places where academic excellence is prized and critical and creative thinking is seen to operate.

There seem to me to be no grounds *ex hypothesi* for excluding Schools or departments of 'Peace Studies' or 'Peace and Conflict Studies', or courses of 'Peace Education' in schools, from among the number of such centres, and certainly not on grounds of their novelty or relatively recent provenance. For if there is any one criterion of academic institutions it is in their concern to promote innovation and development, both within existing subjects, in the area between subjects and indeed of new subjects that have to be developed to deal with the continuing accretion of knowledge from the constantly expanding frontiers of the cognitive realm. Were this not so, we should never have had subjects so critically important as cybernetics and bio-physics. New advances are always being made in the intellectual realm; every subject now accepted as 'traditional' was once thought 'new' and in this respect we do well to remind ourselves of Heraclitus' Fragment (1956) 'No one can step twice into the same river, for fresh waters are always flowing down upon one'. This is true whether we are talking about discoveries of the meaning of Linear B or the structure of the DNA molecule; and we cannot rule out the possibility of our making discoveries, different in kind though equally important, in that new realm of human interest and enquiry we designate 'Peace and Conflict Studies'.

Cox and Scruton do not underestimate the importance of the issues of peace, war and disarmament. These are matters 'which are of the first importance for the future of this country and of mankind', and they set out the questions raised by any attempt to understand the nature of peace and of its preconditions.

With the first of these we are immediately into one of the most difficult and perplexing questions in the whole area: What is peace? And it is perhaps doubtful as to the possibility of giving an answer to this question that lead some to question any subject including the word 'Peace' in its title and its claims to intellectual responsibility. For if 'Peace' is a term empty of

any explicit or positive content, being rather a slogan serving merely to rally those committed to a particular ideal or set of norms of a particular religious or political kind, then those concerned to study it from an academic standpoint would be committed to a search for a chimera and, at worst, liable to end up wasting their time or, at best, more likely to make progress on 'peace' issues *via* other avenues of intellectual enquiry.

Certainly problems of definition surround the concept 'Peace'. For some people it means the absence of war; for others

it is a state in which countries live in peaceful coexistence with each other.

For some, it is life free from fear. To others, it is a state of inner serenity... Peace is a very controversial word (Harbottle, 1985).

In this respect, 'War' (and, for that reason, 'War Studies') is easier to grasp, for there are criteria that can be agreed constitute the minimum conditions for intelligible application of that term to an event or state of affairs. To that extent we can see when a *de jure* or *de facto* 'state of War' might be said to be in existence between two sovereign states: it will involve, at least, the use of force to settle a dispute and bring about some desired end. Similarly with such terms as 'conflict' or 'dispute', applicable not only to the relations of sovereign states but also to individual people: these can be characterised in terms of the different evaluations or judgements concerning some object, situation or course of action and the means by which two parties think it possible to secure the success of the opinion or judgement that they rate as more desirable or important.

When set against such relatively straightforward accounts, any attempt to elucidate 'Peace' becomes problematic, for little except 'the absence of war' seems to be agreed. That is unsatisfactory as a definition, for it is negative: 'p' as 'not-q' cannot be said to tell us anything about the nature of 'p' and the ways in which it can be identified. If this is all we can come up with as an account of 'peace', then the reservations of Cox and Scruton are solidly based: how can there be any sense in the notion of 'Peace Studies' when the principal object of such studies is no more than a negation? Terms like 'freedom from...' and 'absence of...' such objectively identifiable things as 'war', 'strife', 'discord', 'fear' and 'conflict' make up almost all the characterisations of 'peace' in the Standard Oxford English Dictionary (SOED).

Yet, just as there is a widespread feeling that 'health' amounts to more than the mere absence of disease, so there is considerable regard for the view that a state of 'not-war', 'not-conflict' or 'not-oppression' does not add up the 'peace' that is represented as a desired end for the endeavours of statesmen and politicians. A recent Report of a Peace Education Conference in New Zealand has a more positive account of 'peace':

it begins with the fostering of self-esteem or personal well-being in the individual, whether child or adult, and extends to

respect for the rights of others
mutual trust

the pursuit of justice
co-operative decision-making
creative resolution of conflict within individuals, communities and the world
(New Zealand Government, 1985).

These aims seem to fit in well with one of the definitions of the word in the SOED — 'a state of calmness, tranquility and repose', or what some people call 'conviviality'. They also fit in well with a characterisation of the 'positive' side of 'Peace Studies' recently advanced by the Professor of Peace studies at the School in Bradford. 'The theme of peace', writes James O'Connell,

contains two basic elements, one positive and one negative: willing co-operation among persons for social and personal goals and the absence of violence (in the shape of direct physical, psychological or moral violence) ... in the case of medicine, health provides a positive focus and disease a negative focus; and this double focus is analogous to the positive and negative foci that positive and negative peace provide to their subject (O'Connell, 1984).

Thus we can characterise 'peace' in a way that goes beyond the private aspect of the mere absence of conflict. This relates to the *desiderata* of a spirit of co-operation among individuals, communities and states, to bring off joint aims and projects, that will conduce to the welfare of all, that will enhance and secure individual freedom and autonomy and that will create and maintain an atmosphere of mutual toleration and regard. These make it possible for individuals and states to work out patterns of preferred life-options for themselves, without any sense of threat or fear of constraint.

There is more to the positive aspect of 'peace' than that, however, and the reference to the ideal of the increase in personal autonomy that peace makes possible gives us a further clue. One version of the principle of 'freedom' is not to make it an end of ethical endeavour and social policy but a beginning, a presupposition of any kind of moral discourse: moral deliberation about right action starts from the premise that human beings are presumed to be free agents, until good reason can be given for laying constraints upon them. Similarly with the principle of justice and fairness in the idea of 'equality': human beings start upon the presumption of their equality until relevant and socially operative reasons can be given for making exceptions in their case and treating them differently, the onus of justification for so doing always resting upon those proposing to make the discrimination or lay the constraint. Just so with the concept of 'peace': like freedom and equality, it may be presupposed as a prime principle of all moral discourse that human beings will not have any purposes or projects of theirs disrupted by violence, aggression or conflict with the correlative requirement that those who wish or propose to do that have the onus of accountability and the liability of consequence to sustain. There is only one difference: there might, on occasion, be good reason — moral reason — for interfering with people's freedom or for treating them differently; there the analogy ends. For I can see no good reason why anyone should propose, as

an act or policy capable of vindication, to impose aggression, violence or conflict on another human being. *That* view, however, is clearly a function of my own moral and metaphysical preconceptions — and no doubt proponents of the idea of a 'just' War would strongly disagree. Here is one possible area of further debate that can be quite as learned and academic as are many disputations in departments of morals, theology or medicine.

Parties in such a debate share much common ground; one of their shared premises might be a regard for some such positive conception of peace as that advanced above. Why should this be, if the account of Scruton, Cox and others is correct? The answer lies in our questioning the meta-theoretical bases upon which Cox and Scruton's account of peace and Peace Studies rests; we may object to their 'definition' that they are working with a notion of definition that is itself at best contentious, at worst mistaken. Wittgenstein (1953) can be of help to us here; he warns anyone seeking to get clear about 'meaning' not to start off with any preconceptions but, rather, simply to 'look and see' how terms are actually used by participants in a particular universe of discourse: 'for a large class of cases, though not for all, the meaning of an expression is to be found in its use'. The principle of 'Don't look for the meaning, look for the use', when applied to our investigation into the nature of Peace Studies, will then give us the criterion we need to render the aspirations and norms articulated by human participants in communication about this universally-desired end of life, intelligible. Strangely, there seems to be no-one who does not share those aspirations. As Ted Wragg remarks:

I don't actually know anyone who is against peace. Try as I might to trawl through my memories of all the people I have ever known, I cannot for the life of me find one who is against the notion of living in peace (Wragg, 1983).

The problem arises from two considerations: firstly, not all people agree about the aims and projects that will conduce to the welfare of all, about what set of constraints they would be willing to accept consistent with their developing their own preferred pattern of life options, or what indeed individual or national freedom might consist in. For debates about peace often reduce to radically different notions of human being and human flourishing. Thus discussions about peace often come down to differences in basic metaphysics of man and society, of what accounts as human welfare and an acceptable basis of social relations for its optimum realisation. This problem is exacerbated when the interlocutors in such a debate have not even the most rudimentary ideas, concepts or categories required for the comprehension of other parties' ideological commitments and identities, much less evaluated or assessed for any potential worthwhileness they might have for both protagonists to such a discussion.

One of the prime problems of research in Peace and Conflict Studies, therefore, may be the development of a language appropriate for the investigation and elucidation of such fundamental differences. And that may well involve us in an even deeper level of difficulty, according as we are

relativists and believe no such language could ever in principle be developed or as we hold that there are absolute and unvarying criteria of logic and rationality shared and exhibited by all human communication, such that it ought to be possible, in principle at any rate, to develop some sort of common logic for the elucidation and evaluation of even the most fundamental ideological differences as to what counts as human welfare and harm. The answer to that further question is far from clear; all that we can be clear about is that those interested in and committed to the attempt to understand the nature of peace and conflict are not going to be short of work to do that will involve them in the deepest levels of metatheoretical (and academically highly respectable) enquiry.

Faced with these requirements from logic, epistemology, ethics and metaphysics and a large amount of work to do, academics might be forgiven for throwing up their hands and passing on to problems they see as more immediate, such as the maintenance of their own institutions, securing access to research funding, attracting student numbers, and so on: all pressing problems in this day and age. Two considerations might be thought appropriate in rebuttal: first, there is no problem more demanding of solution than the question of how any form of peaceful life can be secured for all people, if the institutions about the continued existence of which academics are concerned are to have any kind of future at all; second, this problem is one that is not in principle beyond solution. We do not abandon the search for a cure for cancer or AIDS, for we believe that, given human ingenuity and resources, a cure will in time be found; so, we might argue that we need not abandon the search for concord and amity between individuals and societies, given that problems of conflict resolution and the inhibition and elimination of aggression are, in principle, capable of solution.

What we do need to abandon (a very considerable matter requiring the most strenuous efforts of education and public support) is the myth that human beings are 'innately' violent and incapable of settling their differences by any other than aggressive means. It is not self-evidently true about human beings that we are 'by nature' or 'innately' disposed in this way or that towards our differences of view, at least not *a priori*; it may be an empirical 'fact' about present human forms of society and institutions that that is how we have *come* to resolve them. But all that can be *changed*. What we need, in our attempts to secure such changes, are those things that are *propria* of human being status: curiosity, a desire to explain and understand, and a creative imagination. And what tends to bring all these into play is being presented with a problem.

One of the principal problems Cox and Scruton delineate as the main focus of the questions about peace: whether peace can be attained and, if so, how it can be maintained and secured. In this concern O'Connell (1984) sees an analogy between Peace Studies and what he calls 'area studies', such as Medicine and Human Geography:

In the case of human geography, economics and sociology are focussed by

a concern for the uses of the earth; and in medicine a whole range of subjects from chemistry to psychology are joined by a concern to maintain and restore health.

Now Peace Studies is analogous to both these 'area studies': it deals with a practical problem and draws upon the insights provided by a range of other forms of enquiry in the attempt to articulate and develop answers to the issues which are its origin and prime focus.

At this point it might be interesting and instructive to take up a suggestion made by Anthony Weaver (1985). He points to the applicability of one curriculum theory to the educational potential of courses in Peace Studies. Referring to other writers' rebuttals against the contention that 'peace studies are not genuine discipline', he contends:

None of them... has explained with the clarity of Paul Hirst that disciplines are primarily distinguished by their respective methods of enquiry, or to use his words 'criteria for truth' (e.g. experiments in science, logic in mathematics, examination of records and artefacts in history) whatever their content. And that subjects such as geography, engineering or education are best regarded as fields of knowledge to which the disciplines contribute... (Weaver, 1985).

Disciplines such as philosophy, science and mathematics, then, are discernible by their distinct concepts, networks of concepts, methods of enquiry and tests for truth (Hirst, 1964). Schwab and Powell (Schwab, 1964(a), 1964(b); Powell, 1965) have added other features, such as particular content, circumstances or outcomes aimed at by practitioners in the field. We may agree that Peace Studies (when measured by such criteria) does not satisfy the requirements for single or separate 'disciplinary' status. Rather it provides a paradigm of what Hirst called a 'field of knowledge', in which subject practitioners draw upon contributions from the various disciplined modes of enquiry to help them formulate answers to the particular problems, practical or theoretical, upon which they are working. 'Theoretical' fields of knowledge, such as geography or politics, are concerned to provide explanations of phenomena and to assist us in understanding what 'is'; 'practical' fields of knowledge, such as engineering, education or medicine search for solutions to problem situations and assist us in our deliberations concerning what 'ought to be'. Here is an account of the epistemological status of 'Peace and Conflict Studies' that answers the objections to it advanced by Cox and Scruton: for this makes it an 'area study' that is both theoretical and practical. 'Conflict Studies' helps us understand and explain the causes and origins of human conflict, violence and aggression; 'Peace Studies' enables us to use that knowledge and understanding in the attempt to frame answers to the question 'What ought we to do in order best to promote the absence of war, conflict and aggression and the attainment of amity, concord and mutual trust?' These areas of reflection and deliberation provide the agenda and curriculum of any scholarly course of 'Peace and Conflict Studies' in an institution devoted to the prosecution of similar questions relating to the promotion of

human welfare and the diminution of harm.

Given that 'Peace Studies' may be properly defined as an 'area study' or as both a practical and theoretical 'field of knowledge', the only question remaining to be settled for curriculum planners in educational institutions is to draw up a list of those subjects that together may be thought to constitute its staple.

I do not believe that any *definitive* or exhaustive list can be drawn up, however, for the reason that circumstances alter cases. In one institution, where the concern is with global conflicts and the attempt to achieve peace, friendship and close co-operation between nations, the curriculum would differ in many respects from that in another, in which the concern was much more devoted to local issues, such as strikes and/or community reconciliation, as for instance in Northern Ireland or the island of Cyprus. But I do believe that there can be *guidelines* and, as a contribution to discussion, I should like to offer the following as prime candidates for inclusions. In the first place, reference to moral considerations and principles would clearly be paramount, at some stage and in some explicit form; ethics will have to feature on such a curriculum. The Human and Social Sciences, too, give a great deal of indispensable information, as well as providing an appropriate set of disciplinary tools for the examination and understanding of the causes and origins of human conflict — especially history, anthropology, sociology, social psychology and psychology. Economics must also play a part, as must Human Geography. Some understanding of Religion would also seem to be required if one is to have any comprehension of conflicts in the Middle East. The critical and analytical skills of Philosophy will also be needed if we are successfully to struggle with questions concerning the nature of Peace, the idea of a 'just' war and the status of arguments supporting policies proposed to promote and secure peace. Scientific understanding is going to be called on at many points throughout a programme of Peace and Conflict Studies as, for instance, when one is considering the consequences of the 'nuclear winter'; the statistical procedures of mathematics would be needed for students to calculate probabilities and run thought experiments in this field. Medicine and the bio-sciences; cybernetics and systems theory; and policy studies — all have contributions to make to this area. The range of subjects and disciplines that would be appropriate to advance understanding and assist deliberation in this field is as wide as the topics themselves; for the ways and means of our securing peace are very various, depending on the level and complexity of the problems to which we may wish to address ourselves, as are the patterns of understanding required to analyse and elaborate what activities and conditions promote the development of personal autonomy and what militate against it.

O'Connell (1984) has a slightly different list. For him there are five 'areas of concentration' identified as critical to students' need to achieve a structured understanding of the issues of peace, in an academic environment: peace theory; nuclear and non-nuclear defence; relations between

economically developed and developing countries; industrialised societies; regions in conflict. These are areas of teaching and research for a particular Department, with a particular background and interests, where the problems, topics and issues are more specific and sharply focussed. They are nonetheless similar to the list suggested above in the range of reference and disciplinary perspectives they call upon. Cox and Scruton (1984) propose another list of contributory subjects and disciplines:

Philosophy, and especially ethics, political philosophy and the theory of social choice

Logic and mathematics, and especially probability theory, decision theory and the theory of games

Military strategy

History, and especially the history of modern Europe and America, of the Second World War, and of the Soviet Union and its expansion

Theology, and especially the theory of the just war, natural law and God's peace

Economics, and especially the theory of the market and the comparison between planned and free economies

Sociology, and especially the theories of social conflict, of social cohesion and of collective action

Politics, and especially comparative systems theory, and the theories of representative government, of mass movements and of totalitarianism.

These three curricula can all be taught in both Schools and Colleges and generate research, at the highest level of intellectual abstraction but at the most nearly relevant points of social and international applicability. Any of them would serve a University's purposes of preserving and transmitting knowledge, critically appraising and re-interpreting it where necessary, and pushing back the frontiers of human ignorance so as to expand and ameliorate human understanding and our ability to predict, plan for and control the future. The difference between Schools and Colleges and Universities is that 'Peace and Conflict Studies' may provide specific courses of teaching and funded research in the latter, while in the former the way in which 'Education for Peace' may best figure on the curriculum is a subject for further enquiry.

Some people believe, for example, that a concern for peace ought to infuse all a school's curriculum endeavours and whole institutional ethos, and that no specific timetable time need be provided for it. Others consider that there ought to be curriculum courses in International Understanding and Human Relationships and that a section of those should be devoted to topics of peace and conflict. Yet others would wish to see a combination of the two; others again would see all this coming under some other heading, of which 'Personal and Social Education' and its like are widely canvassed as providing occasions for peace education. But people increasingly assent to the proposition that courses of some kind, under such headings and for such purposes, should feature on the curriculum and in the programmes of educational institutions.

We should also note, however, that many people — parents, politicians, education authorities and academics — have reservations about this; in their eyes such courses are part of a spectrum that extends from recommendations about good manners to outright indoctrination; and that Peace Education courses often serve to promote outright political agenda.

Few universities or schools, one imagines, would want to see themselves described in these terms. For there is no doubt that the word 'indoctrination' carries the most injurious perjorative overtones. Any of the standard analyses of the term to be found in the literature of philosophy of education would show why this is so (Snook, 1972). Few parents would be happy to see their children exposed to teachers who intended to employ whatever means seemed most efficacious to bring about the uncritical acceptance, on the part of their charges, of highly contentious or even incorrigible theories and doctrines, in such a way as to become unshakeably committed to ideologies, that then govern and shape their lives and which they are also concerned to propagate to others so as to secure similar commitment on their part too. Parents would very soon make their objections known, as the affair of William Tyndale Primary School in London between 1975-76 illustrated (ILEA, 1976) while Universities would be quickly brought under the most critical scrutiny from external examiners and their funding bodies, possibly even to the extent of losing staff or recognition. Schools and Universities, when supported by subventions from the public exchequer, are not in the business of indoctrination; their overt purposes and those of education, characterised by R.S. Peters as the initiation of the young into the various valued traditions of critico-creative thought, by means that require voluntariness and willingness on their part and in such a way that their perspectives are transformed by the cognitive spill-over that their acquisition of the forms of public knowledge brings about in them (Peters, 1965; Peters, 1966). On the basis of such definitions of 'education' and 'indoctrination' Cox and Scruton point an accusing finger at courses of 'Peace Studies'; for they contend that the cognitive character of Peace Studies is such that the subject is

not merely... often taught in a biased and irresponsible way, but that it could be taught in no other way.

For Cox and Scruton there is too little of fact in Peace Studies and too much of belief, opinion and even prejudice; too little of objective information and too much of material that in the hands of some teachers is potentially indoctrinatory.

To such a charge many of the foregoing considerations about the cognitive status of the delineation of Peace and Conflict Studies I have advanced may be thought to constitute adequate rebuttal. On that basis we may support the conclusions drawn from her critique of Scruton and Cox by Annabel Laity:

There is room for a genuine educational discipline in the field of human relations, rights and responsibilities, whether we call it peace studies or not.

It is possible to teach the above-mentioned disciplines without party political bias.

Given that political awareness is a most necessary equipment for those of us who live in a democracy we cannot dismiss the discussion of political issues from the school curriculum or university (Laity, 1985).

This response proffers an alternative articulation of the concept and epistemology of Peace and Conflict Studies, based upon the requirements that can be presupposed by the necessary commitment of the future citizen in a democracy to the idea and goals of 'education for democracy'. Such an aim would seem to require just that open-mindedness and openness to counter-argument, refutation and falsification that is called for in the sort of society argued for by Karl Popper (1943; 1949) as the only one capable of functioning so as to secure maximum human happiness and to provide a bulwark against the exploitation, ignorance and servitude endemic in any totalitarian system (Popper 1943; Popper, 1949). In this respect, at least, Laity and her colleagues are surely on the same side as Cox and Scruton. The goals seem to be the same.

The problem is, however, that the epistemology seems to be the same. For the view of 'objectivity' which both sides in this dispute employ is a function of a foundationalist notion of perception and knowledge, the foundation in question being a version of empiricism that lies behind recent attacks on claims made for the cognitive status of moral discourse, aesthetics and religion. The principal tenets of this empiricist foundationalism are similar to those of positivists in the philosophy of science and verificationists in the philosophy of language: that perception can be veridical, value- and theory-free, unmistakable and untainted by subjective prejudice; that there is a realm of 'facts' that can be logically distinguished from the realm of 'values'; that the collection of such facts is the function of the organs of perception; that 'truth' is only to be sought in the certainties of deductive modes of reasoning (mathematics and logic) or in the highly probalistic findings of the inductive methods of the natural sciences; and that human cognition can be reduced to some basic forms, whether these be the Humean distinction of two realms of proposition or the Hirstian categorisation of human understanding into seven basic 'modes of understanding' or 'forms of knowledge'. It is on the ground of such epistemic preconceptions that both Cox and Scruton *and* Laity can argue for and against the possibility of agreeing as to the 'facts' that are relevant to Peace Studies. There are some who might want to go further and claim that the possibility of 'education' is restricted to the realms of science and mathematics only; when one enters such highly debatable fields as the arts, literature, religion, sex and politics, one must take especial care, for all such subjects are potentially indoctrinatory.

It is surprising that such views continue to be held — and used as the basis for attacks upon such subjects as Peace studies — when arguments in rebuttal of them have proved fatally debilitating, these many years. In 1949 Popper pointed out that inductivist accounts of the 'true' nature of science

rested upon a blatant *petitio principii*; since 1953 Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* has shown that language has very many uses and forms of meaning, certainly more than can be reduced to seven. Similar age can be claimed for arguments that question the validity of the alleged 'Fact-Value' distinction (Hudson, 1969), as also the idea of absolute objectivity and a theory-free account of 'truth' (whatever that is) (Hamlyn, 1970). I do not believe I need reiterate such arguments to show that the views of Cox and Scruton rest upon shaky epistemic foundations. Both Harris (1979) and Chalmers (1982) draw on the work of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, and Feyerabend to maintain that observation is theory-dependent; that our selection of what is to count as a fact will itself be a function of our values and interests; that 'truth' has to be defined, if indeed it can be defined at all, as a criterion of what is interpersonally and conventionally agreed to be 'warrantably assertible' in any field of discourse; that human meanings are shifting, polymorphous and elusive; that the supposed distinguishability of 'fact' and 'value' is a positivist fiction; that human experience and understanding cannot be reduced to any basic building blocks upon which the whole of the structure of the human cognitive enterprise must be erected and that have to be 'presupposed' in all further attempts at sophistication within it.

Armed with the counter-arguments that these tenets afford, we may return to a critique of empiricist foundationalist epistemologies with greater power for their refutation: for now we may rebut the contentions of such critics as those cited, not merely by answering them in their own terms (as Laity and others do) but showing that the basis of their criticism is, at best, highly contentious and, at worst, fatally flawed. And this may involve giving up the recourse one might want to have to the otherwise attractive curriculum defence offered by Hirst's theory; for, as a result of the *elenchus* of its foundationalism formulated by Evers and Walker (Evers & Walker, 1983) it is doubtful whether we should be immune from criticism in seeking support for Peace Studies as a 'field of knowledge' from such a dubious source — for it too exhibits all the axioms and postulates to the falsification of which Australian critics of empiricist epistemology have devoted so much scholarly effort and to such effect.

What then is left? Have we taken away the basis for a theoretically sound account of the epistemological status of Peace Studies, that will enable us to vindicate its appearance on the programmes of Schools, Colleges and Universities? I do not think we have, for from the above set of considerations we may derive other and better arguments in its support. Reference to the work of Popper, for instance, enables us to see Peace and Conflict Studies as a paradigm of science and of philosophy as a species of critical problem-solving. Those active in teaching and research in this area are concerned with the attempt to find solutions to problems of a particularly pressing kind: what is peace, and how can it be secured? These problems are capable, in principle at any rate, of solution, or of 'trial' or tentative solutions, on which all the critical apparatus of the falsification

that is the mark of any 'open' academic community may then, from whatever quarter, be brought to bear. On this basis it would be sufficient for public utilities and education authorities to agree that the need to find policies apt for the promotion of concord, amity and cooperation and the elimination of aggression and structural violence in the world we inhabit is now a matter of over-riding importance if we are to survive at all and have teaching and research institutions to employ for the solution of other human problems, to devote all their energies to its solution. Schools and courses of Peace and Conflict Studies would then be seen as having priority in research funding and the involvement of all academics, instead of, as is now often sadly the case, enjoying no more than the status and role of Cinderella — much less that of the Ugly Sisters to which some cast them.

An alternative possibility would come from the arguments of Evers (Evers 1983, 1984) already referred to. His refutation of Hirstian notions involving a reductionist account of knowledge as partitioned into basic impermeable sets employs Quinean extensionalist logic to argue for an epistemic holism, in which the whole cognitive repertoire of any individual is related and, as it were, integrated into just one 'web of belief', giving that individual the theory that informs and predisposes all his/her attempts to understand reality and cope with its exigencies. On this account science and philosophy become, not so much exercises in problem-solving, but rather activities of critical reflection on and criticism and correction of the theory of which one is a bearer, and of comparing that theory with others to test its fecundity and explanatory power. Critical theory analysis and comparison in the realm of Peace Studies would then enable those engaged in it to re-examine the theories that structure and define their own approaches to it and make whatever adjustments, criticisms or corrections seem to be called for in their attempt to develop and articulate a whole network of theoretical understandings to be brought to bear on the problems with which they are required to deal. This last point is underlined by Walker: he sees such problems as providing the stimulus and the occasion for our theories of the world to be brought into play when questions of human interests and purposes arise; for him the pragmatic approach is always to be preferred and the test of whether a policy or programme works lies in its functional utility (Walker & Evers, 1984). This approach seems to point the way toward a revivification of Deweyan pragmatism which offers Peace Studies as a forum in which theory-building would have the formulation of policy as its primary focus, that would require a range of cognitive skills and repertoire to operate upon its chief problematic.

Popperian evolutionary epistemology; Quinean holism; Deweyan pragmatism: all seem to provide the opportunity for the critical appraisal of problems, topics, issues and theories with which the field open to investigation under the rubric of Peace and Conflict Studies is replete. All of them offer academics a collection of material upon which their skills of conceptualisation and categorisation may work, and constitute what Lakatos might have seen as a properly scholarly and progressive 'research pro-

gramme' (Lakatos, 1970).

Part of that programme may involve considering whether the title or nomenclature of the subject ought not to be changed. As Laity intimates, there seems to be no reason *a priori* why we should stick to one title for the aim of Peace and Conflict Studies rather than another. What is important is the kind of problems to be studied and the policies developed for their solution; it is this that will give such a subject what Powell (1965) insightfully calls its 'flavour'. For him what marks off one scholarly area of investigation from another is its content, the sources it is drawn from, the interests and background of those doing research on it, the considerations that make certain moves decisive in it, the context in which it takes place, the ends aimed at and the outcomes observed — all criteria the pragmatic quality of which both Walker and Schwab too would, one feels, strongly approve. Under this rubric any convenient heading will do; and whether we set teaching and research on these topics, problems and issues as coming under 'human relations, rights and responsibilities', 'personal and social development', 'social and inter-personal skills', 'international understanding' or whatever, what is important is that the study of those factors and conditions conducing to human welfare and minimising human harm be made, at some stage and in some form or other, a necessary element in such courses. For 'education' is, as Daveney convincingly argues (Daveney, 1973), in the last analysis a moral concept; it has to do with the ways in which we choose to institutionalise the child-rearing practices of our various communities with the overt intention of preparing them for a life in a society that, we hope, will be better than our own. What we are after, as Mary Warnock noted (1978), is a society that, even if at several removes from our own, is one in which the knowledge we now hand on is enhanced and further developed so as to improve the lot of its denizens. Peace and Conflict Studies, however we name it and see it, is going to be an indispensable element in courses devoted to that end.

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MAHATMA GANDHI AS THE FORERUNNER OF PEACE MOVEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

In this paper an attempt is made to explain the basic tenets of Mahatma Gandhi, and to reveal how he applied these in day to day life. Gandhi is not just a theoretician laying down meta-physical principles. His popularity, both inside and outside India is related to his ability to face problems in an empirical manner. His explanation of the relation of politics and religion is reviewed, as well as the basic concepts of his philosophy. Gandhi's advice is applicable to tall nations. In Gandhi's view, there is no contradiction between nationalism and internationalism.

The personality of Mahatma Gandhi is a Unique Phenomenon for our age. He is not only looked upon as the father of the Indian Nation but also a world teacher in the line of the Buddha and Christ. Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence is a legacy of ancient India in which our society has had the ideal of great saints who would subject themselves to a singular life of self-suffering for the sake of the whole of humanity. But Gandhi, while following his non-violence, was slightly different from the sages of ancient India. He did not renounce the world but denounced its evils without hating anybody. He worked in the midst of the vast sea of humanity for the welfare of the humblest individual by accepting the path of self-suffering and devotion to love and truth. Non-violence will always remain a noble ideal to be attained.

His method was to make an appeal in a humble manner. This is not to be found in any political structure — democratic, socialist or communist. He wanted to establish a complete new social order with emphasis upon non-violence. Gandhi considered non-violence a great virtue. Karl Marx formed a violent proletarian revolution to overthrow the privileged class of

the capitalists. Gandhi in his concept of the 'Trusteeship' considered the rich as the custodians of the welfare of the poor. He wished the rich to do something with their wealth to bring about the welfare of the poor. If they did not do so, Gandhi would not rule out a violent revolution. Thus Karl Marx jumps to a violent revolution in the first stage while Gandhi, being conscious of the good nature of the human beings, first approaches the problem from a humanitarian angle. However, if the rich do not show generosity to the poor, things might take a different direction.

Gandhi practised non-violence and explored its possibilities for an unbroken period of over fifty years. He applied it to every walk of life—domestic, institutional, economic and political. The South Africans gave him their confidence and extended their friendship and co-operation whole heartedly. Even though Gandhi differed with the policies of the British, he enjoyed the affection of thousands of Englishmen and women, and in spite of his unqualified condemnation of modern materialistic civilization, the circle of European and American friends of Gandhi is ever widening. It is indeed the triumph of the doctrine of non-violence.

GANDHI IN INDIAN POLITICS

The Political career of Mahatma Gandhi in India dates back to 1914, when he was brought from South Africa enjoying a remarkable reputation as an uncompromising fighter against racial discrimination. Gandhi was inducted into the country's public life by such eminent persons as Gokhale and C.F. Andrews, at about the time the first world war broke out. Gandhi spent nearly four years in touring the country, studying the political situation and social condition of the people and developing contacts with the Indian leaders.

Gandhi's early steps in politics were uncertain. Indeed, he remained politically unpredictable throughout his life because his mind was a battle field on which caution contended with passion. Gandhi was ready to die for a principle but he preferred arbitration and compromise on any issue. He was a natural fighter and a born peace maker.

Gandhi's first advent into Indian politics was heralded by an India-wide *hartal* called, on his initiative, by the Indian National Congress, as a mark of protest and resentment against the Rowlatt Bill which was passed in 1919. The promulgation of Rowlatt Bill was a great stroke to freedom fighters because it suppressed the right to freedom of speech and freedom of press. The decision to launch a *Satyagraha* against the Rowlatt Act was taken by Gandhi in consultation with a few close associates. The *Rowlatt Satyagraha* vividly illustrates Gandhi's ability to draw individuals belonging to different castes, communities, and religions into a movement of protest against the British Government. Prior to that period Gandhi was only a peripheral figure in the politics of nationalism. In 1919 Gandhi made a bid for All-India leadership and had declared that occasional participation in

politics was no longer adequate for the ends he had in mind. Before Gandhi called for a nation-wide *hartal* against the Rowlatt Bill, he had entered into an alliance with the Khilafat leaders for joint action against the Government. His long tours in the country convinced him that active backing of the Muslims was important and he thought that he could not rely on the support of the Hindus alone who were then a politically unorganised mass of people. In 1919 when Gandhi stated the *satyagraha sabha* to protest against the Rowlatt Act, the country observed a solemn *hartal* on the 6th April of 1919. Thus began the Gandhian era in Indian politics. From 1920 to 1947, he fought largely under the banner of the Indian National Congress. He vitalised the congress organization, and built up an organization network from villages to provincial towns throughout the country.

Gandhi has offered an alternative, his doctrine of *ahimsa* — non-violence to the society which is fraught with violence. "He had used the principle of non-violence to mobilize the masses of India to drive England from the subcontinent with a moral crusade instead of an armed rebellion, prayers instead of machine gun fire, disdainful silence instead of the fracas of terrorists bombs" (Collins & Lapierre, 1976).

Gandhi was a great success in Indian politics because of his ideals which he cherished and applied in the society in a pragmatic perspective. Here I would like to deal with the main tenets of Gandhi viz. Religion, Non-violence, *satyagraha* and the application of these principles in his political life.

THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION

Critics and admirers of Gandhi have alike attached special significance to the fact that moving through the whole of Gandhian thought, there is the fundamental idea of the inseparability of politics and religion. Gandhi always argued that true religion and true politics have both to concern themselves primarily with human life and action and both must have a common basis in a common morality determined by a common set of values. A truly religious man must also be a politician and a true politician must also be a religious man. Gandhi says, "I could not be leading a religious life unless I identified myself with the whole of mankind, and that I could not do unless I took part in politics. The whole gamut of man's activities today constitutes an indivisible whole" (Ghandi, 1955).

Religion vitalizes and elevates the inner life of human beings. Organized religions should be able to activate the inner spiritual life of their followers, so that it may express itself in universal dimensions. The Church, the Mosque, the Temple all the rituals and symbols of religion are helpful only so long as they nourish and fertilize the inner spiritual life of their respective followers.

For Gandhi, religion is not purely theoretical or academic matter but it is a practical and existential necessity. Religion is the mainspring of

Gandhi's activities throughout his public career not only in the realm of religion proper but also in the spheres of politics, economics and social life. A religion which does not concern itself with every side of life is no religion at all. Whether in England or South Africa or India, Gandhi was invariably involved with the question of religious diversity and the problem of forging unity among the followers of different religions through inter-religious understanding.

By 'religion' Gandhi does not mean formal religion or customary religion but that religion which underlies all religions. Religion should pervade every one of our actions. It means a belief in the ordered moral government of the universe. Gandhi's conception of religion transcends Hinduism, Islam, Christianity etc. It does not supersede them but it harmonizes them and gives them reality (Gandhi, 1955).

Gandhi rejects any religious doctrine that does not appeal to reason and is in conflict with morality. To quote Gandhi, "I tolerate unreasonable religious sentiment when it is not immoral" (Gandhi, 1920). Gandhi was convinced that morality is the basis of things and truth is the substance of all morality. Truth became his sole objective.

Gandhi always considered that religion is the service of the helpless. God manifests to us in the form of the helpless and stricken. The only way to find God is by service to our fellow beings in the society. Gandhi did not find God apart from the rest of humanity. His countrymen are his nearest neighbours. Self-realization is impossible without service of an identification with the poorest. Gandhi says, "I cannot practice *ahimsa* without practising the religion of service and I cannot find the truth without practising the religion of *ahimsa*. And there is no religion other than truth" (Gandhi, 1955).

The Principle of Truth is of permanent importance to Gandhi. He frequently quoted a favourite Sanskrit verse: '*Satyannasti paro dharmah*' (Parva, 1893). Which means that there is no higher religion than truth. And the way to truth is through non-violence. Gandhi gave these religious principles a practical turn. He believed that the salvation of humanity depended on the practice of these principles.

Gandhi's conception of politics is as unorthodox as his conception of religion. He used this word not in the usual sense of the art of capturing, holding and managing governmental power, but it means the art of transforming social relations in terms of justice. Gandhi opines, "A non-violent revolution is not a programme of 'seizure of power', but it is a programme of transformation of relationships" (Tandulkar, 1951).

Gandhi applied his conception of politics as the art of transformation of social relations also to the immediate political situation in which he found himself. The national freedom movement under his leadership was viewed by him as a moral attempt on the part of himself and the Indian people to transform the unjust relationship between the Indian people to transform the unjust relationship between the Indian and the British people into a just one through non-violence. Gandhi insisted that the political

movement he was leading did not represent advice for the capture of political power. Shortly before the independence of India, Gandhi was disturbed by the rapid growth of power politics in the country and lamented that the vicious influence of the parties was no longer confined to the cities but it prevailed in the remotest villages, hindering their progress.

Religion is the recognition of immanent justice and action aimed at the establishment of relative justice in human society. Politics is the art of transforming social relations in terms of relative justice in each particular case. Gandhi's argument was that under such definitions of religion and politics, no aspect of human activity can be regarded as being outside the scope of either subject since every sphere of human action is relevant to the ideal of justice, and they are thus two names for practically the same activity.

THE APPLICATION OF NON-VIOLENCE IN POLITICS

In the wider context of history, Gandhi must be considered as one of the great teachers of the Indian People. Starting with Mahavira and Buddha, a galaxy of sages, have left their valuable imprints on the life and thought of India. Gandhi did not want to break from these teachers of the past nor did he preach an entirely new creed. His role has been that of a renovator of ancient thought who adapted the teachings of the sages to conform to the requirements of the modern world.

Gandhi explains the principle of non-violence in innumerable ways. Gandhi defines non-violence as "soul" force. Force is of two types viz. Physical and spiritual. We are ordinarily acquainted with the physical force. Violence consists of physical force. This is the nature of brutes. Man also is accustomed to using physical force. This can be used not only at the individual level but at the level of communities and international levels. The wars in history have been fought with physical weapons. Physical force gives victory to one and defeat to the other. But if we apply the principle of non-violence, there will be no defeat to anybody. Gandhi says, "There is no such thing as defeat in non-violence. The end of violence is surest defeat" (*Harijan*, 1973).

As opposed to the physical force there is the spiritual force which is an invisible force. Gandhi also describes it as Truth force. It is the use of this force we do not make use of weapons. It depends upon the strength of the soul, i.e. the spiritual strength which one possesses. The soul force does not depend upon the physical strength of an individual. A person may be physically weak and yet spiritually strong. The physical might and the physical weapons have no place in the use of this force.

The message of non-violence is the message of universal love. Gandhi gives a basis for this universal love. He considers all human beings to be good. Human nature is essentially good. Gandhi always said that if any one is bad or wicked, it is the wickedness that should be hated but not

the person. The famous saying of Gandhi is, "Hate the sin but not the sinner" (Gandhi, 1927). When Gandhi was fighting with the British, he always made a distinction between the British Imperialism and the individual English man. He emphatically said that he was fighting against the evil of British Imperialism but not the Britishers. He considered that every Britisher as his fellow-man and friend. He wanted all the Indians to love the Britishers as fellow-human beings in order to be truly non-violent.

Non-violence is truthfulness. Truth is an inseparable ingredient of non-violence. Truth and non-violence are like the two sides of the same coin. He wrote in *Young India*, "*Ahimsa* is my God. When I look for *ahimsa*, truth says, find it out through me, 'when I look for truth, *ahimsa* says, 'find it out through me'" (Gandhi, 1920). Truth is the pre-requisite of the peaceful society. Truthfulness is more important than peacefulness. Truth is the means to attain the end viz. peace.

Non-violence is a way of resolving the conflict situation. What Gandhi always rejected was not conflict, but violence. It is not correct to regard Gandhian non-violence as naturally disinclined towards conflict. In fact, non-violence and conflict are inseparable in Gandhi's view. Arne Naess writes, "Gandhi always gravitated towards the center of a conflict — A *Karma Yogi* does not isolate himself from a struggle; he remains at the very heart of it, immersed in the conflict of his fellow men as one among men. From the centre of the struggle he tries to bring about a general reduction of violence, instead of avoiding it himself" (Naess, 1965).

Non-violence implies non-exploitation in every area of life viz. social, economic and political, with which people are concerned in their daily lives. Exploitation at any stage directly affects the personality of the individual. Gandhi does not like any type of exploitation. He says, "A non-violent activity is such that it involves no exploitation" (Gandhi, 1956). By non-violence Gandhi does not mean resignation from fighting against wickedness. To run away from fight against wickedness and injustice is cowardice. A non-violent person fights against injustice even without caring for his life.

SATYAGRAHA AS A TECHNIQUE TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE SOCIETY:

The term *Satyagraha* was coined by Gandhi in South Africa to express the type of force which the Indians used to fight against injustice. The genesis of the *satyagraha* movement in South Africa was actually to be found in a fateful encounter by Gandhi with the racial discrimination of the government at Maritzburg station where he was virtually thrown out of the first class compartment in which he was travelling from Durban to Pretoria in South Africa soon after his arrival from India.

Satyagraha literally means holding on to Truth. *Satyagraha*, as a weapon of non-violence is Truth force. *Satyagraha* is a relentless search for truth and a determination to reach truth not by infliction of suffering on

the opponent but on one's self. It is a powerful method of direct action. A *Satyagrahi* exhausts all other means before he resorts to *Satyagraha*. Gandhi also used it as his last weapon against injustice, after having exhausted all other possibilities like persuasion and conciliation.

Satyagraha as an instrument of social control is eternally creative. Its creativity is inherent on the basis of *ahimsa* and moral persuasion. It alters social relationships without harming men. Gandhi employed and evolved the method and technique of *Satyagraha* for the correction of the social and political errors during his five-decade long political career. This is an illustration of the wide range of objectives which can be attained without necessarily having recourse to violence. Gandhi's *satyagraha* points to two related things. Negatively, it enjoins upon man the duty to eradicate evil and positively, it reminds him of his obligation to serve the community. Gandhi says, "*Satyagraha* is a law of universal application. Beginning with the family its use can be extended to every other circle" (Gandhi, 1958).

Satyagraha, as applied socio-political action requires a comprehensive programme of planning, preparation, and studied execution. To give active expression to the elements which inform the underlying philosophy of *satyagraha*, attention must be extended to a range of consideration from the choice of the objective through the selection of participants to the terms of final settlement. Most of the participants in the campaigns reviewed were employing non-violence for the purpose of achieving specific objectives and they adopted *satyagraha* because of its efficacy as method. For most of those involved non-violence was a policy, and not a creed. When we examine *satyagraha* in action, "*satyagraha* operates as a force to effect change. The effectiveness of its action is governed by criteria centring upon the degree of persuasion affected, the extensiveness of the constructive programme, and the degree to which the non-violent character of the action has been preserved" (Bondurant, 1958).

GANDHI'S *SARVODAYA* AS A PHILOSOPHY OF *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

Gandhian Philosophy of *Sarvodaya* aims at the establishment of an egalitarian society. The word '*Sarvodaya*' comprises of two words '*sarva*' (all) '*Udaya*' (rising), meaning all-round well being or welfare of all. To an individual living in a society, his neighbour is the representative of mankind. Hence the reason why the Bible commands, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self" (St Mark, 12). Thus love is the fountain of activities that springs out for the betterment of all, leading on to universal brotherhood. The law of love and respect for life if courageously practised is bound to lead to the elevation of the accent, quality and character of politics and civilization. Gandhi agrees in many respects with the Christian concept of love or charity. The great religions of the world can be said to be echoing the ideas of universal love which is the central teaching of *Sarvodaya*.

Mahatma Gandhi was imbued with the tradition of spiritual *swaraj*, but he applied it to secular condition in a unique way. His social and economic objective of *Sarvodaya*, the good of all, was the outcome of his spiritual outlook in life. His ethics, his broad based religious outlook, his humanism, his ideas about decentralised economy and diffusion of political power are all based on his philosophy of life indicated above. It must be remembered that Gandhi looked upon his own life as a spiritual adventure and would not tolerate any compartmental outlook of his different activities. It was his inner spiritual development which reflected itself in all his actions. Spirituality meant the experience of identity with the truth of life and existence with the creator and his creation. Identity means love which must express itself in selfless service and sacrifice for the uplift of all.

In short, it can be said that the word '*Sarvodaya*' epitomises Gandhi's whole social philosophy which aims at the attainment of both *abhyudaya* (material prosperity) and *nisreyasa* (spiritual realization).

The Philosophy of *Sarvodaya* was based on the mystical intuitions and socio-political experiences of Gandhi in particular, and other *Sarvodaya* thinkers in general. In his life Gandhi attempted the synthesis of the ideas of Vedanta, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, and the teachings of prophets like Tulasidas, Tolstoy, Thoreau and national leaders of the Indian Renaissance movement. The Philosophy of *Sarvodaya* takes up the Gandhian synthesis and tries to workout the implications of their ideas at more critical and analytical levels. It has tried to incorporate some ideas from the western socialist and political philosophers.

Gandhi's dynamic philosophy can make possible the advent of a radically transformed humanity. It can serve as a system of norms and moral values that can guide our conduct and action in society and state. True, it is an intellectual attempt to build a plan of political and social reconstruction on the basis of metaphysical idealism. *Sarvodaya* is indeed an attempt to develop Gandhian ideas regarding decentralization and villagism. Gandhi visualised a stateless society and repudiated the authority of the state at every level and in every form. He was convinced that mere institutional structures will not suffice for the concrete realization of rights and hence he postulated the ideal of *Ramarajya*, which means the kingdom of love, justice and righteousness. This amounts to the synthesis of the Augustinian conception of the *De-Civitate-Dei* with the democratic ideal of the sovereignty of the people. Like the pluralists and anarchists of the West, Gandhi believes in the 'sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority'. If freedom is the desired object, then *Sarvodaya* wants people to take to heart the famous dictum of Thoreau which Gandhi used to repeat, 'that Government is the best which governs the least'. It is the stress on the cultivation of real *Janasakti* — the power and strength of the people which is the most significant contribution of Gandhian thought to world political thought. Only this can be an effective antidote to the dominance of *danda-sakti* in the power of coercive violence. As an ultimate ideal, however, *Sarvodaya* is satisfied not with limiting or regulating the state machine but

with the total elimination of the state by gradual process of time.

On the economic plane, *Sarvodaya* teaches a living principle of equal advantages. The economic needs of man and his non-economic pursuits are well apportioned in *Sarvodaya* philosophy. It is a golden mean between rigid economic determinism and complacent social liberalism. Gandhi tried to evolve a socio-economic system that would contain the indigenous ways of life and value system.

Sarvodaya seeks to aim at the welfare of all. Gandhi never wanted the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few rich people. He feared that the rich industrialists would exploit the poor workers and labourers. Gandhi wrote: "I consider, it is a sin and injustice to use machinery for the purpose of concentrating power and riches in the hands of a few. Today the machine is used in this way" (Dantwala, 1944). Gandhi did not agree with pandit Nehru who stood for industrialism because he thought that if it was socialised, it would be free from the evils of capitalism. Gandhi's view is that the evils are inherent in industrialism and no amount of socialisation can eradicate them. Gandhi, in short, insisted that man should be the centre of life and of all the processes of production, exchange and distribution.

The chief principle of *Sarvodaya* economy is simplicity of life. Simplicity of life means neither poverty nor asceticism. As one concerned with spiritual values, Gandhi would never allow luxury and pomp to encroach upon human life. He was all for the control of passion and believed that this will lead to glorious civilization. The craze for acquiring a multiplicity of goods is destructive of contentment, peace, and tranquility. It results in exploitation, enormous waste of nature's material and human labour, and in ever preparedness for war. Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa rightly observes, "man whose needs are few such as can be met by himself can afford to raise his head high and refuse to bow to any power which seeks to enslave him. Not the man with so-called high standard of living: every new luxury he adopts becomes an additional fetter preventing him from freedom of thought, movement, and action" (Kumarappa, 1946).

GANDHIAN APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE

Gandhi's mission is not merely brotherhood of Indian humanity. His mission is not merely the freedom of India but liberation to whole mankind. Gandhi wanted to realize brotherhood or identity not merely with the beings called human, but he wanted to realize identity with all life, even with such things as crawl upon earth because we claim descent from the same God and all life in whatever form it appears must be essentially one. Gandhi says, "I do not believe that an individual will gain spirituality when those that surround him suffer. I believe in *advaita*. I believe in the essential unity of man and for the matter of all that lives. Therefore I believe that if one man gains spirituality, the whole world gains with him and if one man fails, the whole world falls to that extent" (Bose, 1957).

Gandhi considered that it is impossible for one to be an internationalist without being a nationalist. Internationalism is possible only when nationalism becomes a fact, i.e. when people belonging to different countries have organized themselves and are also to act as one man. According to Gandhi "It is not nationalism that is evil but it is the nervousness, selfishness, exclusiveness which is the bane of modern nations which is evil. Each wants to profit at the expense of, and rise of the ruin of the other. This is the greatest evil" (Prabhu & Rao, 1967).

Gandhi categorically said that India wants freedom not at the expense or exploitation of others. To quote Gandhi, "I do not want the freedom of India if it means the extinction of England or the disappearance of Englishmen. I want the freedom of my country so that other countries may learn something from my free country, so that the resources of my country might be utilized for the benefit of mankind" (Bose, 1957).

Gandhi considered that patriotism is the same as humanity. He was patriotic because he was human and humane. He did not want to hurt England in order to serve India. Imperialism had no place in his scheme of life. The law of a patriot is not different from that of patriarch. The non-cooperation in India was neither with the English nor with the west. But it was only a refusal to cooperate with the English administration on their own terms.

Gandhi never said that India should be all in all and let the whole world perish. It is enough if India is one among equals. Gandhi says, "I can keep India intact and its freedom also intact only if I have good will towards the whole of the human family and not merely for the human family which inhabits this little spot of the earth called India. It is big enough compared to other smaller nations, but what is India in the wide world or in the universe?" (Bose, 1957).

At the same time Gandhi declared that India should abandon violence altogether to achieve its end. Peace should be the way of Indian life and it should be the guiding principle to the whole world. Gandhi explains, "whether one or many, I must declare my faith that it is better for India to discard violence altogether, even for defending her borders. For India to enter into the race of armaments is to court suicide. With the loss of India to violence, the last hope of the world will be gone" (*Harijan*, 1973).

Gandhi emphatically said that not to believe in the possibility of permanent peace is to disbelieve in the Godliness of human nature. Methods hitherto adopted have failed because rock-bottom sincerity on the part of those who have striven has been lacking. Peace cannot be possible without complete fulfilment of the conditions of attainment thereof. If the recognised leaders of mankind who have control over the engines of destructions were wholly to renounce their use, permanent peace could be obtained" (*Harijan*, 1973).

Gandhi added that fundamentally he had been and he still was a pacifist. However, for man to exist and live in this world some violence is inevitable. A believer in *ahimsa* should always try to end war, though he

himself had not been able to do so because his pacifism had been under-developed. Gandhi opined, "If the pacifist could not face the task of ending war, he may take part in war and yet whole heartedly try to free himself, his nation and the world from war" (Power, 1961).

TRIBUTES TO GANDHI

On 30th January 1948, Gandhi was killed by the revolver bullets of Nathuram Gadse. It is really ironic that a man who strove for non-violence and peace throughout his life should have been killed by the violent deed of a Hindu. After the death of Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru spoke from the A.I.R., New Delhi and said, "The light has gone out of our lives and there is darkness everywhere. Our beloved leader, Bapu, as we called him, the father of the nation, is no more. But the light shown in this century was no ordinary light. The world will see it and it will give solace to innumerable hearts. For that light represented something more than the immediate present, it represented the living, the eternal truths, reminding us of the right path, drawing us from error, taking this ancient country to freedom" (Collins & Lapierre, 1976).

The great Nobel Laureat, Albert Einstein remarked, "in our times of utter moral decadence he was the only statesman to stand for higher human relationship in the political sphere. Generations to come will scarce believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth" (Cousins, 1969).

Dr. Martin Luther King, the black leader in America was very much influenced by Mahatma Gandhi. Dr. King was profoundly moved by the *Satyagraha* idea i.e., the vindication of truth not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on one's own self. Dr. King said, "As I read his works I became deeply fascinated by his campaigns of non-violent resistance. The whole Gandhian concept of *Satyagraha*... was profoundly significant to me. As I delved deeper into the philosophy of Gandhi, my skepticism concerning the power of love gradually diminished, and I came to see that the Christian doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of non-violence, is one of the most potent weapons available to an oppressed people in their struggle for freedom" (King, 1963).

It is not surprising if one says that Gandhi's principles are echoed in our daily life. It is clearly evident from the president of U.S.A., Mr. Ronald Reagan who paid the greatest tributes to the Gandhi's principles in the U.N. Assembly on 25th September 1984. In the course of his speech, "Mr Ronald Reagan, the President of America quoted Mahatma Gandhi to affirm that all problems could be peacefully resolved if adversaries talked to each other on the basis of love and truth. All through history, the way of truth and love has always won. This was the belief and vision of Mahatma Gandhi and this vision remains good and true today" (*The Hindu*, 1984).

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PEACE BUILDING AND COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATORS

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ABSTRACT

Peace is not an attainment, but a process, and global peace will not occur until individuals consider themselves to be part of the same global community and exhibit "good global citizenship". The changes that must be made in society to manifest these ideals have profound implications for educators. Educational strategies for expanding the definition of community and methods of manifesting group potential for the common good comprise a "process" curriculum. The impact of this process curriculum on the "content" curriculum and the conventional disciplines and implementation strategies are discussed.

According to geologists, some 225 million years ago all of the continents now separated by large oceans were united in one large land mass. The break-up and separation of this single land mass into the continents that we see today is known as the continental drift theory and the original land mass is called Pangaea. Since the earth is finite, movement past the mid-way point on the earth's surface will result in the narrowing rather than the widening of the gap between the land masses. Eventually, the continents will collide and could conceivably result in their reuniting in one land mass, a return of Pangaea. Of course the process will take billions of years as geologic time is very slow.

The theory was first publicly posited in 1912 by Alfred Wegener (1880-1930). He reportedly arrived at the idea while looking at a globe and noticing how the continents fit together like the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle. Wegener's eccentricities and the fact that his idea was so incompatible with contemporary theoretical models and beliefs prevented serious consideration of the concept of continental drift until several decades later.

Today, continental drift is generally accepted as the most accurate explanation of why and how the earth looks the way it does. There is both a lesson and an analogy to be derived from this example.

Humanity has been undergoing analogous changes. The increase in population, knowledge and technology, from the oldest evidence of human presence in Africa, to scattered tribes dotting a few regions of the earth, to the incredible diversity of the human family today, has carried us past the "half-way mark", and the nations of the earth, like the continents, are on collision course. However, the collision is problematic rather than disastrous. Humanity has successively progressed through stages of development including tribal, village, city-state, and nation. These progressive and evolutionary stages of incorporation required that each of the entities sacrifice their previous identity to a new, more inclusive identity. For example, the formation of nations required the incorporation of the city-state just as the formation of the city-state required the incorporation of tribes and villages.

The shift from one level of adaptation to another is difficult. Adaptation is actually the result of an organism appropriately responding to an external stress, but the failure to adapt condemns a species to extinction. As with the physical world, it can be stated with confidence that change in the human world is always present and that only the rate of change differs. It also appears that the current rate of social change is increasing exponentially. It seems ironic that some are so adept at recognizing the process of evolution as it relates to the physical world while remaining pessimistic about the potential for changing the minds of human beings. As with previous transitions, progressing from a national to global orientation, a return to Pangaea, is stressful.

Before going any further it is necessary to establish a working definition of the term peace, as there is little consensus on its definition. Johnson (1976) provides an excellent and comprehensive discussion on the divergent views and definitions of peace and peace studies. For the purposes of this paper, the concept of "positive peace" characterized by "creative and constructive interpersonal and intergroup relations" (International Peace Research Inst., 1971, p.3) will be used. The absence of violence, is of course, a necessary precondition of peace. Violence, as conceptualized by Galtung (1969, pp.167-191) exists "when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations." Facts such as the death of 25,000 people each day due to water-borne diseases, or the illegality of educating South African blacks without the permission and approval of the white minority government, the diversion of billions of dollars from social programs promoting human development to feed the military arsenals of the earth are all examples of violence viewed within the framework of this paradigm. Peace, is not only the removal of these barriers to human development (the absence of violence), but the formation of a structure that promotes the *optimal* development of human potential.

Using this concept of peace as a framework for discussion allows further divergence from the limited concept of peace as the avoidance of nuclear war, and allows inclusion of the concepts of change and development, world order, and structural violence (Johnson, 1976). Within this rubric, peace is a process rather than a state of attainment. This avoidance of the either-or dichotomy is important because it allows a different means of conceiving of peace. Peace, perceived as the process of *progressing towards* peace provides a more easily grasped conceptual "handle", and provides an operational framework for developing strategies that enable us to progress towards ever-higher levels of peace.

APPROACHES TO PEACE EDUCATION

There are in existence a diverse number of approaches to peace education, but in general, deliberate attempts to "educate for peace" have been classified into two types: direct and indirect. Direct education for peace can be described as a very traditional model, the type one would assume would emerge from a university setting. Gudykunst, Hammer, and Wiseman's (1977) use of the term "intellectual approach" when describing one of the six major types of cross-cultural relations training, as well as Harrison and Hopkins' (1967) phrase "university model" are both descriptive of the direct approach to peace education. Peace education as taught through this perspective, focuses on peace as a quasi-discipline, and academic focal point. Different disciplines are applied to the study of peace as a theme or topic much as the disciplines are utilized within "area studies" programs. The topic of peace can be explored through the "lenses" of history, economics, political science, philosophy, biology, education, and so on. The assumption here is that an adequate understanding of the nature of peace and the dispersal of factual information, will promote the world's movement toward peace. In the last five years there has been a proliferation of peace studies programs built upon this educational model.

The "indirect" style of peace education integrates the topic of peace into an existing course or curriculum. Rather than having a course entitled "Peace and Conflict in History", one might have a "conventional" history course in which the professor integrated the subject of peace and conflict into an historical context. In one context, "direct" and "indirect" peace studies are both direct, that is they both treat peace *as a subject to be taught*. The term "indirect" relates more to the way the subject of peace is labeled rather than the ultimate form the subject of peace assumes.

Another type of peace education is the study of conflict resolution. Although conflict resolution is a subject in its own right and is often a component of peace studies programs, it can be regarded as a separate genre of peace education. Conflict resolution, comprised of many field of research "individual psychology, anthropology, social psychology, political science, ethology, . . . and many special interdisciplinary endeavors deal

with the complex aspects of conflict behavior among individuals, within and among social groups, between governments, states and regions" (Dedring, 1976). This focus on the *process* of peace is contrasted with the regard for peace as a *subject* in the previously mentioned approaches. While conflict resolution may be either direct or indirect in its curricular form, it is usually direct and application or methodology oriented.

Peace and peace research have evolved rather rapidly and the contributions of numerous scholars as well as the proliferation of centers for peace studies and research are evidence of a growing world perception that peace is necessary and attainable. Historically, "peace" (used here as the merely the absence of armed conflict) has only punctuated the countless wars seen on the face of the planet and humankind probably does not know very much about it. If nothing else, the study of peace has created diverse (and conflicting) perspectives or paradigms for peace and conflict. Regarding *war as the breakdown of peace* rather than *peace as the cessation of war* creates a new array of responses and possibilities that would not be discovered if one was using only one "lens" through which to view the topic. Peace has a infinite number of manifestations and one must approach the study of peace utilizing the concept of "requisite variety" (Conant and Ashby, 1970) because "diverse experiences can only be comprehended using diverse conceptual frameworks" (Lotto, 1981). The lack of paradigmatic consensus, therefore, probably has a healthy effect on the field of peace research, and it is useful for peace educators to become aware of the diverse approaches to peace before constructing a curriculum.

PEACE-BUILDING AS AN EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Unfortunately, there are some limitations imposed by the types of peace education and peace studies mentioned above. 1) There has been a tendency to regard peace studies as a separate field of study, thereby excluding *de facto*, those who do not have the desire to become peace specialists. 2) Educators without the benefit of an official program of peace studies may find it difficult to pursue the goals of peace education. 3) The growing trend towards vocationalism and a return to the "Basics" (reading, writing and arithmetic), at least in American schools, may prevent a majority of the student population from becoming significantly involved in peace studies. This is a most unfortunate situation because the establishment and maintenance of peace requires the peaceful participation of a majority of the population; one might argue that it is forevermore, one of the "basics". Peace education must become infused into the academic culture, transcending the inclination to become housed in the cloisters or baronies of a traditional disciplinary setting.

The United Nations Charter states that peace begins in the minds of men. Peace competencies must not be *limited* to peace specialists. The establishment of peace will occur when individuals and groups think and

behave peacefully, rather than through the imposition of external controls of inducements. Historical and contemporary evidence of the human propensity for dispensing with rationality is virtually ubiquitous. This concept is illustrated by Dahl (1984 pp.174-175) in the following example:

... many community efforts by official agencies founder because of the lack of the cooperative spirit at the local level. In Pakistan, I was taken to see a "model" biogas electric plant in a village outside Islamabad. The government had constructed this plant with the latest "appropriate technology" as a demonstration plant in an effort to duplicate the successful experience in India with the use of methane gas given off by cow manure. Unfortunately, the plant was not operating because the village had two rival leading families who could not agree regarding the use of the generated electricity. The government was powerless in the situation; they could build electric plants, but had no means to address local feuds and rivalries.

The principles seen operating in this scenario are easily reproduced at the national or global level, and the need for peace-building skills is apparent. The struggle for control and power was greater than the awareness of the need for collaboration and cooperation. The situation, which was perceived by the parties to be a win-lose proposition was actually a lose-lose proposition. What are the basic skills needed for peace-building and global citizenship in an increasingly interdependent world and how are they developed?

As previously mentioned, the world is growing more and more interdependent and interrelated. Air pollution, DDT, contaminants in the oceans, thermonuclear war, disease and the weather all disregard national boundaries. On a less profound but no less effective level, the inhabitants of one country are affected by the economic and political stability of other nations. As with the example cited above, there are no longer any truly win-lose propositions, and the reality of interdependence is increasing. The needs of the age in which we are now living require skills and perspectives that differ from the needs of former times. The expansion of the human population and the extension of human abilities through technological means has made national boundaries so much more conceptual than actual, and the behavior of any nation or its individuals becomes the concern of the remainder of the planet. Photographs of our planet from outer space show neither borders nor a limitless supply of natural resources. The earth is indeed, one planet, but the national boundaries in *the minds of men* are more strongly fortified than any physical walls that have been erected on the face of this earth. Schell (quoted in Pokorny, 1984, p.16) writes: "If the inner landscape of our souls does not change, the outer landscape of the world will not change, either." Since the very nature of education is the direction and development of human potential towards a desired goal, educators have a profound role in the design of this "inner landscape".

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATORS

Clearly, many educators are committed to conflict resolution and peace-building, but the means by which these goals may be met are not so clear. Just knowing where one desires to go does not insure his or her ability to get there. Concerned educators can focus on three specific methods for translating the desires and intentions of peace education into concrete action: 1) content modification, 2) process reorientation, and 3) structural change. *Content* refers to the traditional subject matter orientation towards the curriculum. From this perspective, learning requires the accurate transmission of a body of knowledge (information). *Process* is the means through which the information is presented. This perspective holds that knowledge is relative and that the interaction between the student, teacher, and curriculum should be the focal point of education. *Structure* refers to the organizational and administrative framework of an educational institution.

CONTENT MODIFICATION

What students do not learn is as important as what they do learn. The inclusion or exclusion of subject matter on peace, social justice, third world concerns or the status of women's rights largely affect the knowledge base and world view students will possess at the time of their graduation. That many students are graduating ignorant of the concerns or even location of countries other than their own, is appalling. Textbooks that provide an international or global perspective should be adopted. The study of medicine, often viewed as outside the purview of peace education or global perspective could be modified to include the study of the effects of nuclear war on the human race (nuclear war prevention) or the control and treatment of parasites and diseases found in the third world (peace building). Any course of study can have its content modified in such a way that a global or peace-building perspective is emphasized. On the first day of word-processing in an introductory computer class my students are told to type the following sentence: "Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their country." The methods of rearranging, deleting, and modifying text are presented when they are told to alter the text so that it will read: "Now is the time for all good *people* to come to the aid of this *planet*." Without compromising the content of the class, the concepts of global perspective and the participation of women are introduced. There are those who argue that covert indoctrination into certain values is taking place when content modification is attempted, but indoctrination is already taking place. It is imperative that educators look at the content of their curricula to determine what information is included or excluded, and how that inclusion or exclusion affects the goals of peace-building in a global society.

PROCESS REORIENTATION

How we learn appears to be as important as *what* we learn. Some might argue that the context in which the transmission of subject information takes place is more effective than the transmission of the subject itself. C. Wayne Gordon, in his book *The Social System of the High School* (1958) discusses the impact of the "hidden curriculum" on the performance of high school students. The hidden curriculum, comprised of student cliques, social hierarchy, and norms, affects behavior and beliefs at least as intensely as if the behaviors and beliefs had been deliberately taught. The methods teachers use to transmit their respective subjects is also part of this hidden curriculum. "Merely" rearranging classroom seating alters the learning context in such a way that a whole new class norm can be developed. Seating arranged in rows facing one direction, with the teacher at the head of the class discourages student-student interaction. Putting chairs in a circle, with the teacher in the circle, increases both the role of the teacher as a facilitator and student-student interaction. Placing chairs in small groups of circles encourages small group teamwork while de-emphasizing the significance of the class as a whole. No one of these examples is superior to any of the others, the point to be made is that the delivery of instruction is *never* neutral, and that educators must be aware of the intended as well as unintended consequences of their actions. It would be rather pointless to encourage team-work and collaborative problem solving providing a classroom environment that discouraged such interaction.

Cooperation is a *pre-condition* rather than a by-product of peace, yet the majority of educational settings inhibit or even discourage collaboration and group development. In the United States, it is possible for a student to complete a college education without ever having collaborated on an educational activity or been exposed to a discipline other than his or her own. The trend towards increasing specialization makes this a particular concern as the need for the skills of synthesis, integration, and collaborative problem solving will increase.

Certain social problems cannot be readily perceived from an individual perspective as well as when those problems are viewed collaboratively. Hardin (1968) discusses this type of problem where there is *perceived* to be an "individual good-collective bad" in "The Tragedy of the Commons". The commons was a place where New England community members could graze their cattle at no individual expense. The problem surfaced when it became apparent that the productivity of the commons was nearing an end, either due to increased population of the town or higher cattle production. Individual farmers, becoming aware of the limitation of the commons, grazed their cattle more frequently and in greater numbers. These actions accelerated the demise of the commons to the point where it ceased productivity. Similar problems discussed by Kahn (1966) and Platt (1973) have common principles: 1) the problem exists out

of the immediate awareness of the individual, 2) and/or the existence of the problem does not concern the individual, 3) present personal interests outweigh long range public benefit, and 4) collective individual decisions based upon the preceding principles ultimately have undesirable social consequences affecting even the individuals who made the decisions. Problems of this genre often escape personal detection because they are manifested at a supra-personal level, yet schools provide few supra-personal experiences in which students might develop "social literacy".

Process reorientation fosters the building of collaborative problem solving through not only the interaction of students, but through an interactive orientation towards problems. The *application* of knowledge to various problems or goals reinforces the content curriculum, and develops learners who become adept at *learning to learn* rather than as passive recipients of information. The ultimate usefulness of education is the positive effect that the educated will have upon the world; collaboratively applying knowledge to social problems is a most positive effect.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE

If structures can create violence, then perhaps they can foster peace. Below normal representation of women in educational institutions is an example of structural violence. This exclusion may take the form of either *de facto* or *de jure* discrimination, but it is violence as it has been defined in this paper, nonetheless. In this age of increasing interdependence, the underdevelopment of any sector of society whether of sex, class, race, or religion, is a concrete hindrance to the progress of society as a whole. Educators must not only remove the barriers to the full participation of all members of human society, but must also impose policies and regulations which insure that participation is implemented.

Another case of the need for structural change was recently related by a colleague who had decided, with a group of other professors, to team-teach a course at his university. It was only after considerable effort that the methods for payment of salary and departmental remuneration were resolved. It seems that their university (and probably many others) had no administrative means for officially recognizing either team-teaching or cross-listing of courses, yet the most effective formal peace studies programs are both team-taught and multi-disciplinary. Most institutions grant degrees based upon attainment of a requisite number of courses in a particular subject rather than a thematically oriented course of studies. Educators developing thematic programs (world hunger, peace, etc.) may find implementing a course far more difficult than its design.

The examples of the absence of structural peace are numerous. Most every country has an enormous administrative framework for effectively waging war, but how many have a Department or Ministry of Peace, actively engaged in waging peace? Educators must develop educational infrastructure committed to peace. The existing infrastructure must be

changed and adapted so that it fosters, not impedes, the optimal manifestation of human potential.

SUMMARY

Peace requires peacemakers. A simple statement, a tautology perhaps, but a concept frequently overlooked by those who are working to create peace in the world. Frequently, we find elaborate schemes or plans designed to either eliminate war or to increase social justice built around the assumption that peace is something that has to be done *to* humankind rather than something that will be done *by* humankind. Peace, like war, has to be waged to be effective. Waging peace requires the enlistment, training, and allegiance of all the people of the earth in and to the ways of peace. The people of the world have successfully and progressively become incorporated into larger and more powerful groups. The establishment of tribes, once accomplished became a building block for the formation of villages, towns and cities, making possible the creation of nations. None of these progressive and evolutionary changes was without difficulty. The changes and the successive incorporations were in response to external stressors. Limited autonomies and sovereignties were sacrificed to the collective benefit and security of a larger unit. This process of adaptation to social stressors is analogous to a species' physical evolution. Adaptation is a successful reaction to environmental change. The human race has reached a level of maturity that makes it possible to consciously direct its own adaptation. It is imperative that we do so by learning the ways of peace.

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A RATIONAL FOR PEACE EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

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ABSTRACT

Global ecology, including man is threatened with extinction through nuclear holocaust; most concerned people consider peacelessness to be a major problem in the world today. As a result of their concern — expressed in the growing global peace movement — people and educators are calling for a response from education. The concept(s) of peace education are a response to this concern. The task of this paper then is to elucidate these concepts and to present a rationale for peace education in Australian schools with particular reference to political education.

The paper will focus on the overall concept of peace education as an umbrella philosophy concerned with peace/disarmament, development, environment and human rights problems. The discussion will clarify the interconnections between these global problems and why disarmament education, development education, environment education and human rights education should be considered under the general mantle of peace education. It will also consider the educational philosophy that underpins and enhances the links between these educations and the ramifications of this in terms of the content, form and structures of peace education. Finally, the paper will focus on political education, which is of critical and central importance in any general education for social change. Through an analysis of the distinction between political socialisation and political education, the

¹ The views presented in this paper are the author's own, and do not represent those of the Ministry of Education.

concepts of peace education provide a framework within which political education can be a positive agent of social change for global peace. In this manner, this view of political education forms the basis of the rationale for peace education in Australian schools.

To perform these tasks it is necessary to understand that peace education consists of two concepts: peace and education, that meld into one overriding concept. Peace is viewed as cultural, social, economic, political and human structure that rules out violence and dominance and is concerned with equality, autonomy, and the satisfaction of fundamental human needs (Galtung, 1976). (Formal) education is seen as a paradoxical institution that can, on the one hand, be a powerful instrument for the preservation of the social order (Friere, 1972a and 1972b) (status quo), and therefore structures of violence. On the other hand, education can contribute positively to the causes of peace and social justice, when linked with socio-political action for progressive change (Curle, 1976). Peace education then, is the outcome of the interrelationship between and the ramifications of these two concepts.

As may be gathered from the definition of peace above, peace education is at once a world view and an educational philosophy. It has wider concerns than those normally attributed to the concept of peace as lack of violence. Indeed peace education in the western world is often normatively confused with disarmament education, as most people in the west today consider the arms race to be the overriding problem of peace in the world. While this may be the most dramatic example in the world of the problems of peacelessness, the arms race in itself, is a symptom of a deeper source of peacelessness that has its expression in a plethora of global problems. Peace education then, is a broad philosophy that is based on an understanding of the interconnectedness of specific elements within the "conundrum" facing modern global society. These elements are the problems of peace and disarmament, development, environment and human rights. To fully understand peace education then, it is necessary to clarify the links between these problems, and identify the causative element within them leading to peacelessness in the world today. To do this it is necessary to consider the empirical, conceptual, and political links between these problems and how they relate to the overall concept and concerns of peace education.

The links between issues of peace, disarmament, development environment and human rights are most obvious at the empirical (diagnostic) level. This is defined here as the level where problems as symptoms of a deeper malaise become apparent. These become obvious through a perusal of statistic and facts as indices of real social problems.

The "problem" of development becomes an interesting case in point. Statistics on access to global wealth begins our diagnosis. It has been revealed that 34% of the world's population own 87.5% of the world's wealth, while the remaining 66% of the global population share the remaining 12.5% between them (Gardiner, 1976). While these statistics hide

the gross inequities of distribution of wealth within the rich and poor countries themselves, it underlines the shameless domination of the "developing" "Third World" countries by those of the "First" and "Second World".

Clearly these facts indicate a global problem of distribution of wealth, but how do they relate to the other issue raised earlier? Let us examine the relationships between disarmament and development. The global arms industry is an important case study that displays the patterns of exploitation characteristic of other global industries such as mining and timber production.

The production and sale of arms in the world is dominated by the major "developed" countries the USA, USSR, France and the U.K. The astronomical figure on global arms sales quoted earlier is the statistical expression of a major military/industrial complex with its own self-perpetuating rationale of insecurity.² While this raises many issues, the main point to consider here is the impact on the global development equation. The global burden on the taxpayer and the waste of human, economic and scientific resources is phenomenal (Dolman, 1981). While the "developed" countries have been able to mask this drain on resources through economic growth (and as producers of arms), the "developing" countries as consumers of arms have not. Their share of global arms expenditure rose from 5.2% in 1955 to 14% in 1973, (Gardiner, 1976) and this has increased since then. While the "developing" nations are caught up in their own rationale of insecurity and use their arms to maintain often authoritarian and unrepresentative governments in power, they are nonetheless caught in a net of exploitation. In countries on the economic border line, military expenditures represent a massive dissipation of economic resources that could be better spent on health, food or educational services. From a general perspective though it is absurd that in a world where 1 billion people are considered to be in abject poverty, that such vast human and economic resources can be wasted on arms that are mostly unused or used to suppress their own people. Thus there is a clear empirical link between structures supporting the global arms race and those supporting global poverty.

When one considers the statistics on global consumption patterns of energy, food, minerals and other renewable and non-renewable resources, it becomes apparent that there is a relationship between development and environment problems. Dolman uses the model of the average western consumer to make his point that the western world is characterised by overconsumption and waste. The agricultural resources necessary to support the model western consumer have doubled in the last 40 years and are five times those required by the average Indian or Colombian. He indirectly uses vast amounts of minerals in consumer goods, and wastes

² For a discussion of this see Gardiner (1976).

20% of the food he buys. He consumes prodigious amounts of energy to the extent that he indirectly utilises the muscular energy equivalent of 400 slaves in his everyday life. The industrial processes that produce his consumer goods pollute his rivers, air and soil so that he "consumes" one tonne of pollutants every year. These levels of pollution have dissipated the ozone layer protecting him from lethal ultraviolet radiation; and choked and killed his rivers. His consumption of fossil fuels for energy has raised carbon dioxide levels by 5% in the last 20 years, exacerbating the greenhouse effect (Dolman, 1981). It has also raised levels of sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere producing acid rain.

On the other side of the consumption equation, 1.5 billion people are suffering from malnutrition in the Third World. The poor of the "developing countries" have no electricity and use minimal energy. But despite their austere lifestyles, the poor of the Third World are still the agents of environmental degradation. Poverty has been described as the greatest polluter because the poor devastate unarable land while they are refused access to land capable of sustaining them — land which is often used to grow crops for the world market, not the domestic market. Under pressure for foreign exchange on the world market, poor third World countries have plundered their mineral and tropical rainforest resources. As a result 40% of the world's rainforests have been destroyed and 19% of the world's surface and 80 million people are under direct threat of desertification (Ellwood, 1983).

Clearly, there is a complex empirical link between the social, economic and political structures supporting consumption levels in the developed countries and those supporting poverty in the Third World. And, indeed, there is a distinct empirical relationship between global ecological problems and those related to overdevelopment and underdevelopment. The diagnostic links between environment and development problems serve as illustrations of wider interconnections within peace education. There are also empirical relationships between disarmament and environment problems, (Dolman, 1981), human rights and development issues and human rights and disarmament concerns. They are linked by the central empirical problem of global survival in the long term.

The problems of disarmament, environment, development and human rights are also linked at the conceptual level through the notion of social justice. This concept deepens perspectives on the links between the problems of human survival and has important ramifications for the concept(s) of peace and education.

In a world in which devastating cleavages exist between rich and poor at national and international levels, and where humanity and the global ecology is threatened by nuclear holocaust and rampant depletion and pollution; social justice is an important ameliorative concept. A new paradigm has emerged in which peace is defined not only as the absence of war, but also as the presence of justice, freedom and non-exploitative social structures and relationships (Haavelsrud, 1976). The concept of human

rights is central to social justice, and hinges on the determination of basic human needs. These can be encapsulated as the physical needs such as the right to survive and to have food, housing and protection from pollution; financial and intellectual needs such as a job and access to education; social, emotional and spiritual needs such as affection, membership in society and/or sub-culture, and a sense of dignity and worth free from fear; and political needs such as the right to communicate, receive and disseminate information and opinions. The concept of human rights centres on the notion of equal access to resources and decision making power (Pietila, 1978).³ Most of these concepts, though not all, are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the international covenants of human rights.

Social justice in this sense then is viewed within the concept of human development which is seen as more than an economic process, whereby the whole person (whether male or female) is the active subject of development (Rendall, 1976).

Social justice therefore has ramifications for people in the "developed" countries as well as those in the "underdeveloped" countries, because as has been shown the global problems of human survival negatively affect the satisfaction of human rights throughout the world. Thus there are clear conceptual links between problems of disarmament, development, environment and human rights, based around the concept of social justice. In fact it has been proposed by Stephen Marks (1983) that there are dialectical relationships among the underlying problems of disarmament, human rights and development according to which each of the three concepts can only be achieved if the other two are. "Without peace, development is impossible; without development, human rights are illusory; without human rights peace is violence."³ It can be assumed, given the conceptual and empirical interrelationships noted earlier, that the concept of environment could also be included within this dialectical process.

These conceptual links are given extra depth by the notions of peace and human rights as freedom from oppressive and exploitative social, cultural and economic structures mentioned earlier. The key term is structural violence. "Structural violence occurs when the wealth of affluent societies and nations is based on essential resources and labour drawn from those who, as a consequence, are required to live diminished lives in conditions of poverty and deprivation" (Gardiner 1976; Galtung, 1981). This leads to marginalisation of groups within societies and nations within the world (Burns, 1980). It applies within nations as well as between nations and is relevant to structures maintaining global ecological problems, (Galtung, 1981a, 1981b) as well as those maintaining peacelessness, mal-

³ See Marks (1983), who defines "a dialectic... as the process by which contradictions are resolved through being absorbed in a more comprehensive system representing a 'higher place of truth'."

development and lack of human rights. These concepts are linked because they are affected by the existing power relationships determining human relations and human development. These structures are central to global conflict and therefore have implications for peace; as peace is the indispensable condition for economic, social and human development.

These structures of violence were cogently elucidated by John Galtung (1981a) in his exposition of the inherent conflict involved in the national and international structures of imperialism. It underlines the political links between peace, development, environment and human rights issues. Galtung postulated the concept of centre — periphery relationships in global imperialism as the foremost source of direct and structural violence in the world. He constructed a conflict map in which revolutions, since the Russian revolutions, are seen as reactions by people, groups and nations on the periphery of imperialist structures to domination of these groups/nations at the centre of these structures. Galtung postulated that present day imperialism is bifurcated in the forms of capitalist imperialism (dominated by the O.E.C.D. countries) and social imperialism (dominated by most Eastern European satellites and the U.S.S.R.). Nonetheless, both forms of imperialism display similar characteristics in their military, economic, social and cultural dominance of the periphery countries, although there are some nuances between the two. This becomes the locus of the conflict in the North — South debate in the world (Galtung, 1981a, 1981b). An examination of the nature of imperialism, and its implications, then is important for an understanding of the political links between the problems of peace, development, and environment and human rights.

To do this it is necessary to consider the notion of cultural imperialism. The statistics mentioned earlier on the global distribution of wealth suggests that the concept of imperialism is the dominant cultural ethic of the twentieth century. This ethic is defined as the system: "the linking of an attitude of mind with a pattern of thrusting, ambitious and competitive behavior, and the crystallisation of this behavior in institutions, which in their turn affect our attitude . . . (of) competitive materialism" (Curle, 1976). This cultural psyche has its expression in economic and social structures of dominance and oppression at national and international levels and has implications for the problems outlined earlier.

Development problems are characterised by structures of exploitation and oppression — direct and indirect violence — where the international economic system, as the expression of cultural imperialism has produced rich minorities at the expense of poor majorities at national and international levels. Cultural imperialism has its expression in the installation of national and international elites who adhere to these values, threatening wars of redistribution (Dolman, 1981) in the future within rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor countries. Ecological problems of depletion and pollution can also be attributed to this dominant cultural ethic. These are the direct result of over industrialisation — the economic essence of social and capitalist imperialism. While these inequities

endure, cultural imperialism will continue to frustrate attempts to make human rights possible for all peoples in the world. This will continue while people are faced with the continuing fear of the arms race, whether conventional or nuclear. Thus problems of peace/disarmament, development, environment and human rights are linked at the political level by the common causative element of cultural imperialism. This clearly defines the political dimension within which the struggle to change the structures that determines these problems must be approached.

Thus it is also clear that the global issues outlined above are linked at empirical, conceptual and political levels. It is understood that these distinctions are not absolute and that indeed they may be interconnected. The empirical problem of human survival is caused by the political problem of cultural imperialism and can be ameliorated through the concept of social justice.

Thus it seems that the elements within the "conundrum" of human survival are symptoms of the structures of violence inherent in the practice of cultural imperialism. These structures are the locus of peacelessness, and it is suggested that these problems and teaching about them in disarmament education, environment education, human rights education and development education can be linked under the pan-conceptual term of peace education. In this way the disparate energies (Burns, 1980) involved in these educations and actions resulting from them could be linked through the central concept of peace.

One may well ask how these interconnections relate to peace education. To answer this it is necessary to understand the central concepts underlying the philosophies of all these "educations". These concepts pivot around the belief that education about and for these issues is not just a matter of content and the dissemination of relevant information/knowledge, but requires a process of dialogue, reflection and action. Most proponents of these areas of education stress, in one form or another, the educational concept of conscientisation (or awareness) espoused by Brazilian Paulo Freire (1972a Rendall, 1976; Marks, 1983, Pietila, 1978). Conscientisation affirms the person as an aware being whose ability to participate fully in society is limited by oppressive structures. The educational process is based on people becoming critically aware of these structures and how they affect them. It is a process in which the person is an active subject, capable of reflecting on experience with others and acting to implement insights gained as it affects them (Burns, 1980). Conscientisation is inherently linked to social change through the concept of global transformation. It is predicated upon the belief that global society is not a fixed structure but can be changed: people shape society and through their creative participation they can realise what kind of influence or power they have to change unpeaceful structures (Burns and Aspelagh, 1983).

Thus the separate "educations" are linked by their attitudes to equal access to power, to the process of social change and emphasis on participation. Thus it becomes even more pertinent to link these

"educations" under the mantle of peace education.

To facilitate conscientisation and social transformation through education, it is necessary to consider the content, form and structures of education for peace. The content of peace education should centre around the interrelationship of micro and macro situations of individuals. In this manner learners will be encouraged to understand their place in their own world including the school and the local social environment, and to connect their role to the wider world. They should be helped to discover what action can be taken to stop violence at their own level so that the relationship between violence at that level and peacelessness at higher levels can be upset (Borelli, 1983).

Thus the global problems outlined earlier should be related to this view of violence so that learners can relate this to their personal situations. The overall content should be dictated by the need to encourage a notion of global interdependence and a commitment to a larger world community through the concepts of social and human ecology. It should be understood that through these, global problems can become global aspirations.

Content on its own however is insufficient if it is not related to the form of peace education. In this, the paradox of education noted earlier should be considered. Formal education is seen as a dependent institution that transmits a particular type of knowledge, behavior patterns and beliefs — a process known as the violence of knowledge (Burns, 1980). Given this, if peace education is to be successful in raising awareness rather than socialising people into acceptance of cultural/social structures, then the hierarchical and benevolently authoritarian structure of schools, as a microcosm of wider society, should be questioned. As a result the structure of the school should be used as a resource in the classroom, so that they can be reflected upon. Peace education should also involve learners in planning, determining content and evaluation and using dialogue as a learning technique for teachers and students (Burns 1980). In this way conscientisation may become a more useful educational philosophy and practice within formal educational structures as well as informal ones.

When formal education is seen as an agent of mass socialisation, transmitting the social paradigm of the dominant culture; learning structures must change to create a learning situation that provides the basis of a new socio-political order. Ideally schools would need to be congruent with the peace educators' view of the future world: based on horizontal rather than vertical structures. These structures also include curriculum, and would include a review of curriculum with reference to the myth of a value free, neutral education process.⁴ Political education becomes a case in point, highlighting both aspects of the paradox of education.

In a sense, peace education is synonymous with political education,

⁴ For an analysis of the direct empirical links between education and the maintenance of cultural imperialism and the world order see Curle (1976), Freire (1972a, 1972b) and Galtung (1976).

because as Mario Borrelli has elucidated "peace education is not only an educational fact but a political experience" (Borrelli, 1983). For this paper though, political education is viewed in the more narrow sense of political and social education as a specific part of the general curriculum in schools. To fully understand the role of political education within schools and society, it is necessary to consider the distinction between political education and political socialisation. Political socialisation refers to the "process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practised by the ongoing system" (Stohl and Stohl, 1980). There are various agents of political socialisation, including the family, socio-economic structures, media, television and the school; to name a few. Political socialisation then is a sub-set of the wider process of socialisation. The important point though is that political socialisation supports the status quo and "therein lies its significance for the political system's survival and stability" (Entwistle, 1972).

Political education is not as easily defined in a normative sense. Sigel defines it as a "learning experience . . . designed to foster competence, to think critically and independently, *which could lead to the rejection of established political beliefs and practices*" (Stohl and Stohl, 1980) (emphasis added). Political education here then is characterised as a potentially progressive exercise that can lead to rejection of the status quo. The difference here is that the individual is essentially the object of political socialisation and the subject in political education. Alex Porter, in his typologies of political education programmes, has illustrated that political education falls into four basic categories, each with distinct political implications. He also demonstrated that three of these models — the conservative, the liberal and the reformist — were not primarily concerned with challenging the status quo. Only the radical model was concerned with rejection of established political and social beliefs (Porter and Stradling, 1983).

In fact, after close examination of his models it becomes obvious that most political education in Australian schools falls within the ambit of his conservative, liberal and reformist models. Thus one must either reject Sigel's definition of political education as normatively incorrect or assume that political education in Australia is really an elaborate, institutionalised form of political socialisation. Within this view, "progressive" political education is confined to the reformist model, which as was stated earlier, supports the status quo. This would seem to substantiate Paulo Freire's contention that education is a powerful instrument in the preservation of the social and economic order.

What then, are the implications of this for peace education in Australia? It is obvious that Australian politicians and educational administrators have never confronted the need for true political education to prepare young people for the contradictions of future society. Global structures must change within the next generation if we are to ensure global survival. The next generation has a basic human right to be made aware of

and to adapt positively to the emerging reality of a new global society. It is obvious then that proposals for this political education must come from other sources. To facilitate this, orthodox political education needs to be seen as a socialisation into existing structures that have caused the general problems of peacelessness in the world.

We need go no further than Freire's concept of conscientisation and the resultant work done by peace researchers, to find a framework for this political education. We are also fortunate that Alex Porter has given us an excellent outline of the form that the radical model of political education could take (Porter, 1983).

Within the guidelines of the content, form and structures of peace education outlined earlier, the overall aim of this political education should be to develop the critical consciousness of the learners and teachers. It should be based around the concept of "social environments" and involve the teacher in leading students to a reflective examination of themselves *per se*, and in relation to the important institutions in their lives. It should begin with the individual "I" as a social and political being in the centre of a series of concentric circles working progressively outwards through the layers of social structures. It should move from "I" to the family environment, to the neighbourhood, school and local community, to regions, states, nations, regions of nations and the world community or environment.⁵

Here then we have a concept of political and social education based on an understanding of the individual in relation to the social structures that have helped to shape her identity. Global society, however, is more complex than this simple model suggests and there are a number of institutions, structures, processes and social constructs that must also be examined within the context of how they relate to the individual and her life. Attention must also be given to culture(s): how it (they) are constructed and how political and social action takes place within a culture; and how norms, values and action interact within each person as a result of social processes. Political education should also explore the economic, political and organisational institutions that form from the dominant culture and the means by which they permeate and reflect these social structures at the national and international levels. It should also examine the political, economic and social constructs that both support and help determine various social environments throughout the world and within Australia. Political education in the classroom is not merely about the mechanics of social structures and institutions, but about those in relation to themselves as individuals. It is only then that they can reflect on their personal situations and participate and act on their perceptions in an effort to change their socio-political reality in relation to their new insights.

These programmes should be based on unravelling the interconnections of the elements of peace education outlined earlier from a problematic approach. The central concept should be cultural imperialism.

⁵ For a view of this model of social and political education see Hanna (1982).

They should include an account of present political arrangements in Australia and how these fit into the global context. They should emphasise the manner in which present global cultural imperialist structures maintain political and economic elites in power through the oppression of various groups, nations and races. They should also lead learners to think about and act an alternative social arrangements, values and principles to those which currently prevail.

Political education should emphasise the practice of politics as well as its theory. The learners will be encouraged to participate in society by developing horizontal links with the local community, particularly in the exercise of political action. The emphasis should be on what Entwistle terms "associational democracy" — where people become involved in local organisations and exercise political and social skills — rather than learning passively about uninteresting macro processes of government (Entwistle, 1972). Therefore, learners wherever possible should be the catalysts of such involvement. These skills will then be relevant to the processes of organic social change. In this manner they will become part of the growing network of networks, participating at horizontal levels to effect social transformation based on a new humanistic paradigm.⁶

Thus, political education has provided the framework within which the essential elements of peace education can be developed, and thus provides its rationale. It is time for political education not only for "responsible citizenship" as the civic education in the U.K., U.S.A., and Australia has tried to promote in the past, but for a "new citizenship". This should have an emphasis on survival in the new millenium and a sensitive understanding of the values of humanity, the unity of humankind and our delicate bond with nature. Maybe then the other side of the paradox of formal education may become apparent, and it will contribute to, rather than diminish, the great causes of peace and justice.

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⁶ For an exposition of the emerging networks and the new social and political paradigm see Ferguson (1982).

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THE TRAINING OF A PEACEMAKER

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ABSTRACT

I propose to extract, via the case history method, from an instance of successful conflict resolution (Welker-Rea, 1977), some personal qualities which may characterize the successful peacemaker; to portray the ordinariness of conflict-producing characteristics among community members; and to tentatively set forth some principles that may be applicable to reduce conflict in other situation.

In this paper I propose that the presence of an individual, within the peace process, with certain definable and trainable qualities, may be essential to the reduction of conflict within that process. If this proposition is valid, what then are the qualities, or internalized personal characteristics, which are essential to this peacemaker?

An effort will be made to isolate and list some of the possible qualities, for the readers' consideration. No effort will be made to present a curriculum for the training of a peacemaker (Welker-Rea, 1977). However, the basis for a curriculum might theoretically suggest itself.

The paper aims to establish that peacemakers can be trained in qualities which can be identified as effective in reducing conflict. A case history of a community in conflict is offered, so that some of these qualities may be identified.

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To my father, who wrote truth in his newspaper; who reluctantly fought in two World Wars; who took me into his presence and his confidence as a military governor; who loved me; and who taught me, to "be there".

To my beloved children, Constance, Margaret and Anne; who have not yet embarked upon the hard work of peace.

To Chad Willetts, composer of *Sketches in A Minor for World Peace*, who asked me to write this paper; who encouraged, persuaded, contributed and critiqued its contents; and who cared about my health so that I could write it.

Peace is conceived as *shalom*, for which there is no English equivalent, a term used by the ancient Hebrew writers, including Isaiah, lifted from its religious context. *Shalom* is that abundance of living which we all recognize and value if we have it!

The following assumptions are made explicit:

(a) Universally and ultimately, peace comes through justice (Kohlberg, 1981).

(b) The extraordinary feature which distinguishes human beings from all other species, is our ability to transmit learned behaviors across time, distance and generations. Because we are symbol-manipulators beyond peer, we are able to offer other cultures whatever learnings we choose; and we are able to receive from other cultures whatever we select. Thus, we can transmit culturally that which is in our common best interests, as well as the ability to learn better without end.

(c) There is an imperative to critically distinguish between that which is constructive, and that which is destructive to human beings.

This can be best illustrated considering thermonuclear weaponry. Whatever personal value one holds concerning the nuclear circumstances, that valuing should be a function of the individual's own internalization of his or her freely chosen external referent. For, as we shall see, a critical distinction must be made, or one is made by default. To fail to reach a conclusion about that which is destructive and that which is constructive to human beings (which includes our own persons), is to have already decided by default. We must make our own moral decisions, as opposed to making moralistic decisions which are those we might seek to impose upon others. This task is an individual one; ours alone; no one can effectively do it for us. Such decision-making capacity is also the source of enormous personal power.

(d) Lastly, not all conflict is regarded as destructive. Conflict and disagreement are an inherent part of the democratic process. This latter is a type of constructive conflict which does not attack persons or their property.

Having shared these four assumptions, there are a few defenses which I appreciate making in advance:

1. In the case history which follows, where I was both the observer and a participant, which might be objectionable on empirical grounds, I beg the reader to consider the physician. The medical profession probably functions more by the case history than any other single method the world over, and does so without objection of a serious nature. In fact if the physician does not serve as both observer and participant, we may regard it as a violation of responsibility. Similarly, the profession of journalism often involves the journalist deeply in the event, and we do not object. We want to know what actually did take place.

It is hoped that the reader does not fault the case history of a peace process on grounds that it involved author's wholehearted participation.

2. It may be wondered why effort is made to urge a new profession, that of

the peacemaker, when a host of arbitrators, diplomats, negotiators, and other special emissaries seem to perform quite well for peacemaking purposes?

As valuable as these professions are for their own specific purposes, it is not believed that these professions are primarily involved in a *peace* process, although it may be termed that.

The holding of any institutional affiliation may be inimicable to participation in a peace process. Wherever there lies a vested interest, the peacemaker is no longer a peacemaker; but a servant of that vested interest. As well, institutionalizing roles tends to politicize the roles, with results which can be more polemic than pacific, regardless of the euphemistic language employed. Peace is a *social* activity. The emphasis upon its process must be social, due to the flow of sensitivities, the volatile emotions involved, the very realness of the process; which is not amenable to political or other interference without abreaction. Making *shalom* is the most intensely social activity there can be!

The many existing professions which do work to provide even a nominal, or a temporary peace, deserve our full respect even though the results might be realistically secondary to vested interests. For, one does not criticize the cobbler because he can only repair shoes, and he does not know how to repair feet!

When we think of the long, arduous, tedious, sensitive, dangerous peace process, we usually think of one of a few, a very few, gifted and committed individuals in whom, somehow or another, all parties to the dispute hold trust. Such persons are rare. We need more.

3. Whether the following case history or other material, can safely be generalized beyond its specifics of location, time and other factors, is a matter safely left to the enlightened reader. There is no desire to incur Type II error! Rather than claim to impose a scholarly truth, this offering is made in the spirit of sharing that which this scholar has accepted as truth.

Yet, for whatever we say, people are people the world over. Gordon Allport (1954) refers to "the tyranny of petty differences" as instrumental in the prejudicial processes. In truth, it would seem that that which we share, is far greater than our differences. We are all human beings who want to become more fully human.

THE CASE HISTORY: A COMMUNITY IN CONFLICT

The community presented exists in the eastern region of the United States and will not be identified further.

The community is a town of about 600 residents, which is an entity much the same today. The activities described took place between 1959 and 1963, so that past tenses are employed.

A century or so earlier, the town had been built by a mining company, which owned the land, the houses, the streets and a store which

controlled necessities to be sold at inflated prices; and which also employed the male residents of the town.

In more recent years, the company had abandoned the town and the mines, and there was no further employment for the men in town. A populace remained without jobs, sewer lines, running water, parks, schools, churches, paved roads or sidewalks; without the simplest amenities usually associated with civil town living.

Remaining within this bleak social environment was a populace which included all ages, as in any small town. However, in this town, racially mixed marriages predominated and there were differing ethnic heritages residing in close proximity. The mixed marriages dated from World War II, when black war veterans brought home brides from other lands, often women of superior cultural or educational achievement.

Some residents chose to leave the town, although it was not possible to ascertain the specific number due to the general disorganization. An obvious majority of the residents did remain, and a significant reason was that they owned, residually, their houses.

An even more compelling reason to remain in the town seemed to be that, in this community, institutionalized prejudice was absent; perhaps because, not surprisingly, so were institutions beyond the family.

With strong friendships in the community, there was much interpersonal conflict; the conflict, however, was based upon real and individual factors; not discriminatory ones.

One might readily conclude, after reviewing Dr. Gordon Allport's classic work, *The Nature of Prejudice*, (1954), that all varieties of prejudice simply add up to "one size which fits all", and be correct!

In the former company town, to live in one's own house, to intimately know one's neighbors (and everyone was a neighbor, for everyone knew everyone else), meant that at the very least, one was freed of the need to deal with the additional tensions of dealing with a continuum of stereotypical prejudices which were encountered outside of the town.

I lived in the surrounding suburban area during this period. There was little true community surrounding me and my thousands of anonymous neighbors. My children were caught up in the common school bus and schoolroom conflicts, and I was involved in efforts to create a true community in the new area, outside of the town. At the same time, I was being asked by my children, "Do I hit back when I get hit?"

A casual but a unique friendship intervened. A friend from the town, who differed from me in skin colour, temperament, education, culture, and socioeconomic class, spoke with me about her own concern at the effect of the conflict upon her children. Although we seemed to have little in common, we shared a common religious bond and we very much shared an adamant determination that our children would not be enculturated in the ways of violence.

My friend called a meeting of her own, to be held within her home. She did not know what a town meeting was, and had never attended a

meeting such as she proposed to convene. Determined that "something will be done" in her town, she invited me to the first meeting. I accepted the invitation purely as an obligation of friendship, not perceiving how my attendance would serve the interests of my family or my suburban community. I could not realize that the next three years of Sunday afternoons and evenings, would be spent meeting within my friend's home.

At the first meeting, the entire populace of the town turned out, driven by a mixture of frustration, curiosity and social pressures. Hundred of residents crowded my friend's porch, steps, and a phone pole; the inner hall and stairs, the living and dining rooms, the kitchen and a back porch.

The mood of the townspeople was intense. They were angry, impatient, determined, active, silent, and boiling with frustrations. They did not want to converse with anyone, even one another. Some were muttering to themselves. Their presence and their silence bespoke considerable motivation. If one had made a demand of the crowd at that moment, the response would probably have been of physical turmoil.

The first meeting lasted seven hours. An observer might report only that the purpose of the meeting was a full and open ventilation of feelings, beliefs, attitudes, complaints and fears; and such was indeed so. But something greater took place, as a consensus of one-minded residents agreed that "something will be done" about the intolerable conditions of their existences. And, by adjournment, the general grimness was gone. Tensions relaxed and there was social conversation and even some laughter. Anxieties did remain, but these were seen now as temporary, to continue only until the next Sunday's meeting.

During the first meeting, several speakers were destructive with words, attitudes, plans, expectations and general language. They invoked a small universe of blame for existing conditions. The group seemed to indulge these speakers for a time, and seemed to feel uncomfortable about controlling them; but there came a point when the group shouted or ridiculed such persons into silence.

Wondering what a guest at such a proceeding should do, I spoke only to offer individual pamphlets concerning simple parliamentary procedures, and my offer was eagerly accepted. I realized I would have to provide the materials quickly, or I would lose the group's regard. I did not wish to lose their regard, although I could not say why.

The second meeting, with members equipped with parliamentary skills, terminated in only three hours and was spent in demonstrating the new skills. The exercise of these skills was an end in and of itself, for it served both as technique for social control of destructive persons, but also as a buffer against more anxiety-producing discussion of their deficits, at least for this week's meeting. It also represented a discovery, not forgotten, that each means was a small goal of itself; and in point of fact, over the next three years, goals were never discussed, only the means to be employed. The process of peace was rapidly progressing.

The third meeting represented a community triumph, for by con-

sensus, the organization was formally named The Town Civic Progressive Association. Everyone in town was a member. Everyone knew the rules, for they had participated in designating these. They were organized, they were organized democratically, and they lived, as a consequence, in a true community, whatever wretchedness it still held. They celebrated.

Over the next three years, the Civic Association as an entity obtained the paving of the streets, the installation of sewer lines and bathrooms, the connections with bathrooms already in place but not useful, the purchase of park land, the building of a community center, and the resolution of every material grievance aired three years earlier at the first session.

From the time of demonstrating mastery of parliamentary skills, the meetings proceeded as if the grievance to be resolved had already been resolved; a fine example of confidence!

The town's troublemakers were silenced at meetings by the parliamentary methods transmitted to members and by other strong social controls. Membership in the Civic Association became synonymous with membership in the town, both sources of pride; a sub-culture developed of affirmative, high morale, positive speech and deeds, which became contagious. In reality, there may have been as few as only one additional peacemaker present, but by experimenting with peacemaking qualities by many members, the destructive elements did not prevail, either in the meetings or in the town. This town, once ready to riot, had chosen; and it had chosen well.

Nor were the results of their organized activities only those involving expenditures of funds. Scouting troops which served both girls and boys were established; the first resident was sent off to college; and a legal charter was sought by the Civic Association.

Morale soared with a competitive paint, clean, rake, sweep, and pick-up campaign which made the town visually attractive for the first time. No house went unpainted in this campaign.

After a common group dynamic, my friend was replaced as the Civic Association's leader, according to group process literature, by a leader better able to meet the group's newly formal needs. My friend quietly resumed her position as the town's *de facto* leader.

How could I define my role, I wondered? In retrospect, I felt my role had been primarily to remain role-free; to be in the town but not be of it; to be personal, warm, and accepting; and to discharge, on a continuing basis, such service functions as my own creative response to the memberships needs (both expressed and unexpressed) required. It was clear that I was perceived as a symbol of acceptance from the greater surrounding community, whose rejection stung deeply. I also served as a brake upon discrimination of my own residential area, for it was not possible to speak destructively about an area of such prosperity as my own in my presence. I did conclude that my presence prevented a total stereotyping of my own neighbours.

When it was necessary for me to cancel attendance at a meeting, I

was advised that my failure to attend would not be acceptable. So, I arrived as usual, but with my three small children; only to discover that henceforth, I was expected to bring my children with me to each meeting! No more visual proof of my acceptance of the townspeople could be perceived, than seeing that I had brought my own children, and that my children were happily playing with the children of the town.

As the years passed, my role continued to fluctuate but not change in essential nature. The one term which I could not apply was "facilitator", for I was facilitating no one; I was too busy. In succession, I served as parliamentary advisor, then parliamentarian, then *amicus curiae* with no court, then as resource person; as a kind of general democratic advisor, as advocate for the town in the greater community, as a bridge between town and the institutions beyond, as a trainer of new skills, and as a tactician on demand — but never as a strategist. As I taught how to deal with the three levels of government they needed, I was referred to as The "How-To" Lady. The skills of working with government was essential for the members to grasp, and were very difficult for them to master, for they were predisposed to view government (and other institutions of size) as a personal source of red tape, delay, depersonalization, error and confusion; and the lack of continuity, they felt, was either their personal failure or the result of some personal persecution.

The three years or so I invested in this peace process were not without its effect upon my family. Although I was determined at the outset I would only be a catalyst if needed, there is no social change without equal and opposite changing; I changed. The result was more change for those closest to me.

Conflict did continue in the community, but it was not violent conflict and it was constructively managed chiefly by social control and parliamentary applications.

Why was I treated as if I were indispensable to this town? In retrospect again, I wonder if the common religious bond we did share was a major factor, although religion was never discussed, practiced nor even intimated. Even if implicit, the religious bond meant that we shared a similar value system. Had this not been so, I am sure I would have been regarded quickly as alien; as an intervenor, as a nuisance, or as any guest whose welcome is outworn; and I would have been subtly or openly removed. I began to wonder what principles might be extracted from these years in a peace process?

Eventually, the Civic Association was so effective in getting the town's deficits corrected, that it became somewhat enviable to the surrounding community for its social cohesion and good neighborliness. The suburban residents had not meaningfully organized, for they had no material purpose and their values did not lie in social areas. To my great surprise, for I had not known government was aware of my involvement in the town, I was alerted by a State policeman that youth gangs from the suburban community threatened to invade the town, seeking a fight with town youth,

who had no organized gangs. When I shared this intelligence with the elected leader at the next Civic Association meeting, the chairman announced this news item routinely and then inquired how membership would handle such a conflict.

By consensus, the answer came substantively,

"Oh, that's an easy question. We'll keep our kids indoors. There can't be a fight, if nobody's outside to fight, can there?"

The vast amount of work actually accomplished over the three year period was always of a social, and never a political, nature. In group process terms, when the end of the beginning had arrived, I was honored with a certificate of recognition, upon which was hand-lettered:

PEACEMAKER

But, I still did not know what a peacemaker did. Perhaps a PM is merely someone who has cultivated certain qualities which are needed in the peace process? If this is so, are there some principles which can be extracted? If so, are these truly universals? Many years later, I cannot be sure; but I believe the answer is, yes.

QUALITIES WHICH MAY CHARACTERIZE A PEACEMAKER

1. The PM is a deeply moral, as opposed to moralistic, individual. The PM has probably reached a level of moral development termed by Dr Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) as "the level of reconciliation", meaning feeling a oneness with all of humanity. There may be a strong religious foundation, but this is not open to public view nor is it imposed upon others. Concern lies less with the corruption of others, as in the avoidance of self-corruption.
2. The PM habitually identifies with others, and therefore, does not exploit others to work off the darker side of character by blaming, scapegoating, or other forms of psychological projection.
3. The PM is devoid of personal power needs, and rejects these as offered. The PM is also free of the demands made by an authoritarian character.
4. The PM feels (and never feigns) either genuine compassion or, at the least, respect; to all parties to a dispute. The PM does not deal in pity. The PM is continually striving to love the unloveable, perhaps the most difficult of the PM's tasks. If feeling is not genuine, respect must be given which is not pretense; and the respect must be felt. There is no choice.
5. The PM not only identifies with others, but avoids prejudicial thinking, stereotyping, or generalizing whether of individuals or groups by constantly progressing into "seeing through the other's eyes", or "standing in the other's shoes"; in short, the PM *becomes* the other person, at least for a time.
6. The PM's abdication of self and ability to be all things to all persons, is accomplished without loss of integrity because of the strength of the moral development within the PM.
7. The PM never betrays a confidence. Many strong, hostile feelings are

being managed by participants, and to discuss the peace process with any individual, group, or the media is to be of no further value to the peace process. Betraying such confidence is perceived as a betrayal of trust.

8. The PM has no personal point of view. Such belong to the PM's private life.

9. The PM avoids emotional gestures and body language which are subject to misinterpretation as judgmental, and dresses in a culturally-freed manner without ostentatious display of jewelry or clothing, mindful of other's sensitivities.

10. The PM should prepare him or herself educationally and in other chosen ways for a peace process peaking, denouement, or climax when the PM may become the target of everyone's hostilities; from which point, if the PM can hold steady, the process resolves itself into a satisfactory conclusion. The more successful one is in contributing towards a peace process, the more intense this dynamic may become.²

If it is axiomatic, and understated, that we human beings "love our haters, but hate our lovers", then the PM who holds steady, operates with a generosity of spirit, keeps a keen personal sense of humour, is quiet and self-effacing, has probably adopted the most self-protective qualities at this challenging staff in the peace process.

Whether these qualities are universals or not, the successful PM may well be one who enters as a guest although the situation is fraught with personal peril, conducts him or her self as if walking on egg shells, makes no judgments, holds steady, speaks from no personal viewpoint, receives no paycheck, is terrified more often than not; but who is also one who falls to sleep blissfully at night, and is rewarded with a heart which sings!

Yet this is not all there is to the human condition. Let us next glimpse the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, 1945 and 1946, which this author was privileged to attend as an American college student in residence in Germany at the time, in order to examine for our deeper understanding the darker side of the human condition for its effect upon a peace process.

THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL: THEN AND NOW

Forty years ago, an effort was made to find and hold accountable individuals for crimes as gigantic as those ever inflicted upon other human beings.

In a courtroom at Nuremberg, now the Federal Republic of Germany, this young observer viewed the most unimpressive participants. They looked completely ordinary; as they fidgeted, showed a variety of nervous tics and tremors, shuffled their feet at their seats, smiled inappropriately and ingratiatingly, grimaced, made absurd excuses, whined

² A case in point is Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat, missing since World War II, *The New York Times Magazine*, March 30, 1980.

and underwent astonishing lapses of memory. The order-givers reported that they "were only following orders".

With the exception of the gifted Albert Speer (1976), who spent twenty years of subsequent imprisonment trying to understand his own motivation, their amoral stances were such that the murder of 6 million human beings seemed an ordinary, banal, trivial, humdrum affair. How to make sense of such senselessness?

The observer could not listen without a desire to exculpate oneself from any category shared by these defendants; either they were psychotic, or the observer felt that oneself must be so.

An exceptional psychologist, Dr G.M. Gilbert, gave the Nazi defendants a complete battery of psychological testing, and published his findings (Gilbert, 1947). Dr Gilbert's firm conclusion: None of the Nazi defendants was psychotic.

In more recent years, Dr Molly Harrower confirmed Dr Gilbert's findings that the Nazi defendants were not psychotic. In an experimental procedure wherein eight Nazi records and eight controls were assessed blind by 10 Rorschach experts, Nazi records (not identified as such) showed a similarity to a cross section of records identified as *inadequate personalities*.

In an experimental procedure wherein eight Nazi records and eight controls were assessed blind by 10 Rorschach experts, ... Nazi records ... not identified as such (showed a) selection related to the cross-section of adjustment of *inadequacy*.... (Harrower, 1976).

As global standards for psychoses do exist, both within the country of this writing (The American Psychiatric Association, 1968) as well as internationally (The World Health Organization, 1979), what sense are we to make of this finding? The Nazi defendants, destroyers of 6 million human lives and impetus for the deaths of approximately 54 million other human beings, were not psychotic. They felt inadequate; so they destroyed.

Not only did Dr. Harrower confirm Dr. Gilbert's original findings, but added her conviction that such men as the Nazi defendants "could be found in any... community" (Harrower, 1976).

Equipped with a full understanding of the ordinariness of the human condition, are there some universal principles which can reduce conflict?

PRINCIPLES WHICH MAY REDUCE CONFLICT

1. Peace is within the capacity of human beings to achieve, but all persons are basically either creative or destructive; the choice is our own.
2. Political peace is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to achieve a peace which is *shalom*, but justice probably is.
3. The old methods and the present methods have not achieved peace. Ways which do not work need to be discarded and replaced by ways which do work. Those ways are the selection of *means* to be used.
4. Peace is a social condition. If peace comes, it is a final means in a

long and complex process within the individual and nearly every other individual involved in process. Peace, therefore, is not a goal; it is a process without end.

5. There is a need to recognize a new profession: The peacemaker.

6. The error which may flaw the peace process at the inception, is the chronic underestimation (and occasional overestimation) of the destructive potential of the human condition. To underestimate the enemy, which includes the peacemaker's darker side, is to court cynicism, despair, failure and even armed conflict.

7. The peacemaker's moral dimension, unspoken and never imposed upon others, is critical to the peacemaking process.

8. The peacemaking process quickly takes on a life of its own. To predicate some outcome upon the effort, or to endeavor to control the results, is to destroy the peace process. No one controls a genuine peace process any more than one person controls a genuine war.

9. Political skills, including as they do control and/or coercion, are anathema to the peacemaking process. Political skills cannot obtain peace, if the peace is a true peace.

10. The peacemaking community, if disorganized, is in no position to sell skills and experience if the peacemaking community itself does not know what skills to value and what experiences exist for new learnings.

11. Peacemakers can be trained. Peacemaking can be transmitted like any set of skills. Peacemakers themselves are probably best described by the qualities they possess which further the peace process.

12. Destructive qualities are an ordinary part of ordinary life, and describe many ordinary persons. If this were properly acknowledged, tactics could be devised for such control.

Whether the thoughts, dreams, visions, dynamics, realities, fears, frustrations, confoundments and facts as presented, have a wider applicability beyond their boundaries, is a matter again safely left to the reader's critical judgment. In having been so fortunate as to have two unique experiences in my life, I have endeavored to share with the interested reader, the sense which I had to make of them.

Before we are tempted to either deplore our basic human condition, or to celebrate it all too humanly, it is possible for us to accept ourselves exactly as we are. We are then in position to, if we choose, elect the most difficult, the most unremunerative, the most strenuous, but possibly the most rewarding work there is. For no more gratifying work ever existed than the hard work of making peace, a task in which we become our finest, our most fulfilled, the very best that humans can aspire to become.

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ADDITIONAL PRESENTERS UNDER TOPIC VII

A MODEL FOR PEACE RESEARCH: THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE MOVEMENT PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

In 1984 the World Peace Academy commissioned one of the authors to survey the San Francisco Peace Movement. The entire project serves as a means to determine the existing resources and requirements of individuals and organizations in a circumscribed geographical area. This paper presents not only the methodology of the project, but also its usefulness as a substantive model for international peace research. Two potential applications will be described.

NON-VIOLENCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF DOMINATION

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ABSTRACT

The paper begins with the proposition that peace research can be readily incorporated into the on-going critique of domination developed by the 'critical theory' tradition of neo-Marxist sociological theory.

One of the paucities in critical theory is its general neglect or even occasional rejection of nonviolence. The causes of this paucity are located in general unreflective

totalising Marxist advocacy of violent praxis as purgative or necessary for the creation of a nonviolent socialist society. The causes of violence are at least partially located in a psycho-social dualism between 'self' and 'other' which actively contributes to creating and reproducing the roots and manifestations of domination. It will be argued that nonviolence directly addresses this dualism, striving to replace it with a creative conflict waging duality which erodes the dualism of uncreative violent conflict waging.

THE GANDHIAN TECHNIQUE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: SATYAGRAHA

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the Gandhian method of conflict resolution may be the only hope of mankind when nations are threatened with external aggression born of mutual distrust and suspicion.

TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CASE OF A SOUTH INDIAN VILLAGE

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ABSTRACT

Conflict resolution as the socially accepted mode of regulating the expression of innate aggression denotes prevention of the conflict that is to say one party imposing injury both verbal and physical upon the other and secondly restoration of sense of amicability by means of appeal to social image of village. At non-institutional level, this operates in the form one party adjusting with the other (internal) and secondly in the form of interference of the third party (external). The traditional society of Palaiyurpatti village has built up a value system and culture in which conflicts are limited from within. The classical example would be the ability of wives to adjust with their husbands. The internal factors limit conflicts. This paper attempts to identify the traditional

methods of conflict resolution and their dynamics and pleads for their revitalisation.

PEACE RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM DIVERGENCE TO CONVERGENCE

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ABSTRACT

The paper examines the relationship between the fields of international relations and peace research. It overviews the evolution of peace research as a distinct area of academic inquiry, seeing the work of Johan Galtung as largely responsible for its current form and content. The established distinction between "positive" and "negative" peace provides guidelines for the development of peace research. The focus on "negative" peace needs to confront central questions raised by international relations theory concerning the causes, prevention, or resolution of international conflict, but remains a distinctive enterprise. The focus on "positive" peace, however, need to be recognised for what it could become — a critical theory of international relations.

EDUCATION AND INTERMARRIAGE AS FOCAL POINTS IN MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN INTEGRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

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This paper reports on the results of 15 years of research in Muslim-Christian relations in the Philippines. Relations have been characterized by prejudice, tensions, and conflicts for centuries, sometimes punctuated by violence. Despite generations of integration efforts on the part of the Government, the invisible wall that separates the two groups still continues. However, intermarriages among Muslims and Christians are on the rise and have occurred in large numbers. A sizeable number of these involve a Muslim woman married to a Christian (considered taboo in Islamic

Culture). Those who have dared to cross the ethnic bridge in these marriages, however, are largely well educated, well-placed occupationally, and economically upwardly mobile.

ARE WARS A FORM OF DISEASE?

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ABSTRACT

Research on human behavior and magnetic fields indicates that the species disorder of warring behavior may be triggered by solar activity at approximately 11 year intervals. Increased solar flare activity produces magnetic disturbances of Earth's geomagnetic field which in turn agitates humans. In view of the evidence political solutions are not complete. This paper proposes remedial actions at other levels as first steps towards eliminating the disease of war.

EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Western models of Peace Education imposed upon India are bound to be counter-productive. Cultural ethics are fundamentally different. The focus now should be on under-development and social injustice rather than nuclear issues. A historical review is presented. Indian conceptualizations of peace are reviewed and several models of peace education are critiqued. An educational model to remove poverty, reduce inequality, restore ecological balance, and inspire to better social being while trying to attain self-actualization is proposed.

PEACE STUDIES AS PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

The way knowledge and values are usually transmitted within educational institutions could mean peace studies, incorporated into the curricula — while containing much information *about* peace — could be structured, delivered, received and assessed in a form antipathetic to peace. Alternatively, peace studies as a peaceful educational process could enable people to deal critically with reality and understand their capacity to create change.

ONE PATHWAY TO PEACE: EDUCATION FOR INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

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ABSTRACT

This paper will explore specific methodologies used by educationists when preparing people for cross-cultural encounters. It will focus particularly on adult learning and incorporate a case study of one approach used by the author in a university setting. The presentation will be elaboratively brief, thus allowing time for sharing and discussion on this important topic.

TOPIC VIII: SUPER POWER RIVALRY IN THE PACIFIC BASIN

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THE GROWING RIVALRY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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ABSTRACT

This paper will focus on the following: (1) For what purposes are the United States and the Soviet Union hastening their strategic concerns about the Pacific? (2) What impact will such a rivalry between the two super-powers have on the future of the Pacific? Analytical emphasis will be placed on the strategic positions and economic interests held by these two powers in the Pacific.

Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States have emerged as the most powerful nations on earth. They have been in a position to play major roles on a world stage, thereby being called the superpowers. Their involvements in world affairs have been so profound and far-reaching. But the two superpowers have shown a great deal of competition and even antagonism in dealing with various world affairs. For example, the shrewd rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States was well reflected in the postwar era. Under the bipolar international system, the World War virtually divided into two main camps; the East and the West. Each of them was actually led by either Moscow or Washington. They were also, directly or indirectly opposed to each other in diplomatic and security terms.

Immediately after the Second World War ended, US main concern for the emergence of the Soviet Union and its allies was materialized into setting forth a policy against Communist expansion throughout the world. Its concrete policy orientation was characterized by containment against the Communist expansion backed up by the Soviet Union in Asia or the

other areas. But these efforts were not altogether successful. A number of countries, including China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Eastern Europe and Cuba, became Communist States, and its allies. Thus, post-war international relations in general were highly influenced by the tight confrontation between the Communist bloc and the free world, ideologically as well as military. For time to time there has been armed conflicts in various regions of the world, such as China's civil war and North Korea's invasion of South Korea.

But the bipolar system on the international scene was gradually transformed into a kind of multiple system. This change was mostly due to several factors, including the postwar economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the rapid increase in the number of new independent states, and the advent of nuclear weapons. These factors have really affected the basic structure of the international system. There was no longer an international hierarchical structure controlled totally by either the Soviet Union or the United States, at least in the strategic-diplomatic areas. The multiple international system is different from the bipolar one in the sense that major decision makings which could seriously affect world politics are not confined to the Soviet Union or the United States, but to the other major powers including France, England, and the People's Republic of China. In a multipolarized world, the opportunities for interactions between states increased significantly, and they could also to some extent contribute to the reduction of the danger of mutually reinforcing antagonism between states, which was pointed out as a major disadvantage of a bipolar international order. Moreover, this multiple system could more or less force the superpowers to restrain themselves in exercising their unlimited military power for the solution of certain troublesome world issues.

In particular, the appearance of the multiple international systems seemed to alter the bilateral relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States obviously reducing mutual antagonism and belligerence between them. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the two super powers have maintained their monopolistic political and strategic capabilities which could affect the entire range of world affairs. This is possible because of their clear-cut military superiority over the other major powers.

Under these circumstances, Soviet-American relations took a dramatic turn from the late 1960s. It was officially labelled *detente* in 1969. As a peace strategy and diplomatic doctrine, *detente* was basically designed for the two superpowers to create "a vested interest in cooperation and restraint" by reducing differences, diminishing distrust, and increasing accommodation, between them (Kissinger, 1973). *Detente* was really seen as an important shift of a critical global relationship between the two superpowers. It seemed to "normalize" Soviet-US relations, thus substantially receding the expectation of war between them. As a matter of fact, cooperative interaction between Moscow and Washington increased considerably in such various fields as culture, trade and technology.

However, the age of *detente* did not last for long time. Although the East-West rivalry seems to have waned during the *detente* period, competition between Moscow and Washington for advantage and security had never disappeared at all. In fact Soviet-American relations in the late 1970s took a sudden turn toward confrontation, what is called a new Cold War. For this reason, *detente* was interpreted as an attempt to devise "new means to the old ends of containment." A decisive blow to the *detente* between the two superpowers was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that took place in late 1979. By this event, it was said that *detente* was dead, perhaps irrevocably. In whatever terms they may be defined, an enduring fact is that Soviet-American relations have continued to be highly competitive in important respects — militarily, politically, economically, and ideologically. The persistence of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States is clearly caused by their prominence in the international system, the size of their military weapons. Moreover, as the Soviet Union is said to get a position of parity with the United States in terms of military power, its aspirations for gaining diplomatic and strategic advantages for dealing with important world affairs has continued to increase steadily for the past two decades. And it is clear that the Soviet-American competitive relationship, whatever form it may take, will be one of the most pregnant forces for change in world politics.

In this context, this paper primarily concerns a major question: what impact will Soviet-American rivalry have on the regional stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region? Now, to both Moscow and Washington, this region is considered of much importance to their strategic interests. It has been assumed that the two superpowers have expended a great deal of effort and prestige in the pursuit of their strategic and economic interests in these parts of the world. The Asia-Pacific region is a place where the vital interests of four major powers — the US, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, intersect sharply. Therefore, peace and stability of the world depends to a large extent upon the maintenance of a stable equilibrium of power in this region. And economic factors such as natural resources, markets, energy, trade, and investment are enough for both the Soviet Union and the United States to increase their interests in this vast area so competitively. Taking these things into account, this paper will 1) describe and analyze the competing relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, centering on their interests in the Asia-Pacific region in diplomatic, strategic and economic matters, 2) the military build-up of the two superpowers which is located in several parts of the Asian-Pacific region, and 3) some implications of growing competition of the two superpowers for the regional stability and peace in those areas

II

The Pacific Ocean is the largest water, covering a third of the surface of the territorial globe and also has a great many potentialities to be

exploited by human beings in the future. In this sense, Theodore Roosevelt had once said that "the 20th century will be the Century of the Pacific". Although this prophecy has still turned out to be premature, it is true that the importance of the Pacific region has been stressed, as the 21st century is approaching, in terms of not only economic development, but also international security. Recently, the US Secretary of State, George Shultz said that "to understand the future, you must understand the Pacific" (Schultz, 1984). Moreover, it has been noted that as Europe declines, the westward drift of civilization from the Atlantic to the Pacific is inevitable.

In the Asia-Pacific region, there are a large number of nations. First, among them, this region includes the four most powerful nations in the world, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. These nations have the vital interests in the region, and intensified patterns of alignments and interactions because of their proximity to each other. Of the most significance is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union alike remain the Pacific powers, while paying more and more attentions to this region.

Second, the Asia-Pacific region also has a number of newly industrialized nations, including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. For the past two decades, these nations recorded remarkable economic achievements, and are likely to assume certain roles in the international arena. Suffice it to say, the roles which these newly industrialized nations are expected to play in an increasingly interdependent world cannot be underrated.

Third, there is a regional organization among the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, like the ASEAN (the Association of Asian Nations). This association whose member states are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand was formally organized at the governmental level with the purpose for promotion of economic and social cooperation among its member states. Since its inauguration in 1967, ASEAN has made substantial progress in promoting regional development and providing a common frame for dealing with the other Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and Australia in the fields of trade and culture. ASEAN is mostly characterized by the fact that all members are non-Communist nations, while excluding those in the Indochina.

The countries in the Asia-Pacific region have a common feature in the sense that they are located within the same, albeit arbitrary, geographic division, thus increasing the necessities for enhancing regional cooperation in political, economic and cultural fields. But there are a number of diversities, not commonalities, among the Asia-Pacific countries, in culture, history, economics, and politics. As a matter of fact, they can be subdivided into several categories, such as the Confucian area, the ASEAN, the Indochina, the Communist bloc and the like. Culturally, this region exhibits the varieties and complexities of religious syncretism among Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. Economically, some countries in the region are free market-oriented, while the others are centrally planned, the

stages of their economic development are different from each other.

Politically, the Asia-Pacific countries demonstrate a wide range of diversities from Communist totalitarianism, anti-Communist authoritarianism to democratic political systems. Militarily, some countries are aligned with one of the two, and others are "non-aligned". Because of these diversities, the Asia-Pacific region had been an area of cooperation and collaborative efforts on the one hand, and an area of conflict and competition among the countries on the other.

Under these mixed circumstances, what is most noticeable is the growing Soviet-US rivalry and its compact on the security and stability of the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. The strategic and diplomatic stakes of the two superpowers in the region are very high. It has been repeated that the US should be a strong Pacific nation. This reflects that the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly important to the United States for its security and economic purposes. In fact, since the end of World War II, the US has been deeply involved into the Asia-Pacific region militarily as well as diplomatically. Its primary goal was to limit the expansion of communism in the region especially after the Korean war broke out. To this end, the United States had strengthened its containment policy against Communist powers including the Soviet Union and China, while setting up a mutual security system on a bilateral basis with its Asian allies, such as Japan and South Korea.

This policy of the US contributed to injecting a pattern of confrontation in inter-state relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. This pattern was best characterized as the Cold War, in which mutual antagonism and belligerence between the "free world" and the Communist states in the region reached the climax.

But from the late 1960s, the futility of the US involvement in the Vietnamese war and domestic discontentment with it, had increased significantly, and consequently forced the US to reassess its containment policy in the region. The "Guam Doctrine", pronounced by former president Richard Nixon in 1969, marked the first step of such reassessment. This Doctrine included two basic elements. One was that US military and strategic doctrine must be rearranged in accordance with actual capacity. The other was that the nations, particularly those in Asia, should assume the primary responsibility for their internal security and national defense by themselves, while the US would provide them with a nuclear shield (US Dept. of State, 1982). Reflecting upon the Doctrine, the US sought to modify its China policy which had been molded on the basis of Cold War perceptions. With the announcement of the Shanghai joint communique in 1972, the US changed its relations with China from containment into rapprochement. The fundamental shift in US China policy became the major cause of facilitating the further change in the relationship among the major powers in Asia-Pacific region. For instance, following the Sino-US rapprochement, Japan also resumed formal diplomatic relations with PRC, while terminating diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Also, the US began to reduce its

level of combat troops in Asia, including those in Vietnam, and finally, the Vietnam "problem" ended by its over-all withdrawal from that country. While maintaining a detente with the Soviet Union, the US moved on to adjust itself to the changing international situation and to promote a semblance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region through a quadrilateral balance of power in the region with the other major powers, including Japan and China.

But with the emergence of the Reagan Administration, the US tried to modify its policy toward the Soviet Union. Above all, the Reagan Administration has attempted to deter Soviet expansionist tendencies, and exerted pressure against the Soviet violent involvement in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, and its foreign policy seemed to put more emphasis on the maintenance of enhanced military superiority over the Soviet Union and the exercise of American global leadership in collaboration with its allies. The strong anti-Soviet posture of the US was well expressed by an American official:

The Soviet Union presents a significant threat to the peace, economic growth and social stability of Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular. By no stretch of imagination can the unprecedented growth of Soviet military power be considered defensive in nature. It is an attempt to exploit what they view as a lack of American will and free world will to maintain the balance of power.¹

From this statement, it seems clear that the US regards the Soviet Union as its main security threat in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to cope with the Soviet "threat", the US is interested in maintaining close ties with the PRC and Japan. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is also concerned with increasing its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union lays three-fourth of its territory in Asia, or about one-third of population (80 million people) lives in Asiatic area of the country, and 50 million citizens, accounting for about 20 percent of its total population, are of Asian nationalities. Above all, the Asia-Pacific region is of mounting significance to the Soviet Union because of its conflicting relations with China, its global competition with the US and its own necessity for Siberian development.

As in other areas of the globe, American military presence becomes the major obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, much of the Soviet strategic and military posture in the region is largely aimed at constraining the US military power in the region. With regard to Soviet expansionist impulses toward the Asia-Pacific region, some factors need to be stressed. First, it is obvious that the Soviet Union has a great interest in playing a more active role in dealing with world affairs, which is

¹ This quote is from Richard Armitage, Deputy Assistant of Defense of the US, "Regional Security problems of South-east Asia in the 1980s: A US Defense Department Perspective" (mimeo), which was presented at a "US-ASEAN Conference on Economic, Political and Security Issues in Southeast Asia" held at Denpasar, Indonesia in November 1981.

commensurate with its military and economic capabilities. Through this role, the Soviet Union attempts to expand its world-wide influence and strengthen the foundation of its status as a global power. In the early 1970s, it has been assumed that the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the United States.² This also led a highranking Soviet official to declare that "there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it" (Pravda, 1971). No matter how this self-appointment by Moscow may be still far from reality, most obvious is the fact that the Soviet Union will continue to bolster its global superpower status by increasing its influence on the Asia-Pacific region. In this sense, it is quite interesting to note that just as the US began to curtail its military presence in Asia from the late 1960's to the early 1970's, the Soviet Union had made a proposal for collective security for the Asian States. Undoubtedly, this plan was designed to increase Moscow's strategic interests in the vacuum created by the decline of US military presence, and also to promote its own influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Second, the Soviet advance into the Asia-Pacific region is also reinforced by their additional interests in deterring China in East Asia. Until the early 1950's, the two communist powers had maintained a close alliance against the Western forces. For example, in February 1950, they included the treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, through which Moscow-Peking relations were generally cooperative.

But by the late 1950's and early 1960's, relations between them had worsened to the extent that a border clash took place in 1969. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union was more interested in fortifying its Asian border particularly with China than before, and therefore, a large number of Soviet ground forces and strategic weapons were stationed in more than 400 miles of Sino-Soviet border areas. Since the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union has increased its major strategic concerns about the deterrence of Chinese influence. For this purpose, the Soviets have expanded its relations with Indochina and the ASEAN countries. After the Vietnamese war ended in 1975, the Soviets made efforts to transform Vietnam into its proxy. In order to deter the attempt of China to increase her influence, as in case of a temporary incursion of China in 1979 into Vietnam, the Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty with Vietnam, and strengthened its military capabilities in the country, while building up Cam Ranh Bay and other Vietnam military facilities to serve as a means to expand its influence in the ASEAN countries. Particularly, considering those countries' overall neutralistic positions in terms of ZOPIAN (a zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality), the Soviets are continuously encouraging a sort of anti-Chinese as well as anti-American feeling.

Turning to the Far East, we can see the Soviet advance in military

² For more details, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, Vol. XXIX.

and security terms. As known widely, the Soviets have continued to strengthen their Pacific Fleet from the early 1970's, now becoming the largest one of their four fleets. The main purpose of the Soviet's Pacific Fleet is for its naval forces to conduct active operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and to constitute a counterforce to US military power in the region.

Moreover, it has been said that the Soviet Union was much interested in upgrading its strategic position by taking the initiative in establishing a sort of collective security system in Asia, the proposal for an Asian Collective system made by Brezhnev in 1969 has so far failed to gain support from many states in the region except a handful of client states. Recently, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev seems to renew its effort to build up such a security system in Asia. But again, it is doubtful that such efforts can produce certain outcome as much as expected by the Soviets.

Third, the motive of the Soviet advance in the Asia-Pacific region can be found in its growing interest of the development of Siberia. From the mid-1960's, this matter has been on an agenda of the Soviets' Asia policy. In fact, the Siberian area contains about three-quarters of Soviet mineral, fuel, and energy resources, and this has a great deal of potential for economic development of the Soviet Union. In order to induce advanced technology and financial investment from outside, the Soviets have asked some Western countries to participate in the development plan of Siberia. It is known that Japan has already joined some projects for the development of industrial chip and pulp resources, the production of coking coal mines and the like. Certainly, the development of Siberia, if done fully, will significantly contribute to the promotion of the power and position of the Soviet Union militarily as well as economically. In this regard, the Soviet policy toward Asia is aimed at creating a certain environment favourable to the development of Siberia.

Fourth, in relation to their strategic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the Soviets are seriously concerned with the emergence of a triangular cooperative relationship among the United States, China, and Japan. Since the Sino-US rapprochement took place in the early 1970's, the possibility of triangular relations characterized as an anti-Soviet front has been increasing. The three major powers, even though they are still diverged in pursuit of their own security and diplomatic interests, seem to have a common element in deterring the Soviet hegemonism in a regional level as well as global level. They assume that such hegemonic posture would threaten security and peace in the world. But the Soviets have also shown very sensitive concerns about the triangular relationship among Washington, Beijing and Tokyo. A Soviet Newspaper put as follows:

Under the basis of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and the Sino-US normalization, these three powers are to be the formation of a coalition.... This kind of coalition as an Asian style of NATO is based on the common creed with the element of anti-Soviet and anti-socialism (*Red Star*, 1978).

These words reflect a high degree of sensitivity of the Soviets to the changing power configuration among the major powers in Asia. And there becomes a crucial factor leading the Soviet Union to take some decisive steps in the region, including the military build up of its Pacific Fleet.

III

What is most important is the fact that from the early 1970's the Soviet Union has increased its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. From its strategic and security perspective, the Soviets regard this region as a pivotal one as long as Eastern Europe remains stable. Therefore, the security interests of the United States in the region as well as in other parts of the world have been considerably challenged. For the Soviets, the Asia-Pacific region looks much as other parts of the world, for instance, the Persian Gulf, does to the United States.

Now, it is obvious that the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more and more a major theatre for the ever-growing rivalry between the two superpowers. These phenomena become more evident by their increasing military build-up in the region.

In the face of this situation, the United State began to modify its detente policy toward the Soviet Union, while condemning Soviet expansionist tendencies. In particular, the Reagan administration moved to reemphasize the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, and to strengthen US commitments to this region. Thus, the Reagan administration decided to nullify the withdrawal plan of US ground forces from South Korea, and tried to persuade its Asian allies to shoulder an increasing share of the military burden. In the Asia-Pacific region, this has been made in such a way urging, Japan to increase her military expenditure and to make adjustments for better security and economic relations.

Also, the US has perceived the growing importance of China in its strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, and developed steadily strategic relations with Peking. A renewed interest in US policy makers has converged upon using the "China card" as a strategic asset to curb Soviet expansionism in the region. The sharpening competition between the US and the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region is well shown in their respective military build-up in the region. Most surprising is the rapid increase of the Soviet's military strength. In general, the Soviets' military capabilities continue to grow at a rapid pace notwithstanding their domestic economic difficulties as compared with those of the US during the 1970s. During the 1970s, the US reduced its strategic nuclear delivery systems by three percent, while the Soviet Union increased its own by 20 percent, as shown in Table 1.

The rapid increase of the Soviets' military strength was in sharp contrast to that of the US as shown in Table 2. The Soviet Union was particularly interested in bolstering its global superpower status by en-

TABLE 1: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1970-1980

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
US:											
<i>ICBM</i>	1034	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054
<i>SLBM</i>	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656
<i>Bombers</i>	400	360	390	397	397	397	387	373	336	336	338
Soviet Union:											
<i>ICBM</i>	1513	1527	1527	1575	1618	1527	1477	1350	1400	1398	1398
<i>SLBM</i>	304	448	0	628	720	784	845	909	1028	1028	1028
<i>Bombers</i>	140	140	140	140	140	135	135	135	135	156	156

Those figures are originally taken from *the Military Balance* for the periods mentioned.

hanced military capabilities. It's very interesting to note that the Soviets had made efforts to strengthen their military power on a global level in the 1970s, while the Americans had curtailed their military presence in certain parts of Asia and the Pacific, including South Korea. The Soviet military build-up was made particularly in such areas as the Sino-Soviet border, the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Let us examine the military power of the two super powers in those areas. First, as the Sino-Soviet conflict became widened in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has increased its military build-up along the border area with China.

TABLE 2: NAVAL STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, 1969 and 1970

	1969	1979
US:		
<i>carriers</i>	22	13
<i>major surface combatants</i>	279	165
<i>submarines</i>	156	123
<i>Arm phibious Vessels</i>	153	65
<i>Total US Vessels</i>	610	366
Soviet Union:		
<i>carriers</i>	0	2
<i>major surface combatants</i>	220	264
<i>submarines</i>	354	355
<i>Arm phibious Vessels</i>	103	100
<i>Total Soviet Union Vessels</i>	677	721

Source: *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 1970 and 1980)

In fact, the Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border started in 1964, as a means to cope with China's demands for Soviet territory. Since then, the Soviet military power along the region has increased rapidly. The number of Soviet divisions stationed in the Far East has grown from 35 in 1973 to 53 in 1985. And the number of Soviet tactical

aircraft in the region has increased from several hundred in the late 1960's to 1,700 in 1985 (Kintner, 1985). As a result, the Soviet Union was able to launch far-moving offensive operations deep in Chinese territory. In addition, the Soviets have concluded a series of friendship treaties with the countries bordering China, such as Afghanistan, India, Laos, Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Korea. More steps are basically aimed at encircling and isolating China. With regard to the increase of Soviet military power in Asia, Former Defense Secretary of the US, Harold Brown commented that "Soviet forces in the Far East are geographically positioned, exercised, and apparently designed for offensive operations" (US Dept. Defense Annual Report, 1981).

Second, it is also known that the Soviet Union has deployed two divisions and a large contingent of MIC-17's and ground-to-air missiles in the northern islands of Japan. This military presence of the Soviet Union has become a major threat to Japan. The Soviets often violate Japan's airspace and territorial waters in order to conduct its military exercises. According to the statistics, the number of Soviet aircraft approaches to Japan amounts to approximately 195 annually, and about 360 Soviet warships pass through the straits of Korea, Tsugaru and Soya each year (Kintner, 1985). Moscow's military preparedness near Japan is also targeted against the US as well, because the US and Japan has been closely tied to each other through a mutual security system.

Third, the Soviet Union has strengthened the military power of its Pacific Fleet from the early 1970's. The Soviet Pacific Fleet contains 89 principle surface combatants, 112 other combatant ship, 245 combatant craft, 235 auxiliaries, 120 attack submarines and 440 naval aviation planes. A data also indicates that in 1984 the Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Union has acquired a second KIRO-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser and two attack submarines, two major surface combatants, 13 fighter bombers, 12 ASW helicopters and a third KIEV-class carrier (Kintner, 1985). On the whole, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has increased its power by 50 percent in submarines, 100 percent in guided missile cruisers, 20 percent in destroyers and 1000 percent in guided missile frigates, during the periods from 1970 through 1980. Recently, the Soviets concluded fishing agreements which are designed to make access to two small independent islands in the South Pacific, Kiribati and neighbouring Tuvalu.

Compared with American naval forces in the Pacific, it is estimated that Soviet forces still remain inferior, because of the presence of the Seventh Fleet's aircraft carriers. In parallel with the growth of the Soviet military power, the US has also stressed concerted roles in sea lane security with its allies in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. In addition, the US has made efforts to build a new "defense arc" in mid-Pacific as an emergency measure. But the gap between the navies of the two superpowers in the region has been substantially reduced by Washington's decision in 1980 to disperse key units of the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean and Middle East to protect vital interests of the US and its allies there.

Moreover, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would play a wide range of functions from disrupting essential shipping of the other countries in the Pacific Ocean to increasing military employment of its own naval craft in local Asian water.

However, it has been generally recognized that although the Soviet Union has strengthened its ground, naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific region rapidly, the US still retains its military superiority there. An expert has assessed that "there is little prospect that the US will be outclassed in power projection and other strategic capabilities in the Pacific provided there are no major crises elsewhere".³ Moreover, there are still certain constraints in further improvements of Soviet forces. The Soviets have been obviously faced with great difficulty in developing the technology or gaining Western technology needed to build up their military power, particularly to their strategic logistical capabilities and nuclear forces. However, the Soviet military build-up can have certain implications in the Asia-Pacific region in security and diplomatic terms. First, the Soviet Union is able to strengthen its position as an over-all equal to the US, thereby constituting a serious threat to the stability and security of the region. Second, the Soviet Union can enhance its diplomatic posture by which its relations with pro-Soviet Countries such as North Korea and Vietnam can be further improved. Third, the Soviet military strength in the Asia-Pacific region will also contribute to overcoming to some extent US military superiority by gaining its political influence there. Although Soviet forces are not strong enough to surpass US strategic capabilities, the Soviet challenge has considerably increased so that security and peace in the Asia-Pacific region can be increasingly threatened.

On the contrary, the growth of Soviet military power in the region could be a major factor to draw the US, China and Japan into a loose anti-Soviet front. In particular, the US has remolded its policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, which is aimed at withstanding Soviet process and intervention there. This guideline of US policy is quite different from former President Carter's foreign policy of demilitarization and reconciliation with communist states. In coping with the Soviet challenge, the US has taken a number of measures. First, the US has tried to enlarge its capacity to manage events in the region by providing "leadership". Second, the Reagan administration attempted to reinforce US relations with its traditional allies in the regions, such as Japan and South Korea, while assuming that Washington would not totally dominate the relationships. Third, the US has emphasized the importance of the new relationship of cooperation with China in a "measured, controlled" way. For this purpose, the Reagan administration substantially offered American economic and military-related assistance to China. Fourth, the US itself has shown a firm determination to enhance its military capability by increasing defense

³ This assessment was made by Robert O'Neil, director of the international Institute for Strategic Studies. See *New York Times*, April 18, 1985.

expenditures. While bolstering its nuclear weapons and naval forces deployed globally or regionally, the US has been strongly urging its allies to promote their military capabilities for security of not only their own countries but also the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Discernible progress has been made in US-Japan relations by persuading the Japanese government to make "maximum efforts to improve its defense capabilities as soon as possible."

IV

So far, we have roughly examined the two superpower strategic and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and their military capabilities and deployments there. As mentioned before, the Asia-Pacific region is very important to both the US and the Soviet Union. The principal interest of the US is to protect its forces in the region and to match Soviet military strength levels; and, more specifically, to maintain strategic parity and naval superiority in the region. In addition, the US is interested in ensuring economic gains in such fields as natural resources, energy, trade and investment through close ties with countries in the region. In connection with these interests, the US has taken several new steps; the decision to offer sophisticated military weapons to China and Pakistan, the strengthening of US-Japan security ties, the selling of F-16 jet fighters to South Korea, the renewed commitment to economic and security cooperation with the ASEAN states, and the plan to construct a "three-Ocean navy" to enhance the security in the Pacific.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, as consonant with its global status, has been involved in most parts of the world. Its interest in the Asia-Pacific region is no exception. As the time goes by, this region is probably of greater importance because the Soviet Union is increasingly interested in having a "rimland" of friendly states. Therefore, the Soviets will attempt to expand their influence in political and strategic terms. However, the Soviet attempts in the past did not prove successful. Many states except North Korea and Vietnam in the region have turned their backs on Moscow. Despite such lack of success in the Asia-Pacific region, the Soviet Union is certainly trying to increase its influence with a military build-up that is proceeding continuously.

Thus, the Asia-Pacific region will remain a major fertile area for the two superpowers to vie with each other for the realization of their own interests in political, economic and strategic fields. In the best case, the two superpowers can make certain accommodations analogous to the detente in the early 1970s. By contrast, in the worst case, they will move to accelerate harsh competition between themselves, including arms race, which can become a serious blow to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

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ANZUS 1985: THE END OF AN ERA

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ABSTRACT

The recent crisis in the ANZUS partnership between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States is a consequence of American efforts to transform a consultative mutual security alliance into a venue for the further development of US strategic nuclear policy. Correctly resisting this new effort to extend US policy in the Pacific, the government of New Zealand has reassessed its own basic security needs, redefining traditional understandings of national self-interest and self-reliance. Peace in the Pacific may well depend on the further enunciation of peaceful and nuclear free zones — in New Zealand and throughout the South Pacific.

Ever since the ANZUS Treaty was first ratified in 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, a debate has raged over whose interests were to be served by the treaty. The initial strategic justifications for the treaty by the original signatories have in the intervening three decades been essentially reversed. First proposed by Australia and New Zealand (whose fears of both the revival of a rearmed postwar Japan *and* of an increasingly outward looking China required the reassurance of a continuing American connection), the United States opposed any agreement which would formally commit that government to the automatic military defense of its ANZUS partners.

Accordingly, Article III of the 1200 word document (reflecting American hesitance at the time to overcommit itself in the Pacific), simply indicates that the responsibilities of the three nations are clearly limited to consulting together "... whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific." Hoping for a more formal commitment from the United States, Australia and New Zealand had to settle for this kind of consultative liaison.

The formal ANZUS Treaty went into effect in 1952 and since then the self-interests of the three signatories as well as other Pacific powers have changed. It will be the object of this essay to review that history and suggest that in 1986, a continued ANZUS alliance may well serve only the needs of the United States. Whether or not such an alliance, so clearly the servant of the political and economic intentions of a single power, can actually contribute to peace in the Pacific is at best moot.

I. ANZUS: A POST WORLD WAR II HISTORY

As the post-war political era in the Pacific evolved, concern over the earlier threats from Japan and China to the security of Australia and New Zealand steadily diminished. The feared remilitarization of Japan did not take place, being restrained in that country both by law and by popular will. Content to effect a new kind of non-military economic hegemony in the area, Japan was no longer seen as a threat to Australian or New Zealand security. Detente between the US and China was surprisingly and quickly effected by the Nixon administration, and successive governments in New Zealand (and oftentimes in Australia) recognized that no external military threat existed in the area. When the 32nd annual meeting of the ANZUS Council (the Foreign Ministers and their staffs of the signature nations) was held in Washington, D.C. July 18-19, 1983, the Council reaffirmed the still politically innocuous official nature of ANZUS.

The ANZUS treaty is an agreement between sovereign and equal states committed to the democratic tradition. In accordance with that tradition, the respective states would at times have varying views and perspectives on... international issues. Such diversity does not affect their solidarity under the ANZUS treaty, the maintenance of which reflects the fundamental interests of the three partners.

(New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 33, 3, 1983, p.18).

In fact, however, the solidarity of the ANZUS partners had for long been crumbling as the deployment of nuclear weapons came to dominate the strategic military thinking of the United States. As early as 1963, this tension was seen as the government of New Zealand refused to authorize the storage, testing, or manufacture of nuclear weapons on New Zealand soil. Both Labour and National party governments in that country, for example, have consistently opposed French and all other nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific. The Labour government in 1972-75 declared that New Zealand would not accept nuclear armed or nuclear capable vessels — even those of its historic allies — in its ports. Although National party tacticians were somewhat less critical of the nuclear initiatives of the United States than was Labour, on March 27, 1984 Deputy Prime Minister J.K. McLay of the National party said:

Certainly a conscious choice has been made by successive New Zealand governments which have consistently opposed all nuclear testing and have supported... the limited test ban and non-proliferation treaties. We take the view that the very

survival of mankind is threatened by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race; and that removing the threat of... nuclear war... is the most acute and urgent task of the present day.

(*New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 33, 1, p.12).

Since that time, 65% of the New Zealand population in 90 different local authorities have chosen to live in self-declared "nuclear free" zones. During the 1984 general election, the Labour party reaffirmed its traditional stand against accepting nuclear capable vessels into New Zealand ports and was subsequently returned to power with a strong anti-nuclear mandate from the country. Formal legislation to transform this mandate into law is now under consideration.

II. ANZUS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE 1984 GENERAL ELECTION

Although developments since the decision by the Labour government to refuse entry to New Zealand ports to the nuclear powered American destroyer USS Buchanan in early 1985 have been publicized around the world, not all of the strategic shifts consequent upon that decision have been detailed. ANZUS (never a major treaty in the eyes of US policy makers) was suddenly and for the first time more important to the United States than it was to its Pacific partners. As Soviet military presence in the larger Pacific increased in the 1970's, American Policy makers considered it appropriate to call upon their primary South Pacific partners to assume an even greater role in regional military strategy. Ever since the American withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviets have maintained a major naval facility at the Cam Ranh Bay base built earlier by the United States. For more than a decade, the Russians have used this base as the primary support area for their large fleet of nuclear submarines in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Accordingly, the United States was intent on furthering its own docking and support base in the South Pacific. Pressures on Australia and New Zealand to comply with American initiatives intensified.

It was more than simple super-power pique that motivated the United States into first condemning New Zealand for its stand and then in issuing its subsequent threat of economic sanctions against its long-time ally. Suddenly, more than a yawning acquiescence with the heretofore remote strategies of the powerful ally was expected from New Zealand. For so long thought to be little more than the lapdog of US foreign policy interests in the Pacific, yet often suffering the consequences of mutual security engagements with that country (e.g. participation in the Korean and Indochinese wars), the faithful companion suddenly began to bite, threatening US interests in two different ways.

In the first instance, New Zealand had for decades subsumed its own national self-interests to the importance of the strategic alliance with the United States. Facing no external threat of any kind (attested to regularly by different Ministers of Defense), successive governments have limited

New Zealand military forces essentially to specialized groupings (intelligence, communications, naval support) developed to assist the larger allies in their strategic encounters. Ignoring any kind of self-defense force, New Zealand's military authority was constructed essentially to be a modest complement to those of the United States and Australia. Periodically, the imperatives of the ANZUS connection pressured New Zealand into participating in wars (Korea, Vietnam) that had absolutely nothing to do with national self-interest. Prevented by ANZUS from taking the morally unequivocal positions favored by a majority of the people, New Zealand in practice proved to be an unwilling but still faithful consort to American strategic initiatives in the area by supporting American policies in Indonesia, the Philippines, the Marshall Islands, Diego Garcia and other places of regional concern. And suddenly, with the Buchanan refusal, this support so casually accepted by the United States and so long received on the cheap from New Zealand was in doubt (Galvin, 1984).

Secondly, the symbol of the Kiwi rampant in the fields of American policy interests (and clearly visible *ala* Lange to the rest of the world) was troubling to the United States in its other security arrangements. Already beleaguered in its attempts to force Cruise and Pershing II weapons systems on the more reluctant NATO allies (e.g. Belgium, Holland, and Norway) and facing popular outcry from the populations of traditionally compliant partners (British, Germany, Italy), the Reagan administration found in the independent stance of New Zealand an occasion to warn its more important allies of what might similarly happen to them if they strained too hard at the American leash. Stepping on the tail of the Kiwi was, therefore, a necessary and significant step to US policy makers, both because of the strategic loss being suffered in the Pacific by this sudden renaissance of New Zealand self-reliance and as a warning symbol to other allies with similar doubts.

Even a cursory study of the ANZUS treaty and its history will suggest that only by a strained American interpretation of the partnership obligations of ANZUS have the participant nations been required to accept the policy affirmations of the dominant partner. More particularly, the expectation that Australia and New Zealand should without question accept American nuclear-capable naval vessels has never been supported by any more than a minority of the people in those countries. According to recent polls, the people of both Australia and New Zealand have said "yes" to the continuance of ANZUS. Even a large majority of New Zealanders favour continuance in the treaty obligation. But they have also said "no" to nuclear weapons under ANZUS in a reconfirmation of public opinion in that country since the end of World War II.

Shedding not even a crocodile tear of remorse over its reversal on the issue of national self-determination for the smaller ANZUS powers, the United States in February 1985 and in the months following not only criticized New Zealand for its stance of affirming its own national self-interest but urged economic sanctions against the country — a step taken in recent years only against countries like Cuba, the Soviet Union (following

its invasion of Afghanistan), and Nicaragua (for *its* determination to be free from US intervention).

In spite of the rhetoric about cooperation, for a good many years New Zealand and Australia under ANZUS have been expected to construct a military profile strictly designed to assist the United States rather than to defend themselves. Successive New Zealand governments have found themselves forced to toe the strategic policy line defined by the United States rather than paying attention to that nation's own more direct needs. As critic Ray Galvin has shown, through ANZUS, the United States forced its Pacific allies to support political and economic goals quite indirectly related to the actual needs of those countries. In the remarkable candor of the overconfident, the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones stated in a report to the US Congress in 1983:

The ANZUS Treaty provides the basis for defense against external threats in the South West Pacific... the US should continue to center its security relationships... within the ANZUS agreement to support US objectives in South East Asia, South West Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian gulf (emphasis added).

General Jones then stated that Australia and New Zealand, "possess the best capability for assisting US power projection into the Pacific Islands" (Jones, 1983).

But in fact, ANZUS in no way has obliged New Zealand to accept either United States military or political/economic authority. Insisting that a continuing strong relationship to the United States will in fact be determined by Australian and New Zealand acquiescence in US nuclear readiness policy, the Reagan administration has moved far beyond the "consultative" understandings of the ANZUS treaty itself and has unilaterally sought to determine where the well-being of those nations rests. In the succeeding sections of this essay, the Australian and New Zealand responses to this American redefinition of the nature of national sovereignty in the Pacific will be summarized.

III. THE AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND RESPONSE TO THE REAGAN DICTATE

Although the Labour government of New Zealand in the early 1970's first hoisted the flag of a threatened independence from US nuclear policy, the government stand against nuclear vessels in New Zealand waters was never fully tested by the United States until the USS Buchanan incident subsequent to the election of the new Labour government in 1984. Apparently hoping to both test and perhaps embarrass the Labour government, the United States in January 1985 announced a number of naval port calls for the Pacific area, including that of the destroyer Buchanan to Wellington.

Declaring that New Zealand would continue to welcome port visits

by conventionally powered and armed allied naval vessels, Prime Minister David Lange refused entry to this presumably nuclear powered and nuclear armed USS Buchanan since the United States would neither "confirm or deny" the presence of such atomic accessories. In late February 1985, apparently cutting off its strategic nose to spite its hegemonic face, the United States responded by essentially eliminating intelligence and defense cooperation with New Zealand. Although ANZUS remained in force, the conflict related to and illustrated grave problems in the operational character of the alliance. For the first time in some years, the question "What is ANZUS really all about?" was concretely raised.

The core obligation of the historic ANZUS mission essentially remains in place even after New Zealand's new initiative: periodic consultations to consider threats to the welfare of the ANZUS partners in the Pacific. The Prime Minister has regularly reaffirmed New Zealand's continuing commitment to ANZUS and its determination to play its part fully in upholding western interests in the South Pacific. In Los Angeles on February 26, 1985, Mr. Lange succinctly stated Labour's understanding of signatory obligations relative to nuclear weapons policies under ANZUS (*New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 35, 1, pp.3-7).

Summarizing popular opinion, Mr. Lange stated that New Zealanders would, at least under the Labour government, have no part in supporting allied nuclear weapons policies. New Zealand neither wanted nor expected the United States to come to its defense under any circumstances with nuclear weapons. As other governments of New Zealand had stated, New Zealanders did not want nuclear weapons on their soil or in their harbors. New Zealand would not accept American nuclear capability as a deterrent to anyone who might one day wish to harm New Zealand. The Labour government by this new definition of policy supported the oft expressed hope of the vast majority of the people of New Zealand that the country would remain nuclear free. Mr. Lange said:

The security of the South Pacific does not depend on the occasional deployment of nuclear weapons in New Zealand ports, and in making an issue of it the United States gives scant regard to its own long terms interests in the region.

A nation's foreign policy comes down to a matter of its own interest.

To compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism which allows for no self-determination (*New Zealand Review of Foreign Affairs*, 35, 1, pp.7-17).

According to this New Zealand understanding, the security of the South Pacific region is not currently threatened by nuclear confrontation nor is it likely to be so threatened in the future. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, Mr. Frank O'Flynn have regularly spelled out the appropriate stance of the Labour government given that reality.

New Zealand would betray its own security interests if it took any part in contributing to a nuclear confrontation in the area.

ANZUS, unlike NATO, has no command structure and imposes no military obligations on its members.

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If ANZUS were to become an alliance with policy determined by the nuclear strategies of one of its members, there would be utterly no point in New Zealand remaining in the alliance since it has both rejected nuclear weapons and any possibility of its ever being defended by the nuclear weapons of any foreign power. By pushing New Zealand on the issue, an effort was perhaps being made to force it out of ANZUS (*New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 34-35).

This redefined Labour position, according to Prime Minister Lange, was not to be seen as reflecting an anti-American position nor should it be viewed as a challenge to other collective security arrangements in the area. To the neutral observer, however, the United States' savage response to New Zealand's newly independent anti-nuclear stance has effectively interrupted the more significant role that such a small country can play in contributing to regional peace and security. Posing no threat to anyone, New Zealand could clearly be effective in reducing tensions in the South Pacific. It has now determined in fact to affirm that role, albeit in a fashion different from United States' expectations. It will accordingly have to adjust the nature of its military forces, so long little more than a modest complement to the ANZUS partners by placing even more emphasis on providing supportive services to its South Pacific neighbours.

The Australian connection was, of course, far more complicated. More intimately connected since World War II with American political and economic interests, Australia understandably has faced a more difficult role in affirming the interests of its regional neighbours *vis à vis* the United States. Australia's Labour Party came to power in 1980 on a platform remarkably similar to that of New Zealand's Labour Party. A major plank in the party platform was a proposed ban on visits by nuclear warships of whatever nationality. This anti-nuclear stance by Labour has since been compromised by Australia's Prime Minister, Mr. Bob Hawke. Declaring itself now in favour of port calls by the nuclear powered or armed ships of its allies, Australia has emerged officially as a strong supporter of American nuclear deterrence in the Pacific.

Australia's official position became unequivocally clear when in March 1985, Mr. Hawke announced that host Australia was cancelling the annual meeting of ANZUS since US Secretary of State George Schultz had announced that he would boycott the meeting. As always, however, the position of government does not necessarily reflect the attitudes of all of the populace. As American commentators recently noted:

... the anti-nuclear movement in Australia is far from dormant. December's (1984) national elections saw a strong showing by the new Disarmament Labor party, whose ambitious goals are to keep all nuclear armed and nuclear-powered warships out of Australian ports, to close down all foreign military bases, and to stop the mining and export of uranium (Drucker & Gennino, 1985).

Australians (like New Zealanders) are becoming more and more concerned that under the new understanding of the ANZUS commitment expected by the United States they, too, may in time become nuclear targets. When it was learned that Prime Minister Hawke had secretly

agreed to let the United States use Australian facilities for testing the MX missile, the Labour Party forced him to renege on the earlier agreement with the United States.

Yielding to public pressure, Hawke asked the US to conduct the MX missile test without Australia's assistance. Washington complied, rather than stir up a second and much more damaging, South Pacific controversy (Drucker & Gennino, 1985).

IV. TOWARDS A NUCLEAR FREE SOUTH PACIFIC

The current primary actors opposing the development of a nuclear free South Pacific are, of course, France and the United States. Interestingly, a new cohesion of self-interests in the Pacific between the two nuclear powers has developed in recent years. The geographical locals for the acting out of the drama are New Caledonia (Kanaky) and the Mururoa atoll.

New Caledonia, a French territory since 1853, has been forced by France to postpone the limited referendum on the "independence-association" reform which could increase the now limited local control over territorial political and economic affairs. Escalating its military presence in Kanaky, and deploying the nuclear submarine *Rubis* to the port of Noumea, France has expanded the naval facility there and has announced its intention to develop new military bases including airfields to possibly accommodate fighter and anti-submarine aircraft.

The announced rationale for the proposal has been that New Caledonia is situated in the "... heart of French strategic interests." In spite of popular Kanak opposition to French military and political intentions, a new agenda for French and American cooperation in the area seems to be developing. On the one hand France has expressed interest in using American air fields in the Pacific as support facilities for its nuclear weapons testing at Mururoa and Fangataufa. On the other, given the reluctance of Australia and New Zealand to allow long range missile testing in the Tasman, the United States has indicated its interest in testing strategic missiles near Oneo Island in the Pitcairn group in Polynesia. The expanded port facilities at Noumea could also well serve as ports of call for US warships denied access elsewhere in the South Pacific. Such a prospect is important to the United States.

... given the setback it has received in the Pacific from the nuclear free stands of Belau (Palau), Vanuatu, and... New Zealand... it can be concluded that France is closing ranks with the Pentagon to form a new alliance determined to shake a claim to the Southwest Pacific and re-establish the region as an American "lake" (Meyers, 1985, pp.2-3).

The conflict over continued nuclear testing at Mururoa is a consequence of the now historic decision by Charles de Gaulle in 1958 that France should no longer be dependent upon the American/NATO nuclear umbrella. Detaching France from the alliance, and recognizing that a truly

independent French military must be nuclear-capable, France found itself with the self-assumed responsibility to develop its own nuclear research and development capability.

So long as France continues to insist on maintaining its own nuclear deterrent, and continues its paranoia toward both east and west, it will see itself as justified in continuing its nuclear testing program in the South Pacific. To change that programme now would require the turning over of more than 25 years of a heretofore (in its own world view) coherent defensive strategy. Although both New Caledonia and Mururoa continue to be classic symbols of continuing French colonialism in the region, France is unlikely in the short run to heed the call by Australia, New Zealand, and eleven other nations to stop the Mururoa testing program. Undoubtedly, this determination has been strengthened by the new understandings with the Reagan administration (which has had its own problems in attempting to turn the trust territory of Belau into a more strategic cornerstone of US political and economic policy in the region).

Although France may in fact become a new silent partner within ANZUS, cooperating with US nuclear strategies in a *quid pro quo* arrangement, it is clear that the United States has consistently either ignored or overlooked the strategic role of Australia, New Zealand and the other smaller island nations in furthering peace in the Pacific. In August of 1984, the new Labour government in New Zealand participated in the Pacific Forum conference of fourteen heads of state in Tuvalu which agreed to establish a "Nuclear Free South Pacific Zone" at the earliest possible moment. Later modifying its demands, the Pacific Forum concerns for a Nuclear Free South Pacific Zone include:

There should be no use, testing or stationing of nuclear devices in the South Pacific.

No South Pacific country would develop, manufacture, receive, acquire or test any nuclear explosive device.

Nuclear activities in the South Pacific would be conducted in accordance with applicable international principles and treaties, notably the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The zone would respect the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight (*New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 31-35, *passim*).

In his address to the United Nations Conference in Geneva on March 5, 1985, Mr. Lange stated the key issue of the matter.

South Pacific countries would retain their unqualified sovereign right to decide for themselves, consistent with their support for the objectives of the zone, their security arrangements and such questions as the access to their ports and airfields by vessels or aircraft of another country (*New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 35, 1, p.14).

Other concerns expressed over the years by advocates of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific include the following goals of participant nations:

to represent the opposition of all countries in the region to the continued nuclear arms race

to strengthen the non-proliferation movement by efforts to prohibit the stationing or deployment of nuclear devices on national territories in the area

to seek by every means to reduce the risk that the zone will become the arena for rivalry among nuclear powers

to thus attempt to insulate the region from nuclear war and/or its consequences.

Undergirding all of these concerns is the assumption that every nation should have the right of self-determination and freedom to decide for themselves their own security arrangements. Since the great powers have for years been unable and apparently unwilling to seriously discuss even a comprehensive test ban via bilateral negotiations, it is even more imperative that other, less powerful nations set alternative examples of international conduct. It is in fact the only means available to small nations wishing to protest the continuing escalation in the deployment of the machines of nuclear war. Of less importance than historic alliances is regional determination to seek the peace, security and well-being of the citizens of each country.


Too often, those from outside the South Pacific area forget the history of big power political and military involvement in the area.

For several centuries the Pacific has represented an enticing challenge to those stretching out for new worlds to conquer. Beginning in the 1500's, and decisively since the 1800's, most of the island societies have been incorporated into and used by the global economic and political economy. Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan, and Australia have had Pacific colonies. France, the United States and Indonesia still have them, despite opposition by Pacific people (Siwatibau & Williams, 1982).

Forced to deal constantly with the established interests of the colonial powers (access to island countries for military bases, communications and intelligence gathering networks, transport of military equipment, weapons testing programs, utilization of mineral resources), the desire for the development of regional nuclear free zones is directly related to territorial self-interest.

Simply in the arena of nuclear testing in the South Pacific, the history is dramatic. Depicted in the map are Pacific Ocean nuclear testing sites. A 1980 United Nations report indicates that "since nuclear testing began in 1945, there have been 1,233 nuclear tests worldwide, 441 of them in the atmosphere. There have been well over 200 explosions of nuclear bombs and devices in the Pacific. A summary shows the following nuclear testing statistics:

USA	Hiroshima, August 6, 1945	1
USA	Nagasaki, August 9, 1945	1
USA	Bikini, Marshall Islands, 1946-48	23
USA	Enewetak, Marshall Islands, 1948-58	43
Britain	Johnston Islands, 1958-62	12
USA	Christmas Island	25
Britain	Australia (Monte Bello, Emu,	



MAP 1: PACIFIC NUCLEAR TEST SITES

	Maralinga) 1950's	12
France	Mururoa and Fangataufa, 1966 to present, 41 atmospheric, the others underground, approximately	80
	(Siwatibau & Williams, 1982)	

In the process of implementing the different nuclear testing programs, whole populations have been evacuated from island regions like Bikini, Eniwetak, Rongelap and Wotho atolls, Kwajalein and Roi Namur Islands, Lib Island and the Mid-Corridor Islands. Radioactive fallout has occurred throughout the area. Social and cultural disruption has occurred in the process. Medical problems have been the all too common consequence of exposure to ionizing radiation (Siwatibau & Williams, 1982).

Resistance to such programs of testing continue today. As recently as September 16, 1985, even Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke publicly refused the invitation of French President Francois Mitterrand to observe the new tests being scheduled by the French on Mururoa Atoll.

Mr. Hawke suggested that the French carry out their tests in France and then perhaps, he might attend! Mr. Lange subsequently characterized the visit to Mururoa by Mr. Mitterrand and his post Rainbow Warrior invitation to the South Pacific heads of state to observe the new Mururoa tests as an "obscene gesture."

CONCLUSIONS

As Mary Kaldor (1985) of Sussex University has suggested for Europe, there is in the Pacific the need for a gradual erosion of political and economic dependency connections and the subsequent disengagement of Pacific nations from superpower domination. A new kind of nonalignment (called dealignment by Kaldor) for Pacific countries which might increase room for political manoeuvre and further the accountability of governments to their people rather than to the superpowers has now entered its first phase in New Zealand. The Labour Party has rediscovered the truth that traditional political/economic alignment with a superpower guarantees the abrogation of national sovereignty since only the great powers can make those final determinations which will either cause or prevent a nuclear war.

Dealignment does not necessarily mean withdrawal from the formal military alliances, but it does mean changing the content of those alliances. Countries like Denmark and Greece which are dissenting from NATO's nuclear policies, or like Rumania and Hungary in the East, may be even more dealigned than a country like Switzerland.... Policies aimed at nuclear disarmament or the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases are fundamentally strategies of dealignment because they challenge the content of the alliances.

Dealignment expresses a process in which disengagement from the superpowers through denuclearization and demilitarization... are mutually reinforcing conceptions (Kaldor, 1985, p.143).

The current ANZUS crisis, therefore, is the consequence of a historic realignment of national self-interests on the part of the signatory powers. Strongly supportive of the movement for a nuclear free South Pacific, but more deeply dependent economically on the United States, Australia has thus far found it impossible to align itself with New Zealand over ANZUS. For the foreseeable future, it will most probably continue its fealty to the emergent reformulation of the ANZUS function by the United States.

New Zealand, never in fact a significant part of the strategic defense network of the United States but always expected to uncritically accept US policy interests and initiatives, has now challenged the thesis of the United States that a small power is incapable of looking out for and defending its own interests. Rejecting not only the promise and threat of US "protection," New Zealand has significantly redefined for itself the meaning of national security. Softening perhaps the government's position regarding nuclear capable vessels in New Zealand ports, Prime Minister Lange on September

12, 1985 called for another reassessment of the ANZUS treaty and dispatched Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Palmer to Washington for further discussions on the American/New Zealand relationship. Whether or not this reassessment has been due to increased US economic and/or political pressures, and whatever the final decision of future governments may be (whether under Labour or National Party control), it is clear that most New Zealanders will continue to support the policies of a nuclear free New Zealand and a nuclear free South Pacific.

The United States, troubled by the prospective loss of a heretofore compliant ally, has now used New Zealand as an international whipping post to warn other wavering allies of the dangers in deviating too far from US strategic policy initiatives. The threat of economic sanctions has been used by the Reagan administration to embarrass the Labour government and hopefully to sow some of the seeds of Labour's future defeat. Less overtly and with more benign intent than similar pressures to overthrow truly hostile governments in the past (in Iran in the early 50's, Guatemala, Chile, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Nicaragua, etc.), the United States does seem to be attempting to manipulate internal New Zealand public opinion to encourage a change of regime in that country. The appeal to reaction orchestrated by the US Department of State and dutifully carried out by Reagan emissaries in New Zealand in 1985 suggests a rather clear intent to influence domestic political opinion in that country.

Whether this kind of heavy handed effort by the United States can succeed in any Pacific nation will depend largely on the devotion to the maintenance of the historic anti-nuclear tradition by the ordinary peace-loving people of New Zealand, Australia, and the island nations and the readiness of those people to pay the price that will be demanded by the United States for this demonstration of moral principle and national self-interest. Should such an anti-nuclear policy in fact continue as the majority will of the people in any of those countries, and should the United States continue its effort to transform the historic ANZUS consultative relationship into a formal nuclear alliance, the question of continued New Zealand and/or Australian participation of any kind in ANZUS will surely and properly be raised throughout those countries.

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ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 'FIRST'? TRENDS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the historic tension between the "Europe first" and the "Asia first" focus in American foreign policy in the context of the contemporary superpower rivalry globally and regionally. The differing requirements of bilateral relations and multilateral approaches in the Pacific are explored. The degree of incompatibility between American interests, as defined by current policymakers, and perceptions of those interests by other governments and non-state actors is analyzed. The domestic and foreign constraints on US policy in Asia and the Pacific in the next decade are outlined.

"Turbulence" and "ferment" are the words most frequently used to describe fast-moving events in Asia and the Pacific and their impact on American foreign policy. Often observers and policy-makers preoccupied with temporary stresses and strains forget how deep-seated the roots of present difficulties are. This essay therefore considers three aspects: 1) The historical dimension of US foreign policy in Asia and the Pacific, stressing the images and myths that persist; 2) the current direction in US foreign policy, emphasizing the dilemmas of bilateral relations and multilateral approaches; and 3) the future prospects of US foreign policy, noting the dangers of misunderstanding that could preclude stability and moderation in trans-Pacific affairs.

I. THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION

My title recalls the "great debate" of the 1940's and 1950's in American foreign policy, a debate derived from the 1920's and 1930's, namely: which area of the world should receive priority, Asia or Europe?

This question was in no sense "new" even then, for in early twentieth century America, it was linked to other questions of "focus" that characterized the discussion of isolationism or interventionism as a foreign policy orientation for the United States in world affairs. One measure of our distance from that simpler world is that few would pose the question of focus the same way now. It is worth remembering what Europe and Asia were seen to represent by the advocates of each, because historical myths play a role in the conception and execution of American foreign policy.

For those who favoured emphasizing Europe as the geographical focus, chiefly Democrats, that continent represented (at least before 1914) "civilization" versus American "provincialism". Later, Europe was seen as the site of decadence and corruption, by Woodrow Wilson and other "idealists". By contrast, for those who favoured emphasizing Asia, mainly Republicans, that continent represented, according to Fitzgerald, (1985):

... stretches of territory inhabited by peoples of alien cultures, all of them technologically and militarily inferior to the United States. The businessmen looked upon Asian countries as producers of raw materials and new markets for manufactured goods; the missionaries looked upon them as huge reservoirs of unsaved souls. In the view of the imperial isolationists, the United States was becoming the preeminent power in the world; it has no peers, it had no need for alliances, and it had almost no need for diplomacy. Pearl Harbor brought the isolations into the Second World War, and after the war they could not conceive why the United States had "lost China" to Mao Zedong. Senator Robert Taft, the isolationist par excellence, supported military intervention on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek and supported MacArthur's drive into North Korea, (p.262).

More recently, Asia, in the form of the Vietnam War, was seen to represent the region where both the "second" and "third worlds" could be successfully confronted by the "first world", despite the French defeat. Asia would be the place where the American predilection for certainty and formulas in world affairs would be rewarded, with enough tenacity. While the American defeat in Vietnam shattered these illusions, a nostalgia for predictability has lingered on Fitzgerald (1985) continues:

In retrospect, the notion that stopping the Vietnamese revolution at the Seventeenth Parallel would end all "wars of national liberation" around the world or, alternatively, would stop all of Southeast Asia and Oceania from "falling to Communism" must sound a bit farfetched. In the mid-sixties, however, a great many otherwise sensible Americans took these propositions quite seriously. For twenty years, the country had gone through a series of mood swings about the state of the world: on the one hand, the sense that Americans could control events everywhere if they made the effort; on the other hand, the sense that if they did not the whole free world would crumble. According to Eisenhower, Indo-China was the first of a series of dominoes; according to Kennedy, Vietnam was "the keystone in the arch, the finger in the dike (p.265).

A decade after the war's end, US officials accept the fact that Asian and Pacific countries are not content to be objects of American foreign policy and that issues like trade, arms control and environmental protection

cut across geographical boundaries and are not susceptible to American manipulation, without international cooperation. Moreover, there is increasing awareness that government-to-government relations are accompanied by other kinds of international relationships that involve individuals, including businessmen, journalists, travelers, and scholars, whose activity enriches cross-cultural contact, although it sometimes constrains political leaders, too.

In the altered setting of world politics in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Asia's claims on American attention are revealed statistically and factually: one half the world's people live there, one fourth in China alone. Asia has been the world's most dynamic region economically in the last 10 years, with many newly industrializing countries, like Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea threatening the primacy of older industrial countries in Europe and North America. Asian societies and economies are not simply models for the third world, nor are they replicas of the West or the Soviet Union. The different cultural factors that shape development are difficult for Americans to grasp, not only because countries like Japan and China have long histories, but also because their languages are not easily accessible to Westerners.

As a backlog for understanding the contemporary forces at work in Asia and the Pacific, there is much that is distinctive about the historical experience of the United States in Asia, where it had its major colonial experience (the Philippines), where it fought a global war (against Japan), and where it faces a significant economic challenge today. Indeed, it could be said that the Vietnam War represented America's primary "neo-colonial" experience. Yet, for analysts, the temptation is strong to neglect this distinctiveness and fall back on "crisis-coping" and "ignorance of local conditions" as sufficient explanations of United States policy failures in Asia and Pacific. The difficulty is that these particular criticisms are as appropriate to Latin America and Africa as they are to Asia.

Traditionally, American leaders thought of Asia as "different", "exotic", a subject of fascination, an object of sentiment. Rarely are these images and myths about Asia probed deeply enough to provide day-to-day guidance for newer conditions. Nevertheless, if the historical record offers little by way of concrete guidelines for current US policy, it suggests the confines within which it operates.

II. THE CURRENT DIRECTION

In recent years, especially during the Reagan presidency, American foreign policy in Asia, as elsewhere, has been dominated by a view of the world that stresses the primacy of East-West tensions. Regional areas have been viewed as theatres of contest with the Soviet Union and its proxies when they have risen to the top of the foreign policy agenda at all. The administration has downgraded multilateral approaches in favour of bilateral relations in Asia, as elsewhere, and has moved toward a posture of

"verbal interventions" wherever Communist thrusts are alleged to damage US interests.

Although American conduct has been largely pragmatic, even in the relationship with the Soviets, the reformist urge, the desire to undo any presumed Communist gains in far-off places is also present on the political right. Ironically, unlike earlier conservative moods, the present manifestation uses words like "rollback" precisely at a time when the United States can least afford unlimited foreign crusades. The gap between Washington's rhetoric and actual behaviour continues to widen.

The greater danger for the Reagan administration is not a rerun of Vietnam in Asia, but rather a tendency to advance false analogies that distort the distinctiveness of Asia. When succumbing to this unfortunate habit, official spokesmen have analyzed the events in the Philippines as if it were Iran or Nicaragua, and those in New Zealand as if David Lange were Charles deGaulle. More subtlety is needed to see that there are certain commonalities in Asian and other regional issues, as well as certain differences.

To be sure, the New Zealand case illustrates the problems of alliance management in circumstances of rising nationalism. The Philippine case dramatizes the complexities of weighing local human rights concerns and US security requirements in the context of demands for political change and a return to democratic processes. The Japanese case underlines the ambiguities of defense burden-sharing with other advanced industrial countries. The Thai case attests to the dilemmas of keeping Communist influences at bay in regimes lacking firm democratic traditions.

Still, even if there are generic problems in Asia for the United States as a superpower, the significance of regional issues must be acknowledged, for Asia is neither unique nor *sui generis* in American foreign policy. A more intelligent approach would highlight geopolitical aspects, rather than ideological roots, in bilateral relations and would pay closer attention to the perceptions of American interests held by others. In relations with both China and Japan, for example, conflicting perceptions may inhibit closer relations, no matter how compatible the interests of all parties may seem to be.

In the case of Japan, Washington has pressed for Japanese rearmament without realizing fully the negative reactions of other Asian countries, especially Korea and China, or of Japanese public opinion. It is better to realize the limits of common interest rather than to exacerbate tensions. This approach requires restating that both the United States and Japan intend to protect Japan from any physical threats and to maintain democratic institutions in each other's countries, while promoting reciprocal exports of goods and services.

In the case of China, despite high-level visits and arms sales, common interests between China and the United States remain less impressive, given China's economic backwardness, its Communist regime and its pattern of cyclical involvement and withdrawal from world politics.

Of course, one common interest is constant — containing the Soviet Union. Here too, as with Japan, perceptions play a role. From the Chinese point of view, the United States is often unreliable. American leaders issue statements and communiqués pledging better relations and then continue to sell arms to Taiwan or take other steps that retard closer contacts, like establishing quotas on textiles that may affect China's development adversely.

From the American point of view, Chinese leaders tend to use ploys to pressure Washington, for example, reopening talks with the Soviets when annoyed with the United States, and adopting third world rhetoric on such issues as Israel and South Africa. The evolution of the Sino-American relationship will depend on whether political leaders on both sides lower expectations of each other and reshape their perceptions.

The United States is an issue in Chinese domestic politics insofar as the Deng group debates whether the benefits of closer ties with the West outweigh the cost of contamination by bourgeois social ideas while economic modernization proceeds. China as an issue in American domestic politics is less virulent or even salient than it was in the McCarthy era. Now both sides need a substantive appreciation of where the Sino-American relationship fits into a broader strategic concept. Such a rearrangement of images is possible, if the period of the Korean War is remembered. Then, politicians on both sides realized they had more to gain than to lose by giving up their faulty preconceptions of each other.

The purely negative goal of preventing Soviet "hegemonism" is too limiting to constitute a desirable Sino-American connection, and the concept of a stable triangle as a basis for Sino-Soviet or Sino-American or Soviet-American relations is too static. At the same time, the shape of China's evolving internal political system is beyond the capacity of the United States to influence.

If relations with Asia's key powers are problematic, the status and stature of the United States in the Pacific is also in flux. The Reagan administration is beginning to discover the price of decades of "benign neglect", as economic and social strains mount. American policies on fishing and weapons testing are increasingly out of step with local desires. The ANZUS Pact has been rendered virtually inoperative as a result of American reaction to New Zealand's barring of visits by US nuclear warships to its ports. Smaller nations like Fiji, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Western Samoa are being courted by the Soviet Union. The emergence of a generation of leaders in the region who are acutely sensitive to real or imagined slights from Washington will severely test the diplomatic skills of Australia and New Zealand, as well as those of the United States. American officials are likely to be preoccupied with the pros and cons of relocating Asian military bases at the same time that they must shore up their regional political commitments.

III. FUTURE PROSPECTS

In April 1985, on the tenth anniversary of the fall or liberation of Saigon, American newspapers ran stories with headlines like: "US-Asian Ties: Never Better", "US as Strong as Ever in the Pacific". In the space of a decade, the United States was restored to its "rightful" position in the region with unwavering bipartisan support, for the Asian "dominoes" had not fallen.

Other favourable indicators included the establishment of mutual respect with China, which was restraining in North Korea and tying down Soviet forces on its border. In addition, editorial comment proclaimed that Japan was playing a more compatible role in American policy planning, that Asian economies were flourishing, that the United States was still ahead of the Soviets in power projection in the Pacific. Even more impressive was the fact that Asian trade constituted 31% of US world trade, with Asian exports to the United States rising five-fold, and American exports to Asia doubling in the same period.

Much was wrong or incomplete in this optimistic picture. Journalists downplayed the storm clouds on the horizons, symbolized by the rise of protective sentiments in the Congress, by political instability in the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore and Indonesia, and by the growing tensions in the Pacific islands and New Zealand. These observers tended to neglect the gap between American political leaders and foreign policy careerists who were in better touch with current affairs in the Asian countries and in general were more cautious about the danger of assuming that all was well with the American presence in Asia and the Pacific.

Those with better information or sharper analytical skills noted with concern the failure of Congress to pass the Compact of Free Association with Micronesia, or a fishing rights pact, the general turndown in economic performance caused by declining demands for Asian raw materials, and the growing Soviet military and diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific. Moreover, the continued tensions engendered by repressive rule in South Korea and US trade relations with Japan were obvious liabilities on any balance sheet.

Surface calm in Asia and the Pacific could be misleading and play into the prejudices of Americans eager only for "good news" or no news about the region Fitzgerald (1985) points out

In Reagan's world, Americans could afford to pay no attention to gloomy matters like overpopulation, nuclear proliferation, and the spread of deserts. They could forget whole continents for years at a time. On the other hand, if foreign governments were abusive or ungrateful, Americans could be abusive back without guilt or fear of consequences. Most important, perhaps, there was an aesthetic to Reagan's world. Instead of a chaotic mess, there was a story line, a single sweeping arc of narrative that bound all events together and made sense of them. Even if the story was not true in every particular, even if it left out the subplots appearing daily in the newspapers, it was surely better than no story at all (p.276).

If this explanation of American ignorance as foreign policy bliss is

accurate, observers and participants should expect that the American role in Asia and the Pacific will continue to be shaped (often incoherently), by a variety of factors: perceptions of external threats, domestic politics, bureaucratic compulsions, historical memories and beliefs of political leaders — both individual and governmental. Nevertheless, the margin for error in American foreign policy is not necessarily the same in all regions. The consequences of failed policies in Asia and the Pacific could well be greater than elsewhere, for there the pushes and pulls between the poles of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy find the United States with greater stakes than ever before, far greater than the nineteenth century romantics could have imagined, when they dreamed their dreams of an Asian and Pacific region with countries essentially subservient to American needs, and devoid of dreams of their own.

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CONTROL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE PACIFIC: THE CASE OF MICRONESIA

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ABSTRACT

Military and military related activities have had a profound and negative effect on Micronesia's development and were a major contributing factor in the break-up of Micronesia into four political entities. Several potential sources of control over military activity in Micronesia are explored: initiatives from Micronesia expressed in protracted negotiations with the United States over future political status, US self-restraint based on a limitation of interests to denial to third powers, and international initiatives.

An issue facing the international community is the proposed termination of the last remaining United Nations Trusteeship established the aftermath of World War 2, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), commonly known as Micronesia.¹ Micronesia consists of 2,203 islands with a population in the early 1980s of about 136,000, and covering an ocean area as large as the United States mainland.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was one of eleven trusteeships, and the only one where the United States was Administering Authority. The other ten have since moved on either to independent statehood in the international system, or have become part of an independent state.² The United States is proposing that the Micronesia Trusteeship be terminated with the creation of four less-than-independent entities, one in a "Commonwealth" relationship with the United States, and

¹ In this paper, "Micronesia" is used a shorthand for the area covered by the TTPI, rather than the wider area which is geographically Micronesia.

² New Guinea became independent in amalgamation with the Australian territory of Papua; the two Cameroons merged and part of the north incorporated into Nigeria.

three in a relationship of "Free Association".

The objectives and procedures for the trusteeship system were spelt out in the UN Charter. The responsibilities of the trustees to the inhabitants were further elaborated in each of the specific agreements in similar language. In the case of Micronesia, these responsibilities were expressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Trusteeship Agreement in terms which referred to political development, economic, educational and social advancement and to civil liberties.

The Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was unique in that it was the only "strategic" trusteeship established by the UN. Articles 82 and 83 of the UN Charter were specifically concerned with the definition and declaration of strategic areas within any of the trusteeship territories. Article 1 of the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia designated the whole area as a strategic one, and the agreement is frequently called a "strategic trusteeship". The special characteristics of the strategic trusteeship are frequently misrepresented as pertaining to Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement which states (*inter alia*) that the administering authority shall be entitled:

1. to establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory;
2. to station and employ armed forces in the territory;
3. to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations....

As recently as May 1984, Ambassador Sherman, the United States representative at United Nations Trusteeship Council asserted that these activities were "not permitted to any other Trust Territory" (UN Trusteeship Council, 30 May 1984, p.11). In fact, of the other ten trusteeship agreements, seven contained a similar provision. Indeed, Article 84 of the UN Charter had specifically reversed the principle of the League of Nations Mandate System, in which the Mandatory Powers in Africa and the South Pacific were not permitted to establish fortifications or military and naval bases. The option to establish military bases in trust territories was seen by the great powers in the UN after World War 2 as consistent with the pursuit of international peace and security.

It is not Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement but two groups of factors which distinguish the strategic trusteeship. The first group establish a special role for the Security Council, which assumed functions exercised by the General Assembly with respect to other trusteeships. The Micronesia Trusteeship Agreement was approved by the Security Council whereas all the others were approved by the General Assembly. The Security Council role was defined by Article 83.1 of the UN Charter which states:

All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

When combined with Article 1 of the Micronesian trusteeship which designated the whole area as a strategic one, the functions of the Security Council extended to the whole of the TTPI. In the Security Council, the United States could therefore use the veto procedure to frustrate any change in the original arrangements.

The second group of distinguishing features appear to give special rights to the United States as Administering Authority. Article 13 of the TTPI Trusteeship Agreement makes reference to certain areas being "closed for security reasons" and to the right of the United States to "determine the extent of applicability" of Articles 87 and 88 of the UN Charter. These Articles set out the functions and powers of the Trusteeship Council, a body under the authority of the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, a qualification added to Article 7 (freedom of speech, press, assembly) and Article 8 (most-favoured-nation concepts) states that their provisions are "subject to the requirements of security". In other trusteeship agreements, the section on human rights and fundamental freedom is qualified only by the requirements of "public order".³

The agreement between the United Nations and the United States to establish a "strategic trusteeship" contained clashing concepts and principles. On the one hand there was the notion of the sacred trust, the duties of the administering power to the inhabitants and the rights of the inhabitants as set out particularly in Articles 6 and 7. On the other hand there was the notion of a great power's strategic interests to which the agreement appeared to allow full sway.

In practice, for the first two decades of the Trust Territory's existence, the description of the relationship as one of trusteeship was a complete misnomer. In the 1950s and 60s military activities in Micronesia were unrestrained by a concept of its obligations as trustee to the inhabitants. The strategic trusteeship was taken by the United States as the practical equivalent to outright annexation (which the Navy had sought after the War) and as allowing carte blanche for military and military-related activities: 66 atomic and hydrogen bomb tests in the Marshalls from 1946 to 1958; the closure of Saipan from 1952 to 1962 for training of Chinese nationalist guerillas by the Central Intelligence Agency; and the establishment of a missile testing site at Kwajalein Atoll used in developing ICBMs, intermediate range missiles, SLBMs, and anti-missile technologies. Political, economic and social policies pursued by the US were shaped by or subordinate to military/strategic requirements.

Although the practice of the first decades involved unhindered sway to military priorities, the Trusteeship Agreement nevertheless gave Micronesia an international status as a transitional entity. The post-war movement of anti-colonialism caught up with Micronesia in the mid 1960s, and Micronesian elites seized on the political opening created by the

³ In some trusteeship agreements, religious freedoms were required to be consistent with "public order and morality". See *United Nations Treaty Series* (1947).

formation of the Congress of Micronesia by the US, and subsequently entered into negotiations with the US for a post-trusteeship status and relationship. Unfortunately, this process of negotiation coincided with a period of enhanced United States military/strategic interest in Micronesia which began in 1969 with the enunciation of the "Nixon Doctrine", symbolically, in Guam.

During the negotiations, the Micronesian side split into four political entities, which each separately developed its own Constitution and the institutions of self-government in the 1970s, with US approval. These entities were the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI), the Marshall Islands, Palau (Belau) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), comprising Yap, Truk, Ponape and Kosrae. In 1975 the population of the Northern Mariana Islands approved a plebiscite establishing by "Covenant" a Commonwealth relationship with the United States. In 1983, the Marshall Islands, Palau and the FSM approved by majorities a Compact of Free Association with the United States. Palau's Constitutional requirements, however, were not met. The US Congress considered the Compact for the other two entities in 1984 and 1985 and approved an amended version late that year.

At this time trusteeship is still in existence, and the process of negotiation for a new status and a new US-Micronesian relationship to succeed the trusteeship has been pursued for 16 years. Micronesia is supposed to move from being the passive object of a strategic trusteeship, in which "strategic" factors were given unrestrained primacy, into self-governing entities with a new mutually agreed status and relationship with the United States. This paper focuses on the prospects for the control of military activity in Micronesia and asks what scope for control is embodied in the proposed post-trusteeship relationships, and specifically what control might be exercised by Micronesians. Addressing this question requires an analysis of the complex legal and political evolution of the US-Micronesian relationship.

NEGOTIATING A POST TRUSTEESHIP RELATIONSHIP: PROCESS AND OUTCOME

In both Commonwealth and Free Association, the principal limitation to the self-governing powers of the four governments is in the area of security and defence. In these areas the United States is to exercise full authority — forever in the case of the Commonwealth and for at least 15 years in the case of Free Association. US basing rights and options are more specifically defined than in the Trusteeship Agreement. Under both types of arrangement, the US can close the area to third party military forces in perpetuity (although this was not an original part of the concept of Free Association).

In the Commonwealth relationship between the United States and the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) (which has already been extensively implemented), the US will obtain sovereignty over this part of Micronesia, and retain the power of eminent domain, specific military rights and land

use options have been spelt out in the Covenant which has been approved by the US Congress. The US also has control over foreign affairs. The people of the NMI can become US citizens. The US Constitution and most US laws are applicable to the area and the full range of federal government programs and services are available. The NMI Constitution was required to be compatible with the US Constitution and has been approved by the US government.

In the proposed Free Association relationships with the other three components of Micronesia, sovereignty will reside with the Micronesian entities and the US is to relinquish eminent domain, and control of land to revert to the various governments. The Compact defines a relationship of indefinite duration whereby self-government is limited under Title Three by US control over defence and security for a period of 15 years and thereafter if both parties agree. (The time frame was changed to 50 years in the case of Palau). Economic assistance is made available for the fifteen year period, and is subsequently subject to negotiation. In theory relationship can be terminated by unilateral action by either party at any time in favour of independence (or of a mutually negotiated closer relationship such as a Commonwealth). A plebiscite within the Micronesian entity would be required to terminate Free Association. But if this were to occur prior to the 15 years, the security and defense provisions and certain economic provisions survive the full 15 years. The substantial qualifications to this right to unilateral termination to independence are discussed below.

In addition, in subsidiary agreements to the Compact, the military basing options over land and territorial waters are spelt out as a *quid pro quo* for the United States' relinquishment of eminent domain. These agreements have their own durations: up to 30 years for the Kwajalein Missile Range, 50 years for proposed basing options in Palau. Furthermore the right of the US to deny Micronesia to the military activities of third powers and the obligation to defend Micronesia are set out in agreements which exist independently of the security and defence authority, and these agreements are of indefinite duration and cannot be unilaterally terminated.⁴

The Freely Associated entities have power over foreign affairs, except in areas related to defence and security. The people of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the FSM will not become US citizens, US laws will not be applicable unless specified in the Compact, and US federal govern-

⁴ Copies of the subsidiary agreements have been published by the United States Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, and included in the transcripts of Congressional hearings in 1984 and 1985. The agreements setting out military basing rights and options are titled "Agreement Regarding Military Use and Operating Rights of the Government of the United States in [Marshall Islands, Palau, FSM]". The agreements covering denial and mutual security are titled "Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of [Marshall Islands, Palau, FSM] Regarding Friendship, Co-operative and Mutual Security...". In the case of Palau, the redrafted 1984 version of the Compact placed the equivalent denial agreement in the body of the Compact.

ment services and programs will only be available if specified in the Compact. The Constitutions of the Freely Associated entities do not need the approval of the US government, but they must be consistent with the Compacts of Free Association.

In the case of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth relationship does not appear to provide for any greater degree of control over military activity than existed under the trusteeship. Although certain US basing rights have been set out in agreements with specific durations (up to 100 years!), the US can take additional land or sea for military purposes if the need is considered essential. The inhabitants have access to the same judicial processes as other US citizens, to pursue application of environmental standards, fair compensation. In the case of the Free Association, the proposed relationship is (or seems to be) more complex. A detailed assessment of the areas of policy making which would be under full Micronesian control, and the areas under full United States control, and the areas of greater or lesser control is provided by Clark (1980).

TABLE 1

<i>SPECTRUM OF CONTROL</i>	
<i>Location of Control</i>	<i>Examples</i>
<i>Complete US discretion</i>	• <i>storage of radioactive and hazardous materials not "hazardous to public health and safety"</i> • <i>foreclosure of access to third states for military purposes (denial)</i>
<i>US veto</i>	• <i>any activities deemed by US to be incompatible with defence powers</i>
<i>US concurrence</i>	• <i>economic development plans</i>
<i>Micronesian concurrence</i>	• <i>economic development plans</i>
<i>Micronesian veto</i>	• <i>testing of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons</i>
<i>Micronesian discretion</i>	• <i>additional bases, marine resources, commercial and cultural relations</i>

A major uncertainty in this portrayal of the spectrum of control is the extent of applicability of the US veto under the "incompatibility" clause of the Compact. Section 313(a) states:

The Governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia shall refrain from actions which the Government of the United States determines, after appropriate consultation with those Governments, to be incompatible with its authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.

During the sixteen years of negotiations (1969 to 1985) on the form of a post-trusteeship relationship, the Micronesian leadership groups have

made no *direct* challenge to continuing US defence and security prerogatives (Armstrong, 1981). The US position has been that its definition of military and security interests has been a non-negotiable matter. In answer to a Congressional question "Are our military objectives in the Pacific being subordinated to our goal of quick termination of the trusteeship?" the US Administration replied (Buckley, 1984):

"No, on the contrary, the Compact is designed to protect and further these objectives. The trusteeship will not be terminated unless all US defense interests are accommodated, and until formal agreements covering foreseeable military land requirements and related operating rights have been concluded."

The Micronesians have taken this as a limitation on the agenda for negotiations, which have focussed around the search for trade-offs, or *quid pro quos* which could be gained from the United States.

In the early phase of negotiations, however, Micronesians articulated the desire for a relationship which kept the option open of a move to full independence at some future date, a status wherein US military rights would one day need to be negotiated on a nation-to-nation basis.

The formation of a Micronesian negotiating position on a post-trusteeship status began when the Congress of Micronesia, established in 1965, set up a Political Status Commission. In 1969, the Commission proposed to the United States a Free Association relationship based on the following principles (Armstrong, 1981, p.186):

1. That sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia and their duly constituted government.
2. That the people of Micronesia possess the right of self determination and may, therefore, choose independence or self government in free association with any nation or organisation of nations.
3. That the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution and to amend, change or revoke any constitution or government plan at any time; and
4. That free association should be in the form of a revocable contract, terminable unilaterally by either party.

In 1971, the United States accepted the concept of Free Association after expressing a preference for the status of Unincorporated Territory and then for a Commonwealth. These were rejected by the Micronesian negotiators.

The challenge to US defence and strategic interests emerged indirectly, not as a frontal challenge to those interests, but from conflicts over two issues — the control of land, and the future option of independence through the unilateral termination of the Compact of Free Association.

The conflict over land revolved initially around the question of eminent domain. In April 1972, this issue was resolved when the US agreed to relinquish general control over land in return for the Micronesian negotiators' acceptance of a list of specific United States land use claims spelt out in detail. The military basing rights and options spelt out by the Pentagon in the early 1970s were incorporated almost unchanged in subsidiary agreements attached to the Compacts in the early 1980s.⁵

The question of the right to unilaterally terminate the Compact and move to full independence was not raised by Micronesians in terms which expressed disagreement with specific American military interests, or a lack of willingness to accommodate them. However, the question of some future restriction of American military activities was raised implicitly. This potential constraint was weakened in two stages. First, the united position of the Micronesian leadership disintegrated in the early 1970s, and the question of the right to future independence disappeared from the practical negotiating agenda. Then, in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration added further subsidiary agreements to the Compact package which established US military denial rights which would last in perpetuity if the US wished.

The independence issue went off the agenda when the United States seized the opportunity to conclude a different kind of arrangement with a segment of Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands — a closer Commonwealth arrangement with no option for unilateral termination. Separate negotiations with this part of the Trust Territory began in 1972 at precisely the time eminent domain was conceded to the all-Micronesia negotiators (Gale, 1979; McHenry, 1975, Ch. 5). One US response therefore to the idea of future independence was to hasten to complete a separate arrangement with that part of Micronesia least interested in independence, and willing to settle for a closer relationship than Free Association.

Separate negotiations had been sought for some years by the Northern Marianas' leadership. The Northern Mariana Islands population had more in common ethnically and culturally with Guam than with the inhabitants of the atolls of the Caroline and Marshall Islands. But the sense of difference was reinforced by a decade of closure for use as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) training camp, accessible only through Guam, and isolated from the rest of the TTPI. Jobs and income associated with the military presence led to a substantially higher cash income per head in Saipan and Tinian than in the rest of Micronesia. The development of nearby Guam (an Unincorporated Territory of the US) into a major military base after World War II has provided a model of the potential economic spinoffs from US military activity.

With the cessation of military training activities in 1962, the governing centre for the Trust Territory was moved from Hawaii to the abandoned CIA headquarters in Saipan. The criteria for selection of an administrative centre for Micronesia seem to have been availability of space and proximity to Guam, and the choice had further negative impacts on a sense of Micronesian unity.

The Marianas breakaway movement sought initially a merger with Guam but settled for a Commonwealth relationship involving a permanent derogation of sovereignty in the areas of security, defense and foreign

³ A problem later developed over restrictions in the Palauan Constitution on the alienation of land, but there is insufficient space to develop this point.

affairs. By accommodating this sentiment, the US secured permanently its military options in one part of Micronesia. The move also had the effect of stymying the question of future independence among the remaining Micronesian negotiators. US officials also indicated that there would be financial penalties for pursuing such a course, and that it would not maintain the same levels of financial assistance to an independent Micronesia as it would to one in Free Association with the US. The Micronesian bargaining agenda turned to an attempt to gain the maximum economic benefit in the future relationship as the trade-off for concessions to US military demands.

Further separatism fragmented the Micronesian side, leading to the complete collapse of the right to independence issue. Further break-up was encouraged partly by the Mariana's example, and partly by the belief by sections of the Micronesian elite that they could strike better financial deals with the United States than they could secure as part of a single Micronesian entity. This issue came to a head in 1978 when the Marshall Islands and Palau rejected the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, and with US consent, set about the development of their own constitutions. The Marshall Islands and Palau, were, respectively, the area of major military activity at that time, and the area of most substantial US basing options. The prospect of using their value to the United States military as a bargaining lever to secure additional financial benefits for particular regions was a major impulse behind separatism.

But the fragmentation of the Micronesian side became a two-edged sword as it opened the way for a further indirect challenge to US military prerogatives. Against US opposition, the Palauans voted twice for a Constitution which involved several new constraints on US military options. Most significant were the provisions requiring that any agreement (including the Compact) to test, store or dispose of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons must receive a 75% vote in a plebiscite.

Representatives from the United States government and three Micronesian entities (FSM, Marshall Islands, Palau) initiated a draft Compact in 1980. In 1982, final drafts were signed, and plebiscites took place in 1983 in each of the three regions. A vote for Free Association at the plebiscites was deemed a vote for the Compact package, involving the Compact itself, multilateral subsidiary agreements, and bilateral subsidiary agreements. The Free Association option was approved by majorities in each of the three entities (Ranney & Penniman, 1975). In 1984 and 1985, Congressional hearings were held in the United States on the Compact package as it applied to the FSM and the Marshall Islands, but not Palau, as Palau's Constitutional requirements (75 per cent approval) had not been satisfied. Congressional approval was given in late 1985.

In the period between the initialing of the draft Compact in 1980 and signing in 1982 of the Compact package, the Reagan Administration insisted on a number of changes. These led to the conclusion of subsidiary agreements on the matter of "denial" which would exist indefinitely unless

both sides agreed to terminate. They also established a permanent security alliance unless both sides agreed to terminate (US Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, 1983).

This move appears to qualify severely the right to unilaterally terminate the Compact, the notion which was originally regarded as central to the concept of Free Association and which was already limited by the survival of the security and defence sections (Title Three) of the Compact for 15 years, and the survival of basing options for periods of 30 and 50 years. Such a shift would seem to radically undermine the prospect for the exercise of Micronesian discretion and veto in decision making during and after the period of the Compact. The following interchanges (US Congress, Hearings, 1984) underline this point. The discussion concerned a possible scenario in which the USSR sought to establish a fishing port in Micronesia which the US thought might have military usefulness. Reference had been made to the provision in the Compact for the arbitration of disputes.

Senator Johnston: Now you don't reach arbitration though if the United States determines that that fishing boat could be useful militarily?

Mr Zeder (spokesperson for the Administration on Micronesian negotiations): That's absolutely true.

Senator Johnston: In other words, it is understood that we have full plenary power to say that any activity is military even though we may be wrong?

Mr Zeder: Yes, we do, sir, and we do intend to exercise it.

Senator Johnston: Any activity whatsoever, we could determine to be military and prevent it?

Mr Zeder: Yes, sir.

Senator Johnston: I just want to be absolutely clear.

Mr Zeder: Yes, sir.

Senator Johnston: All right. I think that's clear.

The disappearance of the right-to-terminate-to-independence issue from the agenda of Micronesian concerns in negotiations with the US is a fairly complex matter. It was not as simple as the US compelling Micronesia to drop the issue of the right to independence, or that the US split up Micronesia as part of a strategy of divide and rule, and contrived Micronesia's economic dependence to secure a weak bargaining position. Nor, on the other hand, is it as simple as claimed by US representative at the Trusteeship Council hearings that the US aim was "economic development to the point where the economic entities can become and increasingly independent", and that the US was "altruistic" and that "no threats" of an economic kind were made (UN Trusteeship Council, 22 May 1984, pp.16-18).

United States economic development goals for Micronesia were secondary to military objectives, and this priority largely accounts for US acceptance of an extraordinarily high degree of Micronesian economic dependence on the United States and the consequent distorted economic development in Micronesia. There have been substantial elements of what many Americans and Micronesians have seen as generosity and altruism,

and also strong elements of the conscious manipulation of economic dependence in the pursuit of US political and military objectives. The most substantial example of the latter was the "Solomon Report" prepared for President Kennedy in the early 1960s, which advocated the cultural and economic incorporation of Micronesia by the United States in order to secure its political compliance to US strategic interests. But there is not clear evidence that such a "master plan" united the disparate elements of the US bureaucracy which competed for policy influence over Micronesia in subsequent years.

A fundamental US objective, however, was to gain consent, or the appearance of consent, to continue and to expand the sort of military activities which had been carried out without consent under the strategic trusteeship. This is made clear in written answers by the US Administration to a series of questions by the Senate Energy Committee (US Congress, Hearings, 1984):

Q. Do the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs support the Free association concept?

A. In the Judgment of the DOD and the Joint Chiefs, free association will better serve US defense interests in the long term than would indefinite continuation of the trusteeship because realistically the US could not maintain a defense presence without the consent of the people concerned.

Q. Why doesn't continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement better serve US defense interests?

A. Perpetuation of the Trusteeship Agreement is not compatible with long-range US security interests in the area because the *status quo* is unacceptable to most local political leaders. Those leaders are unwilling to continue current arrangements or conclude agreements for any future requirements, e.g. Palau land, [without] satisfactory resolution of future political status.

Q. What is the advantage of free association over the present situation from the defense and security perspective?

A. Micronesian acceptance of the Compact of Free Association and its subsidiary agreements on defense matters will provide requisite guarantees for US defense requirements and will have been freely negotiated by the Micronesian Governments and approved by their peoples rather than imposed upon them.

The effect, if not the explicit intention, of twenty-five years of extreme economic dependence under the strategic trusteeship, was to undermine the bargaining position on the Micronesian side — when faced with the United States with a bottom line list military/strategic demands and an awareness of the vulnerabilities on the Micronesian side. The reference to the independence option in later plebiscites had more to do with US desire for political verisimilitude than a choice which Micronesian leaders could see as feasible, as the right to terminate Free Association to full independence had been effectively relinquished.

In addition to the effect of extreme economic dependence, previous

and existing military activities had a profound political legacy. Military activity in regions of Micronesia created regionally based clients, who have at times disputed vigorously the terms of transactions and pursued the best possible financial result, but who in the process have seen the economic value of military utility as setting them apart from the rest of Micronesia. With the partial exception of Palau, these clients have not directly questioned the right to conduct military activities, but have disputed the financial terms. (Although the vigour with which the terms have at times been disputed may partly reflect frustration with the perceived inability to challenge the activities themselves.)

On the other hand, fear of *future* military activity appears to have led to more direct oppositional activity. In the case of Palau, opposition to US basing options has been directly proportional to proximity to those areas identified in the options. Paradoxically this may have led to further separatist tendencies — preference for a more accessible vehicle through which to express opposition. The “nuclear free” aspects of the Palau constitution is partly a reflection of these sentiments, sentiments which could be overwhelmed in an all Micronesian process of Constitution formation.

In those areas of Micronesia where there are no actual or proposed military activities (Yap, Truk, Ponape and Kosrae) still remain together as the Federated States of Micronesia, despite regional differences. Furthermore, the FSM has been the area where greatest preference has been shown for a future based on eventual movement towards independence and increasing self-reliance (Schwalbenberg, 1984).

PALAU: THE “NUCLEAR FREE” CONSTITUTION AND THE COMPACT

After 1978, a further potential constraint on US military activities arose from Palau’s “nuclear-free” Constitution. The formation of separate constitutional governments in Palau and the Marshall Islands was agreed to by the United States in 1978. Palau adopted a Constitution which set requirements for approval of the Compact of Free Association and two versions of the Compact have subsequently failed to meet those requirements, at plebiscites in February 1983 and September 1984. As a consequence, the Compact and subsidiary agreements relating to Palau were not forwarded by the US Administration for Congressional approval in 1984 or 1985, and those documents forwarded related only to the Marshall Islands and the FSM.

The Palauan Constitution is not strictly nuclear-free, and this appellation derives from two sections of the Constitution requiring 75% approval at referendum before the testing, storage or disposal of harmful substances can take place (Clark, 1985).

Article XIII, Section 6 provides:

Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials

therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored or disposed of within the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of not less than three fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific question.

Article II, Section 3 states:

Major governmental powers including but not limited to defense, security, or foreign affairs may be delegated by treaty, compact or other agreement between the sovereign Republic of Palau and another sovereign nation or international organization... provided that any such agreement which authorizes testing, storage or disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare shall require approval of not less than three fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in such a referendum.

The Palauan Constitution, which was drawn up at the same time as the draft Compact in the late 1970s, was opposed by the United States and sections of the Palauan polity. After receiving approval at referendum, the Constitution was declared invalid on procedural grounds and replaced by one which did not contain such restrictive provisions. However, this revised Constitution failed to pass the plebiscite, and the "nuclear-free" version was put again and approved in 1981. It is generally accepted as the valid Constitution of Palau. On the other hand, the Palauan government supported the concept of Free Association embodied in a Compact, including Title Three on defence and security, and subsidiary agreements on basing options. It sought funding provisions to match the basing option duration (50 years).

The Constitution required that sections of the Compact which implied approval of testing, storage or disposal of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons be put to separate popular vote and receive 75% of votes cast. In February 1983, the Compact was approved by 62% and matters put separately received 53%, less than the 75% requirement (Ranney & Penniman, 1985).

The main section of the Compact which was put separately was Section 314, a section which itself appeared to place controls on the testing, storage and disposal of these materials. In particular, the Compact stated (Section 314(b)) that, except in times of national emergency, the US "shall not store... any toxic chemical weapon nor any radioactive materials nor any toxic chemical materials intended for weapons use". However, this Section was prefaced by "Unless otherwise agreed", and a bilateral agreement concerning radioactive, chemical and biological substances left the door open to weapons storage. Furthermore, the subsidiary agreement on basing options would also allow the US to store any kind of weapons giving the US free "access to and unrestricted control over defense sites".⁶ The

⁶ See Article V of the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement with Palau referred to in footnote 4. The other agreement with Palau is titled "Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Palau regarding Radioactive, Chemical and Biological Substances", signed August 1982.

implication is made clear in a blunt answer by the US Administration to a Congressional committee question (US Congress, Hearings 1984, p.961):

Q. What types of weapons and other materials may we store in the Freely Associated States?

A. Any weapon or material in our defense arsenal may be stored in the Freely Associated States.

The terminology "Unless otherwise agreed" also opened the possibility of future agreements negotiated on a bilateral government-to-government basis.

In September 1983 the Palauan Supreme Court ruled that, as these matters did not receive 75% approval, the Compact itself had not been approved. Political negotiations resumed between the US and Palauan governments and on May 23 1984, a revised Compact was signed. This revised Compact was presented by the Palauan President as having removed the offending Section 341, and associated bilateral agreement and thus required only a simple majority vote to be compatible with the Constitution. The 75% requirement was not specifically mentioned on the ballot held in September 1984. The Compact received 66% of the vote on a turnout of 71%, compared with 88% in 1983 (Ranney & Penniman, 1985).

The 75% requirement was, however, still applicable and the revised Compact did not meet Palau's Constitutional requirements. Although section 314 was removed, the United States authority and responsibility for defence and security (moved from s.311 of the old Compact to s.312 of the revised one) was still defined in a way that would allow testing, storage and disposal of weapons. By removing Section 314 as a whole, the US removed not just the "loopholes" but also the potential constraints of that section (Clark, 1985). The US would still not forego these options in the revised Compact and a 75% vote was therefore required.

The conduct of the September 1984 plebiscite has been the subject of much valid criticism, in the Trusteeship Council and elsewhere over the misleading presentation of issues and the absence of the Trusteeship Council observers. The US has accepted that Palauan Constitutional requirements have still not been met, and negotiations have resumed on the impasse. The United States position, from the debate over the Palauan Constitution onwards, has been to send the Palauans back to vote again, both when they approved a Constitution at odds with the US concept of the Compact and later when they failed to approve the Compact in the way required by the adopted Constitution. The frequency of plebiscites have been hailed by US spokespersons as an expression of democracy at work. On the other hand the single Constitutional plebiscites and single votes on either the Covenant or Compact by the other three Micronesian entities are presented as definite acts of self-determination binding future generations to a specific international status and relationship.

In recent statements the US has sought to downplay the matter of its military basing options in Palau. According to US Ambassador Feldman at the UN Trusteeship Council in 1985:

The Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in the Pacific Theatre, Admiral Crowe, has said in numerous press conferences... that the United States contemplates no air base, naval base, submarine base, no military base of any kind in Palau.

The United States has been asked that it be allowed, from time to time, to use certain public areas in Palau for brief training exercises. This is purely on a contingency basis in fact, because there are no plans at the moment even to use them for exercises. We simply asked in the Compact whether Palau would be willing to entertain such a request. And I want to stress that, were the request granted, it would be for temporary, non-exclusive use of public lands. No military base is contemplated in Palau.

The military use provisions overwhelmingly contemplate non-exclusive use for temporary activities such as training exercises... which might occur only a few weeks a year.

It is not clear whether this represents some shift of policy on the part of the United States or a public relations exercise. Palau basing options are not just a figment of the imagination but have been explicitly mentioned on the United States' list of military requirements in Micronesia, and go beyond provision for training exercises to a series of exclusive-use areas. Moreover, these were set out in extensive detail in the 1983 subsidiary agreement. If other options apart from training exercises have been dropped, then it would seem a simple matter to drop the training option as these activities can easily be done somewhere else. The US could therefore accommodate itself to the Palauan Constitution and propose a Compact which would need only 50% of the vote in Palau.

PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

In early August 1985, at a meeting at the Cook Islands, the members of the South Pacific Forum agreed to the creation by Treaty of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Eight governments signed immediately and most remaining members were expected to sign, with sufficient ratifications expected for the Treaty to come into force by the Forum meeting in 1986. According to the official communique, the Treaty "would establish only the second nuclear weapon free zone in a permanently inhabited area [and] reflected the deep concern of all Forum members at the continuing nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear war" (Australia, Dept. of Foreign Affairs 1985). The northern boundary of the Zone extended to the equator, south of Micronesia. The SPNFZ has been promoted by Australia as a major regional arms control initiative. Could this regional initiative be extended to Micronesia?

In the Compact of Free Association, Title One, Article II outlines the foreign affairs capacity which may be exercised by Palau, the Marshall Islands and the FSM when the Compact takes effect. Section 121(a) states:

The Governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs and shall

do so in their own name and right except as otherwise provided in this compact.

The Compact outlines a number of areas included in the foreign affairs capacity. These include law of the sea and the marine resources matters, commercial, economic, diplomatic and cultural relations. The list in the Compact is seen by the United States as "illustrative" not inclusive (US Congress, Hearings, 1984, p.986). Micronesian governments will have the capacity to enter into treaties with other governments and regional and international organizations (Section 121(c)), and Micronesia will cease to be covered by treaties concluded by the United States unless specified in the Compact or subsidiary agreements (Section 127).

The US Government sees the Compact as recognizing the foreign affairs capacity, not as conferring it and that "Third states must recognize the government's new status and the foreign affairs powers associated with it in order for the Freely Associated State to enter into bilateral relations with those states" (US Congress, Hearings, 1984, p.926). In the case of the Northern Mariana Islands, the US does not recognize that any foreign affairs capacity will exist after the termination of the trusteeship to a Commonwealth relationship. Foreign affairs in this case will be a matter for the US government. The process of recognizing the Freely Associated entities has begun even though the trusteeship is still formally in existence. The South Pacific Forum has given approval to the FSM to become an observer, and to become a member of the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Cooperative and the Forum Fisheries Agency. Palau, the Marshall Islands and the FSM have been accepted as associate members of the South Pacific Commission.

The SPNFZ Treaty prohibits a limited range of nuclear-related activities, and is more accurately referred to as a partial nuclear-free zone proposal, analogous to the partial nuclear test ban agreed to in the early 1960s by the US and the USSR. It prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons by member states, testing of nuclear weapons, permanent stationing of nuclear weapons, waste dumping at sea by member states, and the use or threatened use of force against the zone by the nuclear-armed powers who are asked to sign Protocols to the Treaty.

The Treaty does not attempt to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons within territorial waters or airspace, port visits or the provision of logistical support, communications or intelligence installations related to nuclear weapons related uses, nuclear power, or uranium mining (Hamel-Green, 1985).⁷ If the three Micronesian entities for which the US will recognize a foreign affairs capacity were to become parties to the Treaty, the sections of significance would appear to be the ban on the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons, and possibly the ban on nuclear waste dumping at sea.

That the Compact allows the storage of nuclear weapons has been

⁷ *Peace Studies* can be obtained from GPO Box 1274, Melbourne, Vic 3001, Australia.

established in discussion of Palau. This is in direct conflict with the SPNFZ restriction, notwithstanding the lack of tight definition to the concept of "permanent" storage in the Treaty, which could allow the development of "de facto" permanent storage without apparent violation of the Treaty. Attempts by Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu to tighten up this provision were rejected by the Treaty drafting committee (Hamel-Green, 1985).

The ban on nuclear waste dumping at sea by Zone members could conceivably affect future plans for the disposal of radioactive topsoil following further clean-ups at Bikini or Enewetak. The crater on Runit island has been filled with debris from an earlier clean-up, and sealed and is not no longer available for this use. (The SPNFZ does not address the issue of dumping on land by Forum members, or dumping by non-member states.)

Several South Pacific Forum members (PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Nauru) pressed for a ban on nuclear missile testing in the Zone to be included in the Protocols, but this was rejected by Australia. If extended to Micronesia, such an inclusion would have been in conflict with the subsidiary agreement on the Kwajalein Missile Range. But as the Treaty stands, the activities at the KMR, which involve testing missiles and anti-missile systems and not warheads, would not be prohibited.

A *comprehensive* nuclear free zone which would prohibit all the activities listed above which have been exempted from the SPNFZ has been promoted by a non-government network of community groups in the Pacific in recent years. This perspective has not entered many government agendas in the South Pacific because of outright US opposition. The USSR has shown a lack of interest and yet all the great powers would need to be parties to any agreement to forgo traditional rights in international waters and airspace. The Comprehensive Zone proposal amounts to an alternative regional security system which challenges the traditional military prerogatives of the nation state. In a sense, it would aim to achieve the same result as the basic US military objective in Micronesia, of military denial, and would extend it to a large area of the Pacific. However, it would also require US "self-denial" and a fundamental readjustment of perceptions of defence and security policy in the Pacific. For the USSR, a similar readjustment of perceptions would be required, although in this case it would be accepting a limitation primarily on future military activities, rather than current activities as with the US. The regime for Antarctica offers one example of this kind of proposal operating in practice.

The partial SPNFZ Treaty is now open for signature — would Micronesia have the foreign affairs capacity to enter such an agreement? During the drafting of the Treaty, Papua New Guinea sought to extend the boundary of the Zone north to include Micronesia, but was overruled on the grounds that it would complicate current negotiations on the future of the Trust Territory (Hamel-Green, 1985). The FSM government was an official forum observer of the SPNFZ discussions.

The limits on the Micronesian foreign affairs capacity are however

very substantial. In the case of the Northern Marianas, no foreign affairs capacity is recognized and the following discussion relates to the status of Free Association. Here, the capacity is limited first by Title Three of the Compact which begins "The Government of the United States has full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to Palau, the Marshalls Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia", including the obligations to defend these areas, the option to foreclose to "use for military purposes" by any third country, and the option to establish bases subject to the terms of subsidiary agreements. Foreign affairs matters with a security or defence aspect are therefore not within the capacity of Micronesian governments. Furthermore, as in other areas of Micronesian decision making, the incompatibility clause (Section 313) operates, requiring Micronesian governments to refrain from activities which the US government determines to be incompatible with Title Three. They are also required to consult with the US Government in the general conduct of their foreign affairs (Section 123).

For the proposed 15 years of operation of the Compact, as a result of Title Three, it would be the United States and not the Micronesian governments which would decide whether they became parties to a treaty such as the SPNFZ. If the Micronesian governments failed to consult in the foreign affairs area, the US Administration's view is that "the United States Government shall have traditional international law remedies for breach, such as diplomatic protest. If there is a fundamental breach, the USG has the right of unilateral termination. *By way of a more limited response, the US could withhold funds or programmes (e.g., by placing the proceeds in escrow)*, (US Congress, Hearings, 1984, p.927 *italics added*).

Beyond the first 15 years, whether or not Title Three of the Compact remains, the operation of subsidiary agreements for military basing would extend constraints on Micronesia's capacity for the duration of those agreements (which entail the right to store weapons, as indicated). The subsidiary agreements on denial raise the prospect of a constraint extending in perpetuity, should the US wish. This agreement gives the US an unqualified right to enter Micronesia at its own initiative to foreclose access to military use by third countries. This right of entry would be in conflict with any comprehensive nuclear free zone proposal, and in tension with the Protocols of the SPNFZ Treaty prohibiting threats against the Zone.

The future international status of Micronesian governments under Free Association is uncertain. Concern has been expressed that the termination of the trusteeship will result in the removal of the area from UN scrutiny, as the new entities will not be eligible for UN membership. A range of protections which now exist, such as the forum provided by the UN Trusteeship Council and legal rights in the US, will be lost, and this could leave Micronesia more isolated and in an even weaker bargaining position against the future claims of US military interests (Roff, 1984). The US Administration has made a number of comparisons with the Cook Islands, claiming that the New Zealand government has a greater authority over

foreign affairs than the US is maintaining in Micronesia (Hills, 1984). This greatly underestimates the actual capacity of the Cook Islands to engage in foreign affairs. Rarotonga was the location of the South Pacific Forum meeting which concluded the SPNFZ treaty, and the Cook Islands are a full Forum member and have signed the Treaty. In addition the Cook Islands retained the ability to terminate Free Association without the application of surviving subsidiary agreements.

In an increasingly militarized world with a global superpower competition, almost any foreign affairs issue could be said to have a security or defense aspect. The scope allowed to the three Micronesian governments under the Compacts seems largely dependent on American good will. In the Northern Mariana Islands, the area once closed off for secret military training activities will remain "closed off" to the world, in the sense that no independent foreign affairs capacity is recognized by the United States. In the rest of Micronesia the degree to which the veto is invoked by the US, and matters of foreign affairs deemed to be matters of security and defence, remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

The "strategic" Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia adopted by the United Nations in 1947 was a flawed document which expressed directly clashing principles, an impossible conflict between a licence for unlimited US military activity and a commitment as trustee to a set of development and human rights objectives for the inhabitants. The conflict was "resolved" by ignoring the latter for the first two decades and conducting an array of military activities, none of which had any direct connection to the geo-strategic position of Micronesia. From the experience of World War II, the denial of Micronesia to military activities by third powers has been seen as the major US military interest and the basic rationale for the strategic trusteeship.

Demilitarized trusteeships were an unfashionable concept after World War II. The League of Nations approach towards Micronesia was reversed and no attempt made to place any restrictions on what the US might do in the name of peace and security. The US then proceeded to abuse what could be said to be its "legitimate" right of denial (analogous to the Russians in Eastern Europe?), by undertaking a series of military programs for which Micronesia was merely a distant, isolated, convenient piece of real estate. Nuclear weapons tests, CIA training camps, and missile testing could all be done elsewhere, but were carried out in Micronesia because it was cheap and convenient and offered no political resistance.

With the development of a movement towards self-government and self-determination, the US responded by proposing that it now had two principle objectives — to allow and encourage an act of self-determination to take place, and to maintain its military and security interests. The US, however, proceeded in the 1970s and 1980s to treat the conflict between

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these two objectives in the same way as it had reconciled the conflicting elements of the Trusteeship Agreement. Military and strategic objectives were not negotiable and the Micronesians, instead of being ignored, were now asked to give their active consent rather than passive acquiescence.

The basing options spelt out by the Pentagon in the early 1970s contained an indiscriminate mix of items, few of which could be related to the geostrategic position of Micronesia, and most were forms of convenience. At times the US has explicitly argued that, because under the trusteeship it could do anything that it deemed furthered international peace and security, it inherited that right in the post-trusteeship arrangements.

A typical statement of the priority of US military objectives in Micronesia is that given by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (US Congress 1984, p.152):

"The Department of Defense's objectives in Micronesia are essentially fourfold. They are specifically:

- A: Denial of Micronesia to the armed forces of hostile nations.
- B. Access for US military forces.
- C. Unhampered use of Kwajalein Missile Range
- D. Contingency use options in Palau."

(Tinian and other uses of the Northern Mariana Islands is not mentioned here as the context related to the proposed Compact of Free Association.)

Having established a list of priorities with denial as the first order priority, the US has not considered the extent to which second order objectives might conflict with its own stated aspirations for Micronesian self-determination. The US appears to have drawn up a military shopping list and set out to secure the lot while obtaining a demonstration of Micronesian consent. And by and large, the Micronesians provided the semblance of "consent".

This paper began as a search for evidence of the capacity for the exercise of national and international controls on military activity in Micronesia arising from the transition to post-trusteeship status. It may be asserted that at least the US has now had to define its basing requirements and has formally relinquished eminent domain (outside the NMI), that Micronesians will possess a right of veto on any new military basing options requested (except for the NMI), that this will also apply to existing basing options when they eventually expire and that Title Three of the Compact can be let lapse after 15 years. Moreover, it could be claimed that permanent denial cannot be secured by any legal document, and the option is open at some future date for one of the Micronesian governments to lodge a denunciation of this part of the agreement.

The thrust of this paper has been to argue against this "optimistic" scenario. Existing military claims on Micronesia are already very large, and in the Marshall Islands and the NMI they have been largely accommodated by the local populations. The capacity of Micronesians to take initiatives to

control US military activities is sharply curtailed by "legal" provisions of the new relationship, by economic dependency, and by the United States' determination to maintain extensive military prerogatives in areas inhabited by small island communities.

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ADDITIONAL PRESENTERS UNDER TOPIC VIII

ABSTRACTS

GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN OCEANIA: IMPLICATIONS AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSES FROM PACIFIC ISLAND MICRO-STATES

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(No abstract provided)

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

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ABSTRACT

The paper will assess the impact of the expansion of the Russian and Chinese presence in the Pacific Basin region, and the impact of their competition for strategic influence both in terms of individual state reactions to this, and in terms of the region's growing importance for Russia's and China's standing as world powers. In order to promote a more peaceful regional order, it might be useful for states

to improve bilateral relations and strengthen sub-regional agreements, with the eventual aim of creating a comprehensive system of collective security.

FRENCH MILITARISATION AND DISRUPTION IN THE PACIFIC

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This paper analyses the nature and scope of French interests and policies in the Pacific, and suggests some possible options and counter-measures available to Pacific countries in resolving the conflicts.

THE SYMPOSIA

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ROTARY CENTER FOR WORLD UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE

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The fundamental and underlying objective of The Rotary Foundation of Rotary International is that of improving understanding among peoples and nations of the world, leading toward eventual peace.

Rotary International, of which The Rotary Foundation is a part, was established in 1905, in Chicago, Illinois, and was the first "service club" ever established. Today there are some 22,000 clubs in 159 nations in different parts of the world with nearly one million members. It is the most international of all organizations. While fellowship among members and service to meet community needs are objectives of Rotary Clubs, the underlying objective of Rotary International is the same as that of the Rotary Foundation. That is to contribute toward improved understanding among peoples of the world, leading toward peace among all nations.

PROGRAMMES OF THE ROTARY FOUNDATION

Building upon the programmes of Rotary International, The Rotary Foundation of Rotary International conducts a variety of programmes, which have as their fundamental purpose contributing toward improved understanding, leading toward more peaceful conditions, while also meeting human needs in various areas of the world.

These programmes are six in number — Scholarships, Group Study Exchange, Special Grants, the 3-H Programme-Health, Hunger and Humanity, PolioPlus and Grants for University Teachers.

A. SCHOLARSHIPS

More than 15,500 Rotary Foundation scholarships have been awarded to scholars from 110 countries to study in 93 countries, representing a total investment of Foundation funds of nearly \$105 million. These 15,500 young men and women who have had the experience of being Goodwill Ambassadors and of studying in a country other than their own have contributed importantly to improved understanding among peoples of the world. Many of these scholars have achieved positions of prominence in their respected fields in the nations throughout the world. Also through this scholarship programme, The Rotary Foundation has taken the initial step in what will be a comprehensive approach to the problem of world hunger. The Foundation has authorized a new category of scholarship: the "Freedom From Hunger" scholarship, which will fund up to three years' study in agricultural development toward an advanced degree for scholars from developing nations. These scholars will return to their nations to contribute toward the production of food to alleviate starvation in the future. Fifty such scholarships tenable in 1986-1987, will be awarded.

B. SPECIAL GRANTS

Special Grants are made for educational or charitable projects sponsored and partially financed by Rotary Clubs or Districts and which contribute to the furtherance of international understanding. More than 650 special grants have been awarded for projects in 90 countries since the inception of the programme in 1965, representing a total investment of \$2.9 million.

C. GROUP STUDY EXCHANGE

One of the most popular of all Foundation programmes is that of Group Study Exchange. Teams of young (ages 25-35) business and professional people are sent from one Rotary country to another for study tours of four to six weeks. More than 10,000 team members have participated in the more than 2,000 Group Study Exchanges since the

beginning of the programme in 1965, with an investment of nearly \$15 million.

**D. THE HEALTH, HUNGER AND HUMANITY PROGRAMME,
POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE 3-H PROGRAMME**

Since the inception of the programme in 1978, 51 projects with an investment of 12.4 million have been adopted. More than 500 volunteers have served 42 countries. Several million people will benefit directly from a variety of 3-H Programmes; for example, the primary health care system of Mali, benefiting half a million, and the Bangladesh project to improve nutrition, will benefit more than three million people. And through 3-H, the Foundation responded to the terrible famine in Ethiopia with a two-year, \$567,000 project that combined immediate emergency food relief with long-term assistance in agricultural recovery, a project that will benefit more than 330,000 people in that beleaguered nation.

E. POLIOPLUS

On its 80th Anniversary this past February, Rotary made a pledge to undertake one of mankind's greatest challenges: to assist the world's national and international health organizations in controlling the crippling disease of polio worldwide before the year 2005, Rotary's centennial year. Through its PolioPlus programme, The Rotary Foundation will provide all the polio vaccines necessary for up to five consecutive years for any approved national or regional health agency, and will make available, upon request, a team of experts to help plan and implement national days of immunization against polio.

The Foundation has already shipped more than 54 million doses of polio vaccine to 20 countries, and this past September of this year, it provided all of the polio vaccine necessary for national days of immunization in Turkey, Paraguay and the Sudan, which immunized ten million children in these three countries alone.

**F. FINALLY, THE FOUNDATION IS BEGINNING A NEW PROGRAMME THIS YEAR,
GRANTS FOR UNIVERSITY TEACHERS**

The Foundation provided grants of \$10,000 each to ten higher education faculty members to teach for a period of six to ten months in countries other than their own, especially in developing nations.

THE ROTARY CENTRE FOR WORLD UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE

Developing out of the above-described programmes of Rotary International and The Rotary Foundation, the Trustees of The Rotary

Foundation have approved a "Rotary Centre for World Understanding and Peace."

The purpose of the Rotary Centre for World Understanding and Peace is to utilize the worldwide membership, programmes and resources of Rotary to achieve greater knowledge by the public, and by opinion and policy makers of the issues that cause conflict among nations and of the influences and activities that can promote peace. This purpose will be achieved through programmes, seminars, publications and other communication efforts done in cooperation with programmes and centres of institutions which share an interest in international peace and conflict resolution.

The centre will offer "a network of activities" including seminars or conferences involving international participants at various places around the world; particularly focusing on issues of conflict; and concentrating on the unique perspectives of Rotary and its members. While events may take place in different areas, every effort will be made to make them representative of a broad cross section of culture, religions and political systems.

While based at the Rotary International headquarters, Evanston Illinois, USA, the Centre will establish mutually satisfactory affiliations with any University, Institute, Foundation, or similar organization. The Centre will have programmes designed to bridge the gap between the sometimes "oversimplified" perceptions offered by the media and the profound studies offered by academia, so that as many people as possible (including Rotarians, the general public and the policy-makers) will be better educated in the key issues involved in international understanding.

PHILOSOPHY OF ROTARY THAT PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EFFORTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TOWARD PEACE

The officers of Rotary International and The Rotary Foundation have a deep-seated belief that through people-to-people efforts of organizations like Rotary, progress can be made toward the achievement of the ideal of World Understanding and Peace held by virtually all citizens of the world. The Trustees of The Rotary Foundation believe that this proposed Rotary Centre for World Understanding and Peace, through its seminars, conferences, studies, publications and various activities, conducted in countries throughout the world and involving knowledgeable persons interested in conflict resolution and peace, can make a significant contribution toward the achievement of the ideal of peace.

My theme-objective as President of Rotary International in 1981-82 was "World Understanding and Peace Through Rotary." One of the features of the Action Programme by which progress could be made toward this objective, was inviting ideas and suggestions from Rotarians in Rotary Clubs throughout the world as to what Rotary can do to make progress toward this goal. Hundreds of ideas were suggested. One of these was that

Rotary sponsor a World Peace Conference which would be attended by representatives of organizations like Rotary, which are non-governmental and non-political. This idea was considered by appropriate committees in subsequent years and from that consideration developed the plan for a conference of representatives of organizations which sponsor people-to-people exchange programmes.

That conference, called INTERCHANGE, was held in April, 1985, in Vienna, Austria. It was attended by representatives of 128 organizations from 31 countries from East, West, North and South. The membership of the organizations represented totalled several million, from more than 160 countries. The number of persons involved in the exchanges sponsored by the 128 organizations represented totalled several hundred thousands a year.

There were seven ways by which it was concluded at this INTERCHANGE Conference that exchanges of persons can be improved to make them more effective as a means of contributing toward international understanding. These forms of improvement could well be extended to other activities among other organizations working toward conflict resolution and peace.

1. We need to increase the number of people-to-people exchanges, especially in the third world."

2. We need to broaden the representative nature of those participating in exchanges: more senior citizens, more from less affluent groups, more ethnic and minority representation, of the handicapped.

3. We need to increase exchange between countries of political and cultural differences. In this connection, let me note several examples, pointed out by participants in this conference, of exchanges they sponsor involving East and West nations.

- Volunteers for Peace, of Vermont, USA, have exchanges of students from Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia and Poland) participating international work camps in the ten states in the US.

- The Dutch Agricultural University has exchanges with agricultural universities in Poland and Czechoslovakia; 35 persons being exchanged for three-month periods.

- The International Association for the Exchange of Students for Technical Experience exchanges 700 persons from Europe and the US with 700 citizens of Poland and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

4. Continuing what we need to do to improve our exchange programmes, Landrum Bolling, president of the Inter-Faith Academy of Peace said: "We need to develop more intensive travel/study seminars, for various leadership groups — The busy influential decision-makers need to be informed in greater depth than is generally the case about the conflict and problem areas of the world."

5. An important point upon which there was agreement was that we need to improve the preparation of exchange participants and the follow-up after their exchange experiences. It was suggested that 25 percent of our

investment in an exchange programme should be spent on preparation and another 25 percent on the follow-up.

6. There was considerable emphasis on the importance of the attitude of exchange participants. Bolling has said: "It is essential that on each side, we approach each other with respect, with sensitivity, with modesty and good humour... Be a partner, not a patron. In the long run, international exchanges, if they are to succeed, must live up to the name; they must be true exchanges."

Concerning attitude, a delegate from Nigeria said: "This is not an argument for 'benign neglect,' but one for a more humble attitude and a posture of listening, not lecturing, when attempting to bring assistance to developing countries." He stressed an even more fundamental point in planning developmental assistance programmes: make activities "recipient oriented," that is, the communities affected should be intimately involved in the process.

A European delegate stated in this connection: "We cannot export our Western methods to developing countries; we have to adapt our experience to their methods."

7. Constructive advice concerning five points important for the success of exchange programmes were presented by a conference speaker:

- Exchange participants should have a knowledge of self — a sense of belonging to one's culture.

- Exchanges must involve the mind and the heart — one should learn something while making friends.

- There is a need for a support system for exchange participants — to provide sense of security.

- Exchanges should not focus on superficial matters but rather on substantive matters.

- We should not be afraid of trouble, of confrontation and crisis; they can produce growth in the individual.

Attitudes of persons working toward conflict resolution and engaged in peace studies are of fundamental importance. Rodrigo Carazo, the former President of Costa Rica and current President of the UN University for Peace, based in Costa Rica, stressed this point at the INTERCHANGE Conference when he said: "So long as the North presses for hegemony and the South is working for harmony, there can be no peace. When there is mutual respect and interdependence, then there will be peace."

In considering the solemnity of the subject and the magnitude of the challenge which is presented, we must not be overwhelmed by what sometimes seems to be the impossibility of achieving our goal of peace in the world. Rather we should always maintain a dedicated hope and vision of the ideal toward which we work, of peace in the world. Dr. Landrum Bolling has charted the course ahead in the following words: "The necessity for expanded, improved and sustained endeavours to enlarge cooperation and understanding among peoples of different races, cultures, religions and social systems is so urgent that we must give this task high priority in every

society. The risks of global conflict and planetary disaster are too real and too awful to be ignored... There must be a broad popular base for establishing and sustaining peace in the world. And for this to be brought about there will have to be countless groups and individuals working at the local community level around the world — working in the schools, the religious bodies, the sports and arts organizations, the professional societies and the trade union and business circles."



Dr Robert Stewart and Dr Stanley McCaffery.

GLOBALIZING TEACHER EDUCATION: A VEHICLE FOR PEACE

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This symposium assumed that peace education should begin at the elementary-school level and is dependent upon globally-minded elementary school teachers, making the globalization of teacher education mandatory. Drawing from the Internationalizing Teacher Education Project (Indiana University, USA), the symposium addressed three important issues relevant to globalizing teacher education: (1) needed curriculum change; (2) conditions that facilitate or impede curriculum change; and (3) the use of classroom-teacher contributions in globalizing teacher education programs.

WHAT CURRICULUM CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE GLOBAL UNDERSTANDING OF TEACHERS?

First, this presentation provided an overview of a three-year project to globalize teacher education on four campuses of the Indiana University System. The rationale for using an infusion strategy to change the curriculum was described along with the reasons for targeting specific courses for reform. This part of the presentation focussed on strategies for involving faculty in course reform. The role of experienced elementary faculty also received attention.

Secondly, this presentation also described the goals that guided this project in its effort to globalize teacher education for elementary teachers. These goals address both the substantive component (content courses) and the professional component (education courses) involved in the professional preparation of teachers. Emphasis was placed on expanding cross-cultural understandings, attitudes and related professional skills.

Thirdly, several illustrations of course changes were described. At the end of its second year, nine courses had been revised. Children's Literature, Biology, Art, and World History were courses usually offered in the Arts and Sciences. Educational Psychology, Education and Culture, Language Arts Methods, Reading Method and General Methods represented the Education Courses. In greater detail, the development of the Biology Module was described. In the case of each of these courses, the key concern has been to provide teachers with the appropriate content background and learning experiences that will foster a global perspective in young children.

WHAT CONDITIONS SERVE TO FACILITATE OR CONSTRAIN EFFORTS TO GLOBALIZE TEACHER EDUCATION?

The challenge of globalizing teacher education is a substantial one. Importantly, it requires an understanding of the broader context that surrounds teacher education faculty, programs and institutions. This presentation identified *facilitators* and *constraints* that appear to have a bearing on globalizing teacher education.

The role of the following facilitators contributed to the welfare of this project. Each was discussed in some detail: 1) world trends, 2) international experience and interest within the faculty, 3) the efforts of professional organizations, 4) the work of state education agencies, 5) the presence of international students and 6) the use of a collegial strategy to support faculty participation. Just as these conditions enhanced the efforts of the project, there were a number of constraints that offered particular challenges: 1) the fact that Schools of Education do not control much of the coursework required for teacher education, 2) certification requirements do not support a global perspective, 3) declining enrollments and budgets and

- 4) competing interests among the faculty.

HOW CAN TEACHERS HELP TEACHER EDUCATORS TO GLOBALIZE TEACHER EDUCATION?

The relationship between teacher educators and teachers is usually a one-way street. Teacher educators serve as "experts", while teachers are expected to receive and implement their advice. In this project an effort was made to reverse the direction of this relationship. In effect, experienced teachers served this project in an advisory capacity. Their tasks were several: they prepared examples of international classroom activities suitable for elementary-school-age children (A compilation of these activities is available). They assessed the initial ideas of university faculty in terms of their usefulness to elementary teachers. Finally, they submitted detailed reviews of the modules developed by faculty providing them with suggestions and criticisms.

In addition, the teachers who participated in this project also serve as cooperating teachers for field experiences as well as the student teacher experiences of prospective teachers. In these ways, the elementary school faculty participants contributed in important ways to the reform taking place in teacher education.

DEVELOPING CURRICULA FOR PEACE EDUCATION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

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¹ The information in this synopsis was abstracted from *Peace Education and Your School*, published by the Peace Education Task Force, Ministry of Education Victoria, permission given by Mr. Delaney.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE TASK FORCE

1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Peace Education Task Force was established in 1984 within the Curriculum Branch of the Education Department. It was given the following terms of reference.

- (a) to establish what interest exists in the development of curriculum concerning these issues in Victorian primary and post-primary schools;
- (b) to investigate existing local, interstate and overseas curriculum theory and practice;
- (c) to identify what resources and/or curriculum guidelines need to be developed;
- (d) to define ways in which these issues may be integrated into existing curriculum;
- (e) to suggest ways in which schools and teachers wishing to address these issues in their curricula may be best supported.

2. METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

In developing its strategy, the Task Force allocated a large proportion of its time to investigating current teaching practice and attitudes to peace education at school and college levels.

108 schools were visited and discussions were held with teachers, school councils, students and parents in both metropolitan and country areas and in state and independent schools, and in some cases the teaching of peace education was observed.

Visits were followed up by a written survey of teachers in schools, and a telephone survey of administrators in 96 primary schools, 100 high schools and 91 technical schools.

The Task Force found that in most of the schools surveyed, peace education was already part of the school program under various existing subject areas. This trend complements items raised in the Ministerial Paper Number 6 which stated:

that students should develop the awareness of the international community, understanding of interdependency of different countries, peoples and economies and to understand the threat to the future well-being of the world of such factors as misuse of resources and the stockpiling of armaments (*The World and Its People* section).

As 1986 is the United Nations International Year of Peace (IYP), education for peace in our schools should be seen as an important contribution towards the goal of a more peaceful world and a more just society.

WHY PEACE EDUCATION?

1. Peace Education is based on the following principles and values:
 - a) that we should enrich the total understanding of the possibilities of harmonious development of human communities within our global environment;
 - b) violence, war and preparing for war are such stark realities in the present day world that it is essential that the investigation of the avoidance of these be an integral part of all school programs;
 - c) it is necessary to consider alternatives to violence as a means of resolving problems and conflicts and in the nuclear age this is vitally important;
 - d) in peace education, it is fundamental to have a commitment to social and economic justice, including human rights, and the tolerance and appreciation of a diversity of cultures leading to greater international understanding;
 - e) it is not intended that peace education should have specific policies or demands on particular issues.
2. While it is recognised that conflict is inevitable, peace education should progressively assist students, through age-appropriate means and resources, in:
 - a) gaining experience in the peaceful resolution of conflict;
 - b) investigating and evaluating facts and opinions in seeking out the truth for themselves on wider issues;
 - c) developing communication skills; and gaining an understanding of, and the respect for, the rights of others to hold differing and contrary opinions.

DEFINING PEACE EDUCATION

The Task Force was careful to avoid prescriptive definitions but offered the following for discussion:—

- * A definition of peace education by Duczek (Atlantic College, England) provides a concise indication of possible content:

Peace education attempts to sharpen awareness about the existence of conflict between people and within and between nations. It investigates the causes of conflict and violence embedded within the perceptions, values and attitudes of individuals, as well as within the social, political and economic structures of society, and encourages the search for alternatives, including non-violent solutions, and the development of skills necessary for their implementation.

- * Some tenets of peace education are:

- a) a positive notion of peace as a way of living which deals creatively with the maintenance of human rights and the satisfaction of human needs.
- b) the belief that violence, war and preparing for war are such stark realities in the world that it is essential that the issues involved be an integral part of all school programs.
- c) the belief that the aims, methods and values of peace education fall within the area of what might be called "good" education, and indeed may refocus attention on them within education at large.
- d) the belief that the determination and actions of individuals and groups can influence the outcome of major events.
- e) the belief that people have the potential to develop alternatives to violence in its broadest sense and that peace education can help people elaborate those alternatives.
- f) the understanding that it is feasible to introduce appropriate aspects of peace education into schools at all levels in a productive way.
- g) democracy is not only an essential ingredient of peace but is also a requirement of peace education. Peace education will only succeed to the extent that it meets the four primary criteria of democracy — equal availability of information, equal access to structures of participation, rights of all to hold unpopular opinions, and equal opportunity to grow in knowledge and experience in the understanding of peace. Such may be centred upon personal, local, national or global concerns, and may occur during, or as an outcome of, student investigations. The ultimate outcome should promote citizens who are more knowledgeable, active and participatory in society's decision-making processes and in forums that effect their lives.

Galtung, a Norwegian peace researcher, has suggested that the problems of peace are fourfold; violence — war, inequality, injustice and environmental damage. These four problems generate values which need to underpin any definition of peace, i.e. absence of violence, economic welfare, social justice and ecological balance.

The overall aim of peace education is thus to develop the skills, attitudes and knowledge necessary to resolve conflict peacefully, in order to work towards a more just and less violent world. What, however, does this mean in terms of classroom experience?

In terms of *knowledge* or curriculum content, it means studying issues which deal with conflict, human rights, and the environment on a variety of scales from the personal to the global.

In terms of *attitudes*, it means developing self-respect, curiosity, open mindedness, tolerance, fairness, and commitment to reason and truth.

In terms of acquiring *skills*, it means the ability to analyse, reason,

communicate, express oneself, empathise, resolve conflict non-violently, and to be socially aware.

SOME SUGGESTED CURRICULUM STRATEGIES

A variety of ways in which schools can introduce peace education can be identified either from existing practice or current thinking about peace education.

1. *Events*

Many schools in Victoria have chosen to introduce elements of the study of peace into their total curriculum through the use of specific events to focus attention on the subject.

Two common examples are Hiroshima and Nagasaki week and UN Disarmament Week. Activities performed on these days may include films, speakers, plays, assemblies, discussion periods, and poster and art competitions. This approach has the advantages of:

- (i) providing a starting point or focus for further activity
- (ii) using the one area of resources in which outside sources can be tapped.
- (iii) introducing the topic in a total school context.
- (iv) providing opportunities for school/community involvement.

This approach has the disadvantages of:

- (i) not providing continuity of thinking about the topic
- (ii) giving rise to misunderstandings within the school community if not introduced with full consultation.

2. *Introduction of a separate Peace Education Subject*

This approach, mainly relevant to post primary schools, can take a variety of forms. The subject could be compulsory or elective, at one year level or at a number. There are few schools with peace education as a compulsory subject, but a number have adopted an elective subject of varying lengths, at one or more year levels. It is recognised that some post primary schools may opt for this approach, particularly at senior levels, as a first step towards the wider application throughout the curriculum. This approach has the advantages of:

- (i) allowing for a co-ordinated development of the subject with appropriate curriculum and resource development.
- (ii) being easier to introduce than some other methods
- (iii) providing a starting point and focus for further development.

This approach has the disadvantages of:

- (i) becoming another subject to incorporate into the timetable

- (ii) becoming isolated and identified with one subject or teacher, rather than influencing the entire curriculum.

3. *Introduction of Units into Subjects Across the Curriculum*

In some schools, teachers have used their initiative to design or include peace education units in their courses. In others, this method is used in conjunction with method 1, i.e. during a special week all teachers may be encouraged to develop and/or use a unit focussing on peace which is appropriate to their subject area. Once again, this approach is mainly relevant to post-primary schools.

This approach has the advantages of:

- (i) providing a cross-curriculum approach
- (ii) involving more people in decision making about, and implementation of peace education.

This approach has the disadvantages of:

- (i) occurring at the same time in different subjects/levels, it may strain resources and risk repetition for students.
- (ii) the difficulty, at the moment, of finding resources for many subjects.

4. *An Integrated Curriculum and Whole School Approach*

This approach is the preferred option of the Task Force. It may require a review process involving:

- (a) the aims, objectives and policy statements of schools
- (b) existing curriculum content and delivery
- (c) school structures and organisation

Any such review outlined could well be in the context of relevant guidelines from Ministerial Paper No. 6, *Curriculum Development and Planning in Victoria*.

With the accumulation of experience, schools could reach the position of planning an integrated peace education curriculum. This would involve the co-ordination of units within all subjects across the curriculum and the progressive development of relevant skills, concepts and attitudes year by year. Ideally, this is what should occur, because whatever we teach, we are constantly faced with the issue of peace and conflict in everyday life and in the wider world.

Thus, the content of all subjects, and the manner in which they are taught, should be influenced by an awareness of these issues.

This approach has the advantages of:

- (i) peace education being thoughtfully and systematically introduced into the curriculum
- (ii) all students having the opportunity to develop their skills,

- concepts and attitudes in this area
- (iii) peace education building upon the existing curriculum

This approach has the disadvantages of:

- (i) requiring considerable co-ordination.

The implications for the adoption of this approach are:

- (i) that schools will need to appoint a person or group to oversee planning or co-ordination as in all other subject/discipline areas
- (ii) that extensive support will be needed to provide guidance on broad strategies and materials for a wide range of topics, subjects and year levels.

5. *School Policy and Hidden Curriculum*

Schools are themselves places where conflicts arise and where the challenge of creating a harmonious community is ever present. The atmosphere of a school is largely determined by organisational structures and informal relationships between teachers and students. From this atmosphere, students learn the values, attitudes and ways of behaving that are deemed acceptable by adult members of the school.

The relationship between freedom, responsibility, discipline and control in a school is complex, but at least there should be some consistency between what students are taught is desirable and what they actually experience in school.

PEACE EDUCATION AND THE SCHOOL COMMUNITY

In many schools a spirit of co-operation underlies efforts to have peace education introduced. The Task Force is of the opinion that peace education is likely to be most successful when it has the support of the school community for the following reasons:

1. A tenet of peace education is its openness to all points of view.
2. Opposition often arises from the lack of information about what is taking place in the classroom both in content and teaching methods. Peace education should be widely discussed within school decision making forums.

Where conflict arises, consideration of the introduction of peace education should itself become an exercise in the resolution of conflict, in the interests of developing effective programs for students.

AWAKENING THE SLEEPING DRAGONS

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Whenever there is a firmly established barrier that is accepted as a fact of life it begins to take on the accoutrements of a "law of nature". The closer we come to penetrating the barrier, the stronger the waves of resistance become — e.g. the sound barrier. One could liken war consciousness to such a barrier. It is held to be in the "nature of man", and a necessary accompaniment to the structural framework of human society. It is "the way things are".

War consciousness operates on symbols that help give it energy. We know its expression as the "heroic"; the "honourable"; the "fight for right"; the father/mother land; the sacred good. The waving flags, the battle hymns, the marching in unison, the resounding cheers enliven the consciousness as Hitler's extravaganzas — crowd-tactics showed.

Peace consciousness, on the other hand is saying that humans don't *have* to be that way. There are other options. War is *not* human nature, it is human creation, and could be uncreated, removed, like a worn out cloak to be discarded.

This symposium addressed the *backlash* that the peace consciousness is arousing in war consciousness. War consciousness is like a dragon that recognizes no other kind of consciousness than itself unless its attention is drawn to the threat of outside intervention in its self-appointed task of destruction.¹ The Peace Research and Peace Studies organizations have awakened the dragon and much "fire and smoke" has been generated.

Examples presented included a discussion of statements by Mr. Harry Greenway, conservative MP For Saling North, England, who

asserted that teachers of Peace Studies "... are sometimes putting over subversive views..." and "... neglected to put forth the multilateralist position."²

Professor David Aspin, of Faculty of Education, King's College London discussed how there are strong criticisms of teaching peace. Among these are that it is anti-educational; unacademic; biased, and indoctrinary.³

Perhaps the most pernicious and rather effective campaign to be waged against the attempts of the Peace Consciousness to change the general uncommitted population is the War Consciousness' campaign to identify Peace Movements, Peace Research, and Peace Studies with communism. Epithets such as "pinko", "nut", "chicken" and worst of all, traitor are slung about freely. The Citizens for Nuclear Disarmament has been classified as a "communist organization".

Andrew Mack presented some ideas from a chapter he has written on this topic in *Peace Research in the 1980's* (available from the ANU address above).

During the past year there have been a number of attacks on the Peace Research Centre by far right political commentators. The broad thrust of all these attacks has been to suggest that the Centre is somehow pro-Soviet and working to subvert Australian national interests. Such claims are false and ridiculous.

The longest and most detailed attacks — by Pat Jacobs (real name Andrew Campbell) and Geoffrey Partington — appeared in the November, 1985 issue of *Quadrant*. [Further similar criticisms appeared in the January/February 1986 issue. A rebuttal by Andrew Mack was published in the April, 1986 issue].

[The attacks] are inaccurate, make misleading use of out-of-context quotations, and guilt-by-association modes of argument.

Not one of the half dozen or so far-right critics has taken the trouble to... check the accuracy of allegations before publishing them.

This symposium drew a large audience, who positioned themselves in circular fashion, and a great deal of audience participation ensued, with various case histories and possible solutions presented.

¹ For a good discussion of the war and peace consciousnesses, write to Professor Anatol Rapoport, President, Science for Peace, University College, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A1 for a reprint of a lecture he gave on the subject at the Conference of the International Peace Research Association in Györ, Hungary, September, 1983.

² Education Staff (1983) Warning on 'Peace' Teaching. *London Daily Telegraph*, London: Sept. 14.

³ Professor Aspin elaborates on these and rebuts them in his paper included in this volume.

INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR (IPPNW)

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International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) is a federation of medical groups in 41 nations dedicated to mobilizing the influence of the profession against the threat of nuclear weapons. That threat is greater today than ever.

Scores of organizations have dedicated themselves to reducing the risk of nuclear war. IPPNW, while sharing some common objectives and characteristics with these organizations, is distinct in a number of ways.

- IPPNW is an international organization, with participation from affiliates in NATO, Warsaw Treaty and neutral countries.
- IPPNW is a professional organization, and speaks with authority and influence on the medical dimensions of nuclear war and the arms race. Its participants include some of the world's most distinguished physicians.
- IPPNW is an organization unusually successful in fostering Soviet/American cooperation and communication.

Two cardiologists, Bernard Lown of the Harvard University School of Public Health, and Evgueni Chazov, of the USSR Cardiological Institute met in Geneva in December, 1980, along with Harvard Professor James Muller; Dr. Eric Chivian of MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvard Medical School; Dr. Leonid Ilyin, Chairman of the USSR Committee on Radiation Protection; and Dr. Mikjhail Kuzin, Director of the Institute of Surgery of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to lay the foundation for what is now IPPNW. Five principles to guide the organi-

zation were agreed to at that meeting:

- That IPPNW would restrict its focus to nuclear war;
- That through IPPNW, physicians would work to prevent nuclear war as a consequence of their professional commitments to protect life and preserve health;
- That IPPNW would involve physicians from all over the world;
- That the same information about nuclear war would be circulated widely to the public and leaders of all nations;
- That although IPPNW might advocate certain steps to prevent nuclear war, it would not directly support or attack the positions of any government.

Soon after, a small group of US physicians began the work of transforming the concept of IPPNW into an organizational reality. In addition to Drs. Lown, Muller, Abrams, and Chivian, Dr. David Greer, Dean of Brown University Medical School, and Dr. John Pastore, professor of medicine at Tufts University, played important roles.

Their initial assignment was to organize the First International Congress of IPPNW. The Congress, held near Washington in March 1981, attracted some seventy doctors from twelve countries. Public lectures on the medical aspects of nuclear war were followed by working group sessions which developed new materials on topics such as the role of physicians in the post-attack period and the social, economic, and psychological costs of the nuclear arms race.

In the eyes of the western press, the dramatic news from the First Congress was the presence of the Soviet delegation. When Soviet doctors joined their American, European, and Japanese colleagues in calling upon Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev to preclude the use of nuclear weapons "in any form or on any scale", the Congress achieved a major goal of the IPPNW founders — demonstrating to the world that American and Soviet physicians could cooperate on the gravest public health question of the time. This fact was underscored by the widespread coverage given the Congress by Soviet press and television.

Soon after the First Congress, the American Medical Association, after reviewing material submitted by IPPNW and its US affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, passed a resolution which recognized the professional obligation of doctors to educate their patients on the medical effects of nuclear war. The basic message of IPPNW's founders had entered the mainstream.

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

IPPNW grew rapidly following the First Congress. The Second International Congress (Cambridge, England, 1982) brought together more than twice the number of delegates as the First Congress. The Third

Congress (Amsterdam, 1983) was larger still, involving more than 300 physicians from 43 countries. The numbers were matched by an expanding influence: by the time of the Third Congress, IPPNW was attracting messages of greeting and support from the Secretary General of the United Nations, from Pope John Paul II, and from numerous heads of state, including Presidents Reagan and Andropov.

Perhaps the most important event of the Third Congress was the first meeting of IPPNW's new governing body, the International Council. Previously, a Board of Directors of American physicians had set policy, with the consensus support of Congress delegates. The rapid growth of affiliate membership called for an explicitly international form of governance. A constitution was written and ratified, and a new structure established: representatives of the national affiliates convened in the Netherlands as the ultimate authorities of IPPNW. This International Council elected copresidents from the US and the USSR (Drs. Lown and Chazov); vice-presidents from Norway, Japan, Hungary, and Finland; and a secretary and treasurer.

By the Fourth Congress (Helsinki, 1984) IPPNW had grown to a federation of medical groups in 34 nations. At the Fifth Congress (Budapest, 1985), IPPNW officially represented over 135,000 physicians from affiliates in 41 nations.

IPPNW has encouraged its affiliates to develop policies and programs that may be exclusively national in focus. As a global federation, however, IPPNW itself has taken only broad positions with worldwide applications. Thus, IPPNW has advocated: (i) a verifiable freeze on the development and deployment of all nuclear weapons systems; (ii) an explicit declaration of no-first-use by the nuclear powers; and (iii) a recognition by governments of the "illusory nature" of civil defense plans for nuclear war. At the Fifth Congress in June 1985, the IPPNW International Council ratified a "Medical Prescription" to reverse the inertia of the arms race — a call for a universal moratorium on all nuclear explosions, to remain in effect until the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Physicians are educators both by training and inclination, and IPPNW believes that the dissemination of medical and scientific information about nuclear war is a doctor's professional responsibility just as it is his responsibility to warn a patient about improper diet or impending heart disease. IPPNW seeks to educate an international constituency which includes medical professionals, government and military leaders, diplomats, journalists, and the general public.

IPPNW educational programs reflect the organization's medical focus and multinational identity, often serving a dual purpose by advancing

understanding of nuclear war and demonstrating the benefits of East-West cooperation.

In June 1982, for example, IPPNW officers suggested to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, that three American physicians and three Soviet physicians take part in a televised roundtable discussion on the medical aspects of nuclear war. A one-hour program was then produced in the Moscow studios of Soviet National Television, and broadcast throughout the USSR, unedited, on two separate occasions. More than 100 million Soviet citizens viewed the program, which included a frank discussion of medical treatment following a nuclear war, civil defense, and accidental nuclear war. A US broadcast followed in October, when the Public Broadcasting Service aired a translated version. The program generated substantial press coverage and was a signal event in Soviet-American relations.

Later in 1982, IPPNW released *Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War* (W.H. Freeman, New York). The book brought together essays by American, Soviet, British and Japanese medical experts. *Last Aid*¹ has reached a wide audience — it has been translated into German and Italian — and has been selected as a course text in many universities and medical schools. Critical reviews, in both the medical and general press, have been almost entirely positive.

More recently, IPPNW and the Center for Nuclear Psychology at Harvard University co-sponsored a pioneering study of American and Soviet children's responses to the threat of nuclear war. The initial results of the study, including videotaped interviews with Soviet children, received extensive US and international press coverage. Studies of the effects of the nuclear threat upon the youth of many nations around the world are currently being conducted by several IPPNW physicians.

Educational materials are important for the support of the national affiliates. IPPNW supplies its affiliates with the proceedings of the five congresses, a variety of medical and scientific papers, a series of pamphlets, posters, and audio-visual materials, and two regularly-published periodicals. IPPNW has published original research papers on the biospheric consequences of nuclear war (nuclear winter), the risks of an unintended nuclear war begun by computer malfunction, and investigations of expenditures on the arms race and their effects on public health.

The best educational devices at IPPNW's command may be the physicians themselves. IPPNW doctors speak at medical symposia and public meetings throughout the world, and have served as expert advisors to governments and international agencies seeking information on nuclear weapons. They have testified before national legislatures, the United

¹ From the *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine* (UK): "This is a book that should be read by every member of the profession to ensure that they are acquainted with the hard facts of nuclear life, and it should be made compulsory reading for leaders of governments."

Nations, and various professional bodies, and were instrumental in the publication of studies of the medical effects of nuclear war by the World Health Organization and a number of national medical societies.

Perhaps the most promising recent educational activity has been a series of international physicians' exchanges. Medical doctors from Europe, North America, Latin America, and the South Pacific have formed international physicians' teams that have criss-crossed various countries in a series of public speaking tours. American and Soviet physicians have now conducted three reciprocal campaigns in both their countries.

The federation's educational activities were given special recognition when IPPNW was awarded the 1984 Peace Education Prize of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. The UNESCO commendation cited IPPNW's "especially remarkable activity to inform public opinion and mobilize the conscience of mankind for peace."

STAFFING AND FINANCES

Although IPPNW has quadrupled the numbers of affiliated physicians and national groups in the four years of its existence, it maintains a relatively small staff. Nine full-time employees at IPPNW's central office in Boston support programs in administration, education, international organizing, East-West exchanges, and fundraising. A European liaison office operates from London. Staff members report to an Executive Director, who in turn reports to an Executive Committee elected by the International Council.

Funding for IPPNW for the current fiscal year is projected to come from foundation grants (15%), direct-mail solicitations (50%), affiliate dues (10%), and contributions from individuals (20%).²

This year's fundraising plans call for an expansion of direct-mail, campaigns especially in Europe, and for the development of a corps of individual donors interested in maintaining an active relationship with the organization and its cause.

CURRENT EMPHASIS

While IPPNW's agenda continues to include broad commitments to international outreach, the stimulation of public action on behalf of nuclear disarmament, and the sponsorship of medical research on nuclear war, several areas of emphasis have been defined. These include:

² A common misperception is that IPPNW is supported by the dues of individual physician members. In fact, IPPNW's only members are organizations, not people. Affiliates render modest annual contributions, adjusted to the size and resources of the particular group.

SOVIET-AMERICAN PHYSICIANS' CAMPAIGN

As a vehicle for relieving tensions between the superpowers as well as dispelling the stereotypes created from years of isolation, IPPNW has been organizing a series of East-West physicians exchanges.

The first exchange took place in February 1985 when four prominent Soviet physicians, including IPPNW Co-President Dr. Evgueni Chazov, joined Co-President Dr. Bernard Lown and Dr. Sidney Alexander, President of Physicians for Social Responsibility, on an educational tour of five US cities. In each city, a symposium was held which focused on the immediate medical consequences of nuclear war, the long-term biospheric consequences, and the history, goals, and aspirations of the physicians movements in the two countries.

In July 1985, after the Fifth IPPNW Congress in Budapest, two groups of American physicians travelled throughout the Soviet Union to speak directly to their colleagues and the Soviet people through a series of similar events. In September 1985, two groups of Soviet physicians joined American doctors for speaking tours throughout the United States.

REGIONAL SYMPOSIA

In March 1985, IPPNW leaders from throughout the Americas travelled to Brazil and Argentina in a series of regional campaigns, culminating in IPPNW's first Regional Symposia, held in Buenos Aires. The main focuses of discussions were the long-term medical consequences of nuclear war and the socio-economic effects of the arms race. Special attention was paid to the TTAPS study ("Nuclear Winter"), with emphasis on the southern hemisphere.

Additional symposia are planned for Europe (Brussels, November 1985) and the Eastern Mediterranean/Middle-East (Athens, October 1986).

GLOBAL TOUR

IPPNW's International Council has called for a dramatic world-wide activity for 1985-1986: "a visit to all continents by a group of physicians representing East and West, North and South, to highlight the global concern for peace by the international community of physicians."

SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS

Over 100 physician delegates from 50 nations are expected to attend the IPPNW Sixth Congress in Cologne in May 1986. Plans are underway for the involvement of leading political figures from

NATO, the Warsaw Treaty, and non-aligned nations.

AFFILIATE DEVELOPMENT

During the past year, IPPNW has greatly expanded its international network. There are now IPPNW affiliates in every NATO and Warsaw Treaty country. Equally important are the federation's efforts in countries where there is a danger of nuclear weapons development: Argentina, Brazil, India, and Israel are already formally affiliated, and an active group is forming in Pakistan. A special effort will be made this winter to promote new affiliates in Africa and Latin America.

THE FUTURE

IPPNW's development reflects growing awareness throughout the world of the risk of nuclear war and the increasing sensitivity of physicians to their responsibilities as healers and caretakers. But within IPPNW there is clear recognition that not a single nuclear weapon has yet been dismantled for peaceful purposes, and that the world is in greater peril now than ever before. IPPNW remains committed to motivating all men and women of good sense to seek the eradication of nuclear arms. With the continued help of sympathetic individuals and organizations, and with the continued participation of tens of thousands of physicians from throughout the world, IPPNW can fulfill the promise of its name.

In 1985 IPPNW was awarded the Nobel Prize for its work in contributing to peace. Dr. Bernard Lown, co-President, participated in a special 40th Anniversary ceremony of the United Nations on 24 October, 1985. Part of his message to the United Nations is as follows:

The world is now brimming with the threat of death. The arsenals are burgeoning with nuclear megatonnage equivalent to one million Hiroshimas. Were one ton of explosive detonated every second, these arsenals would still be exploding one thousand years later. To insure the conditions of life, we must prevent the conditions of death. Mr James Grant, the distinguished Executive Director of Unicef, when he was in Budapest at the Fifth Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, posed as a searing question: 'Would the world tolerate a Hiroshima every three days?' For in fact Hiroshima is occurring every three days. 120,000 children, the number of victims claimed by the first atomic bomb, are dying every three days.


In celebrating this special occasion, dedicated to the noble slogan 'To save succeeding generations', we must confront the ugly fact that \$800,000 million is being spent every year for instruments of death. This means: \$2 billion everyday, \$100 million every hour, \$1.5 million every minute, \$25,000 every second. The world's children are already living in the rubble of World War II. We physicians cry out from our very hearts against such an obscenity.

We physicians, however, have an abiding faith in the concept that

humanity can control what humanity creates. There is an old African saying that asserts: 'This world was not left to us by our parents; it was lent to us by our children'.

I am honoured to sign on behalf of 140,000 physicians committed to rid the world of nuclear instruments of genocide.'

The development of the New Zealand Branch of IPPNW (1982) is used as a model for the establishment of other branches throughout the South Pacific. An interim committee of Fiji physicians was settled at this present Conference, and a local branch will be established in January 1986. Reference is also made to Peace Satellite meetings with physicians from Pacific countries. A major meeting of an Asian-Pacific Regional group will be held in February, 1987.



Dr Elizabeth Stewart and Dr Ian Prior at the New Year's Eve Party.

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PLENARY SESSION I: PEACE, SECURITY AND NEGOTIATION STUDIES IN UNIVERSITIES, CENTRES AND INSTITUTES

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WHAT IS PEACE RESEARCH?¹

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As an organised and institutionalised endeavour, peace and conflict research was a creation of the Cold War. In the late 1950s, increasing numbers of social scientists had become interested in applying the methods of their new disciplines to the cause of understanding, and ultimately preventing, war. Like the 1980s, this was a period in which fears of nuclear war were pervasive.

Peace researchers then, as now, were divided about how to reduce the risks of war. But there was a broad consensus that the Cold War policies of the superpowers were positively destabilising — i.e. they functioned to increase mutual suspicion and hostility, to intensify an already escalating arms race, and to increase the risks of war. A similar consensus regarding superpower nuclear policies exists among peace researchers today.

In sharp contrast to the scholarly practice of established (and

¹ Sections of this description of peace research are taken from *Peace Research in the 1980s*, by Andrew Mack, available from Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., Australia.

establishment) research institutes, such as the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, peace research methodology was heavily influenced by social science theory and method. Peace researchers believed that their *scientific* study of conflict would succeed where the more traditional approaches of the students of *realpolitik* had failed. Political science, sociology, social psychology, economics and rational choice theory took precedence in peace research over the older disciplines of diplomatic history, international law and classical strategy.

Keynesian economics was held up as a model of what could be achieved when the rigorous methods of the social sciences were applied to pressing societal problems. Keynesian theory had, it was argued, enabled economists — and policy makers — to understand the causes of economic depressions and thus derive scientifically-based policies to avoid them.

Peace research aspired to create theories which would provide a comparable level of understanding of the causes of war and similarly efficacious policies for preventing it.

As the 1960s progressed, peace research became more established and more institutionalised. New institutes were being set up throughout the OECD countries, national and international associations had been created, and a dozen or so academic journals catering primarily to a peace research readership were thriving. (Australia was one of the strongholds of the traditionalist approach to studying international relations and neither the 'behavioural revolution' nor peace research made much impact on Australia in the 1960s and 1970s.)

With institutional consolidation came an expansion of the scope of peace research.

In the mid-1960s, as popular fears of nuclear war began to recede, the issue of 'structural violence' became more salient.

'Structural violence' was a term coined to describe the physical harm which results not from war or other forms of violent conflict but from structured inequalities in social systems. It is evident in the differences between rich and poor in life expectancy rates, infant mortality rates, susceptibility to disease and malnutrition and so forth.

Since the highest levels of 'structural violence' were in the Third World, investigation of its causes meant examining the structure and dynamics of under-development. Third World development and development theory thus became an increasingly important focus of peace research.

By the 1970s new research areas were being added to the peace research agenda. In addition to such familiar subjects as arms control and disarmament, statistical analyses of the causes of conflict, game theory and development theory, there was growing interest among peace researchers in the theory and practice of conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation and in alternative defence strategies.

In the 1980s the pendulum has swung away from development issues and back towards the original agenda of peace research — an agenda dominated to a large degree by concern about superpower relationships, the

arms race and the threat of nuclear war.

It is primarily because concern about nuclear war is so pervasive and widespread in the Western World — in a way that Third World poverty unfortunately never has been — that there has been the recent resurgence of interest in peace research in the OECD countries.

As with many new academic fields peace research was initially regarded with suspicion by some scholars from more established disciplines. Diplomatic historians and international relations traditionalists have been skeptical about the peace research leaning towards behavioural social science, while some social scientists who espouse the goal of 'value neutrality' dislike the openly prescriptive stance of many peace researchers.

Much of the heat in the debate among students of international relations between 'traditionalism' and 'behaviouralism' (which included much of early peace research) has subsided and the hubris evident earlier on both sides has disappeared completely.

As peace research has grown and diversified it has become increasingly difficult to categorise. Today it encompasses research as diverse as the military data collection and collation programs undertaken by the Stockholm Institute; crisis theory at Cornell University's Center for Peace Studies; development research at Gothenburg University; alternative conventional defence strategies at Copenhagen University and Starnberg in Germany; non-violent sanctions and negotiation theory at Harvard — and so forth. Oddly almost no work has been done on what might be called the 'causes of peace' — an omission which stands in stark contrast to the huge volume of research on the causes of war.

Although peace research has tended to be an applied discipline, there is an ongoing tradition of research into more basic and deep-seated causes of conflict. Some of this research focuses on economic structures, some on cultural structures — including gender; a considerable amount of work the propositions about geo-politics which inform much of the traditional approach to international relations.

As for its prescriptive stance most peace researchers would argue that it is quite as legitimate to pursue a particular goal in peace research as it is in cancer research. The point of studying cancer is to seek ways and means of preventing or curing it. Understanding is sought not simply for its own sake but for a particular social purpose. Cancer research is not 'value-neutral', nor is strategic studies or peace research.

Many students of strategy would argue that their interest in studying war is also motivated by a desire to prevent it. Strategic studies is also a highly prescriptive discipline.

Differences between the peace research work in this area and strategic studies derive less in the problems studied than in the perspectives used to study them.

An important part of strategic studies, for example, is devoted to analysing how to *fight* wars; peace research, by contrast, has tended to focus on how to *prevent* them.

From a strategic studies perspective the ability to retaliate and to deny aggressors victory in war is the key to successful deterrence — i.e. to preventing aggression occurring in the first place.

While not denying that deterrence strategies may sometimes be efficacious, peace researchers have produced detailed empirical studies which show that, in some circumstances, 'peace through strength' policies designed to deter aggression may so increase tension and mutual suspicion as to make war more, not less, likely.

Unless one believes that the often barbarous means by which human beings have customarily attempted to deal with conflicts are satisfactory, the case for thinking about alternatives to the conventional wisdoms of the past seems compelling.

Peace research evolved as a reaction against the perceived inadequacies of conventional approaches to conflict analysis, management and resolution. It has produced its own analyses and prescriptions. The case for peace research is not, however, dependent on these being accepted but on the legitimacy and utility of such alternatives being pursued. The value — indeed the vital necessity — of alternative views being expressed in our courts, in the media and in our democratic political institutions is widely recognised. The case for diversity is no less compelling when vital interests of national and international security are at stake.

AN INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM TO IMPROVE THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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The Programme on Negotiation is an applied research center committed to improving the theory and practice of negotiation and conflict resolution. Based at Harvard Law School, the Programme is an inter-university consortium involving faculty, graduate students, and administrative staff from numerous disciplines and professional schools at Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tufts University, and other Boston-area schools. There are six major projects within the Programme on Negotiation. Each organizes specialized activities and, under the Programme umbrella, works collaboratively to advance the dispute resolution field: (1) The Dispute Resolution Programme promotes research and experimentation on the alternative dispute resolution approach — by which many disputes are settled out-of-court. (2) The Harvard Negotiation Project focuses on international conflict, and tries to improve the world's ability to deal constructively with conflict by developing improved theory and training in negotiation and mediation. (3) The Negotiation Journal is a quarterly publication devoted to the exchange of ideas that advance the theory and practice of dispute settlement. (4) The Negotiation Roundtable involves a group of faculty and students in weekly meetings aimed at analyzing specific proposals to improve the understanding of negotiation — particularly in business settings. (5) The Nuclear Negotiation Project focuses on the development of a series of ongoing programs to explore and demonstrate how negotiation can reduce the risk of nuclear war. (6) Finally, the Public Disputes Programme focuses on dispute settlement in the public sector; the programme is organized around the assumption that mediated negotiation can enhance the fairness, efficiency and stability of various sensitive decisions in the public sector.

Almost everyone is involved in negotiation of some kind, whether it is at home with children or on the job, settling environmental disputes, conducting international diplomacy, or mediating in divorce cases. The Programme on Negotiation regularly offers seminars exploring the theory and practice of conflict resolution, focusing on topics such as alternatives to litigation in resolving civil disputes, labour relations and collective bargaining, managerial negotiation, environmental and policy disputes, international peacemaking, and the psychology of conflict. Two major assumptions in the field of negotiation are that some negotiation techniques can be applied to diverse settings, and that there is no such thing as a conflict that cannot be settled, if not resolved.

This kind of programme can foster an exchange of ideas among people from different disciplines and institutions, as well as provide a healthy balance between theory and practice. Some of the dangers are a tendency toward superficiality once common areas are recognized, along with the possible development of a group ideology. There are also drawbacks with being located within a particular academic institution, namely a fair number of financial and administrative nightmares.

But I think that we should also look beyond institutions such as the Programme on Negotiation and try to understand what formal and informal mechanisms for the study of disputes exist around the world. By developing an international network of people who are either practising dispute settlement or are in institutions where negotiation is taught, we can begin to learn more systematically about negotiation and dispute settlement around the world.

THE INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COMBINED CAMPUSES

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The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation is an interdisciplinary Multicampus Research Unit of the University of California. The Regents of the University of California formally established the Institute in June of 1983.

The focus of the Institute's programme is two-fold. It is concerned with conflict situations which are sufficiently severe so as to threaten escalation into a large-scale war, and with various forms of international cooperation to meet problems which threaten world peace. The main, but not exclusive, emphasis will be on threats and avoidance of nuclear war. The Institute's programmes focus on the causes of such conflicts as well as the ideas, institutions, policies, and mechanisms relevant for eliminating, reducing, or managing conflicts that might lead to global war.

The mission of the Institute is to enhance the capability of the university to contribute to international security and cooperation by promoting and sponsoring the kinds of activities which can best be carried out by a university. First and foremost, it makes possible the exploration of ideas and the teaching of subjects not now adequately represented in the university's programme.

The Institute wants to involve the University more deeply and broadly in a discussion of these questions. The Institute sponsors research programmes, conferences, and graduate students through fellowships. By stipulating that these various activities have to fit within the structure and requirements of the regular departments of the University, we have tried to avoid the problems encountered by most inter-disciplinary studies programmes.

About half of the people involved in research at the Institute come from the fields of political science or international relations, and the other half come from anywhere from physics to religion. We welcome proposals from anyone: peace researchers, strategic analysts, people who believe in non-violence, people who believe in peace through strength. Two of our political science students are currently studying nuclear proliferation, one in Brazil, one in India and Pakistan. A sociology student is writing a thesis on the history of decision making in the '50's. We are also sending some of our graduate students to other institutes, in Oslo, Stockholm, London, Paris, Rome, for example. We also run an intensive summer teaching seminar for people who teach courses such as Modern American History, Modern Europe, or East-West relations. We usually invite about 30 people to these seminars, half from California, half from elsewhere, and our lecturers range from government officials, past and present, to peace activists and academics. We sponsor individual seminars on the various campuses during the year, during which we try to get people in each discipline to tell us how they can, through teaching and research in their own discipline, contribute to reaching our goal, the better understanding of large scale conflict necessary to avoid nuclear war.



Professor Herbert York.

PLENARY SESSION II: DO PEOPLE CREATE ALTERNATIVES?

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INTERNATIONAL RECONCILIATION: ITS LIMITS AND MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES

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The idea of International Reconciliation is not new. For centuries many people have hoped that through trade and economic contacts states would recognize that peace was to everyone's advantage and that war was not a sensible option. Unfortunately, others have had in mind a very different type of reconciliation, one whereby a new type of world order is brought about through coercion. I think that today's world has elements of both trends, co-existing in an uneasy tension.

At the global level the scene is dominated of course by the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, characterised by a rough parity in military strength and nuclear deterrence. Through this nuclear stand-off we have had 40 years of unprecedented peace between the two super-powers; this will probably continue for at least the next 40 years.

The Soviet Union's international stature depends above all on military force, and it is unlikely that a tightly controlled society which depends on repression at home and the use of force abroad will change of its own will. The challenge for those who want to sustain peace is therefore to find ways to limit the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

During the post-World War II era of decolonisation, conflict has been much more prevalent at the regional level, whether in the Middle East, Southern Africa, Central America or South West Asia. Many countries are becoming more efficient at the art of war, and the most frightening spectre in the next decade is probably the proliferation of a capability for advanced conventional and chemical warfare, as has already happened in the Iran-Iraq war. While the Third World has increasing capabilities for destruction, no advance is being made toward political reconciliation.

The state of affairs both at the global and the regional levels suggests a policy of considerable caution and a modest agenda, namely to try not so much to solve conflicts as to manage them and keep them from expanding. There are ways of building confidence among different states through economic and social connections and political dialogue. I'd like to suggest that Peace Researchers should focus on these at the regional level rather than concentrate on the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, for a number of reasons.

The immediate danger to the livelihood and welfare of most people is not a nuclear war but regional conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Cambodia or Eritria. Conflicts such as these are also the most likely catalyst to a nuclear war between the super-powers. As someone whose background is in international relations rather than Peace Studies, I would also like to say that I think deterrence has worked quite well. It has prevented both nuclear and conventional war in Europe. There is no doubt that deterrence is undergoing change and even eroding, both because of the growing offensive capabilities of each side to threaten the retaliatory power of the other side, and because the concept of mutual assured destruction is being challenged by new technologies. Still, if it is easy to talk about an alternative world where nuclear weapons don't exist or where there is only defence, it is difficult to imagine how to get from here to there.

Unlike many of you, I do not think that tension comes from the existence of nuclear weapons but rather from the state of political relationships. The key to making the use of nuclear weapons less likely is therefore to try to improve the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. I also think that calling weapons "annihilators", as someone suggested during this Conference, only serves to alienate audiences and isolate Peace Reserchers. I've already mentioned that they have in fact preserved the peace for the last 40 years, so why not call them "preservers"? I don't find emotive terminology helpful. Can humans make a difference in International Reconciliation? I think humans can make a difference inside or outside of governments, either in groups or individually. Some of the prerequisites I would argue that are needed to make a difference are a heavy

dose of realism and caution, as well as modesty. Many people in the Peace Movement take themselves out of the debate by being too ambitious and, while that is both understandable and laudable, it may also be self-defeating. Finally, I'd like to suggest there should be more dialogue between peace researchers and people like myself who are perhaps more traditional. I believe we do have certain interests in common and we can perhaps learn from one another.

THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS PEACE COMMISSION

LEON STUBBINGS

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Although many people in Western countries associate the Red Cross with blood transfusions, the image of the Red Cross in developing countries is quite different. Whatever the national programme may be in a given country, the Red Cross knows more than anyone else about the suffering and misery caused by war. No one could wish more fervently the end to wars and to the arms race. Nonetheless the Red Cross has kept separate from the Peace Movement, since complete neutrality has meant acceptance of the Red Cross by almost every government in the world.

The Red Cross is dedicated to helping the victims of armed conflict whatever their race, nationality, politics or religion. Its fundamental task is to prevent and alleviate human suffering, protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings. It also plays an important part in disseminating to the population, especially to youth, the spirit of mutual understanding and friendship among all peoples, thus promoting lasting peace.

The Red Cross does not view peace simply as the absence of war, but rather as a dynamic process of cooperation among all states and peoples, founded on freedom, independence, national sovereignty, equality, respect for human rights, and an equitable distribution of resources. The First World Red Cross Conference, held in Belgrade in 1975 concluded with the drafting of a Programme of Action of the Red Cross as a Factor of Peace. The Preamble to the Programme, in which the above definition of peace appears, stresses that the Red Cross must make constant efforts to safeguard and strengthen peace, and to combat forces violating or threatening peace. The Programme develops further the themes already within the framework of Red Cross: legal protection and relief to war victims, the need to broaden international humanitarian law, and to strengthen the application and dissemination of such law. It also stresses the need for peace education and training, and for development activities, which the Red Cross believes are preconditions to international peace.

THE POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

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Citizen diplomacy (CD) is the conscious effort to affect the course of international events by people outside the formal institutions which traditionally govern international relations. Citizen diplomats (CDs) see themselves as members of the community of human beings, far beyond than any one nation. They are convinced that people have the ability to solve their own problems, without overwhelming intervention by institutions. They believe that psychological, cultural, economic and spiritual factors are interrelated and therefore susceptible to intervention at any level. They believe in the interdependence of all facets of human personalities as much as in global interdependence.

It is not possible to exercise CD unless the society at least does not impede contact between its citizens and those of other countries. We have in the United States the right combination of ingredients for CD to flourish: a multi-partite concept of public power, policy making and self-government, combined with the modern technology of travel and communication.

CDs take a variety of positions towards the government, ranging from a private, behind the scenes, approach, to a public relations orientation seeking the greatest visibility. Some deal directly with members of the foreign government while others meet their counterparts in professional or avocational areas. Views about policies of their own government also vary, going from explicit opposition, to the idea that CD supplements or even complements government action. Most CDs are happy to let the government deal with foreign policy while they focus on misperceptions and fears, and try to find in common concerns a basis for cooperative action.

CD in the Soviet Union has had to take the form of a dialogue with foreign citizen groups which are government dominated, since there can be no truly private initiatives coming from within the Soviet Union. CDs have been quite successful because official Soviet Union organisations have few regular channels for contact with their US counterparts. Even in the

centralised structure of the Soviet Union, some high level individuals exercise significant freedom, and dialogue with them can produce a mutually agreed understanding of the long-term interests of both societies.

While American society places more importance on content than on context, the Soviets spend a good deal of time getting to know the people they deal with and have a long-term perspective about developing solutions to problems. Another difference between the two societies is that the US dehumanisation of the Soviets is much greater than the reverse, and the Soviet citizen seems better able to dissociate American citizens from official US policies. The far greater number of Americans visiting the Soviet Union than the reverse is yet another imbalance. Some of these asymmetrical features mean that CDs have to design activities which can receive at least official acquiescence. Their main objective is to contact people who want to bring about a change in the nature of the relationship between the two countries but do not challenge the existing structure of Soviet society.

Despite all the obstacles, CDs have had a part in the movement toward official dialogue. Private initiatives have brought members of the US Congress together with senior Soviet officials, and many personal connections have been made between significant people, leading to revised perceptions on both sides. Probably the most important contribution of CDs has been the maintenance of multiple communication channels during a period of cold relations.

There is still room for improvement in CD. CDs need a broader knowledge of the issues, the people and the organisations they work with. Many have little background in the history of the Soviet Union or the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. A greater understanding of the actual circumstances in the Soviet Union is also necessary before projects are designed. Simply trying to sell oneself goes against the spirit of true collaboration and weakens the effort in the long run. Americans must realise that institutional norms and procedures in the Soviet Union are not all that different from American bureaucracy, just more so. More sharing of information among CDs would prevent duplication of effort and overutilisation of a limited number of Soviet contacts. Finally, although many CDs tend to simply ignore their government, better communication with officials could be constructive. One of the best ways in which CDs can improve their effectiveness is to develop a better understanding of their own motives and values, and of how their vision of the world affects their interaction with their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

PLENARY SESSION III: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

CHAIRPERSON: PAUL VON WARD
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THE DIPLOMACY OF DIALOGUE: DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

RODNEY GATES
*New Zealand High Commissioner to
Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu
New Zealand High Commission
P.O. Box 1378
Suva Fiji*

One of the recent products of international cooperation and dialogue is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The dilemma of the South Pacific is to protect our region not only from unfriendly designs but also from the side effects of international disputes. Our motivation is that our region is generally peaceful and stable. It is a beautiful place to live. The techniques at our disposal are modest: we can try to persuade through reasoned argument. We cannot eliminate nuclear weapons and we cannot protect ourselves from their effects. Still we will be making progress if we can convince the nuclear states that we do not want nuclear weapons on our territories, or nuclear devices tested in our neighbourhood, or nuclear wastes dumped in our seas. At the same time we commit ourselves never to use nuclear weapons or have others use them on our behalf.

The idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was the focus of diplomatic efforts in the early '70's. It was taken up by the South Pacific Forum in Tuvalu in 1984, which led to the approval of a draft treaty by Forum leaders at Rarotonga in August 1985. The Treaty of Rarotonga has so far been signed by ten Forum members. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone reflects the concern of countries in the region to do something practical to signal their abhorrence of nuclear weapons and anxiety about the ecological consequences of nuclear contamination. Some of the impetus comes from anger and frustration at France's intransigence in persisting with its nuclear testing at Mururoa in defiance of the unanimous opposition of the countries in the region. The Free Zone also embodies the determination of South Pacific countries to protect the region from Great Power rivalry and confrontation, with its associated nuclear competition.

The Treaty establishes a vast zone, extending from the west coast of Australia across to eastern Polynesia, where it meets the boundary of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. From the equator in the north it extends down to 60 degrees south where it borders on the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty, which establishes the entire southern continent as a completely demilitarised zone. A comprehensive control system has been set up to verify compliance with the Treaty, as well as mechanisms to investigate complaints about compliance. In addition to the Treaty there are three Protocols, through which the five nuclear weapon states would agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any country or territory in the zone nor to test nuclear explosive devices there.

In symbolic terms the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is a powerful and unequivocal regional statement that nuclear weapons have no place in the South Pacific. In practical terms, once all Forum members commit themselves to the Treaty, the possibility that nuclear weapons might be stationed in the region will be legally precluded. There is also reason to hope that all five nuclear weapon states will agree to ratify Protocol II, thereby giving a formal commitment that they will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any Forum member state. Finally the Treaty will provide new and powerful reasons to persuade France to cease nuclear testing in the region, especially if all the other nuclear weapon states ratify the anti-testing Protocol III.

We are realists and we know that this regional initiative will not spare us the consequences of nuclear war, but it will strengthen existing global and regional measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Some, not those involved in the dialogue, have suggested that the Treaty is anti-French or anti-American, which we strongly deny. The Treaty is narrowly focused, it is a polite but firm request from the South Pacific nations to five great powers in the Northern Hemisphere not to store or test or use nuclear weapons in the South Pacific region. The Treaty is anti-nuclear and pro-peace. Its existence shows that the parties involved in negotiation believe that their own interests — political or economic — are best served through cooperation. Because we practice what we preach, regional cooperation is working in the Pacific.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: MAKING AN INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD MORE STABLE AND SECURE

IVAN IVANOV,
*Deputy Director
Institute of World Economy and
International Relations
Soviet Academy of Sciences
Moscow, U.S.S.R*

The United Nations proclaimed 1986 the International Year of Peace, and we congratulate the University of the South Pacific and our host country, Fiji, for convening this Conference in these very first days of 1986.

The participants to this Conference are not simply globe-trotters in search of fun or the exotic. Many of us are advisors to our governments or academics, and we have come to find out, in particular, how people here feel about the newly established Nuclear Free Zone in this region. In spite of differing opinions, we are confident that we can promote international cooperation and seek ways to make our inter-dependent world more stable and secure. Several months ago the Soviet Union put forward an initiative to strengthen peace and security in Asia and the Pacific. Our Foreign Minister has already had consultations in India, Australia, and New Zealand, and will soon go to China and perhaps Japan. We are open to proposals in the areas of diplomacy, trade, scientific exchange, and the development of ocean resources.

We believe strongly in the spirit of Geneva and we are confident that the arms race, which is unfortunately no longer a monopoly of the Soviet Union and the United States, will be put under effective control. We also believe that regional conflicts in Asia can be resolved through the United Nations, dependent on the good will of the Asian nations involved.

I would like to stress that we, in the Soviet Union, need a peaceful environment to implement our plans, which are very ambitious and call for doubling our nation's income by the year 2000. I am sure that all states need peace to cope with their own internal problems and disarmament would be one stop on the road to peace in the world.

PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

JI CHAOZHU

Ambassador

The People's Republic of China

Embassy of The People's Republic of China

147 Queen Elizabeth Dr.

Suva, Fiji.

The United Nations Year of Peace is warmly welcomed by the People's Republic of China. This international conference contributes to strengthening the principles of the Charter of the UN, which reflect the common aspirations of mankind — to build a world of peace and prosperity on the basis of equality and cooperation.

But as we look around the world we see war, the expanding arms race and the threat of a nuclear holocaust. The problems of today's world come down to two global strategic issues, the East-West issue of peace, and the North-South issue of development. The arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States is posing a serious threat to world peace. China strongly advocates the elimination of nuclear weapons and hopes that, thanks to the recent summit meeting, the two countries will agree to drastic cuts in their nuclear arsenals, a prerequisite to a general nuclear disarmament.

The essence of the North-South issue is the widening of the economic gap between developing and developed countries. The developed countries cannot expect continued economic growth based on the continued poverty of the developing countries. Without the growth of the developing world, the developed countries will not be able to preserve their own economic interests.

Maintenance of world peace and economic development are interrelated. Peace is essential to development, while economic cooperation and prosperity increases the chances for peace and stability. China, a developing socialist country, is trying to lift herself from poverty and to catch up with the developed countries. To this end we need peace and the cooperation of all nations, and the Chinese government pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China has sought to develop relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for

sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. China stands for the peaceful settlement of international disputes through negotiation. A good example of the value of negotiation is the "one-country, two systems" solution to the Hong Kong question.

Strengthening cooperation with the other Third World countries is the cornerstone of China's diplomacy. We support collective self-reliance and the efforts of the South Pacific Forum for increased cooperation among South Pacific countries. We believe that South-South cooperation and North-South cooperation are not contradictory but rather complementary.



*Dr Paul von Ward, Mrs Marion Lathrop and
Dr Donald Lathrop.*

THE FINAL PLENARY SESSION

MODERATOR: PAUL VON WARD
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Working groups convened at the end of the seven-day conference to review the participants' perceptions of impact, knowledge and concerns shared, creative solutions, desired long-term results, and future alternatives. Nine working groups were convened around the various substantive general topics developed during the formal sessions. Each group was asked to report its deliberations to a plenary session.

At the reporting plenary session it was agreed by participants that each working group's report would be received without plenary comment or action and that their incorporation into this compendium would not necessarily indicate either agreement with or support for all the specific items in each report. Without formal action on each report, the plenary nevertheless agreed that it would be useful, for the participants' personal activities and for the planners of such future conferences, to have the working groups' material made available to all participants.

As an exception to the above described procedure, there was a general consensus of the plenary session to recommend to the United Nations that it consider 1986 to be the first year of a Decade of Peace, analogous to the Decade for Women. It was considered that such an act, the declaration of a decade-of-peace period for special observances by governments and non-government organisations, would highlight the need for continuing concerted action and would encourage a variety of positive initiatives. The specific proposal was as follows:

To recommend to the United Nations that it consider 1986 to be the first year of a Decade of Peace, analogous to the Decade of Women. It was considered that such an act, the declaration of a decade-of-peace period for special observances by governments and non-governmental organizations would highlight the need for continuing concerted action and would encourage a variety of positive initiatives.

Following are summary notes from each working group, with the working group chairperson indicated.

CHARGE FOR CHAIRPERSONS

In order to report back to the final overview session, the chairpersons should explore the creative payoffs (positive or negative) with the members of the groups. What knowledge and concerns have been shared? What solutions created? What would we like to see happen as a result of the Conference? What alternatives have been created (and so on). A recorder should be appointed.

TOPIC I: "THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION"
(Paul Tacon)

REACTIONS TO CONFERENCE

1. Good chance to get together and exchange ideas with those of other disciplines. Subjective impressions were that people did take advantage of the opportunities to interact with others — perhaps more so than at many conferences.
2. Regret was expressed that many countries and many areas of the world were not represented by observers and participants.
3. The generalised nature of the conference, where few specific goals were provided, was felt to have both positive and negative features.
4. It was agreed that if a second conference is held, it should come after an appropriate interval, with more specific foci and at a different location.

IMPORTANT THEMES DISCUSSED

1. There is a great contrast between the adversarial world view and the inter-dependent community world view and each proposes quite different solutions to world problems. The important question arises as to whether the gap between these two views can be bridged.
2. Considerable emphasis should be placed on non-violent solutions to conflicts. There were many papers in this area and the solutions they offered need to be looked at extensively and put into practice. Various examples, were discussed at some length: for example, mutual hostage exchange, and increased interaction.
3. It was felt that there exists a need to try all alternatives — to move beyond conventional wisdom, if you like.

TOPIC II: "NATIONALISM VS. THE WORLD AS EXPANDED COMMUNITY"
(Donald Schurman)

Future conferences should deal with the local problems and they should be included during the planning stage.

The Group perceived a difference between scholarly and activist perceptions.

- Some thought the Conference should be directed towards forming an international peace movement.
- Some thought there should be workshops to help organise movements. (Local focus again.)
- Some thought there was a lack of analysis (as opposed to fact-finding on the part of peace activists).
- The great divergences in methods and aims of peace activists (even in Fiji) were remarked upon. For instance, there was a great divergence in reaction to the nuclear submarine in Suva harbour.

Regarding nationalism: It was noted that not many papers addressed the subject directly. Two exceptions were Northern Ireland — which the group perceived as destructive nationalism — and New Zealand, perceived as positive protection against the powerful interests of other nations.

The Group recommended that the participants to the Conference write to the *Fiji Times* or *Sun* during the year, concerning their impressions of the Conference or about their contributions to it.

The Group strongly endorsed the idea of globalising teacher education as presented by the Group from Indiana.

Some individual suggestions received from individuals within the Group were:

- (a) Develop a new way of thinking. The realisation of inevitable destruction might prompt us to this way of thinking. We need a conference of *all* world political leaders — with time for full discussion of their policies.
- (b) Need for more *analysis* of arms race, to see how many were fully aware of the dangers and to get at the causes rather than the destructive arms themselves.
- (c) Need for a World House of Representatives to fill the gap which presently exists for a structure or a world forum.
- (d) Perhaps peace activists in Nuclear Countries should refuse to pay taxes.
- (e) Proposal for a "dream programme" for peace; people already correspond with others who do it.

TOPIC III: "ECONOMIC FACTORS IN RELATION TO CONFLICT"
(Bruce Cooperstein)

- A. In order to affect the behaviour of governments, corporations, and other groups as regards war and armed conflict, we must work to:
1. **INCREASE** the costs and decrease the benefits of war and preparation of war.
 2. **INCREASE** the benefits of peace and alternative non-military methods of conflict resolution.
- B. Specific methods of promoting peace must be judged against those criteria. Some general methods are listed here:
1. **ORGANIZE** in our own countries and political movements pressure groups to implement peaceful government policies.
 2. **CONDUCT** peace research that speaks directly to the economic and resource implications of arms production.
 3. **ATTEMPT** to change the consciousness of people, and develop educational methods to more fully inform populations about the social, economic and resource implications of arms production.
 4. **SEEK** to increase trade and economic exchange between potential combatants.
 5. **WORK** to increase socially selective spending and do everything we can through our groups and pressure organizations to decrease military expenditures.
 6. **BEGIN** the reconceptualization of changing factories from war efforts to peace production. Some examples: (a) Sheffield in England; (b) the notification by the Berkeley City Council to begin a city-wide programme.
 7. **CHALLENGE** in whatever way possible traditionally accepted undertakings on "national interest", when such interest does not in any way reflect the well-being of the population being spoken for. One example is the recent initiative of the government of New Zealand in establishing a public input for defense and security requirements. Individuals and groups can present alternative views on government policy. The summary of such submissions and the results of the national poll conducted on this issue will then be made available by the government. We felt that this was a good case study of a practical way we would go about implementing some of these concerns.

TOPIC IV: "ORGANISED CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS"
(Jan Prawitz)

This group combined with Group V.

TOPIC V: "CONFRONTING THE NUCLEAR CRISIS"
(Anita Kemp)

The following are conclusions and recommendations of the working group.

1. We recognise that countries vary in the way they perceive the priorities of peace and conflict resolution. This does not mean that the nuclear threat is not of utmost seriousness but regional conflicts must be solved to prevent their escalation to global conflict.
2. There is therefore an urgent need for cross-cultural communication not only between the USSR and the USA but also between other countries with strong negative images of each other, for example Libya and the USA.
3. We urge that communication be required in such cases and more plans be made which translate cultures to each other.
4. We suggest that peace workers in each country lobby hard for a very high content of anthropological films designed to improve communication between nations where misunderstanding and war exist.
5. Similarly we suggest that educational institutions in all countries place high priority for long term security on cross-cultural understanding. We think that this is better than peace studies which can produce feelings of hopelessness and disempowerment if mishandled.
6. There should be a rapid increase in international teams of research and scientific exchange comprising workers from at least four or five countries to counteract the tendency for research to contain ethnocentric attitudes.
7. In our sessions we often concluded that the creation of any enemy or "the other" was a necessary prerequisite to war and that vastly improved communication was necessary.
8. We propose among the improvements that could be adopted via the United Nations and national Governments were:
 - (a) International teleconferencing along the Gelforf lines enabling peoples to talk to each other on a global scale through IYP and beyond.
 - (b) There should be increased teleconferencing of people on either side of conflicts. Premier Gorbachev and President

- Reagan could be urged to communicate on a weekly basis.
- (c) There should be organised twinning of East-West politicians using audiovisual and modern communications.
 - (d) Cities, towns, districts, schools and other institutions could be twinned to exchange information about each other. Such twinning sometimes already exists but should be increased.
 - (e) There should be as much use made as possible of modern networks of information exchange between peoples of all nations.
 - (f) Peace institutions and movements should strengthen their connections and communications systems using modern technology.
 - (g) There should be a massive increase in the amount of student exchange and citizen diplomacy on either side of the East-West divide and between other countries at loggerheads. We believe that this kind of exchange should include large numbers of young people because it would help create hope in the world.
9. Recognizing the work of IPPNW we note the importance of empowerment in relation to children and young people.
 10. We argue that if other factors of destruction like the nerve gas and germ warfare stockpiles, toxic nuclear and industrial waste dumps, and the destruction of the ozone layer are added to the effects of nuclear winter then all life would end on this planet even from a unilateral strike. Following on from this is a total rejection of nuclear weapons not only on practical grounds but on the grounds that they are fundamentally immoral.
 11. We state that the fact that so many children feel that they have no future is an intolerable burden to them. We argue that this value should be promoted actively in the IYP. In order to empower children parents should be encouraged to work for peace and not ignore peace issues. We think that nuclear war is the ultimate parenting issue. We believe that it should be a right of children to live without this fear. Consciousness raising of these issues should be an important activity for the UN and other like organizations.
 12. In order to demonstrate to our children a higher sense of the value of life than the threat of genocide we suggest that we actively lobby for our local groups and government to offer substantial peace prizes for children.
 13. Finally we urge that more research be concluded on children's perception of the future.

TOPIC VI: "HUMAN RIGHTS"
(Betty Feith)

We took time to remind ourselves and each other, of the seriousness of the human rights concerns, some of which had been presented in papers here, and some still to be presented. We acknowledged the difficulty of defining human rights — from the rights of starving children in Africa, to those of refugee families forced across national borders. We recognised that the concept of Human Rights was not handed down from Heaven on Tablets of Stone, but has to be defined by consensus, and that a tension exists between the rights of the individual and those of the larger community. We also, however, reminded each other that our member nations *have* given formal agreement to United Nations statements on Human Rights.

So we finally produced a report in three parts — an Affirmation on Human Rights which we now present to the body of the Conference here, a list of suggestions about possible improvements in procedures for future conferences, and some recommendations for future action.

A. THE AFFIRMATION

"We appeal to the international community of our whole world, to condemn all parties who insist on attempts to solve international conflicts through armed force. In particular, we call for continued pressure against these parties who violate United Nations' Resolutions and Agreements, covering the protection of refugees; the principles of international law, and the 1949 Geneva Convention concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. Violations of that convention such as killings and torture of prisoners must be deplored. We also appeal to the international community to apply pressure for the cessation of practices forcing children to war across national boundaries."

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE ACTION

1. That conference participants be informed of other UN conferences for the Year of Peace — possibly through NGOs.
2. That the United Nations be requested to have the UN International Year of Peace 1986, declared the first year of a Decade of Peace — with the recently concluded Decade for Women as a Model. The UN should be asked to commit itself to a review process involving conferences in 1991 and 1996. At these review conferences, governments and NGOs would *assess progress* towards achieving *Disarmament, International Security, and Cooperation*. This Conference theme **MUST NEVER BE FORGOTTEN.**

TOPIC VII: "PEACE STUDIES AND RESEARCH"
(David Aspin)

We spent some time discussing our impressions of the conference. We felt that it had been a valuable and interesting occasion, the chief utility of which, for our purposes, had been in the way in which it had both sensitised us to the importance of some other issues and perspectives having a direct or proximate bearing on our own research and also informed us of other important work going on elsewhere in the world that was either in confirmation of work we were ourselves already doing or else complementary to it. It had also enabled us to make direct personal connections with other scholars and enjoy the benefit of critical but creative interchanges with them.

At the same time we felt there had been much in the way that this particular conference had been organised that militated against many of our own concerns for research: the lack of any principle of coherence and overarching connectedness was felt to be chief of these, though we agreed that this probably was inevitable, given the wide-ranging nature of topics connoted by the title. This inevitably tended towards diffuseness and some superficiality — a phenomenon that was not diminished by the half-hour slots into which papers had to be compressed. We felt the lack of time to get deeply into an issue; in this respect some present thought that the theoretical level of the whole conference had been too low — though others believed that, on the contrary, it had been too high. We should have liked to have had a pre-conference circulation of the papers in our particular section and then rather longer to discuss them and in depth. Alternatively, we thought that a good way for research interests to manifest themselves and be developed would be simply to timetable a list of topics under some particular chairperson and have these running simultaneously, with no papers prepared or set agenda.

One thing on which we all agreed: the conference had been enormously useful in the way in which it had made us appreciate how multi-disciplinary the topic of Peace Studies Research was and also what a wide-ranging set of problems, topics and issues arose from it and were contiguous to it. We appreciated that some of our own perspectives and approaches to these topics were narrow and perhaps even blinkered; we felt the need to involve ourselves in a much wider range of reading and research, over fields previously diverse from our own. While the importance of philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics and politics had always been appreciated, we had much greater reason now to look seriously at other areas such as anthropology, systems theory, policy studies and the like. Certainly human geography and demography must figure more widely in our concerns.

We were also conscious of the need for a much wider exchange of research ideas and thinking, publications, and some staff and maybe even student exchange, that would we hope promote the spread of scholarly

work and thinking in this area.

We thought it important to distinguish between three themes: Peace Education, Peace Studies and Peace Research. We saw the former in terms of its function on the curricula of schools, both secondary and primary and in this respect we came to the conclusion that, provided our initial analysis of "Education" had been on the right lines (though we noted that people disagreed radically on what these were!), everything that we tended to do in schools would promote Peace Education. That was an ultimate goal, however; in the meantime there is still very much to do to get students and teachers thinking seriously about peace a range of paradigms, and that arise from a point made in the Keynote address by Professor Alfven: the importance of the development of a vocabulary and appropriate mode of discourse in which all these interests could be explored and appraised.

At this point we came to the articulation of conclusions, and they are set out below. The session ended after two hours and twenty minutes of intensive, hard-working but, we all felt, extremely productive discussion — and one that we also felt could be a model for future seminars of this kind devoted to these subjects.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The group concluded that the cause of Peace Studies Research would be materially advanced if there were to be a centre for Peace Studies Research located somewhere in this region. They would be glad to support any initiatives to promote this emanating from USP or some other institution of like standing but emphasize that any such initiatives should come from the institution itself in the first instance. Please see below a resolution to that effect.
2. The group would like to encourage all those interested in Peace Studies Research to become members of International Peace Research Association (IPRA) so that they could attend its conferences and receive its journals, newsletters, etc., and in that way keep in touch both with each other and with developments in the subject area.
3. They would in any case be glad to support and pay for a regular newsletter operating from and between members and attenders of this Conference, to circulate news of developments and a regular information update.
4. They would hope that another conference can be organised at some future date, arising from interests and concerns articulated and shared at this conference. They recommend, however, that such a conference be restricted to the region of the Pacific and Oceania and seek to draw largely upon local representation and membership; and that such a conference be focussed upon a specific theme, such as, for example, population growth and food

- supply, nuclearisation and militarisation of the Pacific, great power domination and hegemony, or the economic imperatives of multi-national companies and their regional consequences.
5. They would also support future meeting devoted to sharing research interests and the broadening of theoretical perspectives generally.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION FOR PLENARY SESSION

"That Conference participants both in the region and outside the region extend an offer of support, should a request be submitted to us from the USP or similar representative body, for the establishment of a Centre for Peace Studies to serve this region in the Pacific. We invite you to respond to requests for support by offering an exchange of ideas and data resources, and call for a list of names of people and organisations willing to share in such an exchange." (Not voted on by plenary.)

TOPIC VIII: "SUPER POWER RIVALRY IN THE PACIFIC BASIN" (Alan Miller)

This group really foundered on two different rocks: one was in anticipation of the fact that the alternative group would probably be dealing with the issues, and secondly the general concern on the part of the two and one half of us who were present, apart from ideological issues, was that there is not much super-power conflict in the South Pacific, and that there is one power that is manifest everywhere in the area. So we decided that there is a concern that was really forced upon us. There is a nuclear-powered submarine in Suva Harbour today and for the next two days. We would like to make a statement about that.

We condemn the decision by the United States Government to send the nuclear powered submarine, USS Portsmouth, to Fiji during the conference period as inappropriate and offensive, and urged conference delegates to condemn this violation of the spirit of the Pacific through letters, submissions and other demonstrations.

TOPIC IX: ALTERNATIVES (Margaret Bearlin)

This group was made up of a small part of those people who had taken part in the supplementary discussions and workshops which some people have named the "alternative programme". Because of the visit of the nuclear powered and (probably) nuclear-armed submarine "USS Portsmouth" to Suva, many of those who have been involved in these workshops were not with us because they are at this moment taking part in various

demonstrations around Suva.

We shared our response to the conference and wish to thank the organisers for making possible the extension of the conference to a wider range of participants and activities. We considered these activities a natural extension of the Conference and not in any sense an alternative conference.

Concern was expressed about: the importance of the participation of people from the Pacific Region and of local people in particular; opportunities for sharing ideas and establishing networks; the lack of peacefulness in some interactions in the conference; the importance of participatory models in structuring conferences; the richness in meeting when real dialogue was possible in small groups or with individuals.

Groups of people, within the larger group of people who took part in these supplementary workshops, had prepared statements which we considered and which are presented by us to the conference as a whole. They deal with threats to peace within the Pacific Region, with gender and peace and with principles for organising future conferences on peace studies and conflict resolutions.

A. STATEMENT ON THREATS TO PEACE WITHIN THE PACIFIC REGION
(Not approved by whole working group.)

This conference should be concerned with:

1. The increasing danger of global nuclear war which threatens all life on earth.
2. The increasing militarisation of the Pacific including the presence of communication and other facilities related to nuclear war strategy.
3. The presence in territorial waters of any nation, of nuclear weapons-carrying and nuclear-powered ships from other countries.
4. Testing of nuclear devices in the Pacific by the French and the use of the Pacific as a missile range by the nuclear powers.
5. Continued presence of colonial and neo-colonial powers in the Pacific.
6. Disposal of Nuclear Wastes in the Pacific Region.

Considers that:

- (a) All nations should give urgency to putting into effect United Nations resolutions calling for disarmament and arms control.
- (b) The super power conventional and nuclear military presence in the Pacific region be withdrawn.
- (c) Encouragement be given to those Pacific nations that have not already done so, to prohibit port visits by nuclear armed and powered warships.

- (d) The utmost pressure should be exerted on the French Government to cease nuclear testing in the Pacific and that a prohibition of such testing should be clearly reflected in the pending South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) Treaty.
- (e) Indonesian occupation of East Timor and West Papua, French control of Kanaky and Tahiti, and US domination of Micronesia should be ended forthwith.
- (f) There should be a total ban on the dumping of nuclear wastes in the Pacific Region.

B. STATEMENT ON NEW CALEDONIA

(Note: This statement was received by the Group, but due to time constraints was not able to be discussed nor voted upon.)

Given the UN 1960 Declaration on Human Rights, self-determination and Independence for people in colonial territories (based on Resolution 1514, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and *given* that 85% of Kanak people at the last regional election in Caledonia voted in support of independence:

1. *We assert that* New Caledonia must again be placed on the United Nations' list of countries for decolonisation, and
2. *We urge* the South Pacific Forum to take the above proposal to the UN Special Committee of 24 before the French General Elections in March 1986.
3. *We further assert that* there can no longer be any rational justification for the retention of the French military base in Noumea and it should be removed forthwith, and that Noumea must remain a nuclear-free zone.

C. GENDER AND PEACE

(Note: This motion presented by a group of women within this alternative group was endorsed by the group as a whole for presentation to the plenary session.)

We, as women participants in this First International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies, affirm our belief in the capacity of human beings to solve conflict non-violently, and to establish relationships of trust and respect for one another.

To this end, we invite all women and men to eliminate those hierarchical and authoritarian values within themselves, and within their societies, which have generated inequality and violence, and

which threaten to culminate, through increasing militarism, and an escalating arms race, in nuclear annihilation.

We call on all organisers of all conferences being held in the International Year of Peace (related to its theme)

1. To address the issue of *gender and peace* and further recommend the holding of conferences specifically addressing this issue.
2. To *encourage* the inclusion of *gender analysis* in all papers and workshops presented in these conferences.
3. To base the organisation of these conferences on *inclusive* principles so as to maximise openness and participation of the goals of IYP. Special attention should be paid to:
 - (a) involvement of community groups in planning;
 - (b) wide dissemination of information;
 - (c) access to child care;
 - (d) appropriately staggered fees to enable all interested people to attend;
 - (e) continuous provision of non-programmed space to facilitate ongoing discussion;
 - (f) maintenance of awareness of gender balance in selecting people to present ideas;
 - (g) methods of presentation which made possible maximum participation and sharing of ideas.

D. PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANISING FUTURE CONFERENCES RELATING TO PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

(Note: The following suggestions were approved by the members of the working group.)

After an assessment of their experience at this conference, participants concluded that a number of principles might be useful for the planners of future international peace conference. These principles highlight the importance of the *process which facilitates the interaction between participants*, and draw more fully on the real and valuable experiences and wisdom of all participants.

PRE-CONFERENCE PLANNING

- * The pre-conference planning process should involve consultation with as wide a range of interested individuals and organisations as is practical.
- * All possible provision should be made to make the conference open to all sectors of the global society.
- * The conference structure should have sufficient flexibility that it

can accommodate the needs of its participants.

CONFERENCE PROCESSES

- * There should be a preliminary meeting at which the pre-arranged form of the conference, and the facilities available, are described, and at which participants can discuss their objectives and how best they can work together to achieve them. This preliminary meeting should be followed by evaluation (perhaps daily) meetings of participants to review the progress of the conference and adjust its organisation where there is both need and possibility.
- * The conference should provide for as much variety as possible. For example, there could be provision for a wide variety of forms of interaction, such as workshops, role-plays and debate on the one hand, and dance, sport, theatre and music on the other.

CONFERENCE CONTENT

- * The Conference content should recognise the fact that the personal experiences of participants are as valuable as their information, analyses and ideas.

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Dr Stewart has written or edited five books and written 70 book chapters, journal articles and conference presentations. In particular he has edited *Pacific Profiles: Personal Experiences of 100 South Pacific Islanders* which contains growing up experiences written by students enrolled in his course in life-span Human Development. Offered in the distance education mode, this course has now been taken by 3,500 students from the eleven countries of the USP Region.

Dr Stewart edits the journals *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal* and *Psychology and Human Development: An International Journal*. These circulate around the world and have published the work of over 1,000 researchers and professionals. His biography appears in 'Who's Who in the world' and 'Who's Who in the Commonwealth'.

Dr Stewart is married and has two sons.

How can we as human beings take charge of our survival?

In the early days of 1986, the first official event of the UN International Year of Peace took place where the new day begins in the Lip Islands. Representing 28 nations, several hundred concerned people came from international bodies, Government and Private organizations, Universities, Research Institutions or as private citizens.

At this first International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies, they addressed, through dialogue and exchange of perspectives, the theme **People Create Alternatives**. They were hosted by the University of the South Pacific (USP), one of the world's most unique universities. USP is the regional university for 11 different tropical island nations whose combined territories cover an area three times the size of Europe, where there are an estimated 300 different language groups.

This book illustrates how the contributions of many perspectives and fields of study can add to the search for a clearer definition of the problems that face us, and their possible solutions.

This book symbolizes the time yet to be enlarged by visionaries who are working toward human survival.